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Digitized by tine Internet Archive 
in 2010 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/warofgreekindepeOOphil 



THE WAR OF 
GREEK INDEPENDENCE 



THE WAR OF 
GREEK INDEPENDENCE 



1821 TO 1833 



W. ALISON PHILLIPS 

liATE SCHOLAR OP MEETON COLLEGE 
AND SENIOR SCHOLAR OF ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD 



WITH MAP 



NEW YORK 
CHAKLES SCRIBNEE'S SONS 

1897 




NOV 6 1897 ) 



-^^W^ter ^ 0.,f£^' 



Copyright, 1897, bt 
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 



9^ 



TROW DIRECTORY 

PRINTING AND BOOKBINDING COMPANY 
NEW YORK 



PEEFACE 

This little book makes no pretence to be the result of 
original research, nor does it aspire to compete with 
the more elaborate works which have already ap- 
peared on the same subject. In offering it to the 
public, my aim has been to make more generally 
accessible a chapter of modern history which recent 
events have invested with a new interest ; and I am 
not without hope that the following pages may be of 
some use in helping those, who have no time or 
opportunity for an extended study of the Greek 
question, to form a clearer judgment upon the mat- 
ters at issue. 

For the materials on which this volume is based 
I am mainly indebted to Mendelssohn-Bartholdy's 

* Geschichte Griechenlands,' &c. (vols. xv. and xx. of 
C. Biedermann's * Staatengeschichte der neuesten 
Zeit '), Finlay's ' History of the Greek Revolution ' 
(2 vols. 1861), Gordon's * History of the Greek 
Revolution' (2 vols. 1832), and Prokesch-Osten's 

* Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen vom Ttirk- 
ischen Reich.' Baron von Prokesch-Osten's work is 
interesting as an elaborate and able apology for 
Prince Mettemich's Eastern policy. It is especially 



VI PREFACE 

valuable for its detailed account of the diplomatic 
developments of the Eastern Question during the ten 
years of the War of Independence ; and, of its six 
volumes, four are devoted to the publication of the 
full texts of the treaties, protocols, and diplomatic 
correspondence on which the work is based. The 
more important of the treaties and protocols will 
also be found in full in Professor Holland's 'The 
European Concert and the Eastern Question.' 

Of the other books which I have used, I will only 
refer here to M. Alfred Lemaitre's 'Musulmans et 
Chretiens: Notes sur la Guerre de I'lndependance 
Grecque ' (Paris, 1895), from which I have occasion- 
ally quoted. This little book was issued by its author 
as a counterblast to the Armenian agitation, and is in- 
tended as an apology for the Turk, and an indictment 
of the Oriental Christian. M. Lemaitre, however, 
damages a strong case by his extreme partisanship. 
The facts he gives are true enough ; but he carefully 
omits all those that would tell against his case. 
This is perhaps only repaying the more fanatical 
Philhellenes in their own coin ; but it is a method of 
controversy for which it is impossible to feel much 
sympathy. 

My hope is that, whatever fault may be justly 
found with the following pages, the charge of par- 
tisanship at least may not be proved against their 
author. 

W. Alison Phillips. 

September 1897. 



OONTEl^TS 



CHAPTEE I 

Continuity of the Hellenic race — Effect of the Ottoman con- 
quest — Function of the Orthodox Church in preserving 
Greek nationality — The Patriarch of Constantinople — 
Condition of the Greeks under the Ottoman rule — Com- 
parative prosperity of the peasants — The Armatoli and 
Klephts — Sea power of the Greeks — The naval islands — 
Treaty of Kainardji — Local liberties preserved by the 
Turks — The Phanariots — The literary movement — Re- 
vival of antique letters — Influence of Korais., .Page 1 



CHAPTER II 

The preparation — Hope of Russian support — Catherine II. — 
The Hetairia Philike — Count John Capodistrias offered 
the leadership of the Greeks — His refusal — Prince Alex- 
ander Hypsilanti chosen — Ali Pasha of Janina — His 
origin — He conquers Tepeleni — His cruelties — He aims 
at creating an Albanian kingdom — His fall Page 19 



CHAPTER III 

The rising in the Principalities — Prince Alexander Hyp- 
silanti crosses the Pruth — Cold reception by the Rou- 

vii 



Vlll CONTENTS 

manian peasants — Massacres at Galatz and Yassy — In- 
cax3acity of Hypsilanti — He marches to Bucharest — 
Heterogeneous constitution of the insurgent force — The 
Patriarch of Constantinople anathematises the revolt — 
It is denounced by the Czar — Treachery of Savas — 
Murder of Vladimiresco — Battle of Dragashan — Col- 
lapse of the revolt — Death of Georgaki — Last stand of 
the Greeks at Skuleni Page 30 



CHAPTER IV 

The rising in the Morea — Neglect of precautions by the 
Mussulmans — Activity of Greek agitators — Pappa 
Phlesas — Archbishop Germanos — The beginning of hos- 
tilities — A w^ar of extermination — Leaders of the revolt 
— Kolokotrones — Petrobey Mavromichales — First suc- 
cesses and cruelties of the Greeks — Siege of Monem- 
vasia — ^Arrival of Prince Demetrius Hypsilanti — Greek 
atrocities at Monemvasia, Vrachori, and Navarino — • 
Siege and massacre of Tripolitza — Eevolt of the islands 
— Greek successes and atrocities at sea — Admiral Mia- 
oulis — First employment of fireships by the Greeks — 
Destruction of Galaxidi by the Turks Page 44 



CHAPTER Y 

Turkish reprisals — Execution of the Patriarch of Constan- 
tinople — Eifect of the news on European opinion — Pro- 
test of Eussia — Suppression of the revolt to the north of 
Thermopylae — Anarchy in Greece — Attempts to form 
Governments — First Congress of Argos — The Constitu- 
tion of Epidaurus — Mavrocordatos elected President. 

Page 75 



CONTENTS IX 



CHAPTEE VI 



Death of Elias Mavromichales — Odysseus of Ithaka — His 
treachery before Karystos — The massacre of Chios — The 
vengeance of Ivanaris — Mahmoud's plan for the recon- 
quest of Greece — Odysseus in East Hellas — Fall of the 
Acropolis — Massacre of the Turks — Invasion of Dramali 
— The Turks at Argos — Defeat of Dramali in the pass of 
Devernaki, and at Agionori — Destruction of the Turkish 
army — Expedition of Mavrocordatos for the relief of the 
Suliots — Defeat of Peta — Advance of Omer Vrioni in 
West Hellas — First siege of Missolonghi Page 88 



CHAPTER VII 

Attitude of the Powers — Policy of Canning — Russo-Turk- 
ish war postponed — Threatened break-up of the Holy 
Alliance — Dissensions among the Greeks — Odysseus in 
East Hellas — Kolokotrones — Second National Assembly 
at Astros — Feud between the civil and military elements 
— Petrobey elected President — Kolokotrones defies the 
Assembly — Campaign of Yussuf Pasha in East Hellas — 
Cruise of Khosrew Pasha — Invasion of Western Hellas 
by Mustai Pasha — Exploit of Marko Botzares at Kar- 
penisi — Successful defence of Anatoliko — Renewal of 
civil strife — Government flies to Kranidi — First Civil War 
— Submission of Kolokotrones Page 113 



CHAPTER VIII 

Arrival of Lord Byron in Greece — Effect on European 
opinion — The first Greek loans — Byron's opinion of the 
Greeks — He goes to Missolonghi — His death — Presidency 



CONTENTS 

of Konduriottes — Eenewed dissensions — The second 
Civil War — Complete victory of the Government^ — Im- 
prisonment of Kolokotrones Page 135 



CHAPTER IX 

Sultan Mahmoud appeals to Mehemet Ali of Eg'ypt for aid 
— Insurrection in Crete — Hussein Bey pacifies Crete — 
Preparations of Mehemet Ali for the invasion of the 
Morea — Destruction of Kasos — ^Ibrahim sails to Rhodes 
— He celebrates the feast of Bairam in the Bay of Makry 
— Destruction of Psara by Khosrew^ Pasha — Turkish at- 
tack on Samos repulsed — Naval engagements of Bud- 
run — Victory of Miaoulis off Crete — Mutinous conduct 
of the Hydriot seamen — Ibrahim reaches Suda. .Page 151 



CHAPTER X 

Ibrahim lands in the Morea — Neglect of the Greeks — ^Defeat 
of the Greeks at Krommydi — Siege of Navarino — Hus- 
sein Bey captures Sphakteria — Surrender of Pylos and 
Navarino — Kolokotrones released and made commander- 
in-chief — Heroic stand of Dikaios at Maniaki — Ibrahim 
advances on Tripolitza — His check at the Mills of Lerna 
— He devastates the Morea — Desperate condition of the 
Greeks Page 170 

CHAPTER XI 

Eeshid * Kiutayeh ' invades West Hellas— He opens the 
siege of Missolonghi — State of the defences — Arrival of 
Khosrew with the Ottoman fleet — Turkish assaults re- 
pulsed — Desperate straits of the garrison — Greek fleet 
under Miaoulis defeats Khosrevc^, and relieves the tow^n 



CONTENTS Xi 

— Critical position of Reshid — Ibrahim arrives before 
Missolonghi — Miaoulis ag-ain relieves the town — Assault 
of Arab guards repulsed — Fall of Fort Vasiladi — Capitu- 
lation of Anatoliko — Repulse of Turks and Arabs from 
the islet of Klissova — Attempt of Miaoulis to revictual 
the town defeated — Sortie of the garrison — Sack of the 
town, and massacre of the inhabitants — Effect on 
Europe Page 182 



CHAPTER XII 

Reshid reduces West Hellas — He advances into Attica — 
Rule of Gouras at Athens — Capture of Athens by the 
Turks — Siege of the Acroj)olis — Karaiskakis appointed 
commander-in-chief in East Hellas — His character — De- 
feat at Chaidari — Death of Gouras — Victories of Karais- 
kakis at Arachova and Distomo — General Gordon at 
Munj^chia — ^Attack of Reshid repulsed — Arrival of 
Church and Cochrane — Siege and surrender of the mon- 
astery of St. Spiridion — Massacre of the defenders — 
Death of Karaiskakis — Defeat of the Greeks before 
Athens — Fall of the Acropolis Page 204 



CHAPTER XIII 

Fall of the Government of Konduriottes — Zaimis elected 
President — Renewal of party strife — League of Koloko- 
trones and Konduriottes against Zaimis — Sissinis elected 
as a rival President — Rival assemblies at Damala and 
iEgina — Arrival of Lord Cochrane and Sir Richard 
Church — They reconcile the factions — ^Assembly at 
Damala — Capodistrias elected President — Constitution 
of Troezene — Provisional administration formed — Mis- 
er3' of the country — Tyranny of the Klephts and Arma- 



xii CONTENTS 

toll — Piracy in the Mgean — Photomaras and Grivas in 
Nauplia — Operations of Ibrahim in the Morea — Trea- 
son of Nenekos — Campaign of Kolokotrones — Successes 
of the Greeks — ^Ibrahim devastates Messenia. . .Pa^re 223 



CHAPTEE XIV 

Greece and the Powers — Eussian proposals — ^Attitude of 
Canning' and Metternich — Conferences at St. Petersburg 
— Changed relations of the Powers — Break up of the 
Holy Alliance — Attitude of Alexander I. — His death — 
Crisis in Eussia — Uncertainty of the succession — Mili- 
tary revolt — Accession of Nicholas — Eussian ultimatum 
to Turkey — Protocol of St. Petersburg — Military reforms 
in Turkey — Massacre of the Janissaries — ^Alliance of 
Eussia, France, and England — Treaty of London. 

Page 237 

CHAPTER XV 

111 success of the Greeks at sea — Junction of the Egyptian 
and Turkish fleets at Navarino — Abortive expedition of 
Cochrane to Alexandria — Increase of piracy — Victory of 
Cochrane off Cape Papas — Intervention of the allied Ad- 
mirals — Armistice accepted by the Greeks and rejected 
by the Turks — Codrington at Navarino — Convention 
with Ibrahim — Eenewed activity of the Greeks — Captain 
Hastings in the Gulf of Corinth — Destruction of a Turk- 
ish flotilla at Salona — Ibrahim sails from Navarino — ^Ac- 
tion of Codrington — The allied fleets enter the Bay of 
Navarino — The battle of Navarino Page 251 



CHAPTER XVI 

The consequences of the battle of Navarino — The allied 
fleets retire to refit — Ibrahim remains firm — Efl'ect of 



CONTENTS Xlli 

the battle on the Powers — Russia proposes a joint ul- 
timatum to the Porte — Weak and vacillating policy of 
England — Lord Dudley's note to the Porte — Policy of 
Wellington — Effect of the battle at Constantinople — 
The Porte demands compensation — Withdrawal of the 
ambassadors — The Sultan proclaims a Holy War — 
Treaty of Akkermann declared void — Russia declares 
war, and occupies the PrinciiJalities Page 2G8 



CHAPTER XVII 

The arrival of Capodistrias in Greece — Enthusiastic recep- 
tion by the Greeks — Misery of the country — Condition 
of the Government — Principles of Capodistrias — He aims 
at establishing a bureaucracy on the Russian model — 
Military reforms — Piracy in the ^gean — The Powers in- 
tervene — Destruction of Grabusa by the Anglo-French 
fleet — Pirates destroyed by Miaoulis at Skopelos and 
Skiathos — Attempts of Capodistrias to improve the fi- 
nances — His nepotism Page 281 



CHAPTER XVIII 

The effects of the Russian Campaign on the Concert — Unex- 
pected vitality of Turkey — The French commissioned 
by the Concert to drive Ibrahim from the Morea — Cod- 
rington at Alexandria — He arranges with Mehemet Ali 
for the evacuation of the Morea — Landing of the French 
at Modon — Ibrahim evacuates the Peloponnese — The 
French occupy the fortresses — Protocol of November 16 
— Withdrawal of the French army — Capodistrias presses 
the war — Renewed insurrection in Crete — Greek naval 
operations — Hypsilanti advances into Attica — Opera- 
tions in West Hellas Page 297 



XIV CONTENTS 



CHAPTER XIX 

Joint report of the ambassadors at Poros — The Protocol of 
March 22 — Indignation of the Greeks — Capodistrias pro- 
tests against the Protocol — He refuses to cease hostili- 
ties — Arbitrary rule of the President — Financial support 
of Europe — A National Assembly summoned — Measures 
taken by Capodistrias to secure satisfactory elections — 
Congress opened at Argos — Proceedings of the Congress 
— Beginnings of organised opposition Page 311 



CHAPTER XX 

Operations in East and West Hellas — Last engagement of 
the War — End of the Eusso-Turkish War — The Peace of 
Adrianople — Eeception of the news in Greece — Its eifect 
on the Powers — Anglo-Austrian entente — Protocol of 
February 3, 1830 — Leopold of Coburg accepts the crown 
— Capodistrias rejects the Protocol — Agitation in Greece 
— Leopold resigns — Concession by the Porte of reforms 
in Crete — They are rejected by the Cretans — Boundaries 
of Greece fixed by Protocol of July 1 — Evacuation of Hel- 
las by the Turks Page 324 



CHAPTER XXI 

Effect on the Greek question of the July Revolution — Grow- 
ing opposition to the arbitrary rule of Capodistrias — 
Activity of the press — The * Apollo ' suppressed at Nau- 
plia — It is transferred to Hydra — ^Hydra becomes the 
centre of the Opposition — Divisions in the Concert of 
the Powers — Hydra declares against the President — 
Miaoulis seizes the Greek fleet at Poros — Intervention of 



CONTENTS XV 

the Kussian Admiral — Miaoulis blows up the Hellas — 
Sack of Poros — Eival assembles summoned at Argos and 
Hydra Page 343 

CHAPTER XXII 

The approach of the crisis — Position of Petrobey — His dis- 
content with the Government — Character of the Main- 
otes — Attempts of Capodistrias to reduce them to order 
— Imprisonment of the Mavromichales — Rising- in the 
Maina — Escape of Petrobey — He is recaptured and tried 
— Admiral Eicord intercedes — Humiliation of Petrobey 
— Murder of Capodistrias by George and Constantine 
Mavromichales— Character of Capodistrias Page 3G0 

CHAPTER XXIII 

Provisional Government — Agostino Capodistrias — Congress 
of Argos — Agostino elected President — Feud between 
Moreots and Eumeliots — Fighting in Argos — Eumeliots 
withdraw — Kolettes follows — Opposition Government es- 
tablished at Megara — Civil War — Kolettes invades the 
Morea — Impotence of the Government — Intervention of 
the Powers — Eesignation of Agostino — Kolettes su- 
preme — Continued anarchy — The French occupy Nauplia 
— Insurrection of Kolokotrones — Treaty of May 7 — Otho 
of Bavaria declared King of Greece — Close of the Con- 
ference at London Page 374 

CHAPTER XXIY 

[)ontinued civil strife — Success of Kolokotrones — Impotence 
of the Government — Misery of the country — Fight be- 
tween Armatoli and the French at Argos — Arrival of 
King Otho — Conclusion Page 393 



THE WAR 



OP 



GREEK INDEPENDENCE 



CHAPTER I 

Continuity of the Hellenic race — Effect of the Ottoman con- 
quest — Function of the Orthodox Church in preserving 
Greek nationality — The Patriarch of Constantinople — 
Condition of the Greeks under the Ottoman rule — Com- 
parative prosperity of the peasants — The Armatoli and 
Klephts — Sea powder of the Greeks — The naval islands — 
Treaty of Kainardji — Local liberties preserved by the 
Turks — The Phanariots — The literary movement — Ee- 
vival of antique letters — Influence of Korais 

Once more the Greek has measured his strength with 
the Turk, and once more the passionate cry of the 
Hellenes for the fulfilment of their national aspira- 
tions has, in spite of the unfriendly attitude of the 
Governments and of the warnings of experienced 
statesmen, awakened sympathetic echoes throughout 
Europe. This Philhellenic enthusiasm is an instinct 
rather than a deliberate conviction. Europe, educated 
for centuries in an almost religious reverence for an- 

1 



2 THE WAE OF GKEEK INDEPENDENCE 

tique culture, cannot forget tlie debt which she owes 
to the land which was the birthplace of her sciences 
and the cradle of her arts. In vain it is pointed out 
that, after the changes and chances of twenty centuries, 
the modern Greeks have little in common with the 
race of Pericles and Plato. In vain has grievous dis- 
illusion followed the high hopes which greeted the 
foundation of the Hellenic kingdom. 

The mountains look on Marathon, 
And Marathon looks on the sea, 

and the imagination of Europe is still fired with 
Byron's dream of a Hellas on whose soil, freed from 
the blighting rule of the barbarian, the arts and 
sciences shall once more flourish in their ancient glory. 
An idle dream, perhaps, which should have no place 
in serious politics. Yet a wide-spread sentiment, how- 
ever empty, is not a factor which the statesman can 
neglect with impunity. Metternich did so, and the 
whole fabric of his policy, laboriously built up on the 
most approved lines of Machiavellian state-craft, col- 
lapsed at the first strong breath of the ^ pathos ' he 
affected to despise. 

The question of the historical continuity of the Hel- 
lenic race is, then, of more than mere academic inter- 
est, and enters to no slight degree into the domain of 



THE GREEK RACE 3 

practical politics. It played an important, even an ex- 
aggerated, part in the history of the first Greek revolt, 
and even now, when the Hellenic cause is more com- 
monly associated in the public mind with that of the 
oppressed oriental Christian races in general, it has no 
small influence upon opinion. What then is the 
truth? 

On the one hand it is urged that the conquest and 
reconquest of Greece, the manifold migrations of the 
northern nations during the middle ages, must have 
completely obliterated the pure Hellenic race, and 
that the so-called Hellenes of to-day are, in fact, a 
mixed breed of Albanian, Slavonic, and Latin origin, 
with but a slight tincture of Greek blood. On the 
other hand it is urged that no nation, if we except the 
Jews, has ever been so tenacious of its individuality. 
Conquered again and again, Hellenism, vanquished in 
arms, ever retaliated by a bloodless victory over its 
conquerors. Macedonians and Eomans in turn, while 
placing Greece under their political yoke, themselves 
submitted to the empire of Hellenic culture; and 
though, with the decay of the ancient civilisation, this 
culture gradually faded away, all the evidence tends 
to prove that the Greeks, more than any other nation 
of modern Europe, have succeeded in assimilating 
those numerous foreign elements which must, in the 



4 THE WAE OF GEEEK INDEPENDENCE 

confusion of troubled centuries, have become inter- 
mingled witb tliem. 

Tbe capture of Constantinople, in 1453, by Ma- 
homed the Second would indeed seem to have crushed 
the last remnant of Greek nationality. Already the 
barbarian invasions had, for centuries, been gradually 
driving what survived of Hellenic culture within the 
walls of the capital. But now the collapse of the last 
bulwark of the ancient civilisation produced a result 
far other than had been expected; for it was the dis- 
persal of the Greek scholars, which followed the fall 
of Constantinople, that led directly to the great revival 
of Hellenism which is known to us as the Renaissance : 
a movement itself destined, in modern times, to react, 
through their literary leaders, on the Hellenes. 

For the time indeed, among the Greeks themselves, 
the last frayed cord that bound them to the classical 
tradition was snapped. They survived as a people: 
but the tie which united them was not the memory of 
their ancient greatness, but that of their common relig- 
ion, an influence all the stronger and more effective 
because their conquerors were of an alien faith. In 
most of the other parts of Europe the barbarian in- 
vaders had been converted to the faith of the nations 
they conquered, and had gradually intermingled with 
the subject populations to produce nationalities of an 



THE TIE OF RELIGION 5 

entirely new type. The Mohammedan conquerors, 
disdaining to mix with the r ayahs, the subject races, 
have by their very exclusiveness served to maintain 
the national characteristics of the Christian peoples 
they subdued, except, of course, in those instances 
where they succeeded in imposing their own faith upon 
the conquered. 

The tie then which, after 1453, bound together 
the scattered Greek communities was the organisation 
of the Orthodox Church. The sultans were indeed glad 
to employ an instrument of government which they 
found ready made to their hand, and it was by their au- 
thority that the Patriarch of Constantinople displaced 
the Byzantine Caesars as official head of the Greek 
Christian subjects of the Porte. Himself, by the very 
exigencies of his position, the mere creature of the 
Sultan, dependent as he was on the whims and caprices 
of court favourites, and bound to acquire and maintain 
his position by lavish bribes, he nevertheless exercised 
over the Christian subjects of the Porte an immense 
influence, and was invested by the policy of the sultans 
with great temporal as well as spiritual powers. As 
the Patriarch over the whole Greek world, so, in each 
diocese, the bishop became the embodiment at once 
of spiritual and temporal authority. To him were 
brought suits between Christians for settlement; and 



6 THE WAR OP GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

even Mussulmans would occasionally, in disputes with 
Christians, prefer episcopal arbitration to the dilatory 
processes of the cadi's court. It was, however, through 
the lower clergy that the organisation of the Orthodox 
Church was most intimately bound up with the life of 
the people; for, as married men, the parish priests 
shared to the full in the feelings and aspirations of 
their flocks, from whom, though set apart by the sanc- 
tity of their office, they were hardly distinguished by 
culture or attainments. 

Just then as, in the West, the idea of imperial unity 
had been preserved, all through the troubled period of 
the barbarian invasions, by the Church of Kome, so, 
throughout the Ottoman dominions, the theocratic 
basis of Greek unity had been deliberately maintained 
by the policy of the Ottoman conquerors. The crea- 
tion or toleration of such an imperium in imperio 
might from the first have seemed of doubtful wisdom. 
As a matter of fact it worked, from the point of view 
of the Sultan, well enough, as long as the Patriarch re- 
inained completely at his mercy. The danger of the 
system became apparent only when, with the decay of 
the Ottoman Empire, the Christian subjects of the sul- 
tans began to look abroad for support, and the Patri- 
arch of Constantinople could reckon upon the assist- 
ance of a foreign power. 



THE OTTOMAN RULE 7 

The Greek then became attached to his religion 
by a double tie of faith and national sentiment. To 
his religion and to the head of his religion alone does 
he owe allegiance ; and no element of loyalty has ever 
entered into his relations to the Sultan, who ruled him, 
and rules him, by force alone. As soon then as the 
rigour of the Turkish tyranny relaxed, no obligation 
lay upon the ' rayah ' to obey a government which 
could no longer enforce its claims. It is a mistake to 
suppose that it was the intolerable tyranny of the Turk 
which forced the Greeks into rebellion. All history 
and experience indeed prove that a people will bear 
without murmuring the most crushing burdens; and it 
is only when the cords have been relaxed, and the load 
lightened, that the oppressed will feel the energy to 
turn upon the oppressor. It was the conscientious ef- 
forts at reform of the government of Louis XYI. 
which directly produced the French Revolution. It 
was the lessening pressure of Turkish rule, and the 
growing prosperity of the Greek population, that ren- 
dered the Hellenic revolt possible and inevitable.^ 

The rule of the Ottoman is indeed harmful rather 

1 Cf. De Tocqueville, L'Ancien Regime et La Revolution, p. 
259: * L'experience apprend que le moment le plus dan- 
gereux pour un mauvais g-ouvernement est d'ordinaire 
celui oil il commence a se reformer. . . . Le mal qu'on 
souffrait patiemment comme inevitable semble insupport- 



8 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

for what it leaves undone tlian for what it does; it is 
intolerable rather for what it implies than for what it 
is. The Christian subject of the Sultan, even before 
modern capitulations, was free to exercise his religion, 
to accumulate wealth, to educate himself as he pleased; 
he could even rise to high office in Church or State, 
become Dragoman to the Porte, or governor of a prov- 
ince. The status of the peasantry under Ottoman rule 
was, in the eighteenth century, far more tolerable than 
in most parts of Europe. Serfdom, still almost uni- 
versal throughout Christendom, had disappeared; and, 
in many parts of the Turkish dominions, the culti- 
vators of the soil enjoyed a prosperity unknown to the 
peasantry of some nations accounted more civilised. 
It was the capricious and uncertain character of the 
Ottoman Government, rather than any conscious op- 
pression, that provoked misery and discontent. The 
custom of farming the taxes and of taking these in 
kind, though in theory workable enough, became, in 
fact, too often an engine of ruinous exactions; for, 
where the crops could not be cut until the tax-assessor 
had made his rounds, there were obviously endless 
openings for bribery and extortion. The evils of this 

able des qu'on conceit I'idee de s'y soiistraire . . . le mal 
est devenu moindre, il est vrai, mais la sensibillte est plus 
Vive.* 



STATUS OF THE CHRISTIAN RACES 9 

system fell indeed on Christian and Moslem alike. 
Far more intolerable was that pride of religion and 
of race which gave to the Christian, in relation to his 
Mohammedan conqueror, the status of a slave, whom 
any good Mussulman might insult or outrage with im- 
punity, and who, for the mere right to exist, was com- 
pelled to pay an annual poll-tax. All men will more 
readily forgive an injury than a slight; and the most 
intolerable of all tyrannies is that which expresses it- 
self, not in isolated acts of violence, but in a consist- 
ently applied system of contemptuous toleration. 

In dealing with a conquered people, Machiavelli 
had said, one must either crush or conciliate. The 
Turks had done neither. They had made their rule 
as galling as possible to the pride of the subject race, 
while they had neither destroyed its organisation nor 
even, in some cases, deprived it of its weapons. Under 
the Byzantine Caesars, certain of the wild hillsmen of 
the Thessalian border country had been enrolled in a 
sort of irregular militia, called Armatoli, for the de- 
fence of the passes and the protection of the roads. 
This system was continued and extended by the sul- 
tans; and the Greek mountaineers were thus, by the 
deliberate policy of the Porte, accustomed for genera- 
tions to the use of arms, and trained in all the arts of 
mountain warfare. From Armatole to brigand was 



10 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPE]!^DENCE 

but a short step; and when, toward the end of the last 
century, the sultans began to diminish the numbers of 
the Christian militia, and to curtail the power of the 
captains, these became the enemies of the order they 
were no longer paid to defend; and, from this time, 
the brigands, or Klephts, grew into social and political 
importance as a permanent class. ^ Where the govern- 
ment shows no respect for justice, lawless men are often 
supported by the lower orders as a means for securing 
revenge, or for redressing intolerable social evils. 
There was as yet no organised effort to throw off the 
Ottoman yoke; but the bolder and more reckless 
spirits among the peasantry, weary of a galling sub- 
servience, hurried to the mountains, and turned brig- 
and. To be a Klepht was, in the popular view, a glory 
rather than a disgrace; and for whole decades before 
the war of independence the Klephts were, in the eyes 
of their countrymen, the defenders of faith and father- 
land against the Turk; though, to tell the truth, they 
plundered Christian and Mussulman with a commend- 
able impartiality. Owning ' no pasha save the naked 
sword, no vizier save the gun,' they looked down upon 
the Ottomans and their ' slaves ' with equal contempt. 
A thousand tales were current of their reckless cour- 
age, their cruelty, or their generosity; their deeds of 
1 Finlay, i. 27. Fyfle, Modern Europe^ i. 246. 



THE KLEPIITS 11 

valour against tlie Turk were sung in countless ballads, 
and the names of their celebrated leaders repeated from 
mouth to mouth in awe-struck tones. And indeed, 
though of schooling they knew nothing beyond their 
wild war-chaunts, in courage and physical endurance 
they in no wise fell short of the heroes of antiquity. 
One thing alone they feared: to fall alive into the 
hands of the Turks; and their accustomed toast was 
* KcChMv fioKv^i ' — the welcome bullet which should 
save them from this fate. Yet, if it should befall 
them, it was easier to crush their body than their spirit. 
The following story is characteristic. 

The chief Katsantonis and his brother George had 
been betrayed into the hands of their mortal enemy 
Ali Pasha, and were by him condemned to have their 
limbs broken piecemeal with heavy hammers. Katsan- 
tonis was operated on first. Weakened by illness, he 
was unable to bear the agony, and, when the hammer 
fell upon his knee, uttered a sigh. George turned to 
him in surprise. ^ "Wliat, Katsantonis, are you howling 
like a woman ? ' When his own turn came, he lay 
without a sound or look of suffering, while both his 
legs, from the hips to the ankles, were shattered to 
pieces. 

The following story is delightfully reminiscent of 
our own Eobin Hood and Friar Tuck. The Klephts 



12 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

of the Pindus had a priest attached to the band, whose 
cell was a huge hollow oak. When they made a cap- 
tive they would lead him up to the tree, and the chief 
would say: ^ Speak, holy oak, which our fathers rever- 
enced, what shall we do with our prisoner? ' ^ Is he a 
Christian,' asked the tree, ^ or an unbelieving heathen?' 
' Thou knowest, sacred tree, that he is a Christian! ' 
' Then let our brother go on his way rejoicing, after 
receiving the kiss of fraternal peace, and dedicating his 
purse for the relief of the needs of his poor brethren ! ' 
If the prisoner was a Mussulman the answer was sim- 
ply ' Hang the infidel on my holy boughs, and confis- 
cate al] he has for the use of the true Church and her 
faithful children.' 

A religious sanction, then, was not lacking to this 
patriotic brigandage. The Orthodox Church gladly 
forgave crimes committed in the cause of faith and 
fatherland; and the klepht could pray, in all sincerity 
of heart, to ' Panagia Klephtrina,' the Mother of God, 
who protects all robbery by sea and land. 

Such were the Klephts who played so important a 
part, for good and evil,* in the war of Greek indepen- 

1 Gordon, 1. 400, says * the Greeks had cause to repent 
their early predilection for the Klephts or predatory chiefs, 
who were almost all . . . infamous for the sordid per- 
versity of their dispositions.' Certainly the wretched peas- 



THE GREEK SEA POWER 13 

dence. Another and even more potent weapon, forged 
by the policy of the Porte, and to be used in the same 
cause, was the maritime power of the Greek islands. 
Long anterior to the Hellenic revolt many of these 
islands had, by one means or another, gained a large 
measure of independence. Some were practically au- 
tonomous, their subservience to the Sultan being evi- 
denced only by the obligation to pay a small annual 
tribute, and to supply a certain number of sailors to 
the Ottoman navy. The islanders, accustomed from 
earliest infancy to face the perils and chances of the 
sea, were magnificent seamen; and, favoured by their 
political circumstances, they speedily built up a very 
considerable maritime trade. To the development of 
this a great impetus was given in 1774 by the treaty 
of Kainardji, by which Russia obtained certain privi- 
leges in the navigation of the Bosphorus and the 
Dardanelles, and a somewhat vague and shadowy 
right of protection over the Sultan's Christian sub- 
jects. Greek merchants now began to trade under the 
Russian flag. Their vessels, hitherto mainly small 
coasting brigs, increased in size; and their voyages, 
at first adventured timidly from island to island, began 
to extend from Cherson to Gibraltar, and even beyond. 

ants suffered, during" the war, far more from them than 
from the Turks. 



14 THE WAK OF GREEK INBEPENDElSrCE 

The danger from Algerine pirates necessitated the 
ships being armed; and the crews were trained to 
fight as well as to navigate the vessel. Thus, under 
the eyes of the Ottoman Government, was gradually 
built up that naval power which, during the war of 
liberation, was to win such signal successes for the 
cause of Hellenic freedom. 

On the mainland, as well as in the islands, the 
Turks had permitted a considerable measure of local 
self-government. In the pashalik of the Morea, while 
the taxes were usually farmed by the beys of the 
twenty-three provinces into which it was divided, the 
village communities were allowed to elect their own 
officers, the Demogeronts, or village elders, who, be- 
sides collecting the taxes and managing the affairs of 
their own villages, met in a district assembly, with 
the representatives of the towns, to elect the Proestoi, 
whose duty it was to determine what share of the dis- 
trict taxation each community should bear, and who, 
in their turn, chose one Greek officer, called Primate, 
and one Mohammedan, called Ayan, to represent the 
province, and to take part in the council of the Pasha 
of the Morea, who resided at Tripolitza. Though of 
but small service in preserving any liberty for their 
countrymen, and indeed themselves more often than 
not the instruments of oppression, the Primates became 



THE PHANARIOTS 15 

a sort of Greek aristocracy, who, at the outbreak of the 
revolt, formed the natural leaders of the people, and 
whose financial experience was especially useful dur- 
ing the first years of the war. Moreover, it was the 
communal organisation alone which, in the absence of 
any other order, preserved the Greeks from destruc- 
tion during the anarchy of the civil wars. 

Yet another class of Greeks, who played a very 
important part in the revolt, remains to be mentioned. 
The Phanariots were so named from the Phanar, or 
lighthouse, quarter of Constantinople, ^vhere the palace 
of the Patriarch was situated, which, with its numerous 
ofiices and law courts, had gathered about it a consider- 
able Greek colony. From this class were mainly 
drawn the officials of the Porte, as well as those of the 
Patriarchate; and, though their general character 
was by no means high, they had produced, from time to 
time, men of distinguished ability and genuine devo- 
tion to the Hellenic cause. To this class belonged those 
Phanariot leaders in the revolt, like Alexander Mavro- 
cordatos and Demetrius Hypsilanti, whose European 
culture and wider experience of affairs served, in some 
m^easure, as a check upon the frank barbarism of the 
Greek native chiefs. 

Before closing this sketch of the Hellenic race 
under the Ottoman dominion, a few words must be 



16 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

added about that remarkable literary movement which 
produced so profound an effect on the development of 
modern Greece. In the course of ages, the ancient 
language of Hellas, the tongue of Plato and Demos- 
thenes, had become for all practical purposes extinct. 
It was indeed still the language of the Church and 
of the learned; but learning itself had become con- 
fined to barren theological discussions, and, to the 
modern Greeks, the masterpieces of the ancient litera- 
ture were quite unknown. For centuries education 
had been either wholly neglected, or consisted only 
in such schooling as could be obtained from monks 
hardly less ignorant than those they taught. To 
restore to the Hellenes their language and literature 
became the self-imposed task of several enthusiastic 
spirits, among whom Adamantios Korais stands pre- 
eminent. Already indeed numerous schools, in which 
the classic writers were taught, had been founded in 
various parts of Hellas and the islands, mainly by the 
generosity of wealthy Phanariots. But as long as the 
language of ancient Greece remained, to all intents 
and purposes, a dead tongue, it was impossible to re- 
store to the Hellenes the intellectual heritage of their 
greater past, and to make it a real power among the 
people. Korais then set himself the deliberate task of 
reconstructing for his countrymen a literary language 



THE GEEEK LANGUAGE 17 

which should combine, as far as possible, the best ele- 
ments of both the ancient and modern tongues. He 
opposed equally those who, despising the idiom in com- 
mon use, wished to preserve classical Greek as the lan- 
guage of the learned, and those who desired to raise 
the vulgar patois to the dignity of a literary language. 
His plan was to base his language on the common 
tongue, but to remove from it all foreign accretions, 
and as far as possible restore all such ancient and pure 
forms as had not become wholly obsolete. What 
Luther^s Bible had done for Germany, Korais's edi- 
tions of the classics, with their prefaces in modem 
Greek, were to do for Greece. 

His efforts were crowned with remarkable success. 
The mixed patois is still the language of common life; 
but, in the press and the schools, a Greek is used which 
differs, not in kind, but in degree only, from the tongue 
of Homer; ^ and the magnificent literary monuments 
of Greece have thus been preserved as the common 
property of the whole people. By this revival of the 
tradition of the dead glories of Hellas a new. motive 

1 One of the most essential differences between modem 
and classical Greek: the pronunciation according to accent 
instead of quantity, is apparent comparatively early in the 
Christian era. Nonnus, an Egyptian-Greek poet, in the 
fourth century a.d., is the first writer to reckon with ac- 
cent. See Prof. Murray's Ancient Greek Literature, p. 395. 



18 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

and a new force were added to the growing national 
consciousness of the Greeks. To the dream of the 
restoration of the Greek Empire of the East was added 
that of the re-birth of the Hellas of antiquity; the 
Greeks, ceasing to call themselves, as they had done for 
centuries, Romaioi, or Romans, resumed their ancient 
name of Hellenes; and the sea captains of Psara and 
Hydra, while continuing to pay their vows to the 
Mother of God, began to call their vessels by the names 
of the pagan heroes of old. 



CHAPTEE II 

The preparation — Hope of Russian support — Catherine II. — 
The Hetairia Philike — Count John Capodistrias offered 
the leadership of the Greeks — His refusal — Prince Alex- 
ander Hypsilanti chosen — Ali Pasha of Janina — His 
origin — He conquers Tepeleni — His cruelties — He aims 
at creating an Albanian kingdom — His fall 

With the consciousness of their past greatness and 
their present unity astir within them, it needed but 
the impulse and the occasion to make the Greeks rise 
against the hated rule of their Ottoman masters; and 
neither the impulse nor the occasion were long lacking. 
Ever since the Venetians had been finally expelled 
from the Morea, at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, the eyes of the oppressed Greeks had turned 
eastward to the rising star of Russia. From the 
Church of the West, divided from their sympathies 
by the double barrier of the Papal supremacy and the 
* Procession of the Holy Ghost,' the Greek Christians 
had met with little save cruelty and persecution. With 
the grow^th of the power of the Czars, their eyes turned 

19 



20 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

naturally to an empire united with them by the bonds 
of the orthodox faith, and which seemed destined to 
restore in the East the supremacy of the Cross. Cath- 
erine II., pondering in her mind vast designs of aggres- 
sion, was nothing loth to encourage the hopes of the 
Greeks. At war with the Porte, she did not scruple to 
send a Russian fleet and Russian agents to rouse the 
Greeks of the Moreaand Archipelago against the Turk, 
only to abandon them, as soon as the immediate ends 
of her policy were secured, to the frightful vengeance 
of their oppressors. Even this terrible object lesson in 
the methods of Russian state-craft could not destroy 
the hopes which the Hellenes based on the great Or- 
thodox Power. The Treaty of Kainardji, indeed, dis- 
tinctly conceded to the Russians some shadowy pro- 
tectorate over the Christian subjects of the Porte, a 
weapon which she was prepared to use or lay aside as 
suited her policy. Yet, baseless as this trust in Russia's 
disinterestedness really was, it was this more than any- 
thing else which gave such tremendous weight to the 
propaganda of the great secret society which, in the 
early years of the present century, prepared the way 
for, and gave the impulse to, the uprising of the 
Greeks. 

The ^ Hetairia Philike ' was founded in 1814, at 
Odessa, by three Greek merchants named Skuphas, 



21 



Athanasios Tsakaloff, and E. Xanthos. It had for 
its object the uniting of all the Hellenes in an armed 
organisation, for the purpose of throwing off tlie Ot- 
toman yoke and restoring the Greek Empire of the 
East. Childishly fantastic in its constitution, with its 
elaborate hierarchy, its masonic ritual, and blood-cur- 
dling oaths, it was nevertheless inspired by a determi- 
nation of purpose which scrupled at no methods for the 
attainment of its ends. Its success was immediate and 
universal. !N'othing, indeed, displays the inferiority 
of the despotic methods of Turkey to those of Russia 
so clearly, as the ease with which a conspiracy so elab- 
orate and so ill-disguised was developed and spread. 
In the course of a year or two the society had extended 
its operations over all the Greek world, drawling its re- 
cruits from all classes. Heartwhole devotion to tlie 
cause of Greece was the condition of membership; the 
most important rule, that which compelled every mem- 
ber to provide himself with arms and ammunition. 
The propaganda was extended even beyond the limits 
of the Hellenic nation; Servians and Roumanians were 
invited to attach themselves to the cause of the Cross, 
and restore, under the hegemony of Greece, the su- 
premacy of the Church in the East. And behind all 
the agitation loomed the shadow of Russia. It was the 
assumed support of Russia that formed the guarantee 



22 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

of the trmmph of the cause of freedom ; and this at a 
time when Alexander I. had surrendered himself, 
heart and soul, to the policy of Metternich and the 
Holy Alliance, and the whole weight of the Muscovite 
power was being used, in favour of the forces of reac- 
tion and despotism, in the attempt to crush out the 
liberties which the French Revolution had won for the 
peoples of Western Europe ! 

This, then, was the situation at the end of the 
second decade of the nineteenth century: at Laibach, 
Metternich with cynical satisfaction putting the finish- 
ing touches to the edifice which his diplomacy had 
raised — to that Concert of Europe, united upon the 
basis of the status quOy which was to stamp out any 
symptoms of ^ Revolution ' wherever found, and make 
' sentiment ' in politics henceforward impossible : 
throughout the length and breadth of the Ottoman 
Empire a vast ramification of conspiracy, owing but 
little to the revolutionary forces of the West, but none 
the less a very magazine of inflammable sentiment, 
which needed but a spark to explode, and blow into 
the air with it all that elaborate diplomatic edifice 
which Metternich had raised with so much skill and 
labour. 

For six years the Hetairia had developed and ex- 
panded without any definite plan or policy. Governed 



COUNT CAPODISTRIAS 23 

by a directorate of a dozen or more self-constituted 
loaders, it necessarily lacked the clearness of view and 
unity of purpose wliicli could alone insure success; 
and it became necessary to seek a reliable leader, who 
could be placed at the head of the whole enterprise. 
One man alone seemed, by his position and great repu- 
tation, to be marked out for the post. Count Capodis- 
trias,^ a Greek of Corfu, had, after the peace of Tilsit, 
which surrendered the Island to ISTapoleon, been taken 
into the service of the Czar Alexander, and had rapidly 
gained the entire confidence of his master. In 1820 
he held, as Foreign Minister of Russia, an immense as- 
cendency over the Czar's mind. A Greek who had 
openly expressed his sympathy with Hellenic aspira- 
tions, and at the same time the trusted minister of the 
Power from which so much was expected, seemed the 
most ideal of all possible leaders of the revolt. A depu- 
tation from the Morea, headed by Xanthos, accord- 
ingly proceeded to Moscow, and formally offered to 
Capodistrias, in the name of the Hetairia, the leader- 
ship of the Greeks. But, however much he might sym- 
pathise with the objects of the league, Capodistrias was 
too intimately acquainted with the secret counsels of 
the Czar to allow him for one moment to place any 
reliance on Russian help in such a cause, or to barter 

1 Capo d'Istria. 



24 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

his own splendid position for a career fraught with 
such perilous chances. The offer was refused with 
sympathetic regret, and the Greeks advised to exercise 
their souls in patience. 

It now became necessary to look round for another 
leader; and the choice fell on Prince Alexander 
Ilypsilanti, the scion of an ancient Phanariot family 
which boasted its descent from the Byzantine Caesars, 
who was at the same time a general in the Russian 
service, and reputed to enjoy the special favour of the 
Czar. Hypsilanti, moved perhaps by a genuine enthu- 
siasm for the Greek cause, and perhaps ^ill more by 
wild dreams of ambition, accepted the call, not doubt- 
ing that he would have the moral, if not the material, 
support of Eussia. The Greeks were now provided 
with a leader; and nothing remained but to decide 
whether the blow for freedom was to be struck in the 
South, in reliance on Greek power alone, or in the 
North, in the certain hope of Russian assistance. The 
opportunity for the rising had already been given by 
the revolt from the Ottoman allegiance of Ali, Pasha 
of Janina, whose extraordinary career exercised so di- 
rect an influence on the fortunes of the Hellenic insur- 
rection, that it will be necessary to devote a few words 
to it before proceeding. 

The story of this remarkable man reads like a lurid 



ALI PASHA 25 

romance of the Middle Ages rather than a chapter in 
modern history. Born at Tepeleni in Epirus, in the 
year 1741, of Albanian parents, the boy's surround- 
ings impressed on him from the first the untamed and 
savage character of his race. His father had died, 
whilst he was still an infant, and his mother, Khamko, a 
woman of extraordinary character, had, on pretext of 
securing the rights of her children, exchanged the veil 
for the sword, and, gathering about her a band of fierce 
warriors, terrorised the surrounding country. At last, 
betrayed into an ambuscade, she and her daughter had 
been imprisoned and insulted by the men of Gardiki 
and Kormovo. Eeleased through the generosity of a 
Greek merchant, Khamko had, after this, nurtured in 
the breast of her son a lust for vengeance, none the less 
fierce that it was content to bide its time; and to re- 
venge his mother's dishonour became the supreme ob- 
ject of Ali's life. It was this passion of hate, no less 
than his devouring ambition and inexhaustible avarice, 
that caused him to embark on a career which ultimately 
led him to measure his strength against the Ottoman 
power, and so compassed his downfall; not, however, 
before his vengeance had been satisfied and, after 
thirty years, the wrong suffered by his family atoned 
for by a holocaust of innocent victims. 

At the outset a mere cattle stealer and brigand 



26 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

chief, Ali took the first step in his upward course 
by making himself master of his native town of 
Tepeleni; and the method used was highly charac- 
teristic of the man, and of the social condition of the 
country. Dressing up a goat in his cloak and fez, he 
gagged the animal to prevent its bleating, and laid it 
under a tree, at a place he had been accustomed to fre- 
quent. He then despatched a trusty messenger to 
Tepeleni, who was to act the traitor, and tell his ene- 
mies that the hated Ali was close at hand, asleep and 
unsuspecting. The chance was not to be neglected. 
Seizing their guns they hurried out and, from a safe 
distance, poured a volley into the sleeping body of the 
supposed Ali. Having watched with exultation the 
death quiver of the unhappy goat, they returned to the 
town, and proceeded to celebrate their prowess with 
feasting and revelry. In the midst of their merriment, 
and while they were completely off their guard, Ali, 
with his trusty followers, suddenly fell upon them, and 
massacred them all. Thus he became lord of his native 
place.^ 

Starting from this beginning, by violence, by 
fraud, by intrigue, he gradually acquired a dominion 
which extended from the Adriatic to the ^gean, and 

1 Pouqueville, Regeneration de la Grdce, i. 29. 



ALI PASHA 27 

threatened at once the hopes of Greece and the author- 
ity of the Sultan. Restrained by no motives of relig- 
ion or humanity, his cruelties revolted even the hard- 
ened sensibilities of a people accustomed to deeds 
of blood. But he knew well how to turn to his own 
advantage the mutual hates of the races under his rule. 
When the soldiers of his Mussulman regiments refused 
to massacre in cold blood the Mohammedan Gardikiots, 
whom he had lured into his power by a promise of am- 
nesty, he found his Greek mercenaries Avilling enough 
to become the instruments of his revenge. The drown- 
ing of eighteen Greek ladies of Janina, accused justly 
or unjustly of immorality, sent a thrill of horror 
through the country, and witnessed at once to his 
cruelty and his hypocrisy ; for he was himself an aban- 
doned libertine. Yet, in spite of his monstrous crimes, 
the rule of Ali Pasha was by no means altogether a 
curse to the country he governed ; for, like many other 
tyrants, he would suffer no tyranny but his own, and 
crushed out with impartial cruelty the feudal anarchy 
of the Albanian chiefs, the lawlessness of the Klephts, 
and the peculations of the Turkish officials. Recog- 
nising too, though himself a mere savage, the value of 
learning as an instrument of government, his court at 
Janina became the centre of whatever culture existed 
in the north of Greece; and under his patronage Mo- 



28 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

hammedan poets composed Greek odes in celebration 
of his unspeakable cruelties ! ^ 

The ambitious views of Ali were notorious, and 
the Hetairists had from the first reckoned upon the 
Pasha of Janina as a possible ally against the Porte. 
'Nor did he scruple to enter into relations with the 
Hellenic leaders.^ It had indeed been his policy 
throughout to conciliate and betray every interest in 
turn; and it was, in the end, to the advantage of the 
Greek cause that Ali was in no sense its protector. Be- 
fore the outbreak of the Hellenic revolt, an attempt of 
Ali to compass the murder of his enemy Pacho Bey, 
chamberlain to the Sultan, at last moved the Porte, long 
since alarmed at the growth of his power, to effect his 
overthrow. Ali embarked on the struggle without mis- 
giving; but he was soon to learn the hollowness of that 
Machiavellian maxim which he had adopted as his own 
* That it is better for a prince to be feared than loved; ' 
for, at the first opportunity, his own sons deserted him, 

1 Relig-ious intolerance could not be reckoned among- his 
faults. When he wished to conciliate the Greeks, he would 
hold out hopes of his conversion, and drink to the health of 
the Mother of God! 

2 The Greek Paparig-opulos went to Russia, shortly be- 
fore All's breach with the Porte, as the representative at 
once of the Pasha and of the Hetairia, to try and induce 
the Czar's Government to declare war against Turkey. See 
Mendelssohn, i. 122. 



ALI PASHA 29 

his generals went over with their armies to the Turks, 
and the wild tribes, whom he had governed by terror 
alone, threw off the hated allegiance. Ali found him- 
self shut up with some four thousand men, in the for- 
tress of Janina; and, besieged by the whole forces of 
the Ottoman empire, his fall was only a question of 
months. 

There can be no doubt that the triumph of Ali 
would have been fatal to the Greek cause, and, in 
place of a Hellenic, an Albanian kingdom have been 
its result. As it was, the service which the Pasha of 
Janina rendered to the Greeks was, firstly, in distract- 
ing the attention of the Porte from the plots of the 
Iletairists, and secondly, in keeping, during the first 
months of the rebellion, the main body of the Otto- 
man troops, under their most able general, Khurshid 
Pasha, locked up before Janina. 



CHAPTEE III 

The rising" in the Principalities — Prince Alexander Hyp- 
silanti crosses the Pruth — Cold reception by the Rou- 
manian peasants — Massacres at Galatz and Yassy — In- 
capacity of Hypsilanti — He marches to Bucharest — 
Heterogeneous constitution of the insurgent force — The 
Patriarch of Constantinople anathematises the revolt — 
It is denounced by the Czar — Treachery of Savas — 
Murder of Vladimiresco — Battle of Dragashan — Col- 
lapse of the revolt — Death of Georgaki — Last stand of 
the Greeks at Skuleni 

If the revolt was not to be indefinitely postponed, tlie 
war between Ali Paslia and the Sultan presented too 
favourable an opportunity to be neglected. On the 6th 
of March, then. Prince Alexander Hypsilanti, accom- 
panied by a few Greek and Russian officers, began the 
rising by crossing the Pruth from Russia into Mol- 
davia. From the first the enterprise was hampered 
by the vanity, incapacity, and weakness of its leader, 
by his over-confidence and complete misunderstand- 
ing of the conditions of the struggle. Secure in the 

fancied support of Russia, and in the assumed sym- 

30 



ALEXANDER HYPSILANTI IN ROUMANIA 31 

pathy of the Roumanian people, he believed he had 
but to show himself in the Principalities to be at once 
welcomed as a deliverer, and carried in triumphal pro- 
cession to the throne of the East. In high sounding 
proclamations, addressed to the Moldavians and the 
Greeks, he announced himself as the champion of the 
Cross and herald of the dawn of freedom, and, lastly, 
and most important of all, declared that his enterprise 
had the support of a Great Power ^ 

To the Roumanian peasants, however, the appear- 
ance of a band of Phanariot Greeks in the disguise 
of deliverers seemed but a mockery and a snare. The 
Greeks had hitherto only been known to them through 
their own Hospodar and other subordinate agents of 
extortion, under whose rule their lot was far more 
wretched than that of the peasantry under the imme- 
diate government of the Sultan. ISTor was the name 
of Russia a grateful sound to a people who, during the 
Aluscovite occupation of the Principalities from 1808 
to 1812, had been reduced to the last stages of misery 
by the extortion of the invaders, and had seen their 
homes and fields devastated by the cruel policy of the 
Czar. Had Hypsilanti appeared as the champion of 
the Roumanian people against the tyranny of the Hos- 
podar and the boyards (as the great landowners were 

1 Prokesch. i. 30 and iii. 54, &c. 



32 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

called), lie miglit have received a different welcome; 
and even a Roumanian national rising against foreign 
tyranny miglit have had some prospect of success. But 
the Hospodar was his active ally, having made over to 
him all the fiscal and military machinery of the prov- 
ince, and with him he could not afford to quarrel; and 
a Greek rising on Roumanian soil was from the first 
doomed to failure. To the mass of the people he ap- 
peared merely as the leader of a band of mercenaries, 
plotting to transfer the sovereignty of the Principali- 
ties from the Sultan to the Czar; and they received his 
advances with a sullen indifference which, as his diffi- 
culties increased, was changed into active hostility. 

The history of Hypsilanti's enterprise is a record 
of incredible folly, of sordid intrigues, and revolting 
crimes; the sombre picture being only here and there 
lighted up by gleams of heroic fortitude or self-devo- 
tion. On the night before the Prince crossed the bor- 
der, a deed of blood was perpetrated which was the first 
of many that cast indelible disgrace on the Greek 
cause. Galatz is the principal port of Moldavia. 
Several Ottoman trading-vessels lay at anchor in the 
harbour, and some Turkish merchants resided in the 
town, where also a small guard of Turkish troops was 
maintained, in accordance with the laws of the Otto- 
man Empire, to act as police to insure the obedience of 



MASSACRES AT GALATZ AND YASSY 33 

the Mussulman inhabitants to the fiscal laws of the 
Principality. The Christian troops of the Hospodar 
stationed at Galatz were commanded by a Greek 
named Kara via; and this man, who had joined the 
Hetairia, thought the present an excellent opportunity 
for enriching himself, in the name of patriotism, at 
the expense of the Turks. He accordingly assembled 
the Hetairists and his own mercenaries, and, inform- 
ing them of the revolution that was about to break 
out, led them to the attack of the Turkish guard. Of 
these a few, taken by surprise, were slain at once. 
The rest held out for some time; but their resistance 
was at last broken, and Karavia then ordered his men 
to seize and murder all the Turkish merchants in the 
town, to take possession of the goods in the ware- 
houses and seize all the vessels in the port. In obedi- 
ence to these orders, Turks of every rank, merchants, 
sailors, soldiers, were surprised and massacred in cold 
blood.^ 

The bloody example thus set was followed in many 
places. At Yassy had been left a body of fifty Otto- 
man troops to act as a guard of honour to the Hospodar. 
Before Hypsilanti entered the city, Michael Soutzos, 
the Hospodar, had persuaded the commander to order 
his men to lay down their arms, under promise that 

1 Gordon, i. 100; Finlay, i. 147. 
8 



34 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

their persons and property should be protected. The 
Turks, believing the Hetairists to be but the vanguard 
of a Russian army, obeyed; and Soutzos ordered them 
to remain in their quarters, and the Turkish merchants 
to be imprisoned, under the pretext that this measure 
was necessary to insure their safety. Yet, as soon as 
the news of the massacre of Galatz reached the capital, 
both soldiers and merchants were murdered in cold 
blood, under the eyes of the Hospodar and of Tlypsi- 
lanti, without either of these princes making the slight- 
est effort to save their lives. Hypsilanti even set the 
seal of his approval on the massacres by making Kara- 
via a general. 

The weakness and wickedness which made the 
Greek leader connive at these horrors was not counter- 
balanced by any skill in forming a plan of campaign, 
or energy in carrying out what he had planned. Had 
he advanced on Ibraila, and there concentrated his 
power, holding from this base the line of the Danube, 
it is possible that he might have prevented the Turks 
from entering the Principalities, and forced Eussia to 
recognise a fait accompli As it was, he preferred to 
linger at Yassy, playing the prince, conferring titles, 
and alienating his own supporters and the proud boy- 
ards by his absurd affectation of royal exclusiveness. 
Several weeks he wasted in these congenial trivialities. 



THE INSURGENT ARMY 35 

while the Turks, thoroughly alarmed at last, made 
vigorous preparations for crushing the revolt. At 
length he marched southward, and, on the 9th of April, 
fixed his headquarters at Bucharest. The forces of 
the insurrection were of the most motley description. 
Hypsilanti himself, though nominally commander-in- 
chief, had at his personal orders only a band of some 
two thousand undisciplined ruffians, more skilled in the 
art of plundering defenceless peasants than in that of 
war. The so-called ' Sacred Legion,' a regiment of 
five hundred Greek youths, whose courage was greater 
than their experience or physical powers, formed a 
nobler element; and besides these he could also de- 
pend upon a small but well-trained force of cavalry, 
under Georgaki of Olympus, the only one of the Greek 
leaders who displayed courage, skill, and disinterested- 
ness. The garrison of Bucharest consisted of a thou- 
sand veteran troops, under the practically independent 
command of the Greek Savas; and Theodore Yladi- 
miresco, a Roumanian boyard, who had joined the 
H'etairists for his own ends, attached himself to Hyp- 
silanti's fortunes with a force of some two thousand 
Pandours, or Wallach cavalry. To weld these hetero- 
geneous elements into an effective force needed a 
stronger hand than that of Prince Alexander Hypsi- 
lanti. 



36 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Already ominous signs were not lacking. Vladi- 
miresco, at the outset of the rebellion, issued a mani- 
festo to his countrymen, calling on them to support 
him in presenting to the Sultan a list of grievances 
against the Phanariot misrule! This was hardly re- 
assuring from the point of view of the Greek leaders; 
but Ilypsilanti could not afford to quarrel with any of 
his allies, and Yladimiresco continued to follow him, 
though their relations were naturally a little strained. 

At Bucharest, Ilypsilanti pursued the same fatu- 
ous course as at Yassy. Surrounded by crowds of 
adventurers and sycophants, he could find no more im- 
portant business to transact than the engagement of a 
comedy company, and the fitting up of a theatre; to 
pay for which princely necessaries he plundered the 
monastery of Maryeni.^ Of military activity the only 
signs were the ceaseless depredations of his ruffianly 
soldiers in the country round, and, in the town, the run- 
ning to and fro, from morning till night, of a numer- 
ous staff of gorgeously uniformed officers, apparently 
intent on business, but in reality doing nothing in par- 
ticular. 

The course of this childish comedy, laughable 
enough had its denouement been less tragic for the 
actors, was suddenly interrupted by news which should 

1 Gordon, i. 106. 



THE CZAR DENOUNCES THE REVOLT 37 

have at once brought it to an end. The Patriarch of 
Constantinople issued his anathema against the He- 
tairia, and denounced the curse of the Church on the 
rebels. Henceforward Hypsilanti became, not the 
leader of an orthodox crusade, but the head of a band 
of ambitious and turbulent conspirators. But a still 
more serious blow was impending. Hypsilanti had 
himself believed, and had suffered it to be generally 
understood, that he had the support of Russia in his 
enterprise; but now there came letters from Laibach 
in which the Emperor Alexander denounced the re- 
volt, upbraided the prince for his perfidy in misusing 
the Czar's name, struck his name from the Russian 
army list, and called on him at once to lay down his 
arms.^ The right and reasonable course would have 
been to obey; for the whole enterprise had been initi- 
ated and supported on the confident assumption that it 
had the sanction of the Czar. Deprived of this sanc- 
tion it was foredoomed to failure; and all that re- 
mained was, by a speedy submission, to obtain the best 
possible terms for its deluded supporters. But Hypsi- 
lanti was too foolish, or too blinded by vanity, to take 
a just view of the situation; he preferred to continue 
his course, and to cover its fatuity from the eyes of his 

1 Prokesch. iii. 65. The letter is signed by Count Capo- 
distrias. 



88 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

followers, and perhaps from his own, by a fabric of 
lies. Alexander, he told the assembled leaders, had 
denounced the revolution publicly in order to preserve 
the peace of Europe, whilst privately commanding him 
to persevere, and promising support. The revolution- 
ary leaders were but half deceived; Savas and Yladi- 
miresco opened negotiations with the Porte ; and many 
boyards, protesting their devotion to the Ottoman rule, 
fled for safety over the Austrian frontier. 

Hypsilanti now at last took the field at the head of 
a small and irregular force, lacking artillery, and al- 
most destitute of ammunition. Instead, however, of 
marching towards the Danube to cover Bucharest, he 
crept away northward towards the Austrian frontier. 
Savas and Yladimiresco, though suspecting some sin- 
ister design on the part of the prince, still followed him 
with their troops; but the treachery of Yladimiresco 
being suspected, Georgaki arrested him in his own 
camp, and brought him before Hypsilanti, who am- 
nestied him, and then allowed him to be assassinated. 
Savas thereupon deserted to the Turks, but, in place of 
the reward he had counted on receiving, was promptly 
beheaded. 

The Hetairists were now in danger of being sur- 
rounded by three divisions of Ottoman troops advanc- 
ing from Widin, Giourgevo, and Bucharest. On the 8th 



BATTLE OF DRAGASIIAN 39 

of June there was a skirmish at Tergovisht, and though 
both sides claimed the victory, Hypsilanti retreated 
in haste to Rimnik. After remaining here three days,, 
he decided to attack a body of Turkish cavahy which 
had advanced from Ivrai'ova, and taken post at the 
village of Dragashan, about thirty miles from his 
camp. 

The force at his disposal numbered four thousand 
infantry, two thousand five hundred cavalry, and four 
guns. The Turks were in all eight hundred horsemen ; 
and the issue of the fight seemed beyond doubt. On 
June 19, 1821, Prince Mcholas Hypsilanti, at the 
head of the Sacred Battalion, supported by Karavia 
with five hundred horse, took up a position opposite 
Dragashan; while Georgaki sent forward a strong 
body of Wallach infantry to hold the road to Krai'ova, 
strengthening them with some cavalry to cut off the 
Ottoman retreat. As the troops were exhausted after a 
long and wet march, Georgaki, who was now the senior 
ofl^icer in command, decided to postpone the attack till 
the next morning, meanwhile dispatching an orderly 
to Prince Alexander Hypsilanti, who was with the 
rearguard some nine miles behind, to bid him hasten 
forward and secure the glory of the expected victory. 
He then retired to his quarters. In his absence, how- 
ever, Karavia, envious of the Olympian's reputation, 



40 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

and thinking to snatch an easy victory, persuaded the 
weak Prince Mcholas Hypsilanti to disregard the 
orders of his superior officer, and advance at once to 
the attack. Unsupported, the Sacred Battalion ad- 
vanced upon the village held by the Ottomans. These 
at once saw their chance of destroying the enemy piece- 
meal, and, with wild cries and brandished swords, 
charged from behind their cover on the advancing in- 
fantry, breaking their ranks before they had time to 
form square. The weary and inexperienced boys of 
the Greek regiment, though they fought and fell with 
the utmost gallantry, were unable to withstand the 
fierce onslaught of veteran troops. The butcher Kara- 
via, brave enough against defenceless men, no sooner 
saw the infantry show signs of yielding, than he set 
spurs to his horse and fled with all his men, spreading 
panic among the troops in the rear. Georgaki, hearing 
the firing, hurried up, but was unable to do more than 
save the standard and a poor remnant of the Sacred 
Battalion. The day, and with it the last hope of the 
Greeks, was lost. 

Hypsilanti, with a scared remnant of his followers, 
escaped to Rimnik, where he spent some days in negoti- 
ating with the Austrian authorities for permission to 
cross the frontier. In terror lest his confederates should 
buy their own safety by surrendering him to the Turk, 



FLIGHT OF HYPSILANTI 41 

he invented a last lie to secure his retreat. Pretending 
that Austria had just declared war on Turkey, he 
caused a Te Deum to be sung in the church of Kosia 
to celebrate the event; and, on pretext of arranging 
co-operative measures with the Austrian Commander- 
in-Chief, crossed the frontier.^ 

His fate could hardly have been worse had he fallen 
into the hands of the Turks; for Austria, under the 
rule of Metternich, had little sympathy with leaders of 
revolts. For upwards of seven years Hypsilanti was 
kept in close confinement; and when, at the instance 
of the Czar Nicholas, he was at last released, it was only 
to die shortly afterwards of a broken heart. 

The fate of the remaining leaders is better worth, 
following, and throws a halo of glory over the end of 
an enterprise which had begun in such pitiful dis- 
grace. Georgaki, who was joined by the Albanian 
chief Pharmaki and some two hundred and fifty men, 
made a bold attempt to fight his way through to the 
frontier of Russia. Their fate was accelerated by the 
hostility of the justly enraged peasantry. Hemmed 
in by the Ottoman forces, their whereabouts was al- 
ways betrayed to the enemy, while they themselves 
could obtain neither guides nor information. At last 
they found themselves surrounded in the monastery of 
1 Pouqueville, Regen&ation de la Gr^ce, ii. 489. 



42 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Seko. Georgaki, determined not to fall alive into tlie 
hands of the Turks, held the campanile of the church 
until it was no longer tenable, then fired his pistol into 
the store of powder, and perished in the explosion. 
Pharmaki defended the main buildings of the mon- 
astery for a fortnight longer, and at last, deceived by 
the promises of the Turks, surrendered on condition of 
amnesty and the honours of war. Thirty-three of his 
men, distrusting their enemies, escaped the night be- 
fore the capitulation was carried out. The rest, about 
twenty in number, were shot in cold blood. Pharmaki 
himself was taken to Constantinople, tortured, and be- 
headed. 

In Moldavia, meanwhile, the insurrection had been 
suppressed without difficulty. As soon as it was cer- 
tain that no Kussian aid was to be expected, the boyards 
deposed Michael Soutzos, who fled to Eussia.^ A 
Greek named Pentedekas, however, collected some 
troops, and, in defiance of the boyards, seized the 
Government. His rule was not of long duration. 
Prince George Cantacuzenos, his lieutenant, had sta- 
tioned himself with the Greek troops near the Eussian 
frontier; and when the Turks entered Yassy, on the^ 
25th of June, he crossed the Pruth. His officers and 

1 He went, later on, to Paris, where he acted as Greek 
Minister during the presidency of Count Capodistrias. 



AFFAIR AT SKULENI 43 

soldiers, however, pleading their military honour, re- 
fused to retire without fighting; and, entrenching 
themselves as best they could at Skuleni, they awaited 
the onset of the Turks. The result could not be doubt- 
ful. Advancing with enormous superiority of num- 
bers, the Turks first bombarded and then stormed the 
camp, losing, however, in the engagement a thousand 
men. Of the Greeks some few survivors escaped by 
swimming the Pruth. This gallant affair of Skuleni 
terminated the Hellenic rising in the I^orth, with the 
collapse of which ended also all idea of restoring the 
Greek Empire of the East. 



CHAPTER IV 

The rising" in the Morea — Neglect of precautions by the 
Mussulmans — Activity of Greek agitators — Pappa 
Phlesas — Archbishop Germanos — The beginning of hos- 
tilities — A war of extermination — Leaders of the revolt 
— Kolokotrones — Petrobey Mavromichales — First suc- 
cesses and cruelties of the Greeks — Siege of Monem- 
vasia — Arrival of Prince Demetrius Hypsilanti — Greek 
atrocities at Monemvasia, Vrachori, and Navarino — , 
Siege and massacre of Tripolitza — Revolt of the islands 
— Greek successes and atrocities at sea — Admiral Mia- 
oulis — First employment of fireships by the Greeks — ■ 
Destruction of Galaxidi by the Turks 

The attempt of Hypsilanti in the Principalities had 
never met with the united support of the Hetairists. 
To the directors of the conspiracy it had seemed mora 
promising to raise the standard of Hellenic freedom 
upon Greek soil ; and the movement in the north was 
not allowed to interfere with the preparations for the 
revolt in the Morea. Here, indeed, where the Mo- 
hammedans, sparsely scattered in agricultural settle- 
ments, formed but a small proportion of the popula- 
tion, a feeling of unrest and foreboding had for some 

44 



AGITATION IN THE MOREA 45 

time been abroad, and among the superstitious popu- 
lation this had been intensified, in the autumn of 1820, 
by a terrific earthquake which convulsed the Pelopon- 
nese. Yet, though the Mussulmans were well aware 
of the rising which the rayahs had in contemplation, 
they neglected, with their usual impassiveness, even 
the most ordinary precautions. The impregnable 
towers and fortresses, with which the country was stud- 
ded, would have afforded, had they taken the trouble 
to arm and provision them, irresistible barriers to 
the progress of irregular and ill-armed forces. As it 
was, the storm, when at last it broke, found them ut- 
terly unprepared, and swept them away in the first 
outburst of its fury, before they had time to concert 
measures of resistance. 

The supineness of the Ottomans was paralleled by 
the unpractical character of the Greek preparations; for 
of a consistent and well-pondered scheme there was no 
question. Emissaries of the Hetairia, so-called apostles 
— too often unscrupulous agitators who embezzled the 
money subscribed for the cause — travelled about the 
country, everywhere inflaming the passions of the peo- 
ple against their Turkish masters, and calling on them 
to take up arms for the cause of religion and liberty. 
Of these agitators the best known and most influential 
was the Archimandrite Dikaios, popularly known as 



46 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Pappa Plilesas, a priest whose morals were a scandal to 
tlie clnircli, as his peculations were to the national 
cause, yet, for all that, a brave man, as he proved by 
his heroic death on the field of battle. 

To the violent counsels of Phlesas and his like were 
opposed the views of a more moderate party, compris- 
ing the wealthier and official element of the movement. 
At the head of this stood the Archbishop Germanos of 
Patras, and it included those of the primates who had 
as yet committed themselves to the Greek cause. In 
the autumn of 1820, the directorate of the Hetairia had 
made an attempt to organise the movement in the 
Morea, and seven ephorates or district Governments 
were created under the leadership of Germanos; but 
the scheme was only partially successful. Moderate 
counsels, in times of great popular excitement, are apt 
to produce results opposite to those intended. Lashed 
to madness by the eloquence of the agitators, the 
common people suspected the motives of the official 
leaders of the Hetairia, disregarded their advice, and 
by acts of violence and cruelty precipitated the crisis 
which these had been anxious to postpone. 

The disquieting news from the Morea had deter- 
mined the Porte to place the province under the com- 
mand of Khurshid Pasha, an officer of tried honesty 
and capacity. On his arrival, however, he found the 



BEGINNING OF THE REVOLT 47 

country to all appearance peaceful and settled; and, 
when the Sultan ordered him to take over from the 
hands of the incompetent Ismael the task of blockad- 
ing AH Pasha in Janina, he left the Government, 
without misgiving, in the hands of the Kaimalcam 
Salik Aga. His absence, however, was the signal for 
renewed activity on the part of the conspirators; and, 
at last, the Turkish governor, alarmed at the increas- 
ing agitation, issued a proclamation ordering the Chris- 
tians to surrender their arms, and summoning the bish- 
ops and primates to Tripolitza. By some the invita- 
tion was obeyed, though with misgiving; others, and 
among them the Archbishop Germanos, started on the 
journey, but made one excuse or another for arresting 
it half way. The proclamation of the Kaimakam had, 
indeed, only hastened the crisis it had been intended to 
avert; and the leaders of the revolt seemed on the 
brink of a decision, when it was taken out of their 
hands by the furious impatience of the common people. 
The War of Greek Independence was, in fact, from 
the first a people's war, a revolt of peasants and Klephts 
against an intolerable subjection; and it succeeded 
I only because of this irresistible popular impulse, and in 
I spite of the general corruption and incapacity of its 
so-called leaders. It began, characteristically enough, 
with isolated acts of violence which could hardly be 



48 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

distinguished from brigandage. A Turkish tax-gath- 
erer and his retinue were fallen upon and murdered. 
A band of sixty Albanian mercenaries were surprised 
and butchered by three hundred Greek Klephts. This 
was in March, 1821 ; and in April the insurrection was 
general. Everywhere, as though at a preconcerted 
signal, the peasantry rose, and massacred all the Turks 
— men, women, and children — on whom they could 
lay hands. 

In the Morea shall no Turk be left, 
Nor in the whole wide world. 

Thus rang the song which, from mouth to mouth', 
announced the beginning of a war of extermination. 
The Mussulman population of the Morea had been 
reckoned at twenty-five thousand souls. Within three 
weeks of the outbreak of the revolt, not a Moslem was 
left, save those who had succeeded in escaping into 
the towns. 

Meanwhile the national uprising had found lead- 
ers. On the 2nd of April Archbishop Germanos raised 
the standard of the cross, and occupied Kalavryta; 
and four days later, accompanied by the primates Lon- 
dos, Zaimis, Sotiri, and Papadiamantopulos, and by a 
wild rabble of peasantry armed with scythes, clubs, and 
slings, he marched to Patras. The Turks had been 



I 



RISING AT PATRAS 49 

warned two days earlier of the occurrences at Kala- 
vryta, and had occupied the citadel, whence for forty- 
eight hours they had bombarded the town; while, 
among the burning ruins, fanatical bands of Christians 
and Moslems massacred each other without mercy. 
The arrival of Germanos and the primates was hailed 
with delight by the Greeks ; and it was hoped that the 
citadel would now be speedily reduced. AVith an im- 
posing religious ceremonial a crucifix was erected in the 
central square of the tow^n, and a proclamation issued 
in the name of the Greek leaders, containing merely 
these emphatic words, ^ Peace to the Christians ! Re- 
spect to the consuls! Death to the Turks. ^ ^ The sole 
immediate result, however, of the rising at Patras was 
the destruction of a once flourishing town. The 
Greeks, a mere undisciplined rabble, commanded by 
leaders of no experience, and divided by mutual jeal- 
ousies, could not reduce the citadel ; and when this was 
relieved, on the 15th of April, by Yussuf Pasha, Ger- 
manos and his followers were forced to retire into the 
mountains. Many subsequent attempts were made to 
reduce Patras, but with no better success; and the 
place remained in the hands of the Turks till after the 
retirement of Ibrahim from the Morea in 1828. 

While the bishops and primates were thus raising 

1 Gordon, i. 148. 
4 



50 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

the banner of revolt in the north of the Peloponnese, 
the southern districts were flying to arms under leaders 
of a different stamp. In Messenia Petros Mavromi- 
chales, generally known as Petrobey, Prince or Bey of 
the Maina, a wild and mountainous district in the 
southern spur of Laconia, inhabited by warlike robber 
tribes who boasted their descent from the ancient 
Spartans, took the field at the head of his clan.^ Mke- 
tas, Anagnostaras, and other well-known chiefs of ban- 
ditti joined the revolt; and, above all, Kolokotrones, 
a celebrated Klepht of the Morea, who for some time 
had been an officer in a Greek regiment in English 
service, crossed over from Zante to share in the libera- 
tion of his country. His courage, personal strength, 
and proved skill in the conduct of irregular warfare 
made Kolokotrones a fitting leader of wild warriors; ^ 
and on his arrival he was recognised as the chief of the 
insurrection, a position to which Petrobey's hereditary 
dignity and patriarchal power, though not his easy- 
going and somewhat weak nature, would seem to have 
entitled him. 

1 For an account of the Mainotes, see p. 362. 

2 Cf . Gordon, i. 222. Kolokotrones had in full measure 
the vices as well as the virtues of a robber chief. * His 
military talents as a partisan v^ere unparalleled in Greece; 
at the same time . . . his sordid avarice, and mean ambi- 
tion, . . . severely scourged his country.* 



FIRST GREEK VICTORY 51 

The war was, from the beginning, conducted with- 
out organisation or plan. All the open country was 
speedily in the hands of the insurgents; the Turks 
found themselves surrounded in the towns by fierce 
hordes of peasants and hillsmen; and, as no prepara- 
tions either of arms or provisions had been made, their 
reduction was, in most cases, but a question of days. 
Kalamata, besieged by Petrobey and his Mainotes, had 
fallen even before the arrival of Kolokotrones. Of 
the Ottoman inhabitants, the men were massacred, 
the women and children enslaved; and on the banks 
of the wild mountain torrent that rushed past the 
town twenty-four gorgeously vested priests, surround- 
ed by an army of five thousand warriors, sang a sol- 
emn Te Deum, in celebration of the first victory of the 
war. 

The career of Kolokotrones opened less auspi- 
ciously. His great reputation had gathered about him 
a force of some six thousand men, with which he pro- 
ceeded to lay siege to Karytsena. The appearance of 
five hundred Turkish cavalry was, however, sufficient 
to raise the siege, and put his untried levies to rout. 
The check was only a temporary one; for Kolokot- 
rones, encouraged by a vision of the Virgin, soon 
gathered another army; and, before long, nearly every 
town of the Morea had fallen into the hands of the in- 



62 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

surgents, the Mussulman prisoners being everywhere 
mercilessly put to the sword. 

The conflagration now spread to the north of the 
Gulf of Corinth. At the beginning of April the 
Albanian Christians of Dervenakhoria ^ rose ; and the 
whole of Attica and Boeotia speedily followed suit. 
Salona, instigated by the Klepht Panourias, threw off 
the Ottoman yoke; and, in Levadia, the Mussulmans 
found themselves besieged by the Christian population 
under the heroic Diakos. At the beginning of May, 
the Mussulmans of Athens were surrounded in the 
Acropolis. Missolonghi, a name afterwards so famous 
in the history of the rising, did not declare itself till 
June. 

In the Morea meanwhile, at the beginning of 
April, only a few of the Ottoman fortresses still held 
out; and these were closely invested by hordes of 
savage warriors. Two thousand were blockading 
Coron; three thousand others besieged Modon and 
iNavarino ; four thousand had collected before Patras, 
and ten thousand on the heights round Tripolitza. 
Acrocorinthos was beset by eight thousand insurgents, 
while three thousand of the wild tribesmen of the 
Maina surrounded Monemvasia. 

The last-named fortress was the first to fall. 
1 The ancient Meg-aris. 



SIEGE OF MONEMVASIA 53 

Perched on an inaccessible rock, it could not be taken 
by storm; but the place was insufficiently provisioned, 
and the hope of relief from the sea was cut off by the 
arrival of a Greek squadron. The garrison were soon 
reduced to the most desperate straits; but a practical 
hint of what they might expect, if they surrendered, 
had been given them by the besiegers, and they were 
determined to resist to the uttermost. For the Greeks, 
thinking to intimidate them, had brought ashore some 
wretched prisoners, men and women, whom they had 
captured on the high seas, had led them before the 
walls, and there butchered them in cold blood. After 
this object lesson in the methods of their enemies, fam- 
ine alone could persuade the Mussulmans to surrender. 
Soon their food stores were all exhausted; and for a 
while they subsisted on vermin and the seaweed 
scraped from the rocks; but soon this, too, was no 
more to be obtained; and now, from time to time, 
gaunt and fierce-eyed bands of warriors would issue 
from the fortress in furious sorties, drive back the be- 
siegers, and drag in the bodies of their slain enemies, 
the last ghastly sustenance suggested by their despair. 
At this point. Prince Demetrius Hypsilanti, who 
had recently been appointed commander-in-chief in the 
Morea, interposed. Prince Demetrius, whose arrival 
in Greece had been greeted with unbounded delight, 



54 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

was the brother of Alexander Hypsilanti, whose fail- 
ure in the Principalities has already been recorded; 
and, in spite of the collapse of the northern rising, he 
proclaimed himself the lieutenant of his brother, and 
persisted in looking upon himself as acting under the 
authority of the Hetairia. He was no more remark- 
able for capacity than his brother, but he was superior 
to him in character; and there is no reason to suppose 
that he was otherwise than an honourable, brave, and 
upright man, or that he would not have done all in his 
power to prevent the ghastly and shameful scenes 
which he was too soon to witness.^ 

Hypsilanti now proposed, by the mouth of Prince 
Gregorios Cantacuzenos, terms to the besieged. He 
promised that, if they would cease to prolong a useless 
resistance and peaceably submit, their homes would be 
respected and they would have nothing to fear for their 

1 M. Lemaitre (p. 71), whose bias is obvious, maintains 
the contrary; he accuses Hypsilanti of having foreseen 
what would take place after the capitulation, ' though he 
none the less displayed a lively indignation against his men, 
which gained him the momentary esteem of our officers.* 
Since, even by M. Lemaitre's admission, he had the esteem 
of the French officers on the spot, it should require more 
than the bare assertion of a prejudiced partisan to make 
us believe him guilty of a base and senseless crime. Cf. 
Gordon, History of the Greek Revolution, i. 220. ' Even his 
enemies were forced to confess that, to ardent patriotism, 
he united courage, integrity, and humanity.' 



MASSACRE AT MONEMVASIA 55 

lives; or, in case they should prefer to leave the country, 
that he would place two Spezziot brigs at their disposal, 
with orders to land them on any part of the coast of 
Asia Minor they might select. It is impossible to be- 
lieve that these promises were made in bad faith; but 
Hypsilanti was a vain man, he had but recently been 
placed in a position of unaccustomed command, and he 
probably quite misjudged the amount of authority he 
was likely to have over the undisciplined brigands who 
formed the bulk of his army. This is most probably 
the measure of his responsibility in the awful scenes 
that followed. 

The Turks, weakened by famine, and rendered 
desperate, whether they trusted the promises or not, 
grasped at the last straw of hope that was held out to 
them. They opened the gates of their citadel, and laid 
down their arms. The greater number of them now 
elected to go into exile and the work of embarkation 
began. Six hundred had already gone on board the 
brigs, when, suddenly, the Mainotes burst into the 
town, murdering and outraging all those who had not 
as yet succeeded in reaching the shore, or who, trust- 
ing in the promise of Prince Demetrius that their 
homes and lives would be spared, had chosen to remain 
in the town. Those on the ships were meanwhile car- 
ried out to sea, and, after a voyage of some hours, were 



56 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

landed, not on the coast of Asia Minor, but on a (ieso- 
late rock in the ^gean; where, after being stripped 
of their clothes, insulted, and beaten, they were left, 
without food or covering, to perish/ A few were saved 
by the exertions of a French merchant, M. Bonfort, 
who, hearing of their case, chartered an Austrian ship, 
and took off those who survived. It has been very 
usual, in speaking of atrocities committed by the 
Greeks, to condone them by talking of ^ the cruel re- 
prisals of a wild people for cruel wrongs/ Let us then 
see what manner of men the Mussulmans of Monem- 
vasia were. Admiral Haglan, commanding the 
French squadron in the Levant, in a report sent home 
to his Government, in 1821, says: ' In the fortress of 
Malvoise (Monemvasia) were found three hundred 
Greeks, who had not been molested in any way by the 
Turks. On the contrary, these had treated them, dur- 
ing the famine, like brothers, and had always respected 
their churches; but the Mainotes and the Greeks of 
the Morea did not repay them in kind when they took 
the town ; they committed all sorts of infamies in the 
mosques of the Turks.' ^ 

1 Archives du Ministere de la Marine, 1821; Lemaitre, p. 74. 

2 Lemaitre, p. 73. I should not have ventured to tell this 
story on the authority of so tierce a Mussulman as M. 
Lemaitre, had he not substantiated it by citing- unimpeach- 
able authorities. The account in Finlay (i. 261) is slightly 



MASSACRE AT VRACHORl 57 

Everywhere, indeed, the conduct of the insurrec- 
tion was characterised by the same treachery and un- 
bounded cruelty. It may perhaps be permissible to 
make allowances for the excesses of a wild people, 
whose passionate hatred, suppressed for centuries, had 
at last found vent. But nothing can excuse the callous 
treachery which too often preceded deeds of blood; 
and since Europe passed a heavy judgment on the cruel 
reprisals of the Turk, historical justice does not allow 
us to hide the crimes by which they were instigated. 
Let two more examples suffice. 

Vrachori was the most important town of Western 
Hellas. It contained, besides the Christian population, 
some five hundred Mussulman families and about two 
hundred Jews, people for the most part of some wealth 
and consideration. The Ottoman garrison consisted 
of six hundred Albanian mercenaries. On the 9th of 
June the town was attacked by about two thousand 
Armatoli, w^ho were afterwards increased to four thou- 
sand. The Albanians, seeing themselves outnumbered, 
and having, through their chief ISTourka, relations with 
the Armatoli, opened negotiations with the Greeks, 
and were allowed to march out with arms and goods. 

less horrible; that in Gordon (i. 228) differs, to the advan- 
tage of the Greeks; but the authorities quoted by M. Le- 
maitre were not accessible to the author. 



58 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Before leaving, however — ^thinking, doubtless, that it 
was a pity all the spoil should fall into the hands of 
the Greeks — they plundered the Turks, and forced the 
Jews to give up to them all the money and jewellery 
in their possession. With the wealth of which they 
were thus deprived these poor wretches had hoped to 
purchase the protection of the captains of the Arma- 
toli; and as soon as they could do so, they informed the 
Greeks of I^ourka's treachery, and laid down their 
arms on promise of personal safety. That promise was 
immediately violated. The massacre commenced with 
the Jews. Men, women, and children were murdered 
without mercy, after being tortured to make them 
reveal their supposed hidden treasures. The poorer 
Mussulmans shared the same fate; and only a few of 
the wealthier families were spared by the Greek lead- 
ers, who hoped to hold them to ransom. 

The horrors that followed the surrender of !N'ava- 
rino on August 19, 1821, were only less revolting be- 
cause they were perpetrated against the will of the 
leaders, who had made preparations for transporting the 
Turkish prisoners to Egypt. ^ While the confiscated 

1 Cf., however, Gordon, i. 231. He adds, in a footnote, 
tliat one of the negotiators of the capitulation boasted to 
him that he had succeeded in purloining and destroying 
the copy given to the Turks, that no proof might remain 
of any such transaction having been concluded. 



MASSACRE AT NAVAEINO 59 

valuables of the Turks were being carried on board a 
Greek ship in the harbour, a dispute arose as to the 
way in which the women were being searched/ A 
general massacre ensued. Phrantzes,^ a Greek eccle- 
siastic who was present, describes the scene with horror 
and indignation. * Women, wounded with musket 
balls, rushed into the sea, seeking to escape, and were 
deliberately shot. Mothers, robbed of their clothes, 
with infants in their arms, plunged in the water to con- 
ceal themselves from shame, and were then made a 
mark for inhuman riflemen. Greeks seized infants 
from their mothers' breasts, and dashed them against 
the rocks. Children, three or four years old, were 
hurled living into the sea, and left to drown.' Let us 
be just. The awful massacre of Chios, which roused 
the public opinion of Europe against Turkey, and 
made the independence of Greece a possibility, was a 
great crime, as it was a great mistake; but it was not 
without its motive, or its justification, according to the 
wild code of barbarous peoples. 

The other atrocities of the Greeks, however, paled 
before the awful scenes which followed the storming 
of Tripolitza. Throughout the summer and early au- 
tumn of 1821, the town had held out against the be- 

1 Lemaitre, p. 76, is more explicit. 

2 Quoted in Finlay, i. 263. 



60 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

siegers. A force had been sent by Khurshid Pasha to 
its relief, but this had been defeated by Kolokotrones 
at Yaltetsi, and the place, which had waited in vain 
for the arrival of the Ottoman fleet with supplies, was 
reduced to the last stage of starvation. At the end of 
September it was obvious that the fall of the town 
could not be postponed for many days. 

At this time the command-in-chief of the army 
was held by Prince Demetrius Hypsilanti; and had 
he remained before Tripolitza, it is possible that the 
horrors which followed might have been avoided, and 
the Greek cause saved from an indelible disgrace. 
Unfortunately, however, the Greek leaders, for their 
own purposes, wanted him out of the way; and he 
allowed himself to be persuaded to go to the north of 
the Morea, to prevent the Turks landing troops from 
the Gulf of Corinth. The insurgent chiefs took ad- 
vantage of his absence to prepare for the surrender of 
the town by selling promises of protection to the richer 
inhabitants, and by opening, during the negotiations, 
a brisk trade in provisions, at exorbitant prices, with 
the starving townspeople. Meanwhile, also, Elmas 
Bey, who commanded the Albanian garrison, was ar- 
ranging special terms with Kolokotrones for himself 
and his men. The cupidity of the chiefs dragged on 
the negotiations, till the soldiers, suspecting that they 



STORMING OF TRIPOLITZA 61 

were being cheated of their prey, took the matter into 
their own hands, and stormed the town. For three 
days the miserable inhabitants were given over to the 
lust and cruelty of a mob of savages. [N'either sex nor 
age was spared. Women and children were tortured 
before being put to death. So great was the slaughter 
that Kolokotrones himself says that, when he entered 
the town, from the gate to the citadel his horse's hoofs 
never touched the ground. His path of triumph was 
carpeted with corpses.^ At the end of two days, the 
wretched remnant of the Mussulmans were deliber- 
ately collected, to the number of some two thousand 
souls, of every age and sex, but principally women and 
children, were led out to a ravine in the neighbouring 
mountains, and there butchered like cattle. 

The fall of Tripolitza completed the first phase of 
the Greek rising. ITauplia, Patras, and one or two 
other fortresses still held out; but, within six months 
of the beginning of the revolt, the Greeks were prac- 
tically masters of all the country to the south of the 
Isthmus of Corinth. 

In Northern Greece, meanwhile, the fortune of 
the war had been more varied, and the first successes 



* Kolokotrones, Airjyrja-is ^Vfi^dvrav, p. 82. *To aXoyo fxov 
OTTO Tflt TfixT) ((OS TO. (Tapdyia dip fnamaf yrj.* 



62 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

of the Greeks liad been followed speedily by a series 
of reverses. Diakos and the Bishop of Salona, who, 
after the capture of Levadia, had advanced to Ther- 
mopylse, were here defeated, on the 5th of May, by 
Khurshid's lieutenants, Omer Yrioni and Mehemet. 
Diakos and the Bishop were both captured and exe- 
cuted; and the victorious pashas pressed on across the 
defiles of Mount Oeta. At the Khan of Gravia they 
were intercepted by the famous captain of Armatoli, 
Odysseus, who was compelled to retire, after a stub- 
born resistance. The Ottomans now recaptured Le- 
vadia, burnt it to the ground, and inflicted another de- 
feat on Odysseus at Scripu. Instead, however, of ad- 
vancing at once to the relief of the Acropolis, they 
wasted a month in inaction, and allowed time for the 
Greeks to recover. All the attempts of the insurgents 
to capture the Acropolis had hitherto failed; and, save 
for the scarcity of water, the fortress would have been 
impregnable. As it was, it held out until the rumour of 
the Ottoman advance spread a panic among the be- 
siegers, who rapidly melted away; and on the 30th of 
June, Omer Yrioni, at the head of some two thousand 
troops, relieved the garrison, after a blockade of eigHty- 
three days. 

Meanwhile Mehemet Pasha had been awaiting at 
Thebes the arrival of strong reinforcements before be- 



GREEK VICTORY AT VASILIKA 63 

ginning a regular advance into the Morea, for the pur- 
pose of raising the siege of Tripolitza. The supineness 
of the Turks allowed the Greeks to form their plans 
without interruption ; and the passes of Oeta and Par- 
nassus were occupied by Odysseus and other Rumeliot 
captains of renown. At the end of xVugust an Otto- 
man army of some five thousand men, under the three 
Pashas, Bayram, Memish, and Shah in Ali, advanced 
through the pass of Thermopylae, and on the 4th of 
September attacked the Greeks at Yasilika, on the 
road to Levadia. The latter waited until the Turks 
had entered a defile of Mount Oeta, when they fell 
upon them on either flank, pouring a hail of bullets 
into their ranks, embarrassed as they were with cav- 
alry, baggage, and a train of artillery. The victory of 
the Greeks was complete. Encouraged by a rumour 
of the arrival of Odysseus, the Armatoli charged the 
broken ranks of the Ottomans, sword in hand, and 
routed them, with the loss of eight hundred men.^ 

After this defeat, and the news of the fall of 
Tripolitza, Omer Yrioni commenced his retreat from 
Attica; and the Turks withdrew across the mountains 
into Thessaly. 

In West Hellas and Epirus, during the same period, 
the interest of the war had centred round the last stand 

1 Gordon, i. 279. 



64 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPEISTDENCE 

of Ali Pasha in Janina, and the activity of the Suliots. 
Here the struggle had not yet assumed the aspect of a 
purely Greek and Christian revolt; and the Snliots 
under the brave Marko Botzares had formed an alli- 
ance against the Ottomans, not only with the Greek 
captains of Armatoli, but with those of the Albanian 
Mussulman chiefs who were devoted to the cause of 
Ali Pasha. Together they had made considerable 
headway against the Turks, and had all but conquered 
the important town of Arta, when rumours of the mas- 
sacre of Mussulmans at Yrachori reached the Albanian 
chiefs, who, realising now the true nature of the revolt, 
threw in their lot with their co-religionists. Although 
this rendered any active policy against the Turks im- 
possible, West Hellas remained, pending the fall of 
Ali Pasha and the reduction of the Suliots, in the 
hands of the Greeks. 

By the end of the year 1821, then, the Hellenic 
cause was everywhere triumphant. The Turks, it is 
true, still occupied the important island of Euboea, and, 
on the mainland, held the Acropolis and the fortress 
of Lepanto; while, in the Peloponnese, ISTauplia, 
Patras, Coron, and Modon still defied all the efforts 
of the Greeks to take them, and the castles command- 
ing the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth remained in 
Ottoman hands. With these exceptions, however, all 



THE WAR AT SEA 65 

Greece to the soutli of the Thessalian frontier had been 
freed from the Mussulman yoke. v 

In achieving this result the activity of the Greeks 
at sea had played no inconsiderable part. As early 
as the 7th of April, the important island of Spezzia 
had declared for the Hellenic cause, and a squadron 
of eight brigs was at once fitted out for a cruise along 
the coast of the Peloponnese. Off Milos they surprised 
and captured a Turkish corvette and brig. The Mus- 
sulmans on board were taken to Spezzia, publicly tort- 
ured and executed.^ This was the first episode in the 
naval struggle which reproduced at sea the heroism 
and the cruelty of the war on land. On the 23rd of 
April Psara followed the example of Spezzia : an event 
of great strategical importance to the Greeks, because 
the Psariot sea force was enough to prevent the Turks 
of Asia Minor sending reinforcements to their com- 
patriots in the Morea. Hitherto Hydra, the most im- 
portant of the ^ naval ' islands, had held back, owing 
to the timidity of the ruling oligarchy. On the 28th 
of April, however, the people rose, under the dema- 
gogue Oeconomos, ousted the oligarchy, and hoisted 
the Greek flag. The islands now combined their 
forces in a single fleet, under Jakonaki Tombazes, 
a worthy and honourable man, though a poor admiral. 

1 Finlay, i. 209. 
5 



66 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPEI^DEW^CE 

iNot even a ISTelson, however, could have kept dis- 
cipline in a fleet of whicli each ship was a dem- 
ocratic community in whose management every 
common seaman had a voice. The Greek war vessels 
were in fact little better than pirates; and the war 
at sea became, in its want of plan and in its incidents 
of horror, a counterpart of that on land. A single in- 
stance may suffice. Two Hydriot brigs, commanded 
by Sachtouris and Pinotzi, captured a Turkish ship 
laden with a valuable cargo, and carrying a number 
of passengers. Among these was a recently deposed 
Sheik-ul-Islam, or patriarch of the Orthodox Mussul- 
mans, who was said to be going on pilgrimage to Mecca, 
accompanied by all his family. He was known to have 
belonged to the tolerant party in the Ottoman Govern- 
ment; and, indeed, it was his efforts to prevent the 
cruel reprisals which, at Constantinople, followed the 
news of the massacres at Galatz, Yassy, and in the 
Morea, which had brought him into disfavour, and 
caused his exile. There were also several other Turkish 
families on board. The Hydriots murdered all in cold 
blood; helpless old men, ladies of rank, beautiful 
slaves, and little children were butchered on deck like 
cattle. The venerable old man, whose crime had been 
an excess of zeal on behalf of the Greeks, was forced 
to see his family outraged and murdered before his 



MURDER OF THE SHEIK-UL-ISLAM 67 

eyes, for, with a refinement of cruelty, lie was spared 
to the last. ' An attempt was afterwards made to ex- 
tenuate this unmerciful conduct, by asserting that it 
was an act of revenge. This assertion is false. Those 
who perpetrated these cruelties did not hear of the 
execution of their Orthodox patriarch until after they 
had murdered the Orthodox patriarch of their enemies. 
The truth is that, both by land and sea, the war com- 
menced as a war of extermination. Fanatical pedants 
talked of reviving the glories and the cruelties of classic 
times as inseparable consequences of Greek liberty. 
They told how the Athenians had exterminated the 
inhabitants of Melos, and how the Spartans had put all 
their Athenian prisoners to death after their victory at 
Aegospotamos.' ^ 

The capture of this valuable prize was of little ser- 
vice to the Greek cause which the cruelty that attended 
it had sullied ; for the sailors refused, on their return to 
Hydra, to share the booty in accordance with the na- 
tional rules, and insisted on keeping it all to them- 
selves. This provoked such bitterness of feeling that 
the fleet was for the time broken up, and no united ac- 
tion against the Turks was possible. 

Meanwhile the Ottoman Government had been 
thrown into the greatest difficulties by the revolt of 
1 Finlay, i. 215. 



68 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

the islands, and the necessity of fitting out a fleet 
against the very people from whom it had hitherto 
drawn its naval recruits. The Turks themselves were 
no sailors, and, invincible as warriors on land, were 
helpless at sea. They were now forced to man their 
ships with untrained fishermen and boatmen, and a 
motley crowd of Algerine pirates and Maltese and 
Genoese adventurers. Under these untoward circum- 
stances, though the revolt of Samos on the 30th of 
April had impressed upon them again the necessity 
for action, it was not till the 3rd of June that the 
Ottoman fleet left the Dardanelles. It consisted even 
now of only two line-of-battle ships, three frigates, 
and three sloops of war, and these were undermanned, 
and sailed by crews who had but a rudimentary knowl- 
edge of seamanship. 

The Greek fleet had meanwhile divided into two 
squadrons, of which the larger, consisting of thirty- 
seven sail, under Admiral Tombazes, cruised in the 
Archipelago, with a view to intercepting the Ottoman 
fleet. The other, which sailed to blockade Patras, and 
watch the coasts of Epirus, was commanded by 
Andreas Miaoulis, a name destined to become famous 
in the annals of the war. 

The character of this remarkable man raises him 
high above the crowd of self-seeking ruffians by whom 



ANDREAS MIAOULIS 69 

he was, for the most part, surrounded. He was the 
Kallikratidas of modern Greece; and to him apply 
perfectly the words in which Grote paints the character 
of the noble Spartan: ' Besides perfect courage, en- 
ergy, and incorruptibility, he was distinguished for 
two qualities, both of them very rare among eminent 
Greeks: entire straightforwardness of dealing, and a 
Pan-Hellenic patriotism alike comprehensive, exalted, 
and merciful.^ ^ While most of the other leaders of 
the revolt were thinking only how they could best at- 
tain to wealth and power, he devoted the whole of his 
private fortune to the cause of Greece ; and even when 
all his efforts to inspire his colleagues and his crews 
with some of his own disinterested patriotism failed, 
his unshaken firmness might well have earned for him 
a guerdon similar to that once bestowed by the Roman 
Senate on the Consul who had shared in the crushing 
defeat of Cannae and yet ^ had not despaired of Rome.' 
Even by the bitterest critics of the Greeks he is ex- 
cepted from the condemnation which is the lot of all 
the rest. By one of these a story characteristic of him 
is told.^ The men of his squadron had been pillaging 

1 Grote, History of Greece, ed. 1883, vii. 403. 

2 The French Captain Peyronnet. He adds: ' L'admira- 
tion dont j'etais rempli pour cet homme-la s'est sauvee du 
naufrage de mon enthousiasme pour ses compatriotes, et 
meme pour la cause des Grecs.' Lem. p. 68. 



70 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

on shore, without his having the power to stop them. 
On complaint being made to him, he deplored that he 
was powerless to prevent the outrages, but asked at 
how much the damage was reckoned. The reply was: 
' Six hundred piastres,' and Miaoulis thereupon paid 
the money out of his own pocket. Amid the sordid 
chicanery and lurid horrors of the war, it may per- 
haps be excusable to have lingered awhile over this 
brighter picture. 

The squadron under Tombazes had fallen in with 
the Ottoman fleet; but though superior in numbers, 
the Greeks were very inferior in size and in weight of 
ordnance, and they did not venture to come to close 
quarters. Taking advantage of their more easily man- 
aged craft, they manceuvred just outside the range of 
the Ottoman guns, waiting for an opportunity to 
strike. This soon presented itself. In the early morn- 
ing of the 5th of June, one of the Turkish battle-ships, 
which had been separated from its companions during 
the night, was observed to the north of Chios, making 
all sail in the direction of Samos. The Greeks imme- 
diately gave chase; and it did not take long for their 
light vessels to overhaul the slow-sailing Ottoman. 

The Turkish captain, seeing that he had no chance 
of regaining the squadron, now changed his course, 
and made for the Bay of Eresos on the JSTorth-West 



USE OF FIRE-SHIPS 71 

coast of Mitylene, where he cast anchor and cleared 
for action. He had scarcely finished his preparations 
when the Greeks attacked him. Sailing under the 
stern of the Ottoman, so as to avoid his broadside, 
they poured in a hail of shot; but their guns were 
of small calibre, and the bullets for the most part 
buried themselves harmlessly in the solid timbers of 
the Turkish battle-ship. 

Tombazes, recognising after a while the futility of 
this method of attack, gave the order to cease fire, and 
summoned a council of war to meet on his flag-ship. 
It was now determined to have recourse to fire-ships, 
which it was remembered had been employed with 
such signal success by the Russians against the Otto- 
man fleet at the battle of Tchesme in 1770. A Psariot 
captain consented, for a sum of 40,000 piastres, to 
sacrifice his brig for the purpose; and this "was now 
hastily prepared, and, manned by a crew of twenty 
men, who had been secured by the promise of a bounty 
of a hundred dollars each, it Avas despatched during the 
night against the enemy. It was, however, timidly 
manoeuvred, was ignited too soon, and drifted, mag- 
nificently ablaze, out to sea, without coming anywhere 
near the Ottoman ship. 

Soon after this failure, two more fire-ships having 
arrived from Psara, another attempt was made, but 



72 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

with no better success. At last, however, a Psariot 
named Pappanikolo succeeded in steering liis hrulot 
into the Turkish ship, and jamming its bowsprit under 
the prow of the Ottoman. Setting light to the fuse, 
he jumped with his crew into a boat, and rowed away 
while the fire-ship burst into a blaze. The flames, 
driven by the stiff breeze over the Turkish ship, soon 
enveloped it in a mass of fire. A couple of boatloads 
of the Ottoman sailors succeeded in getting clear of 
the burning vessel; and many of the crew who could 
swim leaped overboard and made their way ashore. 
But between three and four hundred souls are sup- 
posed to have perished on board the doomed ship.^ 
The 'secret of the war' had been discovered; and 
this conflagration was ' the naval beacon of Greek 
liberty.' 

The disasters of the Ottomans at sea were some- 
what compensated for by the destruction, shortly be- 
fore the fall of Tripolitza, of Galaxidi, a flourishing 
seaport in the Gulf of Corinth. This was attacked on 
the 1st of October by a Turkish squadron under Ismail 
Djebel Akhdar, who took advantage of the longer 
range of the Ottoman ordnance to silence the Galaxi- 
diot battery and cannonade the town, without himself 

1 Cf. account from MS. journal of Admiral Tombazes. 
Gordon, i. 254 (Appendix). 



DESTRUCTION OF GALAXIDI 73 

coming within gunshot of the Greeks. Under these 
circumstances, no effective resistance was possible ; and 
the victory of the Turks was complete. The town, the 
boats on the beach, and the vessels which were aground, 
were burnt. The whole of the remainder of the Gal- 
axidiot navy, which chanced unfortunately to be all in 
the harbour at the time of the attack, fell into the 
hands of the Ottomans, who carried off no less than 
thirty-four brigs and schooners.^ Hypsilanti, who was 
at the head of a considen-ble force on the opposite 
shore, was compelled to witness the fate of Galaxidi, 
without being able to do anything to prevent it. 



Note. — The Greek seamen have been accused of 
cowardice as well as cruelty. It is pointed out that they 
seldom ventured to approach boldly within range of the 
Ottoman guns, and stand up to their enemy in fair fight, 
and never so much as dreamed of laying their vessels 
alongside even a disabled enemy and taking it by the 
board. To the first of these criticisms the answer is pro- 
vided by the action in the Bay of Eresos; for this proved 
the weak ordnance of the Greeks to be powerless against 
the heavy Turkish ships. When the combatants met on 
more equal terms, the Greeks proved themselves not de- 
ficient in courage; as is shown by their gallant attack, 

1 Finlay, i. 272, following* Gordon, i. 250, who, however, 
calls Ismail, Ismail GihraUar. Cf. Lem. 157. 



74 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

under Captain Hastings, on the Ottoman squadron in tlie 
Bay of Salona, later on in the war. As for boarding, to 
make this possible some proportion is necessary between 
the size of the combatants; and for the Greeks to have 
laid their little brigs and sloops alongside the great bat- 
tleships of the Turks might have been magnificent, but 
it would not have been war. The object of war is not 
to exhibit one's prowess, but to disable the enemy as 
speedily as possible, with the least amount of damage 
to oneself. This fact explains and Justifies the use of 
fire-ships, which the Greeks were accused of using only 
because they w^ere too cowardly to employ other means 
of attack. As to the amount of courage needed for their 
effective employment, this surely could hardly be exag- 
gerated. Brulots were to the wooden navies what tor- 
pedo-boats are in our own day; and no naval officer 
would deny that, for the effective handling of torpedo 
craft in time of war, nerves of steel and a swift and un- 
erring judgment are absolutely essential. It is true that 
the crews of the fire-ships almost invariably escaped; but 
this was due, not to the inevitable conditions of this 
method of warfare, but to the bad watch kept on board 
the Ottoman ships, and the panic which the approach of 
a inilot generally created. 



i 



CHAPTEE V 

Turkish reprisals — Execution of the Patriarch of Constan- 
tinople — Effect of the news on European opinion — Pro- 
test of Russia — Suppression of the revolt to the north of 
Thermopylae — Anarchy in Greece — Attempts to form 
Governments — First Congress of Arg-os — The Constitu- 
tion of Epidaurus — Mavrocordatos elected President 

The crimes by which, at the outbreak of the rebellion, 
the Greeks disgraced themselves and their cause were 
not without their expiation. The massacre of Tripo- 
litza was followed by a pestilence, due to the masses of 
unburied corpses, which swept off thousands of the 
Greeks; and the vengeance of Sultan Mahmoud com- 
pleted what the pestilence had left undone. 

When the news of the Greek atrocities in the 
Morea reached Constantinople, the slumbering embers 
of Mohammedan fanaticism burst into flame, and 
raged with uncontrollable fury. The perpetrators of 
the outrages might be beyond their reach, but through- 
out the Ottoman empire was scattered a large Greek 

population, on whom the Turks might execute a justice 

75 



76 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

not accustomed to discriminate between the innocent 
and tlie guilty. Sultan Malimoud himself proved both 
his energy of character and the terrible intensity of his 
wrath. !N'ot content with ordering the arrest of mem- 
bers of the Hetairia wherever he could lay hands on 
them, he determined by a signal act of vengeance to 
strike terror into the whole Greek world. According 
to the Ottoman theory of government, the higher 
State officials are personally responsible for the con- 
duct of those they rule. Already, on the 16th of April, 
Musuri, the Greek Dragoman to the Porte, had been 
led forth in his official robes to execution. A more 
terrible example was to follow. The Patriarch of Con- 
stantinople was, as has been already explained, at once 
the civil and religious head of the Greek nation. As 
the civil head, he was responsible to the Ottoman 
Government for the conduct of the Greeks; as the 
religious head, he was the centre of all that was to 
them most venerable and sacred. The war had been 
proclaimed from the first as a crusade and a war of 
extermination. Sultan Mahmoud now wished to prove 
by a signal example that he took up the challenge. In 
the early morning of the 22nd of April the Patriarch 
Gregorios celebrated solemn mass, as usual, surrounded 
by his prelates. After the service a synod was assem- 
bled, and a messenger from the Palace read a firman 



EXECUTION OF THE PATRIARCH 77 

of the Sultan deposing Gregorios, and ordering the as- 
sembled bishops to proceed at once to the election of a 
new patriarch. The terrified prelates, with tears and 
trembling, had no choice but to obey; and, while the 
new Head of the Orthodox Church was receiving the 
investiture of his office, the venerable Gregorios, still 
in his sacred robes, was led forth and hung before the 
gate of the patriarchal palace. The body, after being 
suspended for a day or two, was cut down and handed 
over to the Jews, to be dragged through the streets and 
thrown into the sea. Picked up by a Greek ship, it was 
recognised and carried to Odessa, where it was buried 
by the Russian authorities with the honours of a 
martyr.^ 

For a moment it seemed as though this act of bar- 
barous vengeance would defeat its own ends, by break- 
ing up the concert of the Powers and provoking an anti- 
Turkish war. A thrill of horror and indignation ran 
through all Christendom. To the Emperor Francis it 
was almost as though the Pope himself had been mur- 
dered. In Pussia especially, the whole population was 
deeply stirred, and, at the slightest word, would have 

1 It is characteristic of the theological amenities for 
which Constantinople has in all ag-es been distinguished, 
that the Greek ' Catholics ' are said to have sung a solemn 
Te Deiim to celebrate the death of the heretical PatriarcJj. 
Mendelssohn, i. 214. 



78 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

risen as one man to revenge the death of the Orthodox 
Patriarch. Had Alexander I. been guided by the sen- 
timent of his subjects, had he even been in Russia at 
the time, war could hardly have been delayed. As it 
was, he was too deeply committed to the policy of Met- 
ternich; and, after wavering awhile, he contented 
himself with ordering his ambassador, Stroganoif, to 
present a vigorous protest to the Sultan, and withdraw 
from Constantinople. To Metternich a massacre more 
or less beyond the eastern borders of Austria was a 
matter of little moment compared with the peace of 
Europe and the policy of reaction of which he was the 
director. To Castlereagh, too, a period of repose 
seemed absolutely essential to Europe, after the ex- 
haustion of the jSTapoleonic wars; and a proposal for a 
joint demonstration of the Powers at Constantinople, 
for the protection of the Christians, failed owing to 
the strenuous opposition of Lord Strangford, the Brit- 
ish ambassador. For the time Turkey was freed from 
all fear of European intervention between her and her 
rebellious vassal. 

Meanwhile the course of the struggle itself was 
once more demonstrating the wisdom of the Machia- 
vellian maxim, ^ ISTo half measures.' Outside Greece 
proper and the Archipelago, the ruthless severity of 
the Sultan had produced its effect, and, by the begin- 



QUESTION OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 79 

ning of 1822, such isolated risings as had occurred 
were all suppressed, and the country to the north of 
Janina and of Mount Pelion restored to the Ottoman 
allegiance. To the south of this line, the no less 
* thorough ' policy of the Greeks had been similarly 
crowned with success. All the Morea, except the for- 
tresses of ^auplia, Coron, Modon, and Patras, was now 
in their hands; and to the north of the Gulf of Co- 
rinth, they were masters of the country as far as the 
Gulf of Arta and the pass of Thermopylge. From a 
people of slaves the Greeks had become a nation. 

The problem that now presented itself to them was 
to evolve out of the anarchy of the insurrection a sys- 
tem of national government: a problem which, un- 
fortunately for them, they were far less capable of 
solving than they were of carrying on a guerilla war. 
That sectional patriotism, with its local feuds and jeal- 
ousies, which had proved the ruin of the ancient civili- 
sation of Hellas, was quite as characteristic of the 
modern Greeks; while the sweeping away of the Ot- 
toman power removed the only paramount authority, 
and gave full play to all centrifugal forces. The com- 
munal organisation, untouched by the revolt, served 
indeed still to preserve order among the people; but 
the confiscation of Turkish property to the public use 
liad placed vast sums in the hands of the rebels, and as 



80 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPEl^DENCE 

there was as yet no centralised fiscal system, this fell 
into the hands of the primates and military leaders, 
who too often used it to further the ends of their own 
private pleasure or ambition. The result was a com- 
plete anarchy, which nothing but the habits of obedi- 
ence of the people to their local authorities, and the 
bond of union which they had in their common relig- 
ious enthusiasm and hatred of the Turk, could have 
prevented from ending in the ruin of the Greek cause. 
Every primate, or bishop, or military chief assumed 
himself to have succeeded, in his own locality, to the 
Sultan's prerogative. Under them was the whole mili- 
tary, fiscal, and criminal government of the various dis- 
tricts, and as yet they owed no allegiance to any higher 
authority. Nor had there been the slightest effort to 
reform the most crying abuses of the Ottoman system. 
JSTothing proves more clearly that the revolt of the 
peasantry was motived by religion rather than politi- 
cal grievances than that, after their success, no im- 
provement was made in the financial arrangements of 
the country, or in the method of collecting taxes ; that 
nothing was done for the security of property, to es- 
tablish law-courts, or to arrange for a publication of 
accounts.* In the local centres, indeed, public opinion 
put some check on the worst abuses; but, in the wider 
1 Finlay, i. 281. 



THE SENATE OF THE PELOPONNESE 81 

sphere of which a patriotism purely local could take no 
account, corruption and knavery reigned supreme. 
The political history of this period is a disgusting 
record of petty jealousies, intrigues, shameless pecula- 
tions and contemptible incompetence; and only the 
heroic patience and indomitable fortitude of the people 
at large can relieve the sordidness of the picture. Xo 
one seems to have had any idea of the right way to set 
about constructing a constitution. That of England 
had been in its origin a ^ concentration of local machin- 
ery,' and had the Greek constitutions similarly been 
based on the existing communal system, they would 
have had more chance of success. As it was, the at- 
tempts at constitution-making of the successive I^a- 
tional Assemblies, when they did meet, were but plau- 
sible schemes evolved by pedantic doctrinaires out of 
their own inner consciousness, and were for the most 
part still-born. 

Meanwhile the demand of the people for some sort 
of central executive could not be neglected; and on 
June 7, 1821, there was formed the Gerousia, or Sen- 
ate of the Peloponnese, a purely oligarchical commit- 
tee based upon no popular suffrage, of which the au- 
thority was to last till the fall of Tripolitza. This 
derived especial power from the co-operation of Arch- 
bishop Germanos, whose eloquence, assumed sanctity, 
6 



82 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

and energy at the beginning of the revolt had given 
him great popularity. The subsequent career of this 
prelate, however, did little to fulfil the hopes excited 
by its commencement; and his popularity soon waned, 
when it was seen that his religious zeal was but a mask 
to hide unbounded pride, ambition, and love of pleas- 
ure. He soon cast aside his pretended sanctity, and 
assumed the airs and gorgeous attire of a barbarian 
prince. This role he had not the qualities necessary 
to maintain; and he was soon pushed aside by others, 
no less unscrupulous, but more able than himself.^ 

The arrival, on the 22nd of June, of Prince De- 
metrius Hypsilanti introduced a new factor into the 
situation. Holding that his brother Alexander, as 
chief of the Hetairia, was thereby ipso facto Prince 
of Greece, he believed himself entitled to act as his 
viceroy, and announced himself as empowered to act 
as lieutenant-governor of the country on his brother's 
behalf. In -^dew of the already notorious ill-success 
of Prince Alexander in the Principalities, the preten- 
sion was foolish; but Demetrius was understood to 
be supported by Eussia, and received, therefore, an 
enthusiastic welcome from the soldiers and common 
people. By the oligarchs, headed by Germanos, on 
the other hand, who were jealous of outside interfer- 
1 Gordon, i. 237. 



DEMETRIUS HYPSILANTI 83 

ence, he was bitterly opposed; and his arrival was fol- 
lowed by a war of intrigues and recriminations. At 
last, he made a bold move to induce the people to de- 
clare actively in his favour. He suddenly left the 
camp before Tripolitza, and issued a proclamation 
stating that all his efforts on behalf of Greece had 
been rendered nugatory by the selfish opposition of 
the primates and senators. The stratagem was suc- 
cessful. On the news of his departure, the soldiers 
rose in arms; and for awhile the lives of some of the 
oligarchs were in danger. Order was only restored 
by their promising to submit to the authority of Prince 
Demetrius, who was now brought back in triumph 
from Leondari, and established in undisputed power. 

Had he possessed the ability, he was now in the 
position to have become ' the Washington of Greece ; ' 
but he was, in fact, too incompetent to retain the au- 
thority he had won. Bit by bit this was usurped by his 
lieutenants, or resumed by the primates; and since 
he was in the eyes of the common people supreme, 
the misdeeds of his supposed agents were laid at his 
door, and so, with the gTadual decline of his power, 
his popularity also waned. 

In the midst of the confusion caused by these quar- 
rels and intrigues, on the 3rd of August, another 
Phanariot Greek, Alexander Mavrocordatos, also ar- 



84 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

rived in Greece. He had already acquired at the court 
of Karadja, Hospodar of Wallachia, a considerable 
reputation for political ability, which, however, his 
long career in the service of Greece did little to justify. 
He was known, moreover, as an honourable man and 
a sincere patriot. But neither his reputation nor his 
honesty availed to reduce the chaos which he found 
to order; and after struggling awhile unsuccessfully 
with the confusion, he caused himself to be nominated 
administrator of "West Hellas, and left for Misso- 
longhi. Here, without further authority from the 
central Government, he proceeded to summon a meet- 
ing of deputies from the provinces of Acarnania, 
zEtolia, "Western Locris, and the part of Epirus which 
had joined the Greek cause. Theodore Kegris, who 
was acting as administrator in East Hellas, convoked 
a similar meeting at Salona, of deputies from Attica, 
Boeotia, Megaris, Phocis, and Eastern Locris. At Mis- 
solonghi a senate was appointed to conduct the execu- 
tive government; and a corresponding body at Salona 
took the high-sounding title of the Areopagus. 

Meanwhile Hypsilanti had made another bid for 
popularity, and summoned the l!Tational Convention 
to Argos, where it met in December. From the out- 
set it was violently opposed by the oligarchy of pri- 
mates and military chiefs; and since, in Argos, these 



FIRST CONGRESS OF ARGOS 85 

had, througli their armed followers, complete control, 
the Assembly was moved to Piada, not far from the 
ancient Epidaurus. The oligarchs, in the meantime, 
remained in Argos, and proceeded to revive the Pelo- 
ponnesian Senate, claiming for it such complete su- 
premacy in the Morea, that the central Government 
remained practically powerless. Greece was thus, at 
the end of the year 1821, divided into three sections, 
each under its own senate, and all nominally depend- 
ent on the central Government. But the Constitu- 
tion published by the Assembly at Piada, known as 
that of Epidaurus, remained a dead letter; and the 
provincial senates only exercised any power in so far 
as they were governed by the faction which chanced 
to have command of most men and money. For the 
most part their pedantic discussions were treated by 
the wild chiefs of the revolt with the contempt they 
deserved. 

The new Constitution was proclaimed on January 
22, 1822, and Alexander Mavrocordatos was elected 
President of Greece. He had few of the qualities 
necessary to maintain so difficult a position. It is true 
that in culture and experience, as in probity of motive, 
he was superior to the mass of the leaders of the revolt; 
but he lacked strength and firmness, and the breadth 
of view which enables a statesman to look beyond the 



86 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

details of administration and to understand tlie wider 
issues involved in the government of men. To him, 
moreover, applied with double force a remark which 
Goethe, in a conversation with Eckermann, afterwards 
made with reference to Count Capodistrias. ' Capo- 
distrias,' he said, ^ will in the long run not be able to 
maintain himself at the head of Greek affairs; for 
he lacks a quality which is essential to such a position. 
He is no soldier. ]^ow we have no example of any- 
mere diplomat being able to organise a revolutionary 
State, or secure the obedience of soldiers and military 
chiefs.' This proved profoundly true of Capodistrias; 
it was no less profoundly true of Mavrocordatos. 
Moreover, whereas Capodistrias, a man of dignified 
and imposing presence, never affected to be a soldier, 
Mavrocordatos, in spite of his spectacles and his plump 
little figure, more than once made himself ridiculous 
by attempts to play the general, with disastrous results 
both for himself and Greece. Thus it came about that 
he entered on his office under inauspicious omens. 
Thinking to strengthen his position by adding mili- 
tary glory to his diplomatic prestige, he attempted, on 
his way from Missolonghi, to reduce the Turkish gar- 
rison of Patras. But he only proved that nature had 
not intended him for a general. The Ottomans over- 
whelmed him in a sortie; and, defeated, and stripped 



ALEXANDER MAVR0C0EDAT09 87 

of all save the clothes on his back, he arrived igno- 
minioiisly at the seat of government. 

It may be doubted whether, at that time, the 
strongest and wisest of rnlers could have reduced the 
chaos of Greek affairs to order. It needed the awful 
lesson which was about to be given them, to make the 
Hellenes forget, for a v/hile, their selfish ambitions 
and jealousies, under the compulsion of a common 
fear and a common passion of revenge. 



CHAPTEK YI 

Death of Elias Mavromichales — Odysseus of Ithaka — ^His 
treachery before Karystos — The massacre of Chios — The 
vengeance of Kanaris — Mahmoud's plan for the recon- 
quest of Greece — Odysseus in East Hellas — Fall of the 
Acropolis — Massacre of the Turks — Invasion of Dramali 
— The Turks at Argos — Defeat of Dramali in the pass of 
Devernaki, and at Agionori — Destruction of the Turkish 
army — Expedition of Mavrocordatos for the relief of the 
Suliots — Defeat of Peta — Advance of Omer Vrioni in 
West Hellas — First siege of Missolonghi 

The year 1822, which was to prove on the whole so 
full of glory and of hope for Greece, began with a 
series of disasters. The rumour that Sultan Mahmoud 
was preparing a great expedition to crush out the re- 
volt in the Morea determined the Greek Government 
to forestall him by pressing the war in Eastern Hellas. 
The Acropolis of Athens was still held by a Turkish 
garrison, and Elias Mavromichales, the eldest son of 
Petrobey, had been invited by the Areopagus to aid 
in its reduction. At Athens, however, he was met by 
an invitation from the Euboeans to help them in an 



DEATH OF ELIAS MAVROMICHALES 89 

attack on Karystos; and as this seemed to promise 
more adventure than was likely to be found in block- 
ading the Acropolis, he responded to the appeal. Be- 
fore his arrival at the camp of the Euboeans, the men 
of Kumi had already elected a Montenegrin named 
Yassos as their captain, and Elias Mavromichales, with 
a rare generosity, consented to share his authority with 
this comparatively inexperienced soldier. Together 
they determined to attack the Turkish post at the 
village of Stura, where a considerable quantity of 
grain for the use of the garrison at Karystos had been 
collected. Unfortunately, owing to the neglect of the 
Greeks to secure in time the pass of Diakophti, and 
so cut off the possibility of relief from Karystos, the 
attack failed. The small Ottoman garrison held out 
until Omer Bey arrived with reinforcements. The 
Greeks were routed; and Elias Mavromichales him- 
self was surrounded in an old mill, where for some 
time he defended himself with great bravery. At last, 
seeing no chance of relief, he tried to cut his way out, 
but was killed in the attempt. His death was the first 
blow to the Greek cause during the year, and created 
great sorrow; for to the bravery which was usual 
among the chiefs of the insurrection, he added a dis- 
interested patriotism which was far from being so 
common. 



90 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Shortly after his death, Odysseus of Ithaka, whose 
authority, since the death of Diakos, had been para- 
mount in East Hellas, arrived from Attica with a 
force of seven hundred men. The Greeks now ad- 
vanced once more upon Stura, but found it evacuated 
and cleared of its stores. Karystos itself was then 
besieged; but suddenly Odysseus, without giving any 
warning of his intention, marched away with all his 
men. This action, in one who was suspected of play- 
ing at all times a double game, so alarmed the rest of 
the besiegers that they raised the siege. 

Odysseus, one of the most celebrated leaders of the 
war, was as Homeric in his personality as in his name, 
and his feats of physical strength and endurance ri- 
valled those of the mythical hero from whom he pre- 
tended to trace his descent. It was said that he could 
leap clear over the backs of seven horses placed side 
by side, and that, after his defeat by Mehmet at Gravia 
on E'ovember 13, 1822, he ran for eight leagues 
through the rough and mountainous country occupied 
by the enemy, with scarce a pause, and with no signs 
of exhaustion or distress.^ Such feats would have 
been enough to make him a hero among the wild and 
barbarous mountaineers, even without that courage and 
cunning which seemed the ordinary qualifications for 
1 Mendelssohn, i. 283. 



ODYSSEUS OF ITHAKA 91 

a captain of Armatoli. Strength and courage were 
indeed his sole apparent virtues. For the rest, he had 
been, like so many other leaders of the revolt, trained 
at the court of Ali Pasha of Janina, and had there 
learned to combine the worst vices of Albanians and 
Greeks. He was false as the most deceitful Greek 
and vindictive as the most bloodthirsty Albanian.^ 
His object in joining the Greek revolt was not to lib- 
erate Greece from the Ottoman rule, but, if possible, 
to establish his own authority permanently in Eastern 
Hellas ; and, if he could achieve this better by attach- 
ing himself to the Turks, it was certain that he would 
not hesitate to betray the Hellenic cause. 

Odysseus himself asserted that he had been com- 
pelled to retire from Karystos owing to want of food ; 
but this did not explain his leaving without informing 
his colleagues of his intention; and the Greeks be- 
lieved that he had been in treasonable communication 
with Omer Bey. Possibly the true explanation was 
that he knew that his enemies, and especially the Min- 
ister of War, Kolettes, were endeavouring to break his 
power in Attica, and that he suspected them of hatch- 
ing some sinister plot against him in his absence. 

Meanwhile, however, there had arrived from the 
Archipelago the news of a disaster which threw all 
1 Finlay, i. 305; Gordon, i. 405. 



92 THE WAR OF GEEEK INDEPENDENCE 

the other misfortunes of the Greeks into the shade, 
and for the time made the factions lay aside their quar- 
rels under the influence of a common horror and thirst 
for vengeance. Of all the island communities of the 
^gean none was more prosperous or more inoffensive 
than that of Chios. Among their more turbulent 
neighbours, the well-to-do and peace-loving Chiots 
had a reputation for stolid simplicity. * Easier to 
find a green horse,' ran the saying, * than a clever 
Chiot.' One attempt to rouse the island had failed; 
but its wealth and general importance made it de- 
sirable to secure its adhesion to the national cause; 
and Hypsilanti allowed himself to be persuaded to 
authorise a Chiot adventurer named Ealli, and a cer- 
tain Lycourgos Logothetes of Smyrna, to make a de- 
scent upon it. 

In March, Lycourgos, with some 2,500 men, 
landed at Koutari, and, calling on the unwilling 
Chiots for aid, proceeded to lay siege to the Turkish 
garrison. From the first he proved himself totally 
incompetent. ISTot only did he mismanage the opera- 
tions on shore in every possible way, but he neglected 
utterly the all-important precaution of keeping the 
command of the sea. 

The news of the attack on Chios roused Sultan 
Mahmoud once more to fury; the ladies of his harem, 



MASSACRE OF CHIOS 93 

too, indignant at the devastations committed in their 
mastic gardens by the insurgents, clamoured for the 
suppression of the revolt; and preparations for this 
were pressed on with unwonted vigour. On the 11th 
of April, without any resistance on the part of the 
Greeks, the Capitan Pasha, Kara Ali, landed 7,000 
troops on the island. Lycourgos and his rabble had 
proved their courage by murdering in cold blood the 
crew of a Turkish felucca which had run ashore, and 
in general by massacring all the Mussulman captives 
who fell into their hands. They now, at the approach 
of the Ottoman force, took to their boats and fled, 
leaving the wretched Chiots to their fate. The ^ blood 
bath ' that followed is the most horrible episode in a 
history of horrors. The Turkish commander, aided 
by the local Mussulman authorities, made some effort 
to curb the excesses of the troops, less, perhaps, in the 
interests of humanity, than in those of the imperial 
revenue. But the Ottoman soldiery had been rein- 
forced by hordes of fanatics, who had crowded over 
from the mainland to share in the holy war; and these 
it was impossible to control. A few of the islanders 
succeeded in escaping in Greek vessels ; and even these 
poor wretches w^ere usually robbed of everything they 
had saved from the wreck of their homes by the boat- 
men, who made the surrender of all they possessed the 



94 THE WAE OF GREEK IKDEPENDENCE 

price of safety.^ Of the rest of the inhabitants, some 
27,000 are said to have been put to the sword, while 
43,000 were collected and sold into slavery; and of 
a once flourishing community of a hundred thousand 
souls, barely two thousand remained to people the 
island. 

The unhappy Chiots were not long unavenged. 
On the 10th of April the Greek fleet put to sea under 
Admiral Miaoulis; and on the 31st, a naval engage- 
ment was fought off Chios, but without result. The 
Greeks then determined to have resort to their favour- 
ite device of fire-ships. On the 18th of June, the prin- 
cipal officers of the Turkish fleet assembled on board 
the flagship, to celebrate the feast of Bairam with the 
Capitan Pasha. The night was pitch dark; but the 
admiral's vessel, decorated from masthead to water- 
line with coloured lanterns, was a blaze of light. On 
board, some three thousand men were celebrating the 
great Mohammedan festival with laughter and music; 
and, in the universal jollity, but a poor "watch was kept. 
Suddenly, through the lines of the Turkish vessels, 
glided, like dark shadows, two Greek fire-ships. One 
of these, steered with admirable precision by Kanaris, 

iCf. Gordon, i. 362. The Philhellene Jourdain himself 
saw, on the island of Psara, many victims of this ' atrocious 
speculation.' M6moires Mstoriques, dc. i. 68. 



EXPLOIT OF KANARIS 95 

made straight for the flagship of the Capitan Pasha; 
and, "unobserved, the cool-headed Greek ran his bow- 
sprit into an open port of the Turkish vessel, fixed his 
grappling irons, fired the train, and, quietly slipping 
with his men into a boat, rowed off, while the fire-ship 
burst into flame. In an instant, sails and cordage 
being soaked in turpentine, the fire ran up the rigging, 
and, carried by the wind over the Ottoman ship, rap- 
idly enveloped it in a mass of flame. An awful scene 
followed. Completely taken by surprise, the Turks 
had no time to save themselves. The few boats that 
were launched v/ere, for the most part, swamped by 
the panic-stricken crowds that leaped into them. The 
other ships of the fleet sheered off, to avoid sharing the 
fate of the admiral, or to escape the hail of bullets 
from her exploding guns. Of the whole 3,000 men 
on board, but very few survived. Kara Ali himself 
was struck by a falling yard, and carried dying ashore. 
The second Greek fire-ship, less fortunate, or less skil- 
fully steered, did not effect anything. 
This episode, when 

Twice twenty self-devoted Greeks assailed 
The naval host of Asia, at one blow 
Scattered it into air — and Greece was free,i 

1 Savage Landor. 



96 THE WAE OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

earned for Kanaris a fame wliich spread far beyond 
the limits of the Greek world, and which, among the 
Hellenes themselves, will endure as long as there is a 
Greek nation to cherish the memory of its heroes. 

The frantic delight with which the news of this 
exploit was hailed at the time was possibly not shared 
by the surviving Chiots. Several hundred of them, 
captive on board the Turkish ship, had perished with 
it. The miserable island, too, was now exposed again, 
by way of reprisals, to a second devastation, which 
completed what the first had left undone; and even 
the mastic villages, whose industry was so indispen- 
sable to the ladies of the Sultan's harem, were this 
time not spared. Their vengeance sated, the Turks 
sailed away to take refuge, from Kanaris and his fire- 
ships, under the guns of the Dardanelles. 

The news of the massacre of Chios awoke the 
Greeks to some sense of the seriousness of their posi- 
tion. But, in the meantime, while they had been 
wrangling and intriguing, Sultan Mahmoud had been 
making preparations for a first great effort to recon- 
quer Greece. The troubles with Eussia, in which the 
execution of the Patriarch had threatened to involve 
him, had been smoothed over; and, above all, the de- 
struction of the power of Ali Pasha had set free the 
army of Khurshid for the suppression of the Hellenic 



khurshid's plan of campaign 97 

revolt. Mahmoud, deceived by the ease with which 
the insurrection had been suppressed in Thessalj, 
Macedonia, and Epirus, believed that his troops would 
experience little difficulty in the task of reducing the 
whole of Greece. The plan of campaign which he 
devised was a good one, and, if properly carried out, 
promised to be successful. 

Nauplia, the most important fortress in the Morea, 
with its two impregnable citadels of Palamidi and Itsh- 
Kale, had now for months been blockaded by the 
Greeks, and its relief was the first object of the Otto- 
man campaign. So far, the place had resisted all the 
efforts of the Greeks to capture it; and an attempt 
made by Hypsilanti, in December, 1821, to carry the 
castle of Palamidi by storm, had ignominiously failed. 
But the garrison, now reduced to the last stages of 
starvation, could not expect to hold out much longer; 
and on the 30th of June a capitulation was actually 
signed, by which the Turks agreed to surrender, if not 
relieved within twenty-five days. If, then, the Otto- 
man campaign was to attain its object, there was little 
time to lose. 

At Larissa, Khurshid, now appointed Seraskier, 

or Governor-General, of Kumelia, had collected a 

large body of troops; and another army, under Omer 

Yrioni, was assembled in Epirus. It was arranged 
7 



08 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPEITDENCE 

that, while the latter advanced by Western Hellas on 
Missolonghi, with a view to capturing this, and cross- 
ing thence to Patras, the main army under Khurshid's 
direction should force the Isthmus, advance to the re- 
lief of I^auplia, where it was to be met by the Ottoman 
fleet, and march thence on Tripolitza. Here it was 
to establish its headquarters, in the very centre of the 
Arcadian plain; and it was judged that if the fleet 
threw supplies into the fortresses of Coron, Modon, 
and Patras, communications with these could be easily 
established, and that the Morea being thus cut up into 
several sections, the population, deprived of mutual 
support, would be reduced to submit before the winter. 
As the spring advanced, Dramali,^ to whom the 
command of the expedition was given, was ordered 
by Khurshid to push on into the valley of the Sper- 
cheios, and there review his troops. Before this was 
effected, an attempt was made, under the leadership of 
Odysseus, to destroy the Turkish troops in Zeituni. 
The plan had been devised by the Areopagus, and its 
failure, due to various causes, led to the relations be- 
tween that body and the masterful Klepht becoming 
somewhat strained. An attempt was made to remove 
Odysseus from his command in East Hellas; where- 
upon he immediately resigned his commission in the 
1 Mohamet Ali Pasha of Drama. 



FALL OF THE ACR0P0LI8 99 

Greek army, and remained at the head of his troops 
as an independent chieftain! It now became the first 
object of the central executive to destroy the power of 
Odysseus in East Hellas; and Alexis IsToutzas and 
Christos Palaskas, partisans and friends of Kolettes, 
were sent, the former to act as civil governor, the latter 
to supersede Odysseus in the supreme command of the 
forces. Their appointment to these posts had been 
kept secret; but Odysseus knew perfectly well the 
object of their coming. His suspicious nature, more- 
over, led him to believe that they had been commis- 
sioned by Kolettes to assassinate him, a task for which 
their previous reputations seemed to point them out 
as very suitable agents. He determined to frustrate 
the plot. He received them with all the polished 
courtesy of which he w^as capable, and gave them a 
hearty welcome. After entertaining them at supper, 
he conducted them to the small wayside chapel which 
was to serve them for bedroom, v/ished them good- 
night, and left them. In the morning they were found 
murdered. 

The horror which this crime excited, and the an- 
archy which was its immediate result, were soon after- 
wards overshadowed in the public mind by the news 
of the fall of the Acropolis, an event of great impor- 
tance to the Greek cause, but which was again sullied 



100 THE WAR OF GEEEK INDEPENDENCE 

by the treachery and cruelty by wliicli it was accom- 
panied. On tlie 21st of June, the Turkish garrison, 
driven by want of water to surrender, agreed to a 
capitulation, by virtue of which they were to be re- 
moved to Asia Minor in neutral ships. They were 
to lay down their arms, but were to be allowed to re- 
tain one-half of the valuables in their possession. 
The Bishop of Athens, a man of honourable character, 
and president of the Areopagus, made the Greek lead- 
ers swear on the Holy Mysteries to observe the terms 
of the capitulation. 

Eleven hundred and fifty Mussulmans, of whom 
only one hundred and eighty were capable of bearing 
arms, surrendered on these terms, and were lodged, 
pending the completion of the arrangements for their 
removal, in the extensive buildings contained within 
the ruins of the Stoa of Hadrian, formerly occupied 
by the Yoivode. Meanwhile news reached the town 
that the army of Dramali had passed Thermopylae. 
An Albanian savage named Mkkas now incited the 
people, as a pledge that they would never yield to the 
Turk, to slaughter the defenceless prisoners; and the 
Klephts and Armatoli, joined by the rabble of Athens, 
ever ready to make mock-heroics the excuse for satis- 
fying their native lust for cruelty, set willingly to 
work. A scene of horror followed which has only too 



MASSACRE AT ATHENS 101 

many parallels during the course of this horrible war. 
For a whole day the streets of Athens resounded with 
the shrieks and cries of tortured women and children. 
The leaders, who had sworn, by all they held most 
sacred, to see the capitulation carried out, did not care, 
or were afraid, to interfere. The foreign consuls did 
what they could; but the mob had tasted blood, and 
their interference all but proved fatal to themselves. 
At last the arrival of two French ships of war in the 
Piraeus put a stop to the slaughter. Under a strong es- 
cort of marines, some three hundred and ninety of the 
Mussulmans, who had sought refuge in the French, 
Austrian, and Dutch consulates, were conducted to the 
harbour through a mob of wild tribesmen and Athen- 
ian citizens, who brandished their weapons, and yelled 
like demoniacs at the sight of their escaping prey.^ 

1 The account given by Finlay (i. 348) of this horrible 
affair differs from that of M. Lemaitre (p. 108) . The former 
gives the Greeks credit for having been ashamed of them- 
selves. After the departure of the refugees in the French 
Consulate, * shame operated, and all the Turks who re- 
mained in the Austrian and Dutch consulates were allowed 
to depart unmolested.' But M. de Reverseaux, command- 
ing the Active (quoted verbatim by M. Lemaitre), states 
that he only succeeded in rescuing the latter with the ut- 
most difficulty from the ' mob of assassins ' : ' Je criai que 
e'etait sur moi qu'ils devaient tirer, et non sur les restes 
infortunes d'une population desarmee; mais que s'ils 
avaient I'audace, je trouverais promtement des ven- 



102 THE WAE OP GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Vengeance in this case followed hard upon the 
footsteps of crime. The advance of Dramali was facil- 
itated bv the quarrels among the Greek chiefs; and 
at the head of twenty-four thousand infantry and six 
thousand cavalry he marched through Boeotia and 
Attica, without encountering serious opposition. 
Athens and the Acropolis next fell into his hands, 
and the Ottomans wreaked their vengeance for the 
slaughter of their co-religionists. 

Eiimour exaggerated the numbers of the Turkish 
host; no such display of military pomp had been seen 
since, in 1715, Ali Kummargee had crossed the Sper- 
cheios to reconquer the Morea from the Venetians; 
and at the terror of its approach all opposition van- 
ished. The Isthmus was passed ; and the impregnable 
rock of Acrocorinthos fell, abandoned by its cowardly 
garrison without a blow. Had Dramali proceeded 
with ordinary caution, the Greek revolt would have 
been at an end ; and already Metternich and his allies 
were beginning to rejoice at the prospect of its speedy 
collapse. But his undisturbed march led the Turkish 
commander, very naturally but no less fatally, to un- 
derrate his enemy. He expected to meet everywhere 
with as little opposition as he had hitherto experi- 

geurs . . . ! Mon mouvement les deconcerta," &c. Cf. 
also Gordon, i. 412. 



ADVANCE OF DRAMALI 103 

enced, and that the whole of the Morea would submit 
on the mere rumour of his arrival. Advised to make 
the Acrocorinthos his base, and, from this centre, 
subdue the country methodically and piece by piece, 
he rejected the cautious counsel with scorn. Instead, 
he decided to advance with his whole force to the relief 
of ^auplia. 

Fortune seemed to smile upon the enterprise. The 
direct road to l^auplia lay over the difficult pass of 
Devernaki, and this the Greeks had neglected to oc- 
cupy. Full of contempt for so despicable a foe, the 
Turks pushed on over the mountains, and descended 
into the plain of Argolis, without even thinking it 
worth while to secure their communications, by occu- 
pying the defiles in their rear. At the rumour of their 
approach, panic terror seized the eloquent legislators 
of Greece, assembled at Argos. Ministers and depu- 
ties, officials, and place-hunters, fled in all directions, 
leaving the town to be plundered by the wild Klephts 
and Armatoli.^ Only a few, and notably Kolokotrones 

1 Those of the wretched fug-itives who escaped the atten- 
tions of the Mainotes, by whom they were stripped with- 
out compunction, and who sought refugee on board Hydriot 
and Spezziot boats at Lerna, were robbed by the sailors of 
the last frag-ments of their property, and left to starve in 
out-of-the-way points of the Morea and Archipelago. Gor- 
don, i. 422. 



104 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

and Demetrius Ilypsilanti, refused to join in the 
stampede. 

A small band of Greeks, under the Mainote Kari- 
yanni, had seized Larissa, the mediaeval castle which 
crowns the Acropolis of ancient Argos; and here they 
were joined by Hypsilanti, who, with a band of seven 
hundred men, threw himself into the fortress. Ill- 
provisioned and insufficiently supplied with arms, they 
could not hope to hold out long; but they achieved 
their purpose of holding the Turks in check until Kolo- 
kotrones had had time to collect an army. Their 
desperate courage placed Dramali in an awkward posi- 
tion ; for he was unable to advance to IvTauplia, leaving 
an unreduced fortress in his rear; and his neglect of 
the question of supplies and communications now be- 
gan to tell. The Ottoman fleet, under Mehmet Pasha, 
was to have kept pace with him along the coast, and 
served as his base of supplies. But Mehmet, with true 
Turkish inconsequence, had preferred to cruise on his 
own account round the Peloponnese; and the army 
of Dramali was, therefore, left without a base, and 
without supplies. The very folly of the Greeks had 
turned to their advantage; for, between the moun- 
tains and the sea, the Ottomans were now fairly caught 
in a trap, and it seemed almost as though the Greeks 
had purposely left the door open in order to lure them 
to destruction. 



DESTRUCTION OF DRAMALl's ARMY 105 

Dramali was soon persuaded of the necessity of 
falling back by the way he had come, before his sup- 
plies were utterly exhausted, and on the 6th of August 
began his retreat. But in the meantime Kolokotrones 
had realised the situation, and hurried with a small 
force to occupy the defile of Devernaki; and, when 
the Turkish army reached the pass, they found it al- 
ready in the possession of the Greeks. The vanguard, 
consisting of some thousand Albanian mountaineers, 
succeeded in evading the Greeks by following diffi- 
cult and circuitous paths; but the main body of the 
Ottomans attempted to force their way through the 
narrow defile; and here they were overwhelmed by 
a murderous fire, which soon choked the road with the 
bodies of men and horses, and made it impossible for 
them to advance. It was a massacre rather than a 
battle; and nothing but the plundering instincts of 
the Greeks saved the Ottoman army from absolute 
annihilation. A few of the better mounted delhis suc- 
ceeded in spurring over the heaps of dead and dying, 
and cutting their way through to Corinth; but the rest 
of the army, with the loss of some four thousand men, 
and of all its baggage, was forced to return into the 
plain of Argolis, with less chance than ever of being 
able to force its way out. 

Dramali seemed as though stunned by this blow; 



106 THE WAR OF GREEK USTDEPENDENCE 

and a whole dav passed in inaction. Then the abso- 
lute impossibility of remaining longer in the barren 
plain of Argolis forced him to move, and he deter- 
mined this time to attempt to force his way out by 
the pass of Agionori. Once more the indiscipline and 
greed of the Greeks proved the salvation of the Turks. 
Kolokotrones had arranged, with Mketas and several 
other chiefs, a plan for cutting off the Ottoman re- 
treat; but this broke down, owing to the Armatoli 
waiting to plunder the Turkish camp, while those who 
reached the pass in time to intercept the Turks de- 
voted more attention to the Ottoman baggage than | 
to the Ottomans. With the loss of about a thousand 
men and all his train, Dramali, breathless, footsore, 
and bedraggled, at last reached Corinth. 

Even at Corinth, however, the Ottomans were not 
in safety; for the Greeks, encouraged by their un- 
hoped-for success, were hard on their heels. With the 
aid of Odysseus, Kolokotrones closed all the passes, 
and shut up the beaten army in Corinth. Starvation 
and disease did the rest. Dramali himself died on the 
9th of November, and only a miserable remnant of 
his great host were at length taken off by a Turkish 
fleet. 

The collapse of Dramali's invasion decided the 
fate of IN'auplia. The advance of the Turkish army 



SURRENDER OF NAUPLIA 107 

had encouraged the defenders, already reduced to the 
last most desperate straits, to persevere; and the ap- 
pearance off the harbour of Mehmet's fleet had given 
them an instant's hope. This, however, had been 
dashed by the cowardice and incapacity of the Otto- 
man admiral, who sailed away without attempting 
anything; and when, therefore, they heard the tid- 
ings of Dramali's defeat, the Turkish garrison lost all 
hope of succour, and at last, weakened by hunger and 
disease, consented to surrender. Already, on the night 
of the 12th of December, the castle of Palamidi, which 
the Turks were too weak to hold any longer, had been 
occupied by the Greeks; and, under these circum- 
stances, the conditions granted by Kolokotrones to the 
garrison were far less favourable than those agreed to 
by the treaty of the 30th of June; but, such as they 
were, the presence of an English frigate in the har- 
bour ensured the terms of the capitulation being ob- 
served; and the Turks were removed by sea to Asia 
Minor. Only Ali Pasha, the governor, who refused 
to sign the capitulation, was held a prisoner. 

While the Greeks were thus successful on land, the 
courage of Kanaris had secured them another victory 
at sea. He had succeeded in destroying with a hriilot 
the flagship of the Turkish vice-admiral, as it lay at 
anchor in the midst of the Ottoman fleet between 



108 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Tenedos and Troas; and this exploit so alarmed the 
Capitan Pasha, that he retired with the Ottoman navy 
under the guns of the Dardanelles, leaving the Greeks 
masters of the open sea. 

In "West Hellas, meanwhile, the other half of 
Khurshid's plan of campaign had likewise started with 
success, and ended in disaster. Before marching south- 
ward to effect his junction with Dramali in the Morea, 
it was necessary for the Ottoman commander to re- 
duce the Suliots, that bravest and most celebrated of 
the Albanian hill tribes, whose desperate resistance 
to Ali Pasha of Janina had once roused the sympathy 
and admiration of Europe, and who were now in arms 
against the Ottoman power. Though they had not 
as yet formally thrown in their lot with the Greeks, 
Mavrocordatos, whose fiasco before Patras had not 
cured him of his belief in his military capacity, deter- 
mined to march to their relief. At the head of a con- 
siderable force, comprising the only disciplined troops 
in the Greek army — the regiment commanded by 
Colonel Tarella, and the corps of Philhellenes, con- 
sisting entirely of foreign officers, commanded by 
Colonel Dania — he crossed to Missolonghi, and ad- 
vanced upon Arta. 

The Ottoman forces in Arta were commanded by 
Reshid Pasha, known to the Greeks and Albanians 



BATTLE OF PETA 109 

as Kiutayeh,* an officer as experienced and capable as 
Mavrocordatos was the reverse. The latter made his 
headquarters at Kombotti, where he remained, while 
the Greek army advanced some fifteen miles further, 
and took up a position at Peta. Here, disadvanta- 
geously posted and without having entrenched them- 
selves, they were attacked, on the 16th of July, by the 
Turks in overwhelming force. In the absence of the 
commander-in-chief, no one possessed sufficient au- 
thority to produce unity of action among the hetero- 
geneous elements forming the Greek army. The Phil- 
hellenes, indeed, fought with desperate courage; but 
the treachery of the chief Gogos, who had been en- 
trusted with the defence of the key of the position, 
suffered the Turks to attack them both in front and 
rear, and only some twenty-five succeeded in forcing 
their way through at the point of the bayonet. At the 
same time Colonel Tarella fell, and his regiment was 
annihilated.^ 

This battle had several important effects, apart 
from its leaving the Turks free to reduce the Suliots; 
for it destroyed the prestige of Mavrocordatos, and 

1 He had been Pasha of Kiutayeh in Asia Minor. His 
father had been a Georgian priest, and he himself was a 
convert to Islam. 

2 For a detailed account of this battle see Gordon, i. 388. 



110 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

all hope of forming a strong central government under 
his leadership. It inspired, too, the wild Greek war- 
riors with an intense conviction of the superiority of 
their own irregular methods of warfare over those 
of European discipline, a conviction all the more 
fatal as, just at this time. Sultan Mahmoud was plan- 
ning the reorganisation of his army on Western 
models. 

The defeat of the Greeks at Peta, and another 
at Splanga, rendered the position of the Suliots hope- 
less. Even in these straits, however, their reputation 
for dauntless courage made the Ottoman commander 
unwilling to drive them to desperation, and obtained 
them favourable terms. Once more they evacuated 
their impregnable mountain fastnesses, and, receiving 
in compensation a sum of 200,000 piastres, crossed 
over into the Ionian Islands. Henceforward they cast 
in their lot with the Greeks, and became, for better or 
for worse, a conspicuous element in the War of Lib- 
eration. 

Meanwhile the Greeks had spent the short period 
of respite, due to the Suliot defence, as usual, in inter- 
necine feuds. The difficult pass of Makrynoros, 
through which any force advancing into West Hellas 
from Epirus would have to make its way, they left 
undefended; and when Omer Yrioni, Khurshid's 



FIRST SIEGE OF MISSOLOKGHI 111 

lieutenant, at last marched southward, he had no diffi- 
culty in pushing as far as Missolonghi. 

This insignificant little town, which lies on the 
shore of a shallow lagoon, between the mouths of the 
Aspropotamos and the Phidari, did not look as though 
it would present any serious obstacle to his further ad- 
vance. Garrisoned only by some six hundred men, 
its sole fortifications were a low earth wall and a shal- 
low but muddy ditch, its only armament some anti- 
quated guns. Had the Turks advanced at once to the 
assault, the place must have fallen. As it was, Omer 
preferred to commence a regular siege, and on the 16th 
of November sat down before the town. 

The Ottoman army had been joined by crowds of 
Albanian Armatoli eager to share in the expected 
booty. The defenders, under Mavrocordatos, were 
full of courage and enthusiasm ; and nothing occurred 
to damp their ardour. A fleet of Turkish ships, sent 
by Yussuf Pasha from Patras to blockade the town by 
sea, was dispersed by a Hydriot squadron ; and a thou- 
sand men from the Morea, under Petrobey, crossed 
the Gulf as a welcome reinforcement to the sparse 
garrison. The Turkish bombardment produced no ef- 
fect; for the cannon balls sped away over the roofs 
of the low houses, and the shells from the Ottoman 
mortars sank in the filth of the unpaved streets and 



112 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

courts without exploding. At last Omer decided to 
assault; and chose the night of January 6, 1823, the 
Greek Christmas day, for the enterprise, with the idea 
that the Greeks would be all at church. But the garri- 
son had received information of the move ; and, when 
the assault commenced, it was the besiegers, and not 
the besieged, who were surprised. A murderous fire 
greeted the Albanian brigands as they floundered in 
the muddy ditch. They broke and fled, leaving two 
hundred dead behind; while the victorious Greeks 
lost no more than four men. Omer now decided to 
raise the siege, and retired, in some confusion, back 
through the pass of Makrynoros, leaving part of his 
siege train and ammunition behind. The aged Khur- 
shid, on receiving the news, poisoned himself, antici- 
pating by only three days the order for his execution 
which had been despatched from Constantinople. 



CHAPTER VII 

Attitude of the Powers — Policy of Canning — Russo-Turk- 
ish war postponed — Threatened break-up of the Holy 
Alliance — Dissensions among- the Greeks — Odysseus in 
East Hellas — Kolokotrones — Second National Assembly 
at Astros — Feud between the civil and military elements 
— Petrobey elected President — Kolokotrones defies the 
Assembly — Campaign of Yussuf Pasha in East Hellas — 
Cruise of Khosrew Pasha — Invasion of Western Hellas 
by Mustai Pasha — Exploit of Marko Botzares at Kar- 
penisi — Successful defence of Anatoliko — Renewal of 
civil strife — Government flies to Kranidi — First Civil War 
— Submission of Kolokotrones 

The campaign of 1822 had resulted altogether favour- 
ably for the Greeks; and from the diplomatic stand- 
point, also, the new year opened under promising au- 
spices. The news of the massacre of Chios had dealt a 
severe blow at Metternich's efforts to counteract the 
growing influence of Philhellenic sentiment in Eu- 
rope; and there were not wanting signs of a change 
in the attitude of the Powers. Alexander, it is true, 
still remained faithful to the Holy Alliance, refused 
to receive the Greek envoys sent to him at Verona, and 
8 113 



114 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPET^DENCE 

dismissed his Greek Minister, Capodistrias. Thus far 
the diplomacy of Metternich had triumphed. For a 
moment, however, it seemed as though the war be- 
tween Eussia and Turkey which he dreaded was on the 
point of breaking out. Certain Hydriot brigs, sailing 
under the Kussian flag, had been seized in the Darda- 
nelles by order of the Porte; and the Ottoman Govern- 
ment, thinking it intolerable that hostile vessels should, 
under cover of a neutral flag, defy it at its very doors, 
thereupon claimed and exercised the right to stop and 
search all ships passing through the straits. This ac- 
tion still further increased the tension already existing 
between the two Governments. To the protests of 
Eussia the Porte replied by a polite but firm insistence 
on what it considered to be its rights; and for some 
time the situation appeared extremely critical. But 
Metternich was anxious, at all hazards, to prevent 
Eusso-Turkish complications; and, above all, to pre- 
vent the Greek question from becoming entangled with 
those that were purely Eussian.^ He now moved 
heaven and earth to persuade the Porte to concede the 
Eussian demands; and in this he was vigorously sec- 
onded by Lord Strangf ord, the English Ambassador at 
Constantinople, whose policy at all times was but a re- 
flection of that of the Austrian Chancellor.^ Their 

1 Mendelssohn, i. 307. 2 ibid. 



THREATENED DISRUPTION OF HOLY ALLIANCE 115 

united efforts, at last, succeeded in overcoming the 
stubborn opposition of the Porte, and prevailing on it 
to sign an agreement which, for the time being, post- 
poned the danger of a Eusso-Turldsh war. By this 
treaty the free navigation of the Dardanelles was con- 
ceded to the ships of all nations, only the Americans 
being excepted from its terms, ' because the Sultan 
did not like Eepublicans! ' ^ 

The Czar now consented to reopen relations with 
the Ottoman Government, though only, for the pres- 
ent, informally. M. de Munciaky was sent, as the 
agent of Russia, to Constantinople, and charged to 
watch over the execution of the treaty, and to clear up 
certain other outstanding questions with regard to nav- 
igation. At the same time, the Russian Minister, 
Count J^esselrode, while thanking the Porte for the 
concessions it had made, hinted darkly at certain claims 
for which as yet no satisfaction had been received.^ 
The breach was merely patched up, not completely 
healed, and the danger of a Russo-Turkish conflict was 
only postponed. 

Meanwhile the Holy Alliance itself was threatened 
with disruption. The death of Castlereagh had re- 
moved one of Metternich's most faithful henchmen, 
and Canning, who succeeded him as Foreign Secre- 

1 Prokesch, i. 306. 2 Ibid. i. 225. 



116 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

tary, was heartily favourable to the Greek cause. As 
early as February 1823 his dispatches to Lord Strang- 
ford show a complete reversal of British policy; and 
England now appears, for the first time, as the advo- 
cate of the cause of the oppressed Christian subjects of 
the Porte/ On the 25th of March England recognised 
the Greeks as belligerents ; and the struggle was hence- 
forward invested with a new significance.^ From 
this time it became impossible for even the most re- 
actionary Powers of the Holy Alliance to deal with 
the Hellenic rising as they had dealt with the popular 
movements in Spain or !N"aples. The diplomatic game 
began once more on a new basis: the recognition of 
the Greek claims. 

In October 1823 the Czar and the Austrian Emper- 
or met at Czernowitz, to prepare for the interference of 
the Powers, in the interests of Europe.^ A divergence 

1 Prokesch, i. 196. ' Canning* approached the subject from 
the relig-ions point of view, which had been, for a hundred 
years, entirely subordinate in English politics; and he laid 
thereby special stress on the very aspect of the question 
which made a peaceful settlement most difficult of attain- 
ment. It was the danger of Alexander taking- this view 
which had, two years before, most disquieted the Cabinets; 
and Eng-land had successfully united with the other Powers _ 
to draw him away from it.' 

2 Mendelssohn, i. 306. 
8 Prokesch, i. 227. 



RUSSIAN PROPOSALS 117 

of views became at once apparent. Russia — then, as 
now, unwilling to see any really powerful State estab- 
lished on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, or to en- 
courage a Pan-Hellenic as opposed to a Pan-Slavonic 
movement — proposed the opening of conferences on 
the basis of the division of Greece and the islands into 
three principalities, under Ottoman suzerainty, and 
guaranteed by the European Powers.^ In view, how- 
ever, of the aggressive policy of Russia in the Danu- 
bian principalities, her motive in making this sugges- 
tion was too apparent. Austria could not afford to see 
Russian influence paramount over the whole Balkan 
peninsula; and Metternich began to suspect that the 
true interest of Austria lay in the erection of Greece 
into an independent State. 

Meanwhile the Greeks had profited little by the 
lessons of the war. No sooner was the immediate dan- 
ger removed than the old anarchy once more broke 
out. The lamentable failure of the attempts of Mav- 
rocordatos at generalship, as well as the cowardice 
displayed by the Government on the occasion of 
Dramali's advance on Argos, had filled the fierce Ar- 
matoli and their captains with contempt for the civil- 
ian leaders, and still further accentuated the already 
deeply-marked line between the parties. Apart fror^ 
1 Prokesch, i. 243. 



118 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

numberless motives of personal ambition or jealousy, 
these were divided also by sharply contrasted principles 
of policy, which were snre, sooner or later, to produce , 
a conflict between them. On the one side were the 1 
Phanariots, and such of the Greeks as had received a 
European training, and who desired to see Greece es- 
tablished as a constitutional State on the European 
model. These were supported also by the islanders, 
whose commercial enterprise had brought them into 
contact with European ideas. On the other side were 
the bishops, primates, and military chiefs, whose sole 
idea was to sit in the seat from which they had expelled 
the Turks ; to wear fine weapons and gorgeous clothes, 
to play the Pasha, to pay nobody and take from all; 
and, finally, to live on terms of good fellowship with 
the common people, sharing their pleasures, their cus- 
toms, their superstitions, and their faith.^ 

For the present, indeed, at the beginning of the 
year 1823, the party of the primates made common 
cause with that of the islanders and Constitutionalists 
against the military chiefs, whose power now over- 
shadowed every other authority in Greece. "West 
Hellas, it is true, was still held for the Government by 
Mavi'ocordatos, though with a weak hand; but, in 
East Hellas, Odysseus now reigned with undisputed 

1 Prokesch, i. 275. 



ODYSSEUS IN EAST HELLAS 119 

authority; and, in the Morea, Kolokotrones was su- 
preme. 

During the summer of 1822, Attica had been 
given up to anarchy; until, at last, some of those 
Athenian citizens who had most to lose begged Prince 
Demetrius Hypsilanti to come and take over the com- 
mand of the country. On his arrival, however, the 
garrison of the Acropolis had refused to admit him, 
and elected Odysseus as their general. Hypsilanti had 
no choice but to give up his enterprise ; and Odysseus, 
seizing eagerly at the chance presented to him, pro- 
ceeded to consolidate his power. He sold the booty 
captured from the Turks in order to pay his troops, 
strengthened the defences of the Acropolis, and, dis- 
solving the Areopagus, summoned another Assembly 
entirely devoted to his interests. A serious mischance 
had, however, nearly destroyed his newly acquired 
power. 

After the defeat of Dramali, Khurshid Pasha had 
sent Mehemet, with eight thousand men, to hold the 
line of the Spercheios; and the Ottoman commander 
had made a rapid dash with some of his troops, by 
way of the pass of Gravia, on Salona. After burning 
part of the to^vn, he had returned by the same road, 
and on the 13th of ISTovember, was intercepted by a 
Greek force, under Odysseus, at the inn of Gravia. 



120 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

After a sharp fight, the Greeks were routed, and Odys- j 
sens himself only with difficulty escaped. In terror* 
lest the Ottomans should now advance into Attica, and 
lest, in the presence of this danger, the Athenians 
should elect a new commander-in-chief, he concluded 
an armistice with the Turks, at the same time offering 
to make his submission to the Porte, and to secure that 
of the other captains of East Hellas, on condition of 
his being continued in his position as a chief of Arma- 
toli. Though the Turks did not believe in his offers of 
submission, they accepted the armistice, for their own 
purposes, and retired to Zeituni for the winter. The 
peasants of Boeotia and Attica, relieved from imme- 
diate danger, and able now to sow their fields in peace, 
gave Odysseus all the credit for saving them from the 
Turks, and, knowing nothing of the terms of the ar- 
mistice, began to regard him as an ideal hero. 

It was, however, the power of Kolokotrones that 
most excited the jealous apprehensions of the other 
parties. In the Morea, the possession of ^auplia, 
which, since its surrender by the Turks, had been held 
for him by his son-in-law Koliopulos, rendered him 
supreme; and to break his power became the main 
object of primates and islanders alike. The Govern- 
ment in vain demanded admission into ^auplia ; and, 
when it became plain that Kolokotrones had no inten- 



NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AT ASTROS 121 

tion of surrendering his Vantage ground, it retired to 
Astros. Here, in December 1822, the new !N"ational 
Assembly^ for which writs had already been issued, 
proceeded to collect. Deputies streamed in from all 
sides, representatives being present even from Crete. 
Members of the former Conventions seemed to think 
they had a prescriptive right to sit in the new one, with- 
out any fresh election; and many deputies appeared 
who could pretend to represent none but themselves. 
Among the more prominent leaders present were Pe- 
trobey, Londos, Zaimis, and many other primates of 
distinction. Mavrocordatos and Hypsilanti also at- 
tended; and even Odysseus condescended to appear. 

Among this motley assemblage there was, of 
course, little question of useful legislation. The 
Greeks from of old have loved oratory and the game 
of debate, and the making of laws better than the 
observance of them; and the new-born liberties of 
Greece seemed now in danger of being drowned in a 
flood of talk, or strangled in a network of intrigues. 
There was, indeed, some attempt made to establish a 
criminal code, and to discuss the publication of a 
budget; and, above all, the necessity was universally 
recognised of raising money by means of foreign loans. 
But by far the most important business of the Assem- 
bly was in connection with the formation of the new 



122 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Government, and tlie attempt to oust Kolokotrones 
from liis dangerous predominance. 

It was, indeed, tlie feud between the military and 
tlie civilian elements wliich liad rendered all efforts at 
legislation impossible. The soldiers, less skilled with 
the tongue than with the sword, withdrew in dudgeon 
from the war of words, and formed a sort of Upper 
Chamber of their own. The measures which survived 
the strife of tongues in the civilian Assembly were 
invariably rejected with contempt by this novel House 
of Lords, wliich, in its turn, originated nothing. That 
legislation was thus rendered impossible would have 
mattered little, where a strong administration was so 
much more needed, if a strong administration could 
have been formed. But it was just here that the bat- 
tle of the factions raged most violently, and with the 
most fatal effect. 

The Government was to consist, as before, of two 
councils or committees, one legislative, to represent 
the Assembly when not in session, the other execu- 
tive. It became the object of the civilian party to 
exclude the military element from these committees; 
and this, as far as their influence in the Assembly was 
concerned, they were strong enough to effect. The 
executive council, as constituted by the Assembly, con- 
sisted of Petrobey as president, and three continental 



PARTY FEUDS 123 

primates : Zaimis, Karalampos, and Metaxas. A fifth 
place was not filled up, and was reserved for a repre- 
sentative of the islands. Kolokotrones, however, with 
threats of violence, obtained the vacant place for him- 
self. He attempted also to secure the election of his 
creature, Deliyanni, to the presidency of the legisla- 
tive committee ; and when this was filled by the choice 
of Mavrocordatos, he broke out in uncontrollable fury. 
The Phanariot, with his spectacles, his swallowtail 
coat, his European airs, and his talk of constitutional 
government, was an object of loathing to the savage 
old Klepht. ^ I won't allow you to be president ! ' he 
cried. ^ If you accept, I will follow you step by step, 
and throw dirt at that fine European get-up of 
yours ! ' ^ 

Kolokotrones now saw that, unless he appealed to 
arms, his influence in the Government would be lost. 
For a time, indeed, he and the other military chiefs 
submitted, grumbling; but on the 10th of April, a 
fresh aggression on the part of the civilians precipi- 
tated the crisis. It was now decided by the Assembly 
to deprive Kolokotrones of the supreme military com- 
mand, and to vest this in a committee of three. This 
was but one more example of the unwisdom of making 
offensive proposals which there is no possibility of 
1 Mendelssohn, i. 311. 



124 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

carrying througli. Kolokotrones, in the face of this 
direct attempt to deprive him of his power, threw off 
the mask, and openly defied the National Assembly. 
Supported by his bands of Klephts and Armatoli, on 
whom he could always rely, he now forced the execu- 
tive council to accompany him to ISTauplia, where it was 
completely at his mercy; while the legislative com- 
mittee wandered helplessly from place to place, in con- 
stant terror from the fierce followers of Kolokotrones, 
and stripped of all power.^ 

At this period nothing but the unreadiness of the 
Ottomans to take advantage of the situation in Greece 
could have saved the Hellenes from destruction. A 
stroke of fortune had indeed once more helped their 
cause; for, early in 1823, the Ottoman magazine of 
Tophana had been destroyed by fire; and in this im- 
mense conflagration, the greatest that even Constanti- 
nople had ever witnessed, vast stores of war material 
had perished, besides some six thousand houses, and 
fifty mosques. 

In spite of the huge loss and inconvenience caused 
by this accident, Mahmoud yet hoped to prosecute the 
war with vigour; and once more a double invasion 
of the Morea was projected. Mustai Pasha was to 
invade West Hellas, and advance upon Missolonghi; 
1 Prokesch, i. 237. 



EXPEDITIONS OF MUSTAI AND YUSSUF PASHAS 125 

while, to prepare and cover this movement, Yussuf 
Pasha marched by way of Boeotia and Attica upon 
Salona and Lepanto, with a view to crossing thence 
to Patras. The moment was very favourable, both 
by sea and land. In the Morea the strife of parties 
was raging with full violence ; and, at sea, the island- 
ers were likewise turning their arms against each other. 
Hydriots and Spezziots were at daggers drawn; and 
Samos, under Lycourgos — of sinister memory in con- 
nection with Chios — was defending itself, by force ol 
arms, against the unjust aggressions of the Psariots. 
The Greek fleet had become a mere flotilla of pirate 
hulls, without organisation or discipline, and as ready 
to prey upon friend as foe; and not even Miaoulis 
could reduce it to order. 

Khosrew Pasha, however, who commanded the 
Ottoman fleet which, at the end of May, sailed out of 
the Dardanelles, was not the man to take full advan- 
tage of the situation. He was in any case more suited 
to the council chamber than the quarter-deck, and, 
timid by nature, the fate of his predecessor, Kara Ali, 
had filled him with a perfect horror of the Greek fire- 
ships.^ His present cruise was not marked by any con- 
siderable results. He touched at Mitylene and Chios, 
embarked some troops at Tchesme, and sailed for 
i Finlay, ii. 14. 



126 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Eubcea, where he arrived in time to relieve Karystos, 
then being besieged by Grisiotis. Thence he sailed 
past Hydra, threw supplies into Coron and Modon,and, 
on the 20th, landed some troops and a large sum of 
money at Patras. Instead, however, of remaining on 
the west coast of Greece to support the operations of 
Mustai, he hastened back to the Dardanelles. 

Yussuf Pasha had meanwhile opened the cam- 
paign in East Plellas. Advancing from Thessaly with 
six thousand men, he marched into Phokis, occupied 
Salona, and, driving the Greeks out of the passes of 
Helikon and Parnassus, descended upon Levadia. 
The Pasha of Eubcea, at the same time, with eight 
hundred horsemen, raided in the direction of Thebes^ 
and swept off the harvest. Odysseus now entrusted 
the defence of the Acropolis to his lieutenant Gouras, 
who had lately married a beautiful girl of Lidoriki,^ 
and marched to occupy the defiles of Helikon, while 
the Athenians took refuge in the island of Salamis. 
The news of the Ottoman invasion had, moreover, 
put an end for the time to the feuds in the Morea; 
and Kolokotrones and Niketas now advanced to Me- 
gara with a force of Moreots. Other bands also speed- 
ily collected, and succeeded by a bold guerilla war in 
driving the Turks back into the plain of the Kephis- 

1 See p. 210. 



EXPLOIT OF MARKO BOTZARES 127 

SOS. The Seraskier himself crossed over into Euboea; 
and, as Odysseus took no measures to prevent it, he was 
able to drive the Greeks out of the northern half of 
the island. The Ottoman plan of campaign in East 
Hellas was, however, shattered. 

For the invasion of AVest Hellas, meanwhile, 
Mustai Pasha had assembled at Ochrida an army con- 
sisting entirely of Albanian tribesmen. Of these five 
thousand were Mussulman Ghegs, and three thousand 
Roman Catholic Miridits, whose hatred of the Ortho- 
dox Greeks had made them the close allies of the Mo- 
hammedans. As usual, the Greeks, occupied with 
their own quarrels, had neglected to guard the passes ; 
and the army of Mustai advanced as far as Karpenisi 
without encountering any serious opposition. Here, 
however, it met with a disaster which constituted for 
the Greeks one of the most brilliant exploits of the 
war. 

On the night of the 21st of August, Marko Bot- 
zares, the Suliot hero, with three hundred and fifty of 
his clansmen, surprised the camp of Djelaieddin Bey, 
who commanded the Ottoman vanguard. Four thou- 
sand Mussulman Ghegs and Catholic Miridits were in 
the camp ; but so complete was the surprise that little 
opposition was offered when, slaying and plundering, 
the Suliots rushed among their panic-striken enemies. 



128 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Botzares himself made straight for the tent of the Bey, 
which had been pitched within a small enclosure sur- 
rounded by a wall. Raising his head above the wall 
to see how an entrance could be effected, the Suliot's 
head became visible against the sky, and he received a 
bullet through the brain. The death of their beloved 
leader was a terrible blow to the Suliots, and put a stop 
to their proceedings, but not before they had slain some 
two thousand of the enemy. Taking up the body of 
Botzares, and laden with an immense booty, they re- 
tired without molestation. Had the ^tolian Arma- 
toli taken part in the attack, as had been arranged, the 
force of Djelaleddin must have been annihilated; but 
their jealousy of Botzares and his Albanians had kept 
them idle spectators; and, as it was, the Ottoman com- 
mander kept command of the ground, and Mustai^s 
march was hardly delayed. 

At the end of September, the Ottoman commander- 
in-chief formed, at Yrachori, a junction with Omer 
Yrioni, who commanded an army of some four thou- 
sand Mussulman Tosks, an Albanian tribe speaking a 
dialect distinct from that of the Ghegs, with whom it 
was by no means on friendly terms. With this hetero- 
geneous force Mustai, in October, proceeded to lay 
siege to Anatoliko, a small town in the ^tolian la- 
goons, about five miles west of Missolonghi. The place 



SIEGE OF ANATOLIKO 129 

was garrisoned by some six hundred men, and entirely 
unfortified. It had, however, a small battery of six 
old-fashioned cannon, commanded by William Martin, 
an English seaman, who had deserted from some ship 
of war, and who succeeded with these in dismounting 
the only Turkish gun. The pashas now could do noth- 
ing but bombard the place with a couple of mortars, 
which did but little damage, the garrison, in fact, suf- 
fering much more from thirst than from the Ottoman 
shells. In this strait, the angel Michael came to their 
assistance. A bomb from the Turkish mortars fell 
into the church of the archangel, shattering the pave- 
ment; and lo! from the hole thus made there bub- 
bled up a plentiful spring of pure water. ^ Encouraged 
by this miracle, the Greeks made so stout a resistance, 
that on the 11th of December Mustai raised the siege. 
The second half of the Ottoman plan of campaign had 
thus also broken down ; and the year closed in triumph 
for the Greeks. 

]^o sooner was the danger from the Turks at an 
end than the Greeks resumed the internecine struggle 
which the common peril had interrupted. Mavrocor- 
datos, supported by the party of the primates, and by 
the islands, determined to make another effort to break 
the power of Kolokotrones. The executive committee 

1 Gordon, ii. 36. 
9 



130 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

was now entirely in the hands of the military party. 
Zaimis, indeed, had left it and thrown in his lot with 
the other primates; but Petrobey, after wavering 
awhile, had definitely declared for Kolokotrones, 
whose authority was now supreme. The legislative 
committee, stripped of all power, had broken up; and 
the remnant of it, which had established itself in 
Argos, now opened the struggle by sending to the ex- 
ecutive to demand a statement of accounts. Tor only 
reply, Petrobey sent a band of his Mainotes, who dealt 
with the Rump of the legislative committee as Crom- 
well had dealt with that of the Long Parliament. The 
members thereupon fled to Kranidi, opposite the island 
of Hydra, and put themselves under the protection of 
the Hydriots. Greece was thus, at the end of 1823, 
divided into three sections. In East Hellas, Odysseus 
reigned supreme ; West Hellas was held by Mavrocor- 
datos for the Government at Kranidi; while Kolokot- 
rones, established in ISTauplia, and in the Acrocorin- 
thos, which had surrendered on the 7th of November,^ 
aimed at subjecting the Morea to military rule. 

Thus far the violence of Kolokotrones seemed to 

1 It is pleasant to record that on this occasion the firm- 
ness of Niketas prevented the capitulation being- violated. 
The Moslems were embarked on an Austrian ship, and al- 
lowed to carry away their arms and a small sum of money. 
See Gordon, ii. 71. 



FIRST CIVIL WAR 131 

have triumphed ; but the Government at Kranidi pos- 
sessed many elements of strength which, now that it 
was removed from the immediate danger of intimida- 
tion at the hands of the military chiefs, began to assert 
themselves. It had the prestige of legitimacy ; it pos- 
sessed in Mavrocordatos a man who was regarded by 
the opinion of Europe as the constitutional leader of 
Greece, and in Kolettes the only one of the Greek 
chiefs who could combine the spirit of the old barbar- 
ism with that of the new culture; ^ and, above all, it 
alone would dispose of the loans which were at this 
time being raised in Europe, of which the arrival was 
already rumoured abroad. This last indeed, was the 
factor that ultimately determined the victory of the 
Government; for, in Greece, even more than else- 
where, he who held the purse-strings held the reins of 
power. 

The Government now determined to make a vigor- 
ous effort to reassert its authority. It had already 
opened the struggle by demanding the surrender of 
^N'auplia, and openly accusing Kolokotrones of pecula- 
tion. It now put Petrobey and Karalampos on their 
trial, deposed Metaxas, and deprived Kolokotrones 
of the supreme command of the forces; while a new 
executive council was created, with Konduriottes, a 

iProkesch, i. 274. 



132 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

wealthy Hydriot ship-owner, as President, but Ko- 
lettes, the astute Epirote, as its moving spirit. 

To this action of the Government Kolokotrones 
replied by collecting some thirty-five members of the 
Assembly at Tripolitza, and there setting up an op- 
position government. At the same time he began 
to collect his bands in Elis and Arcadia, strengthened 
the defences of the Acrocorinthos, and handed over 
the command of ^auplia to his son Panos; while the 
influence of Petrobey assured him the support of the 
Mainotes in Messenia. The Government, on the other 
hand, could reckon, in the Morea, only on the support 
of Corinth, which was held by Notaras, and of Achaia 
and a part of Arcadia, where the influence of the pri- 
mates Londos and Zaimis was supreme. East Hellas 
was still held by Odysseus, who played of course en- 
tirely for his own hand, and could be relied upon by 
neither party. West Hellas, on the other hand, re- 
mained, under Mavrocordatos, true to the Government. 

Konduriottes, the new President, owed his eleva- 
tion solely to his great wealth, which gave him an in- 
fluence quite out of proportion to his capacity. In 
private life he was jovial and good-tempered, and, as 
a statesman, his riches placed him above the suspicion 
of corruption; but he was dull, obstinate, and igno- 
rant, and, above all, full of Hydriot prejudices, which 



GOVEENMENT OF KONDURIOTTES 133 

he was at no pains to disguise.^ Kolettes, who had 
been physician to Ali Pasha, and combined a certain 
amount of European culture with a thorough knowl- 
edge of the best way to deal with barbarous or half- 
civilised people, was the only man of any capacity in 
the new administration; and it was under his influ- 
ence that, to counteract the military preponderance of 
Kolokotrones in the Morea, the Government now in- 
troduced bands of Rumeliot and Bulgarian merce- 
naries, who invaded the Peloponnese by way of the 
Isthmus, and treated it as an enemy's country. By 
March 1824 the Government had everywhere the 
upper hand, and Kolokotrones began to feel himself 
hard pressed. ITauplia was closely invested; and a 
Hydriot force, under Miaoulis, marched into Argolis, 
seized the mills of Lerna, and captured Argos. Kolo- 
kotrones himself was shortly afterwards defeated be- 
fore Tripolitza by the united forces of the Bulgarian 
Hadji Christos and the Moreots; and, after one or 
two more fights of less importance, w^as compelled to 
open negotiations with the primates Zaimis and Lon- 
dos. Through their mediation, an arrangement was 
ultimately come to by which Kolokotrones submitted 
to the Government, and surrendered !Nauplia in re- 
turn for an equivalent in money. 
1 Gordon, ii. 191. 



134 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

The Government was now everywhere triumphant; 
but in its very victory were contained the seeds of 
future troubles. Zaimis and Londos were accused of 
making too favourable terms with Kolokotrones;^ and 
the first symptoms of a rupture between the islanders 
and the Moreot primates became apparent. To the 
disgust of the Peloponnesians, the Suliot Photomaras 
was made governor of I^auplia; and this first instance 
of the undue favour, which the administration of 
Konduriottes was about to show to the continental 
Greeks and the islanders, so offended Londos and 
Zaimis, that they withdrew from E^auplia in dudgeon. 
1 Gordon, ii. 100, 102. 



CHAPTER Vin 

Arrival of Lord Byron in Greece — Effect on European 
opinion — The first Greek loans — Byron's opinion of the 
Greeks — He goes to Missolongfhi — His death — Presidency 
of Konduriottes — Renewed dissensions — The second 
Civil War — Comx3lete victory of the Government — Im- 
prisonment of Kolokotrones 

In the autumn of 1823, when the civil dissensions 
were at their height, Lord Byron arrived in Greece. 
Even before he publicly announced his intention of 
joining the Greek cause, he had exercised an immense 
influence in arousing the Philhellenic enthusiasm of 
Europe; and now that the genius whose fame ex- 
tended throughout the length and breadth of Christen- 
dom, proclaimed that he was prepared to devote health 
and fortune, and, if need be, life itself, to his ideal of a 
free Hellas, the eyes of the civilised world were di- 
rected with a new interest on the affairs of Greece. 

It was largely owing to the influence of Byron that 
the two first Greek loans had recently been floated in 

135 



136 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEP30NDENCE 

London. It is tlie surest proof of the genuineness of 
tlie Philhellenic sentiment in England at that time, 
that two loans, one of 800,000Z. and the other of 
2,000,000?., should have been floated without diffi- 
culty, within a few days of each other, only on such 
very unsatisfactory security as could be offered by an 
insurgent Government constantly at feud within it- 
self. Byron himself brought out with him the first 
instalment of 40,000?.; and, when he realised the act- 
ual condition of Greece, he felt serious qualms at hav- 
ing helped to induce people to invest in so doubtful a 
speculation. For the time being, indeed, the money 
was not handed over to the Greek Government, but 
banked at Zante, where, after Byron's death, it was 
detained for a still further period by order of the au- 
thorities of the Ionian Islands. The question of what 
became of it when it was ultimately handed over to 
the Greek Government, or what was the destination 
of the subsequent instalments, has some light thrown 
upon it by the statement of the Philhellene General 
Gordon, who says, ' "With perhaps the exception of 
Zaimis, the members of the Executive were no better 
than public robbers.' ^ A considerable sum was, in- 
deed, saved from the greed of the Greeks by being ex- 
pended, more or less wisely, in the national interest 

1 Gordon, ii. 72. 



THE GREEK LOANS 137 

before it reached their hands/ The services of Lord 
Cochrane, the celebrated sailor, who had made a great 
name for himself in the naval wars of South America, 
were engaged by a retaining fee of 37,000Z.; though 
it was not till 1827 that he made his appearance in 
Greece. Four steamers were also ordered, at a cost of 
150,000/.; but of these only the Karteria arrived in 
time to be of any service; while, of the two frigates 
which Captain Lallemande, a French cavalry officer, 
had been sent to America to buy for the Greek navy, 
only one, the Hellas, ever arrived in Greek waters, and 
cost 160,000/. By far the greater part of the loans 
was, however, scrambled for by the factions in Greece 
itself; and, as one main result of the generosity of 
Europe, the partisans of the victorious party swag- 
gered about the streets of ISTauplia, their clothes glitter- 
ing with gold embroidery, and their belts lined with 
English sovereigns.^ It is certain that, whatever else 
may have happened, the unfortunate creditors never 
received one penny either of the principal or of the in- 
terest that had been * secured ' to them. 

Byron himself was, from the moment of his land- 

1 But according- to Mendelssohn as much as 1,000,000Z. was 
absorbed by jobbery in London and New York. See also 
Finlay, ii. 44, 

2 Finlay, ii. 40. 



138 THE WAU OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

ing, under no illusion as to the character of the people 
he had come to serve. During the autumn of 1823, 
he had remained in Cephalonia, one of the Ionian 
islands then under the British flag, to gather informa- 
tion with a view to seeing where his help could best 
be given. To the Greeks, meanwhile, the wealthy 
English • milordos ' was interesting mainly as a gold 
mine, to be worked for their own personal advantage; 
and, during his residence in the island, nearly every 
statesman or general of any pretensions wrote to him 
to solicit his favour, his influence, or his money. Kolo- 
kotrones in Salamis, Mavrocordatos in Hydra, and Me- 
taxas in Missolonghi competed for his presence; for 
only where each of them chanced to be could Greece 
be served. Petrobey, more naively honest, said, 
straight out, that the best way to save Hellas was to 
give him, the Bey of the Maina, a thousand pounds. 
' Of the Greeks,' Byron wrote, ^ I can't say much good 
hitherto, and I do not like to speak ill of them, though 
they do of each other.' ^ 

In the face of so much disillusion and discourage- 
ment, the attitude of Byron is full of a singular and 
pathetic interest. Under circumstances which would 
have crushed the enthusiasm of a man of less sym- 
pathetic imagination, he displayed a wide-minded gen- 
1 Moore's Life of Byron (ed. 1846), p. 601. 



BYRON AND THE GREEKS 139 

erosity, a steadfastness of purpose, and withal a 
shrewd common-sense, which could scarcely have been 
expected of his wayward genius. The glorious Hellas 
of his dreams had faded, for the time, in the hard, grey 
light of a day of sordid realities. Yet here, beneath his 
eyes, was a Hellas, human, pitiful, bleeding from many 
wounds; it was not for him to gather his poet's robe 
about him, and pass by on the other side. Many had 
come out to fight for the cause of Greece thinking to 
find a country peopled with the heroic types of old, 
had found instead a race of brigands, and departed in 
disgust. Many more had remained, their eyes so 
blinded by Philhellenic prejudice that they were con- 
tent to gloss over the worst crimes of the Greeks with 
classical allusions. Byron belonged to neither of these 
classes. He knew that half-barbarous peoples are full 
of vices, and that emancipated slaves are not of the stuff 
that makes heroes. He saw in a very clear light the 
dishonesty, the meanness, the selfishness of the Greeks ; 
and yet he did not despair of Greece. * I was a fool 
to come here,' he wrote, on the 7th of October, from 
Cephalonia, ^ but, having come here, I must see what 
can be done.' ^ 

Once out of the realm of dreams, and brought 
face to face with facts, the activity of Byron on behalf 
1 Moore's Life, p. 601. 



140 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

of Greece was cliaracterised by good sense as well as 
generosity. ISTothing is now heard or seen of the three 
beautiful classical helmets which he had caused to be 
made for him before he came out to Greece ; but with 
practical advice and wisely bestowed material help 
he is ever ready. He refused, indeed, to squander 
his money on unworthy objects, or to become, as 
so many of the Philhellenes had done, the dupe 
and instrument of a selfish faction. ^ I offered,' 
he writes, ' to advance 1,000 dollars a month for the 
succour of Missolonghi and the Suliots under Botzari 
(since killed) ; but the Government have answered me 
that they wish to confer with me previously, which is 
in fact saying that they wish me to expend my money 
in some other direction. I will take care that it is for 
the public cause, otherwise I will not advance a para. 
The Opposition say they want to cajole me, and the 
party in power say the others wish to seduce me, so 
between the two I have a difficult part to play; how- 
ever, I will have nothing to do with the factions unless 
to reconcile them if possible.' * 

His efforts to bring about a cessation of the ruin- 
ous civil strife were as unceasing as they were ineffec- 
tive. ' The Greeks,' he said, ^ have no enemies in 
heaven or earth to be dreaded but their own discords.' ^ 
1 Moore's Li^e, p. 596. 2 ibid. p. 604. 



BYRON SAILS FOR MISSOLONGHI 141 

He besought the Government to bring about a recon- 
ciliation between the parties, and threatened that, if 
union could not be restored, the payment of the loan 
would be indefinitely postponed. To Mavrocordatos 
he wrote: ^ Greece is placed between three measures; 
either to reconquer her liberty, to become a depend- 
ence of the sovereigns of Europe, or to return to a 
Turkish province. Civil war is but a road which leads 
to the two latter. If she is desirous of the fate of Wal- 
lachia and the Crimea, she may obtain it to-morrow ;if 
of that of Italy, the day after; but if she wishes to be- 
come truly Greece, free and independent, she must re- 
solve to-day, or she will never again have the opportu- 
nity.' ^ All his prayers and admonitions, however, fell 
on deaf ears. The Greek factions wanted his money, 
not his advice ; and, failing the appearance of the for- 
mer, they rejected the latter with scorn. 

At last, in January 1824, Byron decided to take 
a more active part in the war, and sailed for Mis- 
solonghi. With characteristic perversity, he had 
chosen, for the scene of his activity, in spite of the 
entreaties and warnings of his friends, one of the most 
unhealthy spots in Greece. For one whose health v/as 
already undermined to settle amid the fever-breeding 
marshes of the Acarnanian coast was, indeed, to court 
1 Dated December 2, 1822, from Cephalonia. Moore, p. 604. 



142 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

death ; and Byron went to meet Ms fate with a certain 
deliberation. He had openly expressed his willingness 
to surrender his life for the cause of Greece, and, per- 
haps, he felt that this could be better served by his 
death than by his life. He regarded himself, to use his 
own simile, as but one of the many waves that must 
break and die upon the shore, before the tide they help 
to advance can reach its full mark. 

The voyage to Missolonghi was not without its 
adventures, and twice the military career of the erratic 
genius was nearly cut short. Once, during a sea fog, 
the Greek brig which carried him nearly collided with 
a Turkish frigate; and, but for the fact that the latter 
took it for a fire-ship, and sheered off in alarm, he must 
have been captured. A day or two later he was all but 
wrecked on the coast of Acarnania, the vessel having 
twice actually run upon the rocks. However, in due 
course he arrived safely at Missolonghi; though the 
vessel containing his money and stores was captured 
by the Turks, and towed into Patras. Here it was de- 
tained for a few days, but ultimately very generously 
restored by Yussuf Pasha to its owner.^ 

1 Byron himself affected that the Turks had done no more 
than they were compelled to do in restoring his ship, which 
was sailing' under the English flag. But it was notoriously 
laden with stores and money to be used against the Turks; 
and these at any rate they would have been justified in re- 



BYRON AT MISSOLONGHI 143 

Byron's activity at Missolonghi was not sufficiently 
prolonged to be of any great importance in affecting 
the fortunes of tlie war. He took the Suliots, who had 
been left leaderless by the death of Marko Botzares, 
into his pay. Fifty of these he formed into a body- 
guard to protect his own person; while some five hun- 
dred were enrolled as a regiment of which he took the 
command. Their lawlessness, greed, and insolence, 
however, soon compelled him to disband the latter, 
though he retained his select guard to the last. For the 
most part, he devoted his money and energy to 
strengthening the fortifications of the town, being 

taining. It is certain that, under similar circumstances, 
the Greeks would have done so. As it was, the Ottoman 
authorities restored the whole of their capture, greatly to 
the astonishment of the British ambassador at Constanti- 
nople, Lord Strang-ford, who even thought it necessary to 
protest to the Porte against this action, as forming a bad 
precedent. There is no doubt tl^at the protection of the 
British tlag was grossly abused during the w^ar by the Eng- 
lish Philhellenes. Lord Cochrane, after he became High 
Admiral of Greece, though he himself sailed under the Hel- 
lenic ensign, was constantly accompanied by his private 
yacht, flying the English colours, on which, for safety's 
sake, he kept all his money and valuables! In the present 
instance, the Eeis-EfPendi, replying to Lord Strangford's 
remonstrances, said: ' Yussuf Pasha has understood the 
views of the Sultan; it is better to suffer than to open the 
door to injustice, which would happen if Pashas were al- 
lowed to search European ships.' See Prokesch, i. 246. 



144 THE WAE OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

aided in this work by the engineer Parry. He also 
planned an attack on Lepanto; but its execution was 
prevented by the insubordination^pf the Suliots; and 
his remaining weeks of life were embittered by the 
feuds and broils of which he was compelled to be the 
helpless witness. A regular war broke out between 
Anatoliko and Missolonghi. Karaiskakis marched, 
with three hundred men, from the former place, and 
in revenge for some injury received, carried off two 
primates from Missolonghi; while the dismissed Su- 
liots returned and seized the fort of Yasiladi, which 
commanded the town from the lagoon. 

Prostrated by sickness and racked with pain, 
Byron preserved among all these troubles, which he 
was powerless to prevent, the same unshaken forti- 
tude and unbroken spirit. Even on his death-bed, 
his cool courage and indomitable will cowed into si- 
lence the fierce Suliot warriors, who had burst, with 
brandished knives and wild threats, into his room. 
It may perhaps be doubted whether he would, had he 
lived, have proved a really effective general, or have 
been able to reunite the shattered fragments of Greece, 
before they were once more welded together by the 
blows of a common misfortune. It is certain that his 
death was the best service that he could have rendered 
to the cause he had at heart ; for all Europe felt that he 



DEATH OF BYRON 145 

had died an exalted martyr to his faith in the future 
of Hellas; and no martyr, however humble, ever yet 
died quite in vain. 

By the Greeks the news of the death of Byron, 
which took place on the 19th of April, was received 
with a becoming regret, which was, however, speedily 
swallowed up by anxiety as to the fate of the loan of 
which he had been the trustee. It was, in fact, the 
prospect of the arrival of this loan which had done 
more than anything else to secure the victory of the 
Government in the first civil war; for the contending 
factions had hastened to make peace, so as not to be 
absent from the expected division of the spoil. Only 
Odysseus, planning deep schemes of his own, had 
held aloof. The presence of Byron at Missolonghi 
had inspired the wily Klepht with the idea of getting 
the English poet into his hands, and securing, by an 
astute diplomacy, the lion^s share of the loan for him- 
self. He was enthusiastically seconded by Colonel 
Stanhope (Earl of Harrington), whose fanatical Phil- 
hellenism made him the blind instrument of the Greek 
hero's unscrupulous intrigues.^ A meeting had act- 

1 For Colonel Stanhope's benefit Odj'^sseus affected to be 
an ardent partisan of liberty. * His conversation was of 
newspapers and schools, the rights of the people, and a 
museum of antiquities.' One morning-, while the Colonel 
and Odysseus were sitting together in the latter's quarters, 
10 



146 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

ually been arranged between Byron and Odysseus at 
Salona, when the poet's death put a stop to the plot. 
Odysseus now, fearing lest he should lose all share 
in the loan, gave up suddenly all his schemes of inde- 
pendent action, and hurried to Nauplia to pay court 
to the Government. 

After the death of Byron, the first instalment of 
the loan, amounting to 40,000/., which had been 
banked by him at Zante, had been, to the dismay and 
disgust of the Greeks, detained by the English admin- 
istration of the Ionian Islands. After the destruction 
of Psara by the Turks,^ on the 2nd of July, however, 
the money had been handed over to the Greek Govern- 
ment; and, at the news, not only Odysseus, but Kolo- 
kotrones, J^iketas, and every other chieftain, great or 
small, who could formulate the shadow of a claim, 
hastened to !Nauplia to share in the spoil. For the 
Government, however, duty and interest for once co- 
incided; and they determined to fit out a squadron to 
avenge the disaster of Psara ; a decision which it was 
all the easier for them to make, as it would benefit 
their main supporters, the Hydriot ship-owners. Any 

Dr. Sophienopoulo entered, handed the General a report on 
the state of the hospital, and answered various queries 
about it. No hospital existed! Gordon, i. 121, and note. 
1 See the next chapter. 



SECOND CIVIL WAR 147 

funds that might be left over, they determined to hold 
in reserve. For the disappointed chieftains and pri- 
mates, this put the coping-stone on the edifice of the 
misdeeds of the Government.^ Konduriottes had used 
his powers as President throughout to favour the isl- 
anders at the expense of the other Hellenes; he had 
thrust his friends, the Hydriot sea captains, into all 
the most important military and civil commands ; and 
now the pure stream of British gold was to flow into 
the same dirty channel ! This was more than the dis- 
interested patriotism of the Moreot primates and the 
Klephts of the mainland could stand. Furious with 
jealous rage and disappointed greed, they retired, with 
their bands of armed followers, from ISTauplia. Odys- 
seus was the first to leave. Kolokotrones follov/ed, 
and with him went the Moreot primates, who, in the 
last civil war, had been his main opponents: Sissinis 
of Gastuni, the great landowner of Elis, who lived 
upon his estates with more than feudal splendour: ^ 
Londos, the friend of Byron, w^hose influence was para- 
mount in Achaia: and Zaimis, who could always 
reckon on the support of a large part of Arcadia. 

1 Prokesch, i. 295. 

2 See Finlay, ii. 35. The peasants had to fall on their 
knees whenever they addressed him, even in reply to a 
simple question. 



148 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Again Greece was about to be plunged into civil war: 
a war, this time, of the Moreots against the islanders. 

Bj the autumn, the whole of the Morea was in 
flames; but the conflagration, this time, did not last 
long. Kolettes, the only member of the Government 
who possessed either firmness or ability, had hitherto 
let the folly and incompetence of Konduriottes have 
full play, because he desired to undermine his author- 
ity; but, now that serious danger threatened, he took 
the reins of government into his own hands. The 
possession of the English gold, and, still more, the 
prospect of the speedy arrival of a second and larger 
instalment of the loan, was a tower of strength to the 
Administration. Kolettes, with promises of plentiful 
reward, induced the Rumeliots to come to the aid of 
the Government; and 3,000 men, under Gouras and 
Karaiskakis, crossed the Isthmus into the Morea. 
Against this host the scattered forces of the Moreots 
could do nothing; and in less than fourteen days the 
rebellion was at an end. The Rumeliot bands harried 
and wasted the country as though they were fighting 
the Turk and not their own countrymen. The country 
houses of Londos and the other primates were burnt, 
and they themselves forced to fly.^ The death of his 
son Panos, in a skirmish before Tripolitza, broke the 

1 Prokesch, i. 297. 



KOLOKOTRONES IMPRISONED 149 

spirit of Kolokotrones; he surrendered to the Govern- 
ment, and was imprisoned in a monastery in Hydra. 
Here, for the time, he languished in a studied neglect, 
unwashed and unshorn, and prophesying moodily to 
sympathetic visitors that the time was not far distant 
when his ungrateful country would supplicate, on 
bended knees, for his assistance. 

Odysseus, meanwhile, had recrossed the Isthmus, 
and had taken advantage of the absence of his lieu- 
tenant Gouras and of Karaiskakis to make peace with 
the Turks. In December 1824, he made an arrange- 
ment by which, as the price of his treason, he was to 
be guaranteed the Captaincy of East Hellas by the Ot- 
toman Government. As an open traitor, however, his 
career was not of long duration. In April 1825, 
Gouras returned to East Hellas, and attacked his for- 
mer chief and a body of Turks under Abbas Pasha, at 
Daulis. Odysseus and his allies were defeated, and 
driven to Cheroneia. Deserted by his followers, and 
distrusted by the Turks, the power of Odysseus was 
now completely broken; and, on the 25th of April, 
he was compelled to surrender at discretion to his for- 
mer lieutenant.^ He had declared himself the enemy 
not only of the Government, but of Greece, and he 
could have little hope of mercy. A convicted traitor, 
iMendelssohn, i. 331. 



150 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

stained with innumerable crimes, his death by process 
of law might have been regarded as an act of stern 
justice. As it was, he was imprisoned in the Acropolis 
for several months, and finally, on the 16th of July, 
murdered there by Gouras, who had succeeded to the 
place forfeited by his treason.^ 

At the beginning of the year 1825, then, the 
Government of Konduriottes and Kolettes was every- 
where victorious. Supported by the islands, by Euro- 
pean opinion, and by the Phanariot Greeks, it was now 
at the height of its power; all resistance to its author- 
ity was broken ; and it seemed as though Greece were 
at last to be united imder a powerful administration. 
But, meanwhile, a storm had been gathering over Hel- 
las from without, which, when it burst, would have 
shattered to its foundations a far more substantial edi- 
fice of power than this Government of selfish factions. 

1 Finlay, ii. 94. In view of the growing unpopnlarity of 
the Government of Konduriottes, Gouras was afraid lest 
Odysseus should escape and regain his power. This, and 
not the satisfaction of justice, was the motive of the mur- 
der. 



CHAPTER IX 

Sultan Mahmoud appeals to Mehemet Ali of Egypt for aid 
— Insurrection in Crete — Hussein Bey pacifies Crete — 
Preparations of Mehemet Ali for the invasion of the 
Morea — Destruction of Kasos — Ibrahim sails to Rhodes 
— He celebrates the feast of Bairam in the Bay of ^fakry 
— Destruction of Psara by Khosrew Pasha — Turkish at- 
tack on Samos repulsed — Naval engag-ements of Bud- 
run — Victory of Miaoulis off Crete — Mutinous conduct 
of the Hydriot seamen — Ibrahim reaches Suda 

While the Greeks were finding an ally in the Phil- 
hellenic sentiment of Europe, Sultan Mahmoud sought 
aid in another direction. With the keenness of view 
that characterised him, he had studied the causes of 
the failure of the Ottoman arms, and determined on 
a new plan of action. To master the insurrection he 
realised the absolute necessity for obtaining the com- 
mand of the sea, and of opposing the untrained valour 
of the Greeks with the discipline of drilled troops; but 
all attempts to ref oriu the Ottoman army had hitherto 
failed, owing to the fierce opposition of the Janissaries 
to any interference with their privileges and immuni- 

151 



152 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

ties; and the Turkish navv, owing to the causes men- 
tioned elsewhere, had not proved itself efficient in war, 
though it was now in a far better condition than at the 
outbreak of the revolt, and doubtless in time the vastly 
greater resources of the Ottoman empire might have 
worn out the naval power of Greece. 

Under these circumstances, the Sultan's thoughts 
turned to his vassal Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt; and 
to him he determined to apply for aid. This remark- 
able man, who had raised himself from the lowest 
ranks ot the people to sovereign power, was already 
plotting those vast schemes of ambition which subse- 
quently brought him into collision with the Ottoman 
Empire; and, in preparation for these, he had organ- 
ised an army on the European model, and a magnifi- 
cently appointed fleet. The Sultan, fully awake to 
the importance of modern methods in warfare, had 
viewed these preparations of his powerful vassal with 
considerable misgiving; and, in proposing to him to 
help in the suppression of the Greek revolt, he doubt- 
less hoped to serve a twofold object, in using the in- 
strument which seemed the most effective for his im- 
mediate purpose, and at the same time, perhaps, blunt- 
ing a weapon which he suspected would, sooner or 
later, be directed against himself. He, therefore, now 
proposed to Mehemet Ali to use these newly disci- 



INSURRECTION IN CRETE 153 

plined forces for the suppression of the Greek rebel- 
lion, and promised, in return, to hand over to him the 
Island of Crete, and to invest his son Ibrahim with the 
Pashalik of the Morea. Mehemet, whose plans of 
wider ambition were not yet ripe, and who still main- 
tained towards his suzerain the attitude of a loyal and 
dutiful subject, was nothing loth to respond to an ap- 
peal which was so flattering to his pride, and so preg- 
nant with future possibilities; and the bargain was 
soon concluded. 

Crete, the price of his interference, was the first 
to feel the weight of Mehemet All's power. The in- 
surrection in the island had, so far, been singularly 
successful. At Therison, at Crepa, and at Haliarkae 
the insurgents had been victorious; the Mussulmans 
had been swept from the hills and the open country, 
and confined to the three coast towns. But success 
had been followed by the customary quarrels between 
the victors. The hillsmen fought with the lowlanders ; 
and both combined to resist the authority of the Rus- 
sian Af entulis, who had been sent as his representative 
by Demetrius Hypsilanti. In E^ovember 1822, the 
Hydriot Tombazes arrived, and replaced Af entulis; 
but the quarrels continued, and the short intervals 
of peace were spent in empty discussions on abstract 
questions of constitutional government. 



154 THE TVAE OP GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

While the Cretans were wasting their time in 
quarrelling and oratory, Mehemet Ali was making 
vigorous preparations for taking possession of his new 
province. In June 1823, his son-in-law, Hussein Bey 
Djeritli, landed at Suda; and forthwith the ^ pacifica- 
tion ' of the island began. Against the disciplined 
Egyptian troops the guerilla warriors of Crete were 
powerless. Step by step, the island was reduced, with 
admirable method, and barbarous cruelty; and the 
Cretans, defeated in the open and driven from their 
villages, sought refuge in their mountain caves. But 
even here they were not safe. In the cave of Melato 
2,000 souls had sought refuge; and of these thirty 
men capable of bearing arms and all the old women 
were slain ; the rest were sold into slavery. Still more 
ghastly was the tragedy of the Grotto of Melidoni, 
whither some 370 souls had fled for safety. The nar- 
row entrance of the cave was held by armed men, and 
all the efforts of the Arabs to storm it failed. At last 
the discovery of a hole in the roof of the grotto in- 
spired the latter with a brilliant idea for reducing the 
garrison. They now proceeded to block up the en- 
trance to the cave, and, when this was accomplished, 
thrust masses of burning material through the hole 
in the roof. The wretched defenders fled from point 
to point of their place of refuge, now become a dread- 



HUSSEIN REDUCES CRETE 155 

ful death trap, to escape from tlie advancing horror 
of suffocating smoke; but every outlet had been care- 
fully closed, and when, after a certain time, the xirabs 
entered the cave, not a soul of all the defenders was 
left alive.^ 

By April 1824, the severe measures of Hussein 
had succeeded in reducing the island to submission; 
and only in some of the remoter mountain fastnesses, 
which had, like the Maina, ever defied the Ottoman 
power, did a few bands of the Cretans still assert their 
independence. Tornbazes, with a crowd of refugees, 
was taken off by a squadron of Hydriot ships. Hus- 
sein, the object of his cruelty being accomplished, ex- 
changed it for a politic clemency, and, while disarm- 
ing the people, issued a general pardon, and attempted 
to reconcile the Cretans to the Egyptian rule by a con- 
siderable remission of taxation. 

Crete being thus in the hands of the Egyptians, 
Mehemet Ali determined to make it the base of the 
expedition which, under his son Ibrahim Pasha, he 
was now preparing against the Morea. For months 

1 The Cretan * Christians ' appear to have used this inci- 
dent as a precedent during" the recent massacres at Sitia, 
when many ^Moslems, who had taken refug-e in a cave, were 
killed just in the same way. See * Side Lights on the Cretan 
Insurrection,' by Mr. Ernest Bennett, Nineteenth Century for 
May 1897. 



166 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

past the dockyards and arsenal of Alexandria liad 
been tlie scene of extraordinary activity; and, by 
the beginning of June, one of the most magnificent 
fleets that had ever been seen in the Mediterranean 
was assembled in the port; while, outside the town, 
an army of 15,000 disciplined troops was encamped, 
in readiness to sail for the suppression of the infidel 
revolt. 

Before the transports were ready to embark the 
troops, the impatience of Mehemet caused him to fit 
out a squadron for the purpose of striking a blow at 
the Greek islanders. Three frigates and ten corvettes, 
commanded by Ismail Djebel Akhdar, and carrying 
3,000 Albanian troops under Hussein Bey, were or- 
dered to sail against the island of Kasos, a nest of 
pirates, which had earned a peculiarly evil reputation 
in the Archipelago. The ruthless cruelty of the Kasi- 
ots was remarkable even among the barbarous corsairs 
of the ^gean, and to their sinister activity was as- 
cribed the disappearance of numberless merchantmen 
on the high seas.^ Believing themselves safe from all 
attack on their seagirt fortress — a barren rock some 
three leagues in length, and surrounded on all sides 
by inaccessible cliffs — the Kasiots had made no ade- 
quate preparations for defence; and had even carried 
1 Jurien de la Graviere, Station du Levant, i. 269. 



DESTRUCTION OF KASOS 157 

tlieir negligence so far as not to take tlie slightest pre- 
caution against being surprised. During the night of 
the 19th of June, therefore, Hussein had no difficulty 
in landing a strong body of his Albanians on the west 
coast of the island; and the hardy mountaineers 
scrambled with ease up the precipitous crags, and oc- 
cupied the heights of the island. The Kasiots, com- 
pletely taken by surprise, and scattered in four vil- 
lages, could make no effective resistance. The slaugh- 
ter began at midnight, and lasted till dawn. Every 
man capable of bearing arms was mercilessly cut 
down ; the young women and children were embarked 
the same morning for Egypt; and the slave markets 
of Alexandria were glutted with human wares whose 
plastic beauty, moulded by the sun and the pure air 
of the southern seas, gave them a high value as com- 
modities. Besides thousands of slaves, the Arabs capt- 
ured large quantities of stores, the accumulated pro- 
ceeds of piracy, and fifteen armed and forty unarmed 
vessels. The neighbouring islands also, terrified by 
to signal an example, now sent in their submission. 
Meanwhile the preparations of Mehemet Ali had 
been completed, and on the same day, the 19th of 
June, that Hussein landed in Kasos, the fleet of 
Ibrahim sailed from Alexandria. Seldom had a more 
imposing armada been borne upon the waters of the 



158 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Mediterranean. Two hundred ships of war and trans- 
ports, carrying 18,000 men, followed the flagship of 
Ibrahim to sea. The whole sea between Alexandria 
and Khodes was now covered with scattered ships; for 
the prevailing north winds compelled the Egyptians 
to beat up the coast in detached squadrons; and had 
the Greeks been animated with the spirit of our own 
Drakes and Frobishers, their light sailing cruisers J 
might have done, under these conditions, endless havoc " 
among the hostile fleet. As long, however, as the dan- 
ger was not actually at their doors, they were too busy 1 
with their own quarrels to pay much attention to the 
proceedings of the enemy; and Ibrahim had no diffi- 
culty in uniting his scattered fleet at Rhodes. 

The Egyptian commander-in-chief cast anchor in 
the Bay of Makry, where he proceeded to celebrate 
the great Mohammedan festival of Bairam with ex- 
ceptional solemnity, so as to impress upon the sol- 
diers the religious character of the enterprise on which 
they were about to embark. The whole army was 
drawn up along the shore of the bay; and, as the red 
rim of the sun disappeared beneath the horizon, col- 
oured lanterns were hoisted at every masthead, and 
the guns of the fleet thundered out a salute, while 
volley after volley of musketry re-echoed from the 
hills. Then there fell a sudden silence, and, as the 



DESTRUCTION OF PSARA 159 

smoke clouds cleared away, the warriors of Islam saw 
the crescent moon floating, surrounded by glittering 
stars, in the darkening vault of the sky. From twenty 
tliousand throats a mighty shout went up; and to the 
simple faith of the Arab soldiers it seemed as though 
Allah himself had set his seal upon their enterprise. 

While Ibrahim was confirming the courage and 
enthusiasm of his troops by this effective coup de the- 
at re, the Ottoman fleet, under Khosrew Pasha, had 
been unusually active, and on the 2nd of July struck 
a blow which at last awakened the Greeks to some 
sense of their danger. Of all the zEgeau islands, none 
had been more energetic and active in carrying on the 
war than the little rock of Psara. The courage and, 
it may be added, the cruelty of the Psariot seamen had 
rendered them peculiarly obnoxious to the Turks; the 
Mussulmans of the Asiatic seaboard especially, whose 
fields they had harried, and whose towns they had 
burned for years past, hating them with a perfect 
hate.^ Their Greek neighbours also had suffered not 
a little from their meddlesome pride and overbearing 
conduct; yet, on the whole, no Hellenic community 
had deserved better of its country, or taken a bolder 
part in its liberation, than Psara; and its destruction 
was felt to be a national disaster of the first order. 
1 Gordon, ii. G7. 



160 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

The continued successes of their vessels at sea had 
filled the Psariots with an overweening belief in their 
own prowess, and a corresponding contempt for the 
Turks, which was to cost them dear. It never entered 
their heads to take any effective measures for guarding 
their island against the attacks of so despicable a foe ; 
and they boasted that, if the whole power of the Capi- 
tan Pasha were to land upon the island, they could 
easily sweep it into the sea. Their boast was soon to 
be put to the proof. 

On the 2nd of July, Khosrew Pasha, favoured by 
a sudden change of wind, which disguised his move- 
ments from the enemy, succeeded in landing a strong 
force on the northern side of the island, where the 
coast was apparently so inaccessible that it had been 
thought unnecessary to protect it by more than a weak 
battery. Completely surprised, this was carried at the 
first rush; and the Albanians proceeded to climb the 
precipitous sides of the mountains, and in due course 
reached the heights looking down on the town of 
Psara, and commanding the rear of the Psariot bat- 
teries. On the opposite side of the island, meanwhile, 
Khosrew with the Ottoman fleet had attacked the town 
and the ships in the harbour. Surprised and out- 
flanked, the Psariots made a desperate resistance ; but 
their batteries were ill placed, they themselves little 



KHOSREW ATTACKS SAM08 161 

accustomed to fighting on land, and quite incapable 
of effective combination. Only a few succeeded in 
reaching the vessels in the harbour, and making their 
escape ; the majority were put to the sword. A small 
band, under Dimitri Prazano, retreated to the fort of 
Palseocastro, and defended it till further resistance was 
hopeless; they then received the communion, and as 
the Turks swarmed over the defences, the Greek 
leader fired his pistol into the powder magazine, and 
buried the defenders and some 2,000 of the enemy 
under the ruins of the fort.^ 

The news of the destruction of Psara spread dis- 
may among the Greeks, and, for the time, inspired 
the selfish Government at Nauplia with some energy 
against the common enemy. It was now that the Lord 
Commissioner of the Ionian Islands allowed the first 
instalment of the loan to be handed over to the Greek 
Government; and this, as has already been men- 
tioned,^ was used in fitting out a squadron of ships in 
the harbours of Hydra and Spezzia. With these 
Miaoulis now sailed to Psara, and destroyed the ves- 
sels which Khosrew had left to hold the place. The 
return of the Ottoman fleet, however, compelled him 
to retire; and the island remained, for the time, in 
the hands of the Turks. It never again recovered its 

1 Prokesch, i. 290. 2 See p. 146. 

11 



162 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

former prosperity; and the activity of the surviving 
Psariots was more than ever directed to piracy pure 
and simple. 

Encouraged by his success against Psara, Khos- 
rew next decided to attempt the reduction of the im- 
portant island of Samos, which had long acted as a 
breakwater against the tide of Ottoman conquest. But 
the Greeks, warned by the catastrophe of Psara, were 
now thoroughly on the alert; and a strong squadron, 
under Miaoulis and Sachtouris, cruised night and day 
round the island. On the 14:th of August, Miaoulis 
had gone on a hasty cruise to watch the Egyptian fleet 
at Rhodes, and, in his absence, Khosrew appeared off 
the southern point of Samos; at the same time, a fleet 
of forty transports, carrying 4,000 men, started from 
the mainland to try and effect a landing on the island. 
They were, however, attacked by the Greek squadron 
under Sachtouris, who, having the advantage of the 
weather -gage, succeeded in sinking two of the trans- 
ports, capturing two, and compelling the rest to retire. 
A second attempt of the Turks to cross the strait also 
failed; and on the 16th and 17th of August, the ar- 
rival of one Psariot and nine Spezziot ships enabled 
the Greek admiral to attack the Ottoman fleet with 
success. As usual, the Greeks relied mainly on their 
fire-ships; and Kanaris succeeded in burning a Turk- 



KHOSREW JOINS IBRAHIM AT BUDRUN 163 

ish frigate of fifty-four guns. Two others were like- 
wise destroyed in the same way; and 2,000 of the 
enemy perished. Discouraged by these losses, Khos- 
rew gave up the idea of reducing Samos, and sailed 
away to effect a junction with Ibrahim, which he ef- 
fected, on the 1st of September, off Budrun.* 

The united Turkish and Egyptian fleets should 
now have been able with ease to sweep the Greeks 
from the open sea. Besides the battle-ship of seventy- 
four guns, bearing the flag of Khosrew, there were 
twenty frigates, twenty-five corvettes, and forty brigs 
and schooners, with nearly 300 transports of all sizes 
and shapes. The Ottoman fleet, moreover, though 
still far from being in good order, had very greatly 
improved since the beginning of the war. But the re- 
lations between Ibrahim and the Capitan Pasha were 
by no means cordial ; the Egyptian prince resented the 
authoritative attitude which Khosrew's technical su- 
periority of rank entitled him to assume; and he no- 
ticed with suspicion and contempt that, when it came 
to action, the Egyptians were allowed to bear the 
brunt of the fighting, while the Ottoman admiral al- 
ways discovered some pretext for remaining at a dis- 
creet distance from the danger. Even when the Turks 

1 Prokesch, i. 298. 



164 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

did go into action, the practice of their gunners was 
so bad that the Greeks received very little damage.^ 

The Egyptian and Turkish fleets being now united, 
the object of the allies was to convoy their great fleet 
of transports safely to Crete ; and no effort of courage 
or patience on the part of the Greeks should have been 
spared to prevent the success of this enterprise. On 
the 5th of September, a Greek fleet of between sev- 
enty and eighty sail^ under Miaoulis, appeared in the 
channel between Kos and the island of Kappari; and 
the Ottoman fleet stood out to engage it. All day the 
battle raged, with great violence, but very little result. 
In the end, such advantage as there was lay with the 
Ottomans, though, beyond the loss of a couple of fire- 
ships by the Greeks, neither side had suffered appre- 
ciably during the whole day's cannonade.^ The 
Greeks, however, noticed with dismay that their fire- 

1 Finlay, ii. 56, ib. 70. Lord Byron said, * These Turks, 
with so many g'uns, would be dang-erous enemies, if they 
should happen to fire without taking- aim.' 

2 The Turks seem to have suffered more from their own 
bad seamanship than from the Greeks. ' Their principal 
care was to avoid running- foul of each other, which, never- 
theless, they continually did.' ' They had few killed or 
wounded, but many of their ships were disabled by mutual 
collision.' Gordon, ii. 153, 154. The English blue-jackets 
used to say that the Ottoman fleet was * adrift in the Archi- 
pelago.' 



NAVAL ENGAGEMENTS OFF BUDRUN 165 

ships had fewer terrors for the well-trained Egyptian 
seamen than for the ill-disciplined Turks. Where the 
latter had fallen into panic and confusion at the ap- 
proach of the dreaded engines of destruction, the 
Egyptians simply manoeuvred out of their way, and 
allowed them to drift harmlessly to leeward ; or, if by 
chance they succeeded in attaching themselves, cut 
them adrift before they could do any damage. From 
this time forward, the superiority at sea which the 
Greeks had owed to their skill in this particular form 
of warfare began to decline; and such successes as 
they gained later in the war were due more often to 
their possession of the steamer Karteria,, purchased 
on the advice of the Philhellene Captain Hastings, and 
to their use of heavy ordnance and charges of red-hot 
shot. 

On the 10th of September, the Ottoman fleet again 
stood out from Budrun, and a battle followed in which 
the Greeks obtained slightly the advantage. A Turk- 
ish frigate and a corvette were destroyed by fire-ships ; 
and these losses so terrified the Turks, that they hauled 
off, and both fleets returned to their former anchor- 
ages. The Greeks, however, though they had in- 
flicted considerable loss upon the enemy, had only 
done so at great cost to themselves; for some of their 
own vessels had been destroyed, and many fire-ships 
had been sacrificed in vain. Their success, therefore, 



166 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

was scarce marked enough to dissipate the sense of 
discouragement which had seized them after the battle 
of the 5th. A renewed effort of Khosrew to reach 
Samos met with but very ineffective resistance on their 
part; and its success was only prevented by a storm 
which dispersed the Turkish fleet. The Capitan Pasha 
thereupon retired once more into the Dardanelles; 
and only a few Turkish vessels remained with the fleet 
of Ibrahim. 

Early in IN^ovember, Ibrahim again made an at- 
tempt to reach Suda, where a considerable force, trans- 
ported direct from Alexandria, had already collected. 
On the 13th, however, as his fleet, convoying the 
transports, was approaching Crete, Miaoulis with a 
Greek squadron bore down upon them. The Egyptian 
captains had neglected to keep, in accordance with 
their orders, to windward of the transports, which were 
sailing far in advance of the ships of war. Miaoulis 
was therefore able to attack them before the warships 
could come to the rescue. Several were destroyed, 
several captured, and the rest so completely dispersed 
that some of them even returned to Alexandria. A 
Turkish frigate also nearly fell into the hands of the 
Greeks; and, surrounded by five or six Hydriot brigs, 
it only escaped owing to the invincible objection of 
the Greeks to coming to close quarters with the enemy. 



VICTORY OF MIAOULIS OFF CRETE 167 

The next day at dawn, Ibrahim, seeing the necessity 
for once more postponing his enterprise, collected the 
remnants of his convoy under the shelter of Scarpanto, 
and two days later cast anchor in the deep Bay of Mar- 
morice, on the west coast of Rhodes. 

The Greeks now thought that, the season being far 
advanced, Ibrahim would give up, for the present, all 
idea of reaching Crete. The pay of the Hydriot sea- 
men was a month or two in arrear, and they were eager 
to return home and enjoy some of the fruits of their 
victory. Miaoulis, inspired by a clearer perception of 
the threatened danger to Hellas, and by a purer patriot- 
ism, was anxious not to lose sight of the Egyptian fle^t 
even now; and he besought his mutinous seamen, by 
their love of country, by their faith, by the shades of 
their ancestors, and by their good name among pos- 
terity, not to abandon their task. His prayers and 
entreaties fell on deaf ears. The Hydriot seamen 
wanted neither glory nor the blessings of posterity, 
but their arrears of pay; they were not slaves or Turks 
to work for nothing. The Egyptians had been swept 
from the sea ; let them now have their money, or they 
would return to their islands, orders or no orders. 
Miaoulis was obliged to yield; and the Greek fleet 
sailed for E'auplia, leaving the sea unguarded.^ 
1 Cf. Lemaitre, 169. 



168 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

The Greeks had not yet realised the character of 
the enemy they had now to deal with, nor had ex- 
perience of Ibrahim's dogged tenacity of purpose; or 
they would never have dreamed themselves safe as 
long as the Egyptian fleet was not utterly destroyed. 
As it was, on the 5th of December, Ibrahim again set 
sail, and this time reached Suda without falling in 
with a single Greek ship. 

A couple of months were now spent by the Egyp- 
tian commander in making elaborate preparations for 
the invasion of the Morea; and to the European offi- 
cers of the staff he remarked that, having outmanoeu- 
vred the Greeks at sea, he should meet with little diffi- 
culty in crushing them on land.^ When he had em- 
barked at Alexandria, he had sworn never to set foot 
on dry land before reaching the Morea; and now 
European travellers saw him seated upon his quarter- 
deck, cooling his rage and impatience on his unhappy 
subordinates with kicks, blows, and bullets.^ At last 
all was prepared; and on February 24, 1825, he 
landed at Modon, at the extreme southern point of the 
Peloponnese, with an army of 4,000 regular infantry, 
and 500 cavalry. The transports were sent back to 
Crete; and soon afterwards, without meeting with 

iFinlay, ii. 62. 

2 Mendelssohn, i. 352. 



IBRAHIM LANDS IN THE MOREA 169 

any opposition from the Greeks, they brought over a 
second force of 6,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, be- 
sides artillery. The tide of war had turned against 
the Greeks. 



CHAPTEE X 

Ibrahim lands in the Morea — Neg-lect of the Greeks — ^Defeat 
of the Greeks at Krommydi — Siege of Navarino — Hus- 
sein Bey captures Sphakteria — Surrender of Pylos and 
Navarino — Kolokotrones released and made commander- 
in-chief — Heroic stand of Dikaios at Maniaki — Ibrahim 
advances on Tripolitza — His check at the Mills of Lema 
— He devastates the Morea — Desperate condition of the 
Greeks 

The Greeks were far from realising the full import of 
Ibrahim's invasion. Their success against the Turks 
had given them an overweening confidence in their 
own prowess; while the misfortunes of such trained 
battalions as they had possessed had filled them with 
contempt for regular troops. After the disastrous 
battle of Peta every semblance of military discipline 
had vanished from their forces in the field; and now 
they boasted loudly that the Arabs would run away 
at the mere sight of the bold Armatoli, who had al- 
ways been victorious over the Sultan's armies. Of 
effective military preparation, even on their own ir- 

170 



CAMPAIGN OF KONDURIOTTES 171 

regular lines, there was none. The English loans, or 
such part of them as had not *been spent in buying 
rotten hulks from the Hydriot shipowners for the use 
of the navy, or embezzled by the members of the Gov- 
ernment, had been squandered in maintaining a host 
of greedy adventurers, whose only title to be consid- 
ered soldiers lay in the fact that they swags^ered about 
in the streets of Nauplia, resplendent in gold-embroid- 
ered Albanian costumes and silver-mounted arms. 
Even so, of the 30,000 soldiers whom the Government 
had in its pay, only some 8,000 could be mustered 
when at last the President, Konduriottes, determined 
to march against the invader. 

The brief career of Konduriottes as a general is 
strongly reminiscent of comic opera. ^ As he passed 
under the lofty arched gateway of E'auplia on the 28th 
of March, the cannon from the ramparts and from the 
fortress above pealed out their loud salutations, and 
were answered by the batteries on the shore and the 
shipping in the harbour.' ^ He was habited with bar- 
baric magnificence, and followed by a long train of 
secretaries, guards, grooms, and pipe-bearers; but the 
dignity of his appearance was somewhat compromised 
by the fact that, as an islander, he was unaccustomed 

1 Historical Sketch of the Greek Revolution, by Dr. S. G. 
Home, who was present at this scene (p. 226). 



172 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

to riding, and had therefore to be held on his mettled 
charger by a groom on either side. The campaign 
thus magnificently begun was not fruitful of great re- 
sults. The enemy being in the south, Konduriottes 
proceeded to march northward, until, at last, hearing 
that Ibrahim was besieging ^avarino, he turned, and, 
by a circuitous route, led his army back to — l!^auplia 1 
Having thus earned sufficient military glory, he re- 
signed his command^ and appointed a Hydriot sea-cap- 
tain named Skourti commander of the land forces. 

Meanwhile Ibrahim had been proving himself a 
leader of a different stamp. 'No sooner were the troops 
landed than, without a moment's unnecessary delay, 
he advanced on ^avarino, and on the 21st of March 
opened the siege of this important fortress, as well as 
of the old castle of Pylos, which commanded the nar- 
row channel to the north of Sphakteria. 

A Greek army under Skourti now advanced to 
attempt the relief of these two places. It was com- 
posed of 7,000 men, the flower of the Hellenic forces, 
consisting of a band of Suliots under Djavellas and 
Constantine Botzares, of Eumeliot Armatoli under 
Karaiskakis, and a force of Albanians from the plain 
of Argolis under the immediate command of Skourti. 
There was, besides, a body of Bulgarian and Wallach 
irregular horse under Hadji Christos. This force was 



BATTLE OF KROMMYDI 173 

attacked on the 19 th of April by Ibrahim with a de- 
tachment of 3,000 regular infantry, 400 cavalry, and 
four gims. 

The affair of Krommydi was the first serious en- 
counter between the Greeks and regular troops, and 
it resulted in an easy victory for the latter. The 
Greeks had established themselves, in a position se- 
lected by themselves, as usual, behind their shallow 
entrenchments ; and these Ibrahim, after a brief recon- 
noissance, ordered his Arab infantry to storm at the 
point of the bayonet. The regulars, for the most part 
mere raw recruits, advanced up the slope towards the 
Greek entrenchments without wavering, though many 
fell. When they approached the enemy, their officers 
ordered them to advance at the double, and led them 
cheering to the attack. The veteran warriors of 
Greece, skilled in all the arts of irregular warfare, 
were unable to stand against the onset of disciplined 
battalions. With scarce a moment's resistance they 
fled, leaving 600 dead upon the field. 

Ibrahim was now free to push the siege of ISTava- 
rino and Pylos, without fear of further interruption 
from the Greeks on land. Shortly after the battle of 
Krommydi, Hussein Bey, the conqueror of Crete, ar- 
rived in the Egyptian camp; and his keen judgment 
at once noticed the defects in Ibrahim's dispositions. 



174 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Without having read Thucydides, or knowing any- 
thing of the immortal struggle between the Spartans 
and Athenians for the possession of the island, he 
realised that Sphakteria was the key of ISTavarino, 
and that the possession of this would involve in 
the end that of the fortress; and on his pointing this 
out to Ibrahim, the Egyptian commander ordered him 
to take possession of the island. The Greeks, too, had 
realised, though late, the extreme importance of this 
position, had hastily occupied it with a few hundred 
troops, and erected a couple of weak batteries. They 
had, however, forgotten, what the Spartans had learned 
to their cost two thousand years before, that Sphak- 
teria could only be held by the Power commanding 
the sea. The Greek fleet had, as usual, been delayed 
by the selfishness and insubordination of the Hydriot 
seamen, and in the harbour were only five brigs; and 
when, therefore, on the 8th of May, the Egyptian 
fleet of ninety sail entered the bay, all hope was lost 
of holding Sphakteria or saving Navarino. 

Under cover of a heavy cannonade from the Egyp- 
tian ships, Hussein landed, with a regiment of Arab 
regulars and Moreot Mussulmans, on the southern 
point of the island, and at once advanced to the assault 
of the Greek entrenchments. Again the Greeks fled, 
almost without striking a blow, before the Arab bay- 



FALL OF PYLOS AND NAVARINO 175 

onets; and only the brave Hydriot captain Tsamma- 
dos, with two or three others, among whom was the 
gallant Piedmontese exile Santa Rosa, died at their 
posts. Of the others, Mavrocordatos and Sachtouris, 
the governor of !Navarino, succeeded in escaping on 
board a Greek vessel. Some 200 Greeks were taken 
prisoners, and about 350 slain, amongst the latter be- 
ing the Klepht Anagnostaras. 

Scarcely three days after the occupation of Sphak- 
teria by the Egyptians, Pylos capitulated; and the 
800 men of the garrison were allowed to depart, after 
laying down their arms. Ibrahim now also offered 
honourable terms to the garrison of ISTavarino, and in 
spite of the strenuous opposition of George Mavro- 
michales, afterwards the assassin of Capodistrias, the 
unexpected clemency of the Egyptian commander to 
the garrison of Pylos had its due effect, and the Ru- 
meliot Armatoli insisted on the surrender of the place. 
In view of the hideous scenes which had been enacted 
at J^avarino a few years before, the Greeks may well 
have had some doubt as to whether the capitulation 
would, in their case, be strictly observed. Among the 
crowd, through which they would have to pass on 
their way to the ships on which they were to be em- 
barked, were the fathers, husbands, and brothers of the 
unfortunate Mussulmans who had been massacred and 



176 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

outraged by them, or their co-religionists, four years 
before; and their own evil conscience inspired them 
with terrors which proved to be groundless. The pres- 
ence of Ibrahim's regular troops insured the terms of 
the capitulation being observed; the soldiers of the 
garrison were marched down to the quay, surrounded 
by a strong escort of cavalry, and thence transferred 
to Kalamata in neutral ships, escorted by a French 
and an Austrian man-of-war. 

When all was over, a Greek squadron under Mi- 
aoulis at last appeared upon the scene; and, seeing 
that he was too late to save l^avarino, the Hydriot 
admiral proceeded to Modon, where he siicceeded in 
destroying with fire-ships several of the Egyptian ves- 
sels in the harbour, including the fine frigate Asia, 
and also in burning a considerable quantity of stores; 
but this success of the Greeks had no effect in delay- 
ing Ibrahim's movements. 

Hitherto the vanity and overweening self-confi- 
dence of the Greeks at the centre of government 
had been fed by false reports of victories, and 
bombastic promises of the speedy expulsion of the 
Egyptians from the Morea. The fall of so important 
a fortress as ]N"avarino, however, was a misfortune 
which not even the most plausible Levantine could 
interpret as a success; and the arrival of the news at 



RECALL OF KOLOKOTRONES 177 

Nauplia was followed by a wild outburst of rage and 
alarm. The incapacity of Konduriottes was violently 
denounced; and the primates and chiefs clamoured 
for the recall of Kolokotrones, as the only leader ca- 
pable of organising an effective resistance to the in- 
vader. Konduriottes was compelled to yield; for the 
Rumeliot Armatoli, upon whose support his power had 
mainly rested, had now been drawn from the Morea 
by the report of Reshid Pasha's advance into West 
Hellas. The Archimandrite Dikaios (Pappa Phlesas) 
also, who was now Minister of the Interior, joined in 
the popular outcry, and in the meantime asked that 
he himself should be allowed to march against the 
enemy, the recall of Kolokotrones to be the reward of 
victory. The harassed Government was not unwill- 
ing to let the turbulent ecclesiastic go; in the same 
spirit as that in which the Athenians had once allowed 
Cleon to have a command, in the hope that they would 
thus rid themselves either of the enemy or of their 
general. 

With a body of 3,000 troops, Dikaios marched 
southward, and at Maniaki, on a spur of Mount Malia, 
took up a position commanding a view of the plain 
towards J^avarino, and there awaited the arrival of 
the Egyptians. Presently the plain below them 
seemed to be covered with marching battalions; and, 
13 



178 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

when the Greeks saw an apparently innumerable 
host advancing upon them with a steadiness and 
fateful deliberation as disconcerting as it was strange 
to their experience, many of them lost com*age and 
fled. About a thousand, however, held their ground; 
and Dikaios stimulated their courage with the elo- 
quence which had made him so great a power in the 
revolt. Victory was always possible, he cried, but if 
they fell, many Turks would also bite the dust, and 
this battle would be as famous among posterity as the 
immortal stand of Leonidas and his three hundred 
Spartans. For once, courageous words were followed 
by courageous deeds. The Arabs advanced to the 
attack; but the Greeks held their ill-constructed en- 
trenchments with obstinate valour. At last, however, 
the discipline and numbers of the enemy prevailed; 
but not before 800 of the Greeks and 400 Mussulmans 
had fallen. Dikaios himself fought like a lion; and 
the headless trunk of the burly priest was discovered 
surrounded by piles of slain Arabs. Ibrahim caused 
the head to be sought; and, when it was found, had 
it set upon the trunk, and the figure of the dead leader 
placed upright against a post. For a while he stood 
silently regarding it ; then at last he said, ^ That was 
a brave and honourable man ! Better have spent twice 
as many lives to have saved his; he would have served 



IBRAHIM TAKES TRIPOLITZA 179 

US well! ' Such was the heroic end of one who had 
hitherto been mainly known as a dissolute priest and 
a dishonest politician.^ 

This exploit of Dikaios revived the drooping cour- 
age of the Greeks; and when Kolokotrones, raised 
from his prison to the supreme command, took the 
field, he made his dispositions with a certain confidence. 
But in generalship he was no match for Ibrahim. The 
rapid movements of the Egyptians bewildered those 
who had been accustomed to the dilatory methods of 
Turkish warfare. Kolokotrones had occupied the pass 
of Makryplagi, to bar the road to Tripolitza; but 
Ibrahim outflanked him, advanced on the town, and 
took it, without meeting with any serious opposition. 
He hoped from this base, by a rapid movement, to 
secure Kauplia, before it could be put into a state of 
defence; but at the mills of Lerna, which were occu- 
pied by some 250 Greeks, under Makriyanni, Constan- 
tine Mavromichales, and Hypsilanti, he met with so 
stout a resistance, that he realised the impossibility of 
seizing ^NTauplia without a regular siege; and, as at the 
present moment he was not prepared to undertake 

I this, he returned to Tripolitza. 

I Kolokotrones now hoped to repeat in the case of 
Ibrahim the strategy which he had once employed so 

1 Mendelssohn, i. 357. 



180 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

successfully against Dramali, and, by occupying tlie 
mountain passes, to blockade the Egyptians in Tripo- 
litza, and starve tbem into surrender. But Ibrahim 
was awake to this danger; and, on the 6th of July, 
he anticipated the designs of Kolokotrones by making 
a simultaneous attack on all his positions, and forcing 
him to retire. The mills of Daria, Zerekovia, and 
Piana, which the Greeks had neglected to fortify, fell 
into his hands; and the Egyptian army was secured 
plentiful supplies. 

The war, from this point, ceased to have the char- 
acter of a contest between equal forces. Ibrahim, 
using Tripolitza as his base, crossed and recrossed 
the country, harrying and devastating; and it seemed 
as though his deliberate policy were to destroy by 
famine and disease the remnant of the population 
which the sword had spared, in order that the Morea, 
cleared of its inhabitants, might be repeopled by Mo- 
hammedan negroes and fellaheen. The Greeks, ut- 
terly discouraged, no longer ventured to meet the 
enemy in the open, but carried on a guerilla warfare, 
cutting off his supplies, and harassing his march. For 
effective aid Hellas could look no longer to her own 
children, but turned despairing eyes abroad. Such 
was the desperate state of the fortunes of Greece, when 
Mehemet Ali sent orders to Ibrahim, who on Septem- 



IBRAHIM ORDERED TO MISSOLONGHI 181 

ber 30, 1825, had gone into winter quarters at Mo- 
don, to advance to the assistance of Reshid Pasha, 
who for eight months had been in vain besieging Mis- 
solonghi. 



CHAPTEK XI 

THE SIEGE OF MISSOLONGHI 

Keshid * Kiutayeh ' invades West Hellas — ^He opens the 
siege of Missolonghi — State of the defences — Arrival of 
Khosrew with the Ottoman fleet — Turkish assaults re- 
pulsed — Desperate straits of the garrison — Greek fleet 
under Miaoulis defeats Khosrew^, and relieves the town 
— Critical position of Eeshid — Ibrahim arrives before 
Missolonghi — Miaoulis again relieves the town — Assault 
of Arab guards repulsed — Fall of Fort Vasiladi — Capitu- 
lation of Anatoliko — Kepulse of Turks and Arabs from 
the islet of Klissova — Attempt of Miaoulis to revictual 
the town defeated — Sortie of the garrison — Sack of the 
town, and massacre of the inhabitants — Effect on 
Europe. 

The defence of Missolonghi must always rank as one 
of the most heroic and soul-stirring episodes, not only 
in the war of Greek independence, but in all his- 
tory. It seemed as though Greek patriotism, flying 
from the selfishness, the intrigues, and civil broils 
which elsewhere disgraced the cause of freedom, had 
concentrated itself in this little city of the lagoons, 
where a garrison of peasants, burghers, and simple 

183 



RESIIID INVESTS MISS0L0NC4ni 183 

fishermen defied for months the whole power of the 
Ottoman Empire. 

Sultan Mahmoud remembered with bitterness the 
failure of his troops before Missolonghi three years 
before. He determined now to make another attempt 
to reduce the stubborn rebels; and to make sure that 
this time there should be no failure, he entrusted the 
task to Reshid ^ Kiutayeh/ Pasha of Janina, who had 
commanded the Ottoman army at the battle of Peta, 
and who was at once an able general and a man of 
singular determination of character. At the same 
time he thought it expedient to warn him that either 
Missolonghi or his head must fall. 

Reshid set about the task with great thorough- 
ness. The wild Albanian tribes were won over by 
the usual presents; and on the 6th of April he led an 
army of twenty thousand men through the pass of 
Makrynoros, the Thermopylae of Western Hellas, 
which the Greeks had, as usual, left undefended. On 
the 27th of April he reached Missolonghi, and on the 
7th of May formally commenced the siege by opening 
the first parallel. 

The town was now in a far better state of defence 
than during the former investment. The earth wall 
had, mainly owing to the exertions of Lord Byron, been 
strengthened by a couple of bastions and other defen- 



184 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

sive works. A covered gallery had been constructed 
outside tlie ditch, and, flanking the wall, in the lagoon 
the island of Marmora had been fortified. At the out- 
set, moreover, the besieged were much better provided 
with artillery than the besiegers. Reshid, indeed, in 
this respect was so badly oif that he had at first to 
trust mainly to the spade, and gradually advance his 
parallels nearer the walls. 

The garrison of the town consisted of four thou- 
sand men, under some of the best captains in Greece ; 
but there were in addition to these some twelve thou- 
sand non-combatants, who formed a serious drain on 
the resources of the besieged. The veteran Notaris 
Botzares commanded the forces of the defence; the 
heroic Papadiamantopulos, a Moreot primate, presided 
over the civil government of the town. 

In June Reshid received some reinforcements of 
artillery, but was prevented from pressing the siege 
with proportionate vigour owing to lack of ammuni- 
tion. The supply of bombs having run out, the mor- 
tars were reduced to hurling rocks; and the practice 
of the gunners was, moreover, so bad that very little 
damage was done. An attack on the island of Marmora 
was repulsed. On the 10th of June, a squadron of 
seven Hydriot ships sailed into the harbour, bring- 
ing plentiful supplies, some reinforcements from the 



OTTOMAN ASSAULT REPULSED 185 

Morea, and promising the speedy arrival of further 
succour. A month later the Greek watchman reported 
a fleet in the offing, and the hard-pressed Missolonghi- 
ots thought that the promised relief had arrived. Their 
joy was, however, premature; for the fleet turned out 
to be that of Khosrew Pasha, who brought Eeshid 
much-needed supplies, and, above all, large stores of 
ammunition. At the same time, Yussuf Pasha had 
sent from Patras a flotilla of flat-bottomed gun-boats 
for use in the shallow waters of the lagoons, and these 
Reshid now used to sieze the islets off the shore, and 
to invest the town by sea as well as by land. 

Every fresh advance of the besiegers, however, 
only seemed to raise to a higher pitch the courage and 
determination of the defence. The town was now 
exposed to a hail of shot and shell, which speedily re- 
duced it to a mass of ruins. On the 23rd of July a 
bombardment more violent than usual seemed to 
herald a general attack. On the 28th a mine exploded 
under the bastion Botzares, and the Turks advanced 
into the breach. Twice they planted the banner of the 
Crescent on the summit of the ruins, and twice they 
were hurled back into the ditch. For that day they 
gave up the attempt. 

On the 1st of August, and again on the following 
day, they renewed their efforts to storm the town, but 



186 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

with no better success. Five Imndred of their number 
had fallen, and still Missolonghi seemed as far as ever 
from being taken. Eeshid vented his wrath on some 
unhappy prisoners, whom he caused to be taken before 
the walls and beheaded. 

In spite of their triumphant resistance, however, 
the position of the Missolonghiots seemed now to be 
desperate. The garrison was weakened by hunger, 
and, worse still, the supply of ammunition was all but 
exhausted. There were only two small kegs of powder 
left in the town, and, should Reshid return at once to 
the attack, the result could not be doubtful. 

At this critical moment the arrival of the Greek 
fleet, so long expected, was at last signalled. It ap- 
peared that the Ilydriot seamen had refused to sail 
without double pay in advance; and the timely arrival 
of a loan from England had alone revived their venal 
patriotism, and saved the Missolonghiots. 

On the 3rd of August the Greek fleet attacked that 
of Khosrew. For two hours the hostile squadrons ma- 
noeuvred to win the weather-gage. At last the Greeks 
got to windward, and sent down their fireships on the 
vessel of the Capitan Pasha. But Khosrew had a 
peculiar dislike to this form of warfare, which might 
prepare for him the fate that had befallen his pre- 
decessor, Kara Ali, at the hands of Kanaris. No 



MIAOULIS KAISES THE BLOCKADE 187 

sooner did he see tlie hated craft bearing down upon 
him than, with his whole fleet, he stood out to sea, 
and, on pretence of forming a junction with the Egyp- 
tian fleet, never slackened sail until he reached Alex- 
andria. Nevertheless, with true Oriental compla- 
cency, he claimed the victory, on the plea that his 
ships had received no damage ! 

Keshid Pasha had, however, been abandoned to his 
fate; and, before Missolonghi, the tables were now 
completely turned. Admiral Miaoulis destroyed Yus- 
suf 's flotilla of gunboats, and threw a plentiful supply 
of ammunition and provisions into the town; while 
a sortie of the garrison, under Karaiskakis, succeeded 
in regaining the islets in the lagoons and destroying 
the Turkish works. The blockade was now completely 
raised; and the Greek fleet, leaving seven vessels to 
keep the command of the sea, sailed away in pursuit 
of Khosrew. 

Kiutayeh, without ammunition, without money, 
and with but little food, was now in an evil plight; yet 
his courage and determination never faltered. Fail- 
ing other means, he took again to the spade, and rolled 
an immense mound of earth against one of the bastions. 
The Greeks had hailed this primitive siege operation 
with shouts of derision; but it was so far successful 
that the bastion was taken, only, however, to be im- 



188 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

mediately recaptured, and tlie labour of three weeks 
destroyed. On the 21st of September and the 13 th of 
October two vigorous sorties were made by the gar- 
rison. The troops were followed by crowds of the in- 
habitants with spades and pickaxes, who proceeded, 
while the soldiers drove back the Turks, to demolish 
the Ottoman earthworks. What the Greeks left un- 
finished the autumn rains completed, and Reshid saw 
the whole labour of the year destroyed. Under pres- 
ent conditions any further effort against the town was 
out of the question. By death and desertion his army 
was now reduced to some three thousand men; and 
it was necessary to wait for help. He determined, 
therefore, to withdraw from the immediate neighbour- 
hood of the town, which the malarial swamps rendered 
extremely unhealthy, and, entrenching himself at the 
foot of Mount Zygos, to act strictly on the defensive. 

The position of the Ottomans was now extremely 
critical, and nothing but the fatuousness of the Greeks 
saved them from utter ruin. In their rear the moun- 
tain passes were held by strong bands of Greek Arma- 
toli; in front was Missolonghi. Had the garrison of 
the latter combined with the mountaineers in a simul- 
taneous attack on the^Turkish camp, the Ottoman army 
would have been annihilated. But the chiefs of Arma- 
toli were too much occupied with their own quarrels; 



IBRAHIM BEFORE MISSOLONGHI 189 

and the Missolongliiots were so well content with the 
success they had hitherto achieved that, so far from 
dreaming of any offensive action, they neglected even 
to reprovision the city, or make any arrangements for 
the future. Probably, too, they thought that the 
Turks, in accordance with their usual custom, would 
retire homeward before the winter. 

In this, however, they were greatly mistaken; for 
Reshid knew well that he must either conquer Misso- 
longhi or perish before the walls. On the 18th of 
!N'ovember the fleet of the Capitan Pasha returned, 
just in time to save the Turks from starvation; and 
the small Greek squadron being unable to hold its own 
against the Ottomans, they once more regained the 
command of the sea. 

At this juncture Ibrahim received orders to join 
Reshid before Missolonghi. With his accustomed 
promptness he advanced from ISTavarino by forced 
marches, crossed the important pass of Kleidi without 
encountering any opposition, and at Pyrgos and 
Gastuni seized the stores of corn which had been in- 
tended for Missolonghi. On the 27th of ^November 
he held a council of war with Reshid and Yussuf 
Pasha. Between Ibrahim and Kiutayeh there was no 
love lost. The mere presence of the Egyptian was a 
wound to Reshid's pride, and Ibrahim rubbed salt into 



190 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

the sore. ' What ! ' lie cried, when he saw Missolonghi, 
' were you kept out eight months by this fence ? Why, 
I took Kavarino in eight days ! ' ^ He boasted that, 
within a fortnight, he would reduce the town, with- 
out Reshid's assistance. Kiutayeh accepted the offer, 
and vented his ill-humour on some wretched Greek 
women and boys, whom he impaled, as spies, before 
the walls. 

The appearance of Ibrahim before Missolonghi 
threw the Greek Government into the greatest state 
of alarm. With the fate of the gallant Missolonghiots 
that of Greece seemed now to be inextricably involved, 
and it became urgently necessary to take measures to 
relieve the town; but the treasury was empty, and all 
attempts to float a new loan failed. It was proposed 
to sell the public lands, already pledged as security for 
the national debt; but the suggestion merely destroyed 
the last vestiges of the Government credit. Personal 
patriotism now came to the rescue, and by private 
subscription a sufficient sum was raised to enable 
Miaoulis to fit out a fleet for the relief of Missolonghi. 

On the 21st of January he arrived off the belea- 
guered town, and succeeded in landing some stores on 
the island of Yasiladi. Here, however, he was attacked 
by the combined Turkish and Egyptian fleets, and 
1 Mendelssohn, i. 370. 



ARAB ASSAULT REPULSED 191 

compelled to draw off. On the night of the 27th the 
Greeks succeeded in destroying with a fireship an 
Ottoman corvette. On the 28th a battle with the 
Turkish and Egyptian fleets resulted in a victory for 
the Greeks. Miaoulis was enabled to throw two 
months^ provisions into the town, before, at the be- 
ginning of February, he was compelled by the insub- 
ordination of the Hydriot seamen to sail home. 

Ibrahim, whose proceedings during the winter had 
been stopped by floods and rains, which made the 
marshes about the town impassable, now commenced 
operations in earnest. He determined flrst to attempt 
to take the place by assault, trusting that his drilled 
regiments might succeed where Reshid's undisciplined 
horde had failed. On the 25th of February a heavy 
cannonade began; and, for three days, a hail of iron 
descended on the devoted town. On the 2Sth the 
Egyptians advanced to the attack of the bastion Bot- 
zares. Three times the Arab guard gained a footing 
on the walls ; three times they recoiled before the furi- 
ous onslaught of the Greeks; and at midday the at- 
tempt was relinquished. Ibrahim was beside himself 
with rage. Reshid, not altogether displeased, asked 
him what he now thought of the * fence ' ! 

It was now determined to invest the place once 
more by sea, as well as by land. The selfishness of 



192 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

the Hydriot sailors, who had refused to remain with- 
out pay in advance, had forced Miaoulis to leave the 
Turks in command of the sea. They now again pre- 
pared a flotilla of flat-bottomed boats, and proceeded 
to make a systematic attack on the islands of the 
lagoons. On the 9th of March, Fort Yasiladi fell. On 
the 21st, after a seven hours' fight, the Egyptians 
captured the sandbank of Dolma ; and thereupon the 
town of Anatoliko, which had so far shared the fort- 
unes of Missolonghi, capitulated. Its three thousand 
inhabitants were transported to Arta, in accordance 
with the terms of the capitulation. 

To Greek and Turk alike this seemed the begin- 
ning of the end ; and Ibrahim seized the opportunity 
to offer the Missolonghiots honourable terms. The gar- 
rison was to be allowed to withdraw, the inhabitants 
either to follow, or to remain undisturbed under the 
protection of the Sultan. But the undaunted defend- 
ers were determined to hold out. What the future 
had in store for them or their foes, they answered, God 
only knew; but of terms they would have none, and 
were determined to live, or die, free.^ 

1 Cf. Lemaitre, p. 195. He ascribes this attitude solely to 
the Missolong-hiots' distrust of Ibrahim's promises, which 
they regarded as a trap. He is right when he says that 
their fear of being massacred was idle. I find only one in- 
stance during the war of the Turks having violated a ca- 



ATTACK ON KLISSOVA REPULSED 193 

A last gleam of brilliant success illuminated the 
darkening fortunes of the Greeks. In all the lagoons, 
only the little island of Klissova, garrisoned by about 
two hundred men, under the brave Djavellas, remained 
now in their hands. On the 6th of April this was at- 
tacked by some two thousand of Kiutayeh's Albanians. 
Even the flat-bottomed boats of the enemy were, how- 
ever, unable to come close in land; and the soldiers 
were compelled to leap into the water and wade ashore 
through the mud, while, from behind their low en- 
trenchments, the Greeks met them with a deadly fire. 
The water was soon cumbered with the bodies of those 
who fell. The rest scrambled back into the boats, and 
made off. 

Ibrahim now thought he would like to prove the 
superiority of his disciplined troops, and, in his turn, 
made an attack on the island. But the Arabs met 
with no better success than the Albanians. Three 
times they advanced to the assault, and three times 
the volleys of the Greeks threw them into confusion 

pitulation — that of the surrender of the monastery of Seko 
by Pharmakidi (see Chap. III.), when the promise given 
by the Ottoman officers was held to be overruled by the 
special orders of the Sultan, which arrived subsequently'. 
The Greeks, of course, did so frequently; and, possibly, 
they judged others by themselves. I prefer, however, to 
believe that in this case their motive was a higher one. 
13 



194 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

and drove them back. Hussein, the conqueror of 
Kasos, of Crete, and of Sphakteria, fell mortally 
wounded while directing the third assault. The 
Greeks, with the loss of thirty-five men, remained 
masters of the island. Of the Turks, a thousand had 
fallen in vain. 

Had the Missolonghiots taken advantage of the dis- 
couragement of the besiegers, caused by this reverse, 
to throw themselves en masse upon the enemy, and 
cut their way through, the attempt would probably 
have succeeded. But, though reduced now to the 
greatest straits, they still looked forward confidently 
to the arrival of the fleet with relief. On the 31st of 
March, Admiral Miaoulis actually did appear; but his 
fleet was small, poorly armed, and undermanned. The 
combined navy of the Turks and Egyptians lay, in 
overwhelming strength, across his course; and, in the 
absence of flat-bottomed boats, he could make no at- 
tempt to throw provisions into the town by way of the 
lagoons. Eeluctantly he was compelled to relinquish 
his enterprise, and leave Missolonghi to its fate. 

This could noAV be no longer delayed. The town 
was reduced to the most miserable plight. The starved 
inhabitants wandered amid the ruins of their homes, 
looking more like ghosts than living men. For days 
they had been reduced to subsisting upon the most 



DESPERATE STRAITS OF THE GARRISON 195 

loathsome food ; and now even rats and mice were lux- 
uries no longer obtainable. The sick and wounded, 
for whose care it was impossible to make provision, lay 
in neglect and filth, rotting in a living death. The 
brave defenders of the shattered walls, weakened by 
hunger, could scarcely any longer bear the weight of 
their arms. And now, even of the most miserable food, 
rations remained for only two more days. Yet no 
voice was raised in favour of surrender. The men of 
Missolonghi were determined, come what might, to 
be true to their vow to live or die as free men. 

There remained but one chance: to cut their way 
to life and freedom through the lines of the enemy; 
and a sortie of the garrison and all the inhabitants of 
the town was accordingly arranged for the night of the 
22nd of April. It was hoped that in the surprise and 
confusion of the attack a large portion, at any rate, of 
the besieged might fight their way to liberty. Those 
who fell would at least die gloriously as free men. 

Botzares' plan was well conceived, and by no means 
hopeless of success. Communication was opened with 
Karaiskakis, and that chief was asked to send a strong 
body of Armatoli to the slopes of Mount Zygos, to 
feign an attack on the rear of the Turkish camp, and 
draw off the attention of the besiegers. The sound of 
the firing was to be the signal for th^ sortie to begin, 



196 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

The Missolonghiots were to be divided into two bands: 
one was to attack the camp of Reshid; the other, with 
the women and children, to attempt to cut its way 
through the Egyptians. Once beyond the Mussulman 
lines, they could join hands with the Armatoli on 
Mount Zygos, and seek safety in the mountains. 

The plan, however, was betrayed to Ibrahim by a 
Bulgarian deserter. Karaiskakis, too, was unable to 
carry out his share of the programme. The messenger 
of Botzares found him lying ill in his tent, and the 
other chiefs of Armatoli too much occupied with their 
own selfish quarrels to care much about the fate of the 
heroic Missolonghiots. Only about two hundred men, 
under [N'oti Botzares, proceeded on the afternoon of 
the 22nd to Mount Zygos, only, however, to fall into 
an ambush of some two thousand Albanians, whom 
Ibrahim had posted there for the purpose of cutting 
them off. The sound of the firing was taken by the 
Missolonghiots to mean that the Armatoli had reached 
the place arranged. Unfortunately it also warned 
Ibrahim that the sortie might be expected that night, 
a belief which was confirmed by the unwonted stir and 
clamour in the town. He made his dispositions ac- 
cordingly. The troops lay under arms in the trenches ; 
and, in case the Greeks should succeed in breaking 
through, strong bodies of cavalry were held in reserve 



THE FINAL SORTIE 197 

to fall upon them in the open ground beyond the 
camp. 

At nightfall the preparations of Botzares began. 
The soldiers were ordered to lie in the shallow moat 
in front of the wall until the signal should be given. 
Across this moat were thrown three bridges, and be- 
hind these were massed all those of the inhabitants 
who could walk — the men on the outside, the women 
and children in the midst. All were armed. The 
women were dressed as men ; the very children carried 
pistols. As yet there was no sign of wavering, and all 
alike seemed inspired by the same heroic resolution, 
the same steadfast patience. But hour after hour 
passed, and still the expected signal from Mount Zygos 
was not given. At last, about midnight, the moon 
rose. The excited warriors, their nerves strung to the 
utmost tension, seemed to take this as a signal to begin. 
With a wild shout they sprang out of the ditch, and 
rushed upon the hostile lines. At the same time the 
masses of men, women, and children began to crowd 
across the bridges. 

The Greek charge was met with a murderous 
fusillade from the Turkish trenches, and at the same 
time the Ottoman guns opened fire on the packed 
masses of humanity on the bridges. For a while these 
continued to advance without confusion; but pres- 



198 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

ently, as the hail of shot fell thick about them, those 
in the rear began to press forward, and in the crush that 
ensued some were in danger of being pushed off the 
edge into the ditch. One or more of these cried out 
* Back! Back! ' ^ in a frightened voice. The word 
was passed from mouth to mouth with increasing ter- 
ror. A panic seized the majority of those who had not 
yet crossed, and, believing that all was lost, or acting 
only on a blind impulse of fear, they turned and rushed 
wildly back into the town. The Mussulmans, with 
loud cries of ^ Allah! Allah!' leaped from their 
trenches, and entered the town together with the 
wretched fugitives.^ 

Then began a slaughter grim and great. From a 
cloudless sky the moon gazed calmly down on the 
awful scene of carnage. It seemed as though hell had 
been suddenly let loose on earth. The still air of the 
spring night was filled with the sound of yells and 
shrieks, the crackling of flames, and the crash of fall- 

1 Finlay, ii. 108. This seems the most reasonable explana- 
tion of the panic. By some the cry of 'Back! ' has been 
ascribed to treason. 

2Lemaitre (p. 200) says the Arabs waited till dawn before 
entering* the town, which they did only that they might 
exchange their cold tents for warm houses! They were 
fired upon from the windows, and, not till several had been 
killed, did the massacre begin. But M. Lemaitre can only 
sometimes be taken seriously. 



STORMING AND SACK OF MISSOLONGHI 199 

ing timbers. Yet this night of lurid horror was not 
without its brighter episodes, its stirring examples of 
cool courage and steadfast heroism. In the bastion 
Botzares a lame man sat, linstock in hand, and waited 
the coming of the Turks. As the enemy swarmed over 
the battlements he set the light to the powder-maga- 
zine, and blew himself and them into eternity. The 
Primate Kapsalis took up his post in the cartridge fac- 
tory. A large body of Turks in search of plunder 
swarmed into the building; the heroic Greek set fire 
to the powder, and perished with them in the explo- 
sion. Papadiamantopulos, more noble than most of 
his class, had deliberately returned to Missolonghi, 
when the fate of the town could not be doubted, in 
order to set an example of fortitude to the people whose 
government he had conducted. He perished in the 
sack. Truly, had Byron lived to see this night, he 
would have admitted, in spite of all his former dis- 
illusion and disappointment, that at last ' Grecian 
mothers had given birth to men.' 

To return to those bands of the Greeks who had 
not been carried by the panic back into the town. 
Their first furious onset carried all before it. Led 
by the veteran Botzares, by Makris, and Djavellas, 
the hero of Klissova, they leaped into the Turkish 
trenches, and cutting and slashing with their yata- 



200 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

ghans, succeeded witli comparatively little loss in hew- 
ing their way througli tlie Ottoman lines. The con- 
fusion and the dim light helped them; and doubtless 
also the liberty to sack and murder in the doomed 
town had more attraction for the brutal soldiery than 
a struggle with desperate men. 

Once beyond the Turkish lines the Greeks imag- 
ined themselves safe. They were, however, woefully 
mistaken. "No sooner did they appear in the open than 
the cavalry, which Ibrahim had held in reserve for the 
purpose, fell upon them and scattered their already 
broken ranks. They met this new and unexpected 
danger, indeed, with dauntless courage; but what 
could a confused crowd of foot soldiers do against 
cavalry ? Individual acts of heroism are recorded. A 
girl, who was carrying her wounded brother, w^as at- 
tacked by a Turkish horseman. Putting down her 
burden, she took his gun, aimed with great coolness, 
and brought the Ottoman from his saddle. Then lift- 
ing her brother she resumed her flight.^ But escape 
was all but impossible where the treacherous moon- 
light betrayed every movement of the fugitives; and 
only a broken remnant of the Greeks reached the rug- 
ged slopes of Mount Zygos, where the nature of the 
ground rendered the pursuit of cavalry impossible. 

1 Gordon, ii. 265, note. 



FATE OF THE FUGITIVES 201 

Here at last they hoped to be safe; for here, ac- 
cording to the plan, Karaiskakis and his Armatoli were 
to have awaited them. No Greeks, however, appeared; 
and their signals were unanswered. At last, wearied 
out with the fight and their former privations, they 
halted in the deep shadows of the forest to rest, and to 
collect their scattered forces. Suddenly on all sides of 
them the thick undergrowth was ablaze with the 
flashes of muskets, and a deadly hail of lead fell once 
more among their broken ranks. Instead of falling 
among the friendly Armatoli, they had stumbled into 
an ambuscade of Kiutayeh's Albanians. There was no 
attempt at resistance. Many fell at the first volley. 
The rest, favoured by the darkness, continued their 
weary flight up the mountain. Of all the defenders of 
Missolonghi only some thirteen hundred souls, in- 
cluding about seven women and a few children, ulti- 
mately reached a place of safety. Many who had es- 
caped the sword of the Turks perished of hunger and 
exposure in the mountains. Plain and forest were 
strewn with the bodies of the dead, and in Missolonghi 
itself Ibrahim erected a ghastly trophy of three thou- 
sand heads. But, living or dead, the Missolonghiots 
had kept their word, and were free. 

The fall of Missolonghi marks an epoch in the 
story of the Hellenic revolt. Even after the lapse 



202 THE WATl OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

of seventy years, it is impossible to read tlie account 
of the heroic defence of the town, and of its terrible 
fate, without emotion. At the time the effect of the 
news was profound. All Europe had been watching 
with breathless interest every phase of the titanic 
struggle. Missolonghi, the scene of Byron's romantic 
activity, the site of his grave, appealed in itself to the 
imagination of a world which had not yet shaken off 
the spell of the poet's genius; and, even without this, 
the heroism of its inhabitants would have sufficed to 
win for it the enthusiastic sympathies of Christendom. 
The defence and fall of Missolonghi then gave an im- 
mense impetus to the wave of Philhellenic feeling 
which was already sweeping all before it throughout 
Europe. The crimes, the follies, the selfishness of the 
Greeks were forgotten. The public opinion of Europe, 
itself growing restless under the yoke of Mettemich's 
reactionary policy, saw only the spectacle of a gallant 
people struggling ' against fearful odds ' for the lib- 
erty which is the birthright of all men; and, not in 
England only, but throughout Europe, an active prop- 
aganda was carried on in favour of the cause of Hellas. 
On the continent, where the Greeks were not recog- 
nised as belligerents, subscriptions were collected, os- 
tensibly to provide funds for the ransom of Greek 
slaves, really for the purposes of the war. Through- 



EFFECT OF THE DEFENCE OF MISSOLONGHI 203 

out France, Germany, nay in Austria itself, societies 
were formed for this purpose. The smaller German 
princes, 'sentimental' professors, poets, and tradesmen 
alike, joined in a work which Metternich rightly felt 
was a practical revolt against his own policy of reac- 
tion. In spite of his protests, however, and of his 
police, he was unable to curb a movement for which 
even the Crown Prince of Prussia and Ludwig of Ba- 
varia openly expressed their sympathy. The empty 
coffers of the Greek Government continued to be re- 
plenished with European gold, and the Greek armies 
reinforced by European volunteers, till Reshid Pasha 
could exclaim, with bitterness and with truth, ' We 
are no longer fighting the Greeks, but all Europe ! ' 



CHAPTEE XII 

Eeshid reduces West Hellas — He advances into Attica — 
Eule of Gouras at Athens — Capture of Athens by the 
Turks — Siege of the Acropolis — Karaiskakis appointed 
commander-in-chief in East Hellas — His character — De- 
feat at Chaidari — Death of Gouras — Victories of Karais- 
kakis at Arachova and Distomo — General Gordon at 
Munychia — Attack of Keshid repulsed — Arrival of 
Church and Cochrane — Siege and surrender of the mon- 
astery of St. Spiridion — Massacre of the defenders — 
Death of Karaiskakis — Defeat of the Greeks before 
Athens — Fall of the Acropolis 

The fall of Missolonghi removed the barrier wliicli 
had kept the Ottoman forces pent up in the western 
corner of Greece, and the flood of war now rolled east- 
wards. Ibrahim, indeed, not altogether to Eeshid's 
sorrow, refused to join in the invasion of Eastern Hel- 
las. Mehemet Ali had already spent vast sums on 
the war, and felt no inclination to incur further ex- 
penditure with no immediate benefit to himself. Ibra- 
him then returned to his own pashalik of the Morea, 
where, inadequately supplied with funds and rein- 

204 



KIUTAYEH INVADES ATTICA 205 

forcements, he spent the rest of the summer in com- 
parative inactivity. 

Kiutayeh, on the other hand, freed from the pres- 
ence of his hated rival, pushed the war with his accus- 
tomed vigour. Western Hellas was soon pacified. 
Many renowned chiefs of Armatoli, among them 
Yarnakiotes, who had taken part in the shameful 
massacre of Yrachori early in the war, gave in their 
submission ; and in July the Turkish Commander was 
free to push forward into Eastern Hellas. He occu- 
pied the passes over the mountains without meeting 
with serious resistance, strengthened the garrison of 
Thebes, and formed a junction with the forces of 
Omer Yrioni in Euboea. The united army of the 
Ottomans, 8,000 strong, with plentiful cavalry and 
guns, then marched into Attica, before the ingather- 
ing of the harvest. 

Odysseus, the hero of so many exploits, who had 
been supreme in this part of Greece during the earlier 
phases of the struggle, was now no more; and, in the 
Acropolis, his former lieutenant, Gouras, commanded 
in his place. 

The rule of Gouras, who now governed Eastern 
Hellas in the name of the Greek State, was that of 
a brigand chief rather than of a civilised adminis- 
trator. His tyranny and exactions were worse than 



206 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

the worst experiences of Ottoman misrule, and when 
the Turks at last appeared, they were welcomed by 
the miserable peasantry of Attica as deliverers. Kiu- 
tayeh sought to strengthen this impression. He made 
grants of public lands to the peasants, and even en- 
rolled them in an organised police force to resist the 
incursions of the Greeks.^ 

Having by this wise and politic generosity won 
the sympathies of the inhabitants of the open country, 
the Ottoman commander advanced, without delay, on 
Athens, and laid siege to the town. On the approach 
of the Turks, Gouras with his immediate followers 
deserted the city, and threw himself into the Acropo- 
lis. The townspeople, who sought to follow him, he 
repulsed with brutal callousness. Thus left to their 
fate, they made no long resistance, and on the 25th 
of August the Turks carried the town by storm. A 
stream of fugitives fled to the Acropolis, and this time 
Gouras could not refuse to admit them. 

All eyes were now centred on the Acropolis, as 
they had once been on Missolonghi. The historic rock, 
crowned with immortal memories, and still bearing 
on its summit the glorious monuments of the great 
days of Greece, seemed the only remaining bulwark 
of Hellenic freedom. If it fell, nothing would be left 
1 Cf. Gordon, ii. 331. 



1 



KARAISKAKIS 207 

to prevent the Turk from sweeping across the Isthmus 
into the JNforea, where there was now no force capable 
of resisting his attack. But as long as the Acropolis 
held out, the Peloponnese was safe; for Reshid could 
not advance, leaving an unreduced fortress in his 
rear. 

At last the fatuous Government of Greece awoke 
to the imminence of the danger. The Greeks had 
cursed the selfishness and supineness of their rulers 
to which jMissolonghi had been sacrificed. If the 
Acropolis fell, there would be no rulers left to curse. 
Por a moment, in the presence of a common peril, 
the warring factions laid aside their quarrels. 

One man was now pointed out by a consensus of 
public opinion as alone capable, if he wished, of sav- 
ing Greece. If he wished — for the previous career of 
Karaiskakis had not been altogether such as to inspire 
unlimited confidence. In the character of this ex- 
traordinary man were present in full measure all 
those strange and vivid contrasts of light and shade, 
of baseness and nobility, which give to the actors in 
the story of the Greek revolt such remarkable dra- 
matic interest. Bred among the wild brigand tribes of 
Epirus, he had, from his youth up, been distinguished 
by his dauntless courage and his ready wit. These 
would seem to have earned him the special regard of 



208 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

old Ali Pasha, who, though not given to the exercise 
of clemency, twice commuted a sentence of death 
which had been passed on the young brigand, and 
even enrolled him in his body-guard. Trained thus 
in the school of the Pasha of Janina, a character nat- 
urally fierce and subtle had received, as yet, little im- 
press of higher and nobler influences. After the fall 
of Ali, Karaiskakis took once more to the mountains, 
and, as a chief of Klephts, ultimately threw in his lot 
with the cause of the Greeks. His patriotism had, 
however, not been above suspicion. More than once 
he had entered into relations with the Turks, and was 
suspected, not without justice, of playing the same 
selfish game as Odysseus. But of his courage, his 
skill as a leader, and his immense influence over the 
w^ild hillsmen, there could be no doubt. Among the 
Armatoli his name had passed into a proverb. ^ Why 
are you running, fool,' they would cry out when any 
one fled, ^ as though Karaiskakis were after you? ' 
*" Karaiskakis,' said the Albanians of Kiutayeh's army, 
' is the only Romaic captain whom we fear.' 

To this man the Hellenic government decided, 
not without misgiving, to entrust the command of 
the Greek forces in Attica. Zai'mis, the President, 
Karaiskakis's personal enemy, agreed to forget old 
grudges in the face of the common danger, em- 



GREEK REVERSE AT CHAIDARI 209 

braced him in public, and formally handed over to 
him the leadership of the troops. Karaiskakis knew 
that he was distrusted, and with reason. ' Hitherto,' 
he said, ' I know I have been devil and angel by turns. 
Henceforward I am determined to be all angel.' ^ 
He kept his word. It seemed as though the new sense 
of a great responsibility, the consciousness that on his 
eiiorts rested the main hopes of the cause of his people, 
wrought in his character, as in that of many others 
in the course of the national uprising, a complete revo- 
lution. From a selfish partisan chief, he became a 
great national leader, and from this time, until 
he sealed his devotion with his death, gave himself up 
heart and soul to the service of his country. 

The immediate object of Karaiskakis was now to 
advance upon Athens, and raise the siege of the 
Acropolis. At Eleusis he gathered a band of some 
two thousand irregular warriors. Besides these, the 
French Colonel Fabvier was also present at the head 
of a thousand drilled troops; and together they 
advanced as far as Chaidari in the direction of Athens. 
Here, however, they were attacked by the Ottoman 
forces. Karaiskakis's hillsmen, entrenched behind 
their shallow tamhurias, repulsed the onslaught of 

1 Mendelssohn, i. 432. 
14 



210 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

the enemy; but the regulars, either from pride or 
laziness, had neglected to entrench themselves, and 
were thrown into confusion by the Turkish horse. 
Their defeat involved also that of the irregulars, who 
were outflanked and compelled to retreat. The ad- 
vance upon Athens had, for the present, to be aban- 
doned. 

Meanwhile the defence of the Acropolis, on which 
so much depended, was in danger of collapsing. The 
brigands and mercenaries, who formed the greater 
part of the garrison, were no Missolonghiots, to dare 
all for the sake of their country. As the siege was 
pressed, and the conditions of life within the narrow 
citadel grew more and more intolerable, desertions be- 
came increasingly frequent, and more than once the 
troops broke out into open mutiny. Gouras was com- 
pelled to harass the enemy night and day with an 
unceasing fusillade, to keep them on the alert, and so 
prevent his own men slipping through their lines un- 
der cover of the darkness. At last, on the 13th of 
October, Gouras himself was killed. At first it seemed 
as though this misfortune would involve the fall of the 
fortress. But the heroic wife of the dead chieftain 
harangued the soldiers, upbraiding them for their 
cowardice, and, aided by her husband's lieutenant, 
Makriyanni, succeeded in persuading them to con- 



GREEK VICTORY AT ARACHOVA 211 

tinue the defence. On tlie 23rd they were encouraged 
by the arrival of Kriezotes, who with 300 men had 
cut his way through the investing force. Two months 
later, Colonel Fabvier, with six hundred men, also 
succeeded in entering the fortress, bringing with him 
a supply of powder, but no provisions. As, however, 
he was unable, in spite of all his attempts, to cut his 
way out again, so large an additional force proved 
a severe strain on the already somewhat straitened re- 
sources of the garrison. 

Meanwhile Karaiskakis was endeavouring to re- 
peat, against Kiutayeh in Attica, the plan which Kolo- 
kotrones had used, in Argolis, so successfully against 
Dramali. His design was to seize all the passes 
between Eleusis and Marathon, in this way to cut off 
the Ottomans from their base of supplies, and so starve 
them out of Attica. But Reshid was a better general 
than Dramali; he saw the supreme importance of 
keeping his communications open, and sent out in 
good time a sufficient force to secure them. Karais- 
kakis was beaten, and had for the present to give up 
his plan. But though out-generalled by the Turkish 
commander-in-chief, he gained over one of his lieuten- 
ants a signal success, which did much to retrieve his 
defeat, and revive the courage of the Greeks. On the 
5th of December he succeeded in cutting off, in a 



212 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

mountain pass near Arachova, a detachment of some 
2,000 Turkish troops under Mustapha Bey. Sur- 
rounded by hordes of savage hillsmen, the Ottomans 
defended themselves for some time with their accus- 
tomed valour. At last a violent snowstorm seemed to 
give them an opportunity for abandoning an unten- 
able position. Getting into such formation as was pos- 
sible under the circumstances, they prepared to make 
their way out of the trap into which they had been led. 
The main road, however, being now held by the enemy 
in force, they were compelled to take to the steep 
mountain-tracks which, even in fine weather, gave but 
a very insecure foothold. Struggling through the 
blinding snow, up these dizzy paths, they were at- 
tacked by the Greek mountaineers, who were in hot 
pursuit. The matchlocks of the Greeks had been ren- 
dered useless by the storm, and the soldiers used only 
their yataghans. Amid the swirling snow the work 
of butchery proceeded in ghastly silence. "When, their 
labour accomplished, the pursuers returned to Ara- 
chova, the inhabitants, who had heard no sound of fir- 
ing, asked what had become of the Turks. For only 
answer the Greeks held up their bloody knives. Of 
the Ottoman force scarce three hundred succeeded in 
making their escape. 

In February 1827 Karaiskakis added to his pres- 



ARRIVAL OF COCHRANE AND CHURCH 213 

tige by another victory, repulsing Omer Vrioni from 
Distomo, with the loss of all his baggage and artillery. 
These and other lesser successes made him appear in- 
vincible to the wild tribesmen. The chiefs of xVrma- 
toli, who had but lately submitted to Kiutayeh, once 
more changed their fickle allegiance, and joined the 
Greek leader with all their forces. Beyond the imme- 
diate reach of Eeshid's army, and excepting Misso- 
longhi, Anatoliko, Lepanto, and Vonitza, all continen- 
tal Greece was now again restored to the Hellenic 
cause. Karaiskakis had more than justified the confi- 
dence reposed in him. 

Meanwhile, however, new actors had appeared 
upon the scene. The Hellenic Government was now 
almost wholly dependent on the sympathy of the 
Philhellenes of Europe for the means of carrying on 
the war; and in the first outburst of despair that fol- 
lowed the fall of Missolonghi, it had even been pro- 
posed in the ^N'ational Assembly to place Greece 
formally under the protection of England. The 
timely arrival of General Gordon with a sum of 
14,000?. alone saved the country from ruin. With 
the help of this sum a fleet of sixty vessels of war and 
twenty-one fire-ships had been fitted out, the regular 
troops reorganised under Colonel Fabvier, and some 
nine thousand Armatoli taken into the pay of the 



214 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDEIS^CE 

Government. Early in 1827 Lord Cochrane and Sir 
Kichard Church arrived in the Morea, and were ap- 
pointed high admiral of the fleet and generalissimo of 
the land forces respectively. The veteran Miaonlis, 
in spite of his well-earned fame, consented, with a rare 
disinterestedness, to accept a subordinate post under 
the English Admiral; and when, in April, Lord Coch- 
rane and Sir Kichard Church arrived at Phalerum, 
Karaiskakis added to his laurels by agreeing with- 
out demur to serve under the orders of the new gen- 
eral. 

Already, on Eebruary 5, 1827, General Gordon 
had landed and entrenched himself on the hill of 
Alunychia, near the ancient harbour of Athens. His 
plan was to fortify this as a base for an advance on 
the Ottoman camp, while the attention of the Turks 
was diverted by a demonstration from Eleusis in the 
direction of Menidi. This latter ended in disaster. 
An advanced guard of 800 Armatoli, under the brave 
and enthusiastic Colonel Burbaki, was fallen upon by 
a superior Turkish force, and cut up. Five hundred 
of the Greeks, with their heroic leader, fell in this 
engagement; while the rear guard of 2,000 men, un- 
der ^N^otaras and Yassos, fled without coming in sight 
of the enemy. 

After this success Eeshid, on the 11th of Febru- 



OPERATIONS BEFORE ATHENS 215 

ary, advanced on Munycliia to attempt to dislodge 
General Gordon. The onset of the Turks was, how- 
ever, repulsed, partly by the vigorous resistance of the 
Greeks, but still more owing to a hail of shot and shell 
poured upon them by the steamer Kartcria which, 
imder the command of the brave Philhellene Captain 
Hastings, had entered the bay. 

On the arrival of Cochrane and Church at Phale- 
rum, a council of war was at once held to settle on the 
I)lan of campaign. Karaiskakis proposed to have re- 
course to the plan which he had already unsuccessfully 
attempted : to occupy the mountain passes leading into 
the plain of Attica, and starve the Turks out. "With 
the increased forces now at the command of the 
Greeks, the country at their backs no longer hostile, 
and the command of the sea, this plan, had it been 
accepted, would not improbably have been crowned 
with success. But Cochrane's whole temperament dis- 
inclined him to cautious measures, and Church, as his 
subsequent proceedings proved, was incapable of 
grasping the true conditions of the war he had under- 
taken to conduct. Karaiskakis was overruled, and it 
was determined to make a direct attack on the Otto- 
man position at Athens. 

On the 20th of April a body of troops under Major 
Urquhart landed at Munychia; and on the 25th a 



216 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

chance skirmisli brought on a general engagement 
with the Ottoman troops stationed near the monas- 
tery of Saint Spiridion. Cochrane, seeing his oppor- 
tunity, put himself at the head of the Greeks, and, 
armed only with a telescope, led them in person 
against the Turkish entrenchments. The impetuous 
onrush of the Greeks carried all before it ; and, before 
the victorious soldiery stopped, seven of the smaller 
Turkish redoubts had been captured, communication 
established between the Greek camps at Phalerum and 
Munychia, and Kiutayeh's vanguard isolated in the 
promontory of the Pirseus. In the monastery of Saint 
Spiridion, however, a band of 300 Albanians still held 
out, and these it now became necessary to reduce. 
For two days the brave defenders repulsed every effort 
to storm their position ; but on the third day want of 
water compelled them to capitulate; and General 
Church granted them honourable terms. Unfortu- 
nately, he had taken very inadequate measures to in- 
sure the terms being observed. They were to march 
out with the honours of. war, Karaiskakis and one or 
two other leaders as hostages in their midst. When 
the Albanians emerged from the gate of the monastery 
they were at once surrounded by an angry and excited 
mob of Greek soldiery. Some chance altercation led 
to a shot being fired; and immediately there began a 



MASSACRE AT MUNYCHIA 217 

hideous slaughter. In vain Karaiskakis sought to stop 
the bloodshed. The Albanians broke and fled, pur- 
sued by the furious Greeks. Karaiskakis cried out to 
them, in his horror and disgust, to kill him, as was 
their right. The panic-stricken wretches, however, 
were thinking only of their own safety. A few suc- 
ceeded in escaping to the Turkish lines, but the greater 
number were slain. 

This ghastly breach of faith on the part of the 
Greeks was an ill-omened beginning of their cam- 
paign. Cochrane was furious; Church apologetic. 
A certain measure of responsibility undoubtedly rests 
upon the head of the English general; for, knowing 
the fierce and unreliable character of the Greeks, he 
should have taken measures to prevent his, soldiers 
coming anywhere near the Albanians during their out- 
march; and, above all, he should himself have been 
present to see that the terms of the capitulation were 
honourably observed. 

The 5th of May was fixed for the general attack 
on the Turkish camp; but an untoward event led to 
its being postponed till the 6th. Strict orders had 
been issued that there was to be no outpost skirmishing 
on the day before the battle. To hold fire within 
sight of their enemy was, however, more than the 
hot-blooded Armatoli could achieve; and Karaiskakis, 



218 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

lying ill and feverish in his tent, was suddenly aroused 
by the sound of firing. Kushing out to discover the 
cause, he found a Greek outpost engaged in a sharp 
encounter mth a small party of the enemy. He at 
once joined in the fray, to try and drive back the 
enemy and stop the fight. In the eagerness of pur- 
suit, however, he advanced too far, and was isolated 
from his men. Surrounded by foes, before his sol- 
diers could come to his rescue, he received a bullet in 
the body, and was carried mortally wounded from the 
field. 

When the news of this misfortune spread abroad 
the effect was profound. The Greeks, who till now 
had been eager for the battle, and, if anything, over- 
confident as to its result, were overcome with grief, 
and filled with despair and the gloomiest foreboding. 
In the Ottoman camp the exultation was correspond- 
ingly great; and the Albanian outposts shouted over 
in derision to the Greeks : ' You must put on mourn- 
ing; Karaiskakis is dead! ' xiU night the wounded 
hero lay dying. While breath remained in his body 
his soldiers swore they would not leave his side; but, 
even if they could have been induced to move, it would 
have been impossible to undertake a serious military 
enterprise with troops in such a temper; and it was 
accordingly decided to postpone the attack for an- 



ROUT OF THE GREEKS 219 

other day, and give the soldiery time to recover their 
spirits. 

Between Munychia and Athens the ground was 
covered with olive yards and gardens, which would 
have afforded excellent cover for the advance of irreg- 
ular troops. But for some unexplained, and perhaps 
inexplicable, reason. Church had transferred his base 
from the Pirseus to the eastern end of the Bay of 
Phalerum, and here on the morning of the 6th of May 
the main body of the attacking force was landed. Be- 
tween it and the enemy lay a stretch of open downs, 
affording no cover for infantry, but excellent manoeu- 
vring ground for the Ottoman cavalry. Church was 
still on his yacht, where ' in most unmilitary ' fashion ^ 
he had made his headquarters. The Greeks, sullen and 
depressed, advanced across the open in a straggling 
line, without order and with no eagerness. Suddenly, 
from a ravine where they had been concealed by the 
Ottoman commander, a large body of Turkish cavalry 
burst upon them; and the Greeks, with hardly a pre- 
tence of resistance, broke and fled. 

Cochrane and Church had just landed from their 

yachts when the crowd of fugitives, close pressed 

by the Ottomans, rushed helter-skelter to the shore. 

The English officers had barely time to wade into 

1 Finlay, ii. 143. 



220 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

tlie sea, and scramble into their boats, before the 
panic-stricken mob readied them. For the rest, 
all that could be done was to turn the guns of the ships 
upon the victorious Turks, and hold them at bay till 
the fugitives could be taken off by the boats. As it 
was, 1,500 Greeks perished in this disgraceful rout. 

The effects of the defeat were out of all propor- 
tion to the importance of the battle. The English 
officers, whose arrival had been hailed with such un- 
bounded hope and enthusiasm, fell into discredit; for 
it was felt, with some justice, that the reverse was in 
great part due to their defective judgment and their 
lack of a true grasp of the situation. The army of 
irregular warriors, which had only been held together 
by the commanding personality of Karaiskakis, now 
melted away like snow; and all hope of driving Kiu- 
tayeh from Attica, or of raising the siege of the Acrop- 
olis, had to be abandoned. Of all the positions which 
had been won in the recent fights, Munychia alone 
remained in the hands of the Greeks. Here Church 
held out for three weeks longer, more for honour's 
sake than for any end it could serve. On the 27th of 
May, he abandoned this post also, and, before leaving, 
he sent orders to the garrison of the Acropolis to sur- 
render the fortress. They refused with scorn. ' We 
are Greeks,' they answered, ' and determined to live 



SURRENDER OF THE ACROPOLIS 221 

or die free. If Keshid wants our arms, let him come 
and fetch them ! ' In spite of these heroics, however, 
they thought better of it. Negotiations were opened 
with the Turkish commander-in-chief through the in- 
tervention of the French Admiral de Rignj, who 
chanced to be in the harbour; and a rumour that 
Ibrahim was approaching from the Morea made 
Keshid more amenable to terms; for the proud Otto- 
man did not feel inclined to yield the laurels of vic- 
tory a second time to the hated Egyptian. On the 5th 
of June the garrison of the Acropolis marched out 
with the honours of war, Reshid himself, at the head 
of a strong body of cavalry, keeping the line of march, 
and seeing that the terms of the capitulation were ob- 
served.^ 

The Turks were now once more masters of the 
whole of continental Greece, and had Kiutayeh ad- 
vanced at once across the Isthmus, the insurrection 
must have been finally crushed. Happily for Greece, 
his jealousy of Ibrahim prevented him from doing 
anything to aid him in reducing his pashalik to order; 

1 Mendelssohn, i. 456. Jurien de la Graviere, Station du 
Levant, ii. 137. The conduct of Reshid throug-hout the nego- 
tiations for the surrender of the Acropolis was marked by 
a moderation and straightforwardness which did him great 
credit. See Finlay, ii. 153. 



222 THE WAK OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

and instead of advancing into the Morea, he returned 
to Janina, where he employed himself in consolidating 
the provinces he had reconquered. Once more the 
Greeks had been saved in spite of themselves. 



CHAPTEE Xni 

Fall of the Government of Konduriottes — Zaimis elected 
President — Renewal of party strife — League of Koloko- 
trones and Konduriottes against Zaimis — Sissinis elected 
as a rival President — Rival assemblies at Damala and 
^gina — Arrival of Lord Cochrane and Sir Richard 
Church — They reconcile the factions — Assembly at 
Damala — Capodistrias elected President — Constitution 
of Troezene — Provisional administration formed — Mis- 
erj' of the country — Tyranny of the Klephts and Arma- 
toli — Piracy in the .^gean — Photomaras and Grivas in 
Nauplia — Operations of Ibrahim in the Morea — Trea- 
son of Nenekos — Campaign of Kolokotrones — Successes 
of the Greeks — Ibrahim devastates Messenia 

After the fall of Missolonghi, the interest of the war 
during the year 1826 had been centred in Attica. In 
July, indeed, Miaoulis had sailed, with the fleet fitted 
out with the money brought by General Gordon, to 
the relief of Samos. On the 11th and 12th of Sep- 
tember he had engaged the Turks in a running fight, 
the Greek sailors once more displaying their superior 
seamanship, and had forced them to take refuge under 
the guns of the Dardanelles. On land, however, no 

223 



224 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

decisive action was fought. Ibraliam for tlie time was 
powerless; Mehemet Ali had sent him no reinforce- 
ments; his troops were worn out and demoralised; 
and in l^ovember he retired into winter quarters at 
Modon, where he remained until April 1827. The 
Greeks, relieved from the most pressing dangers, were 
free to waste their energies in talk, and their strength 
in suicidal strife. 

The fall of Missolonghi had brought to a head 
the furious discontent of the people with the selfish 
and incompetent government of Konduriottes, who 
was compelled to bow to the storm, and resign the 
Presidency. Zaimis was elected in his place, and a 
governing committee of eight members formed, from 
which both Konduriottes and Kolokotrones were ex- 
cluded. This was the signal for the beginning of a 
still more furious war of parties; and even the Phil- 
hellenic sympathies of Europe were torn to shreds to 
form the ensigns of hostile factions, which dubbed 
themselves English, French, or Russian, according to 
the nation whose interference they most favoured. It 
was characteristic also that the party divisions, even 
under these alien designations, followed local divi- 
sions. Miaoulis, Mavrocordatos, and the islanders gen- 
erally were ' English.' The Moreots declared for Rus- 
sia, following the lead of Kolokotrones, who hated 



i 



CAPODISTRIAS ELECTED PRESIDENT 225 

both Mavrocordatos and the Hydriots, who had held 
him prisoner. The Rumeliots, or continental Greeks, 
were ^ French.' 

In November the ISTational Assembly, which was 
powerless amid the strife of armed factions at Piada, 
was transferred by Zaimis to the island of zKgina. 
Konduriottes and Kolokotrones, patching up a tem- 
porary truce in their common hatred of Zaimis, now 
summoned a second Assembly at Kastri, and, in Feb- 
ruary 1827, elected Sissinis President. Once more 
Hellas, already bleeding from so many wounds, seemed 
in danger of being torn asunder by civil war. At this 
crisis, however, Lord Cochrane and Sir Richard 
Church appeared upon the scene, and their earnest re- 
monstrances succeeded in once more uniting the rival 
parties. Both Assemblies were dissolved, and, in 
March 1827, a new one called together at Damala, 
near the ancient Troezene. Zaimis and Sissinis also 
now both resigned, and the Assembly proceeded to the 
election of a new President. The choice fell upon 
Count Capodistrias, the ex-minister of Russia, for 
whose election Kolokotrones and the ^ Russian ' party 
had long been intriguing.^ The appointment w^as to 
be for seven years, and until the arrival of the new 
President, the Government was placed in the hands of 

1 Mendelssohn, i. 440 445. 
15 



226 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

a committee of three. George Mavromichales, Milia- 
itis, and Kakos were the commissioners chosen. 

In May 1827 was published the Constitution of 
Troezene, the charter of the liberties of Greece. This 
was in many ways a document of singular interest. As 
an instrument of effective government, indeed, it was 
stillborn, but as a manifesto embodying the ideal of 
the Hellenic race it was full of significance; for it pro- 
claimed in the face of Europe that, whatever fate the 
diplomacy of the Cabinets might have in store for 
Greece, she herself would never rest content until the 
whole of those members of the Hellenic race who had 
risen in arms against the Turk had obtained their lib- 
erty. The limits of the new Greek State were to in- 
clude Albania, Thessaly, Samos, and Crete! ' Apart 
from this pronounced Panhellenism, the constitution 
was remarkable for an enunciation of democratic ideas 
far in advance of those of any State of Europe, includ- 
ing as it did the principle of government by the peo- 
ple, the equality of all before the law, freedom of opin- 
ion and of the press, and provisions against arbitrary 
taxation and imprisonment without trial. ^ 

The actual condition of Greece was indeed a curi- 
ous commentary on these ambitious and high-soaring 
sentiments. When, on the 17th of May, the Assem- 

iMendelssohn, i. 460. 



ANARCHY IN GREECE 227 

blj dissolved, its work dissolved with it. In the actual 
state of the country force was the only principle of 
government that found recognition; and every ad- 
venturer who could command a dozen cut-throats 
thought himself entitled to a share in the spoils of 
office. The provisional government, which had been 
appointed till the arrival of Capodistrias, was as cor- 
rupt as it was incompetent; and it was indeed charac- 
teristic of the state of Greek politics that this had been 
entrusted to two rogues and a fool. George Mavromi- 
chales ^ and Miliaitis, intent only on making their fort- 
unes while they might, found the readiest way to this 
end in selling their countenance to the pirates who had 
now begun to swarm in the iEgean, a scandal which 
Kakos was too imbecile to prevent. 

The Senate which, under the terms of the consti- 
tution, had been elected for three years, was a mere 
debating club, and hardly even that. Kolokotrones, 
in derision, had insisted in forcing its presidency on 
Dr. Eeniaris, a deaf old Cretan, who at the time of his 
election had in vain sought to escape from the danger- 
ous honour by hiding behind an almond tree! ^ 
I Even had the Government been honest and com- 
i 1 Georg-e Mavromichales, who afterwards murderea 
[Capodistrias, had the virtues and the vices of a brig-and 
chief. As a Mainote he could have no objection to piracy. 
2 Mendelssohn, i. 461. 



228 THE WAR OF GREEK IITDEPENDENCE 

petent, the task that lay before it might well have 
proved too much for its strength. The country was 
utterly exhausted; no taxes could be collected; no 
customs levied ; and, save for the contributions of the 
Philhellenes, the coffers of the State were empty. 
Everywhere, too, the wildest anarchy reigned supreme. 
The islanders, weary of an unprofitable war, had taken 
to piracy, and turned their arms against the commerce 
of all nations. Spezziots and Hydriots did what 
seemed good in their own eyes. The Psariots made 
JEgina. itself the centre of their depredations; and the 
fugitive Cretans in the Cyclades had established pirate 
strongholds, from which they issued to scour the nar- 
row seas. On the mainland, too, the fortresses in the 
possession of the Greeks had been converted into rob- 
bers' nests. J. Mavromichales in Monemvasia, Dja- 
vellas in Acrocorinthos, levied blackmail on the 
wretched peasants of the surrounding country. In 
jSTauplia the castles of Itsch-kale and Palamidi were 
held by rival bands of Suliots and Eumeliots, under 
their chiefs Photomaras and Grivas, who, when not 
engaged in bombarding each other, agreed in wring- 
ing contributions from the miserable inhabitants of the 
town by torture and imprisonment. In the open coun- 
try wandering bands of Armatoli passed hither and 
thither, plundering what the devastating columns of 



PHOTOMARAS AND GRIVAS IN NAUPLIA 229 

Ibrahim had spared; and the wretched peasants fled 
to the mountains, or here and there turned desperately 
on their tormentors. At Argos the townsmen threw 
barricades across the roads, and fired on every soldier 
who appeared in sight. ^ 

In June civil war seemed once more on the point 
of breaking out. To plundering in the abstract the 
Moreot Klephts had, of course, no objection. But 
they could not endure that a Peloponnesian town 
should be laid under contribution by Rumeliots. The 
position of Photomaras and Grivas in Kauplia was 
gall and wormwood to them; and they determined to 
make an effort to expel them. To this end they de- 
vised a plot which, in men themselves so treacherous 
and shifty, displayed a touching simplicity and trust. 
An officer of Grivas was bribed, with the gift of a pair 
of gold-mounted pistols, to admit the younger Koloko- 
trones and a party into the fort of Palamidi. The of- 
ficer agreed, kept the pistols, and betrayed the plot to 
his chief. 

The night of the 9th of June was chosen for the en- 
terprise. A postern in the wall of the lower town had 
purposely been left open oy Photomaras. Through 
this Kolokotrones, with a body of 250 men, penetrated 
into the town; while Tsokris, with another band, 
1 Mendelssohn, i. 463. 



230 THE WAR OF GEEEK INDEPENDENCE 

clim'bed the steep ascent to Palamidi. Arrived at tlie 
castle, tlie latter found the door unlocked as agreed, 
and passed through it with his men. But he was 
scarcely inside before a murderous volley was opened 
upon him at close quarters. Completely taken by sur- 
prise, and wounded at the first discharge, he turned 
and fled out of the mouth of the trap, pursued down 
the hill by the laughter and the bullets of the Ku- 
meliots. Meanwhile Kolokotrones had fared no better. 
Surrounded, in a house which he had seized, by the 
superior forces of Photomaras, he had to ransom him- 
self and his men by signing a bond for 60,000 piastres. 
Scarcely had the Rumeliot chiefs got rid of this 
danger, however, when they began once more to quar- 
rel with each other. Accusations brought against 
Kolettes, who was accused of receiving Ottoman 
bribes, had raised party spirit to white heat, and Pho- 
tomaras and Grivas plunged into the fray, on opposite 
sides. The guns of the forts of ISTauplia were now 
turned against each other, and for days a vigorous bom- 
bardment was kept up. On the 13th of July alone, 
more than two hundred bombs and shot were dis- 
charged. The wretched townsmen, already stripped 
by the rival gangs of ruffians of nearly all they pos- 
sessed, now saw their homes reduced to ruin solely to 
prove which robber should have the right to deprive 



INTERVENTION OF CODRINGTON 231 

tliem of the rest. The town caught fire in several 
places, and a hundred souls perished in the flames. 
The inhabitants tried to escape into the open country ; 
but the gates were occupied by soldiery, who drove 
them back, or only sold the right to leave the town at a 
high tariff. 

To this hotbed of anarchy the Government had 
been transferred a month before. The provisional 
committee now fled, and was followed speedily by 
the Senate, wliicli on the 14tli of July had lost three 
of its members by the bursting of a bomb in its midst. 

Once more the situation was saved by foreign 
intervention. During the height of the bombardment 
Admiral Codrington had arrived off l^Tauplia, and now 
interfered on behalf of the townspeople, whom he per- 
suaded the chiefs to allow to depart. The city was soon 
deserted by all its inhabitants; and, of all the Greek 
leaders, only Demetrius Hypsilanti remained, obedient 
to what he considered his duty, in his bullet-riddled 
house. 

On the 19th of July a conference was arranged be- 
tween the rival chieftains on board Captain Hamilton's 
ship. It was represented to them strongly by the Brit- 
ish officer how fatal the continuance of their course of 
action would be to the Greek cause, since, however 
willing the Powders might be to interfere on behalf of 



232 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Greece, it was impossible for tliem to negotiate with 
a Government terrorised by armed factions. Sir 
Richard Church, who had meanwhile also arrived, 
added his representations to those of the admiral. 

Photomaras, who had had rather the worst of the 
bombardment, made a virtue of necessity, and yielded 
his stronghold to the Government. Grivas, however, 
still held out, and refused to evacuate Palamidi, ex- 
cept for payment of a million piastres; and, since no 
one had the power to force him, he remained for the 
time master of the situation. 

Meanwhile, after five months of inactivity Ibrahim 
had, on the 18th of April, once more taken the field, 
and marched northwards into Elis. For three weeks 
he was detained before the castle of Klemutsi, into 
which Sissinis had hastily thrown himself on the news 
of the Egyptian advance ; but, at the end of the third 
week, want of water compelled the garrison to capitu- 
late, and the Egyptians continued their march to 
Rhium. Ibrahim, who had hitherto raged like a lion, 
now changed his policy, and began to play the fox. 
Everywhere he treated the peasantry with the greatest 
forbearance, leaving them their seed corn, and paying 
them for all his provender. This new and unlooked- 
for generosity bore fruit; and whole districts, weary j 
of the hor>eless struggle, sent in their submission, and 



IBRAHIM IN ELIS 233 

returned to tlie Ottoman allegiance. I^enekos of 
Zabati, who had first set the example of defection, 
even raised a corps of irregulars to act as auxiliaries to 
the Egyptians. 

The news of this treason and of the defection of 
so many whole eparchies from the Greek cause roused 
the old lion Kolokotrones from his lair. Casting aside 
at the call of patriotism the miserable intrigues and 
quarrels in which he had been immersed, he threw 
himself, with his accustomed fierce energy, into the 
task of resisting the victorious advance of the Egyp- 
tians. He issued a proclamation calling on all men 
capable of bearing arms, between the ages of sixteen 
and sixty, to rise for the defence of their country. A 
corps was despatched against the traitor jSTenekos. An- 
other, imder Mketas, marched southward into Mes- 
senia, to attack Ibrahim's base. Two more, under 
Gennaios ^ Kolokotrones and Paploutas, were deputed 
to hold the mountain passes in the centre of the Morea. 
Kolokotrones himself marched to Corinth and the lake 
of Phonia, to join i^otaras and his Corinthians in 
watching Ibrahim's further movements. 

In the irregular warfare that followed the advan- 
tage remained on the side of the Greeks. An attempt 

1 I.e. the * brave,' a nickname given him by the Armatoli 
for his courage. 



234 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

of Ibrahim to seize the monastery of Megaspilaion 
was frustrated by the valour of the militant monks. 
He then tried to penetrate into Karytsena; but the 
forces of Gennaios and Paploutas held the passes, and 
he was compelled to turn back. He retired baffled 
into Messenia; and the Greeks were correspondingly 
elated. 

Further triumphs awaited them in the north. On 
the 15th, and again on the 29th, of July Kolokotrones 
defeated the combined forces of isTenekos and Achmet 
Bey at St. Ylasi and the Cloister of Saint John. He 
lacked the means, however, to take full advantage of 
his victory and attack Patras. In vain he urged the 
Hellenic Government to send him supplies of food 
and ammunition. ' I cannot,' he wrote indignantly, 
* feed my soldiers with air, turn earth into powder, 
or rocks into bread! ' The Government paid no at- 
tention to his urgent messages, either because they had 
no supplies to send, or because they were too much oc- 
cupied with their own selfish ends to care about the 
conduct of the war. The Greeks as well as the Turks 
were, therefore, compelled to live upon the unhappy 
peasants, who thus found themselves ground between 
the upper and the nether millstone. 

Ibrahim, hearing that Kolokotrones was about to 
make an effort to reconquer the districts which had 



SUCCESSES OF THE GREEKS 235 

submitted to tlie Ottoman rule, now sent reinforce- 
ments hj sea to Patras. Achmet Bey also once more 
led an expedition out of Patras, and, guided bv ISTen- 
ekos, marched along the coast of Acliaia,witb a view to 
securing the current harvest. But Kolokotrones was 
prepared. At Yostitza his lieutenant Paploutas defeat- 
ed the Turkish force, and hurled it back on Patras; 
and shortly afterwards another body of Ottomans was 
defeated by Gennaios amid the vineyards of Divri, and 
driven back on Pyrgos. On the news of these victo- 
ries, the districts which had fallen away from the na- 
tional cause once more threw in their lot with the 
Greeks. 

A new danger now loomed in the South- West, 
where Ibrahim was threatening the reduction of 
Arcadia and the Maina; and Kolokotrones hastened 
southward to the aid of [N'iketas. But the wild Main- 
otes, invincible in their own mountain fastnesses, held 
the passes successfully against all the Egyptians' efforts 
to force them; and Ibraham, furious at these continu- 
ous checks, now let loose his hordes of savages once 
more over the open country. 'Not only life itself, but 
everything that could support life was to be destroyed. 
His devastating columns crossed and recrossed the 
country in every direction, the line of their march 
being marked by clouds of smoke and flame. In this 



236 THE AVAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

ruthless campaign of destruction more than sixty thou- 
sand fig and olive trees, the staple support of the coun- 
try people, were destroyed. It was, hoAvever, too 
late for any barbarous cruelty to succeed in crushing 
the liberties of Greece. The enthusiasm of the peo- 
ples of Europe had at last borne fruit, and stronger 
hands were about to take up the sword which Hellas 
had all but let slip from her weakening grasp. Soon 
the thunder of the guns in the bay of IsTavarino would 
proclaim to all the world that Europe had at last recog- 
nised the right of a heroic people to freedom. 



CHAPTER XIV 

Greece and the Powers — Eussian proposals — Attitude of 
Canning" and Metternich — Conferences at St. Petersburg 
— Changed relations of the Powers — Break up of the 
Holy Alliance — Attitude of Alexander I. — His death — 
Crisis in Russia — Uncertainty of the succession — Mili- 
tary revolt — Accession of Nicholas — Russian ultimatum 
to Turkej' — Protocol of St. Petersburg — Military reforms 
in Turkey — Massacre of the Janissaries — Alliance of 
Russia, France, and England — Treaty of London 

FoK years the attempts of the Powers to arrive at 
some mutual understandingj with a view to the settle- 
ment of the Greek question, had dragged on without 
leading to any generally acceptable proposals. At 
first the policy of the Holy Alliance, the Concert of 
Europe for the suppression of ^ revolution ' and ' im- 
piety,' had been supreme; and, under the influence 
of Metternich, the revolt of the Greeks had been put 
under the ban of the European Cabinets. The open 
sympathy of Canning for the Greeks had been the first 
sign of a coming change, and led the Russian Govern- 
ment to believe that England might herself soon take 

237 



238 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

up the cliampionship of the Hellenic cause, which 
Eussia, under the influence of Metternich and Can- 
ning's predecessor, Castlereagh, had hitherto declined. 
But if the Greeks were to find a friend, it was intoler- 
able that that friend should be England, and the Czar's 
government determined to anticipate her possible ac- 
tion. In January 1824, accordingly, a proposal, which 
has already been mentioned, was laid before the vari- 
ous courts by the Kussian representatives.^ This plan, 
however, which proposed to erect the three provinces 
of the Morea, and East and West Hellas, into tribu- 
tary principalities on the model of Moldavia and Wal- 
lachia, found favour with no one. The Greeks them- 
selves rejected it with scorn and indignation; and 
Canning refused to consider any scheme that did not 
recognise the right of the Greeks to mould their own 
destinies.^ Conferences were indeed opened at St. 
Petersburg to attempt to reach an agreement; but 
Canning ordered the British representative to with- 
draw,^ and, though the other plenipotentiaries re- 
mained, the diplomatic debate dragged on without ar- 
riving at any result. The motive underlying the Rus- 
sian proposals was indeed too clear to deceive anyone, 
much less the astute diplomacy of Metternich, who, 
while, in the interests of the Holy Alliance, he desired 
1 Prokesch-Osten, i. 249. 2 M. i. 311-314. a Id. i. 319. 



CONFERENCE AT ST. PETERSBURG 239 

to humour the Czar, had no desire to see Russia play- 
ing in the Levant the role of patron which she had as- 
sumed in the Danubian Principalities. After sitting 
for some time without effecting anything, the Confer- 
ence was adjourned for several months. In February 
1825 it met again, and Metternich now declared 
through the Austrian plenipotentiary that the court 
of Vienna could recognise only one of two alterna- 
tives, either the complete subjection or the complete 
independence of Greece.^ With the idea of a group 
of vassal States, which Russia desired to force upon 
the Porte, he flatly refused to have anything to do. 
France had been won over to his views during a visit 
he had paid to Charles X. in Paris, in the spring of 
1825.^ Under these circumstances Russia had no 
choice but to yield; and the sole result of the St. 
Petersburg Conferences was that, on the 13th of 
March, it was resolved to present a joint note to the 
Porte inviting it to accept the mediation of the 
Powers in the settlement of the Greek question.^ 
Needless to say, in the absence of any threat of com- 
pulsion, this proposal was indignantly refused by the 
Ottoman Government. 

On the relations of the Powers themselves, how- 

1 Prokesch-Osten, i. 341; Mendelssohn, i. 387. 

2 Mendelssohn, i. 389. 3 Prokesch, i. 340. 



240 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

ever, the effect of the Conferences was more impor- 
tant. The spell which the genius and personal charm 
of Metternich seemed to have thrown over the mind of 
the Emperor Alexander was broken, and the relations 
between the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna were 
strained almost to snapping. As France and Prussia 
both inclined to favour the Austrian policy, Russia 
now found herself compelled to court the sympathies 
of England. For the present, indeed, the sharp di- 
vergence of the ultimate aims of the two Powers for- 
bade any actual alliance. A certain distance, how- 
ever, either might proceed without clashing with the 
views of the other; and Canning was not ill-content 
when, in a note dated August 18, 1825, Alexander 
announced to the great Powers his intention of taking 
matters into his own hands. ^ A journey which, at 
this time, the Czar made to the south of Pussia was 
generally looked upon as connected with warlike prep- 
arations directed against Turkey. 

The unexpected death of Alexander, however, 
which occurred at Taganrog on the 1st of December, 
threw everything again into uncertainty. The new 
Czar might reverse the policy of his predecessor; and 
it was not even known who the new Czar was to be. 
Constantine, the eldest son of the late Emperor, and 

1 Mendelssohn, i. 390. 



ACCESSION OF THE CZAR NICHOLAS 241 

rightful heir to the throne, was a mere unlettered sav- 
age. In 1820, moreover, he had divorced his wife, 
and contracted a morganatic union with a certain 
Countess Grudzinska. This circumstance, and per- 
haps some consciousness of his own utter unfitness to 
rule, had induced him, in 1823, to sign a resignation 
of his claim to the crown in favour of his second 
brother, the Grand Duke Mcholas, who was married 
to the Prussian Princess Charlotte. The Czar Alex- 
ander had agreed to this arrangement, and the formal 
documents had been duly executed, and deposited in 
the archives at Moscow and St. Petersburg, but with 
such secrecy that the transaction had not become gen- 
erally known, and Nicholas himself had received no 
official intimation of it. 

When, therefore, the news of Alexander's death 
reached St. Petersburg, Nicholas himself took the oath 
of allegiance to Constantine, and administered it also 
to the imperial guard. Not till this was done were 
the documents unsealed which appointed Nicholas 
heir to the Empire. Even now he refused to mount 
the throne, unless he received from Constantine a re- 
newal of his abdication. The result of this delay and 
uncertainty was an inevitable confusion, of which the 
forces of discontent were quick to avail themselves. 

For some years before the death of Alexander the 
16 



242 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

army had been honeycombed with secret societies hav- 
ing for their object the overthrow of the autocratic 
power of the Czars. Outside military circles these 
plots had met with little support; but amongst the 
officers, and especially those who had been exposed 
to the influences of AVestern Liberalism during 
the three years passed by the Kussian army in 
France, revolutionary ideas had obtained a strong 
foothold. The objects aimed at by the conspirators 
were by no means uniform. Some, like Nicholas 
Turgeniew, desired only by the gradual spread of 
education and enlightenment to pave the way for con- 
stitutional government. Others dreamed of a Russian 
republic, and, like Colonel Pestel, wished to have re- 
course to a military rising. Various plans for an out- 
break had been projected even during Alexander's 
lifetime, but unforeseen circumstances had always 
arisen to prevent their coming to a head. The con- 
fusion and uncertainty which now followed the death 
of the Czar, however, seemed an opportunity not to be 
neglected, and led the conspirators to precipitate their 
action. 

For the mass of the common soldiers, of course, 
the word ' Constitution ' had no meaning whatever. 
An instrument for working upon them, however, was 
discovered in the double oath which, in the course of 



RUSSIAN MILITARY REVOLT 243 

a few days, they were required to take. It was pointed 
out to them that to swear allegiance to Nicholas was 
a breach of the oath which they had already taken to 
Constantino. The 26th of December was the day fixed 
for the administration of the new oath to the army. 
Several regiments, however, refused to take it, and 
with flying colours and rolling drums, marched into 
the square opposite the Senate house, shouting for 
Constantino and Constitution, which latter they had 
been told was the name of Constantine^s wife ! ^ 

The revolt threatened to spread among the rest of 
the troops, and ominous signs were not wanting of 
unrest even among the civil population. But the 
firmness of Nicholas prevented the most serious con- 
sequences. The mutineers were surrounded by a 
strong force of reliable troops, and summoned to lay 
down their arms. At first they refused, and shot down 
General Miloradovitch, who was endeavouring to 
bring them to reason. The Czar then ordered the ar- 
tillery to be turned against them; and three rounds 
of grape sufficed to quell the mutiny. Five of the 
ringleaders, including Colonel Pestel, were arrested 
and executed. Many of the subordinate agents were 
transported to Siberia; and the whole conspiracy was 
completely broken up. The revelation of this wide- 
spread disaffection in the army was, however, a dis- 
1 Mendelssohn, i. 395. 



244 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

agreeable discovery, and inclined the Czar more and 
more to the idea of a Turkish war, as a means of re- 
storing the morale of his troops. 

The course of events at St. Petersburg had been 
a severe blow to Metternich. When Alexander died, 
he knew nothing of the alteration made in the suc- 
cession, and had written to congratulate Constantine 
with unconcealed joy. He knew that from Constan- 
tine the cause of the Greeks would have little to ex- 
j)ect; that he hated England, despised France, loathed 
Prussia as a hotbed of revolutionary intrigue, and was 
wholly devoted to Austria.^ ^ The Russian romance 
is at an end,' he wrote exultingly; ' now begins Rus- 
sian history.' ^ And now Constantine had given place 
to Nicholas, who, in every important respect, was the 
exact reverse of his brother. Nicholas, indeed, who 
in character seemed half Puritan, half drill-sergeant, 
had little enough sympathy for the Greeks. ' Don't 
speak to me of Greeks ! ' he is said to have exclaimed, 
^ I call them rebels! ' Nevertheless the course to which 
personal inclination would never have led him was 
being gradually forced on him by the logic of political 
necessity; for, apart from the military reasons already 
mentioned, and which would have made the need for 

1 Metternich to Baron Ottenfels, December 18, 1825. 
Prolcesch, Appendix, vi. 15. 

2 lb. ' L'histoire de la Russia va commencer la oil vient 
de finir le roman.* 



POLICY OF CANNING 245 

the active intervention of Kussia in the affairs of the 
East not unwelcome to the Czar, the growing influ- 
ence of England in the Levant was beginning to fill 
him with anxiety. Eussia could not afford to see her 
own prestige completely overshadowed by that of a 
Power which was already recognised as her great rival 
in the East. 

During the moment of supreme peril, when Ibra- 
him stood on the heights above Nauplia, in July 1825, 
the Greek ]Mational Assembly had offered to place 
Hellas formally under British protection. Canning 
had refused; but at the same time his policy had now 
become so markedly favourable to the Greeks, that 
Lord Strangford, the Turcophile ambassador at Con- 
stantinople, resigned.^ He w^as replaced by Stratford 
Canning (Lord Stratford de Redcliffe), to whom in- 
structions were given to enter into relations with the 
Hellenic Government. In January 1826 a conference 
took place between the British ambassador and repre- 
sentatives of Greece at Perivolakia, opposite the island 
of Hydra. The Greeks, discouraged by the unfavour- 
able turn the war had taken, were at this time prepared 
to consider the Russian proposal of vassal States. 
Canning now determined once more to open direct 
negotiations with the Czar, of whose favourable dis- 
position he had been previously assured in some pri- 
1 Prokesch, i. 266. 



246 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE ; 

vate conversations with Baron Lieven, the Russian am- 
bassador in London. In March 1826, accordingly, the 
Duke of TV ellington was sent to St. Petersburg to con- 
gratulate the Czar on his accession, and at the same 
time to invite him to take part in some joint demon- 
stration on behalf of Greece. 

The English proposal placed the Czar in a some- 
what awkward position. Only a few days before, on 
the 17th of March, he had sent an ultimatum to the 
Porte demanding, with the threat of war in case of 
refusal, the immediate despatch of plenipotentiaries 
to Russia to discuss certain grievances of which the 
Czar's Government had to complain. It was possible, 
of course, that the Sultan might reject the ultimatum. 
If, however, he were to accept it, it would be diffi- 
cult for the Czar immediately to advance a new and 
entirely different series of claims. In spite of this 
objection, however, Mcholas, on the 4th of xipril, and 
before the answer of the Porte accepting the ultima- 
tum arrived, signed the so-called Protocol of St. Peters- 
burg, according to which England was empowered to 
offer to the Ottoman Government a settlement of the 
Hellenic question based on the terms agreed to by the 
Greek representatives at Perivolakia, Russia in any 
case promising her support.^ 

The publication of this protocol produced a perfect 
1 Holland, p. 5. 



DESTRUCTION OF THE JANISSARIES ^47 

storm of indignation. The Sultan, having accepted 
the Enssian nltimatum, naturally resented the sudden 
intrusion of an entirely fresh demand; and Metter- 
nicli, who stigmatised the protocol as a compound of 
feebleness and folly,^ encouraged the Porte to resist. 
Sultan Mahmoud's stubborn temper, indeed, showed 
no signs of yielding; and at Constantinople the prep- 
arations for the long-projected reforms in the organ- 
isation of the army were pushed forward with new 
vigour. The measures taken to achieve this recoiled 
on the Ottoman Government itself. On the 15th of 
June, the Janissaries, whose old-established privileges 
were most aifected by the reforms, rose in open insur- 
rection. Their opposition had, however, been fore- 
seen. They were overwhelmed by masses of Anato- 
lian troops, whom the Sultan had collected in the cap- 
ital for the purpose, driven back into their barracks, 
and there cut down to a man. Sultan Mahmoud was 
thus rid at a stroke of those proud and turbulent war- 
riors who for centuries had played in Constantinople 
tlie part of the Praetorian guards at Pome. But, 
though he was now free to pursue his schemes of mili- 
tary reform, the destruction of the Janissaries had se- 
riously weakened his available forces; and he found 

1 ' Une oeuvre pleine de faiblesse et de ridicule.' — ^Nfetter- 
nich to Baron Ottenfels. Prokesch, Appendix, vii. 11. 



248 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

himself compelled, in spite of the new demands of tlie 
Czar, to send his representatives, in accordance with 
the Russian ultimatum, to meet those of Russia at 
Akkerman. Here, on the 26th of October, an arrange- 
ment was come to by which Turkey granted all the de- 
mands of Russia with regard to certain outstanding 
questions in Servia and Roumania, the navigation of 
the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, and the handing over 
of some Circassian fortresses. 

During all this time the British ambassador to the 
Porte had refrained from presenting the Protocol of 
St. Petersburg, though as early as May the Sultan 
had received private intimation of its contents. Mean- 
while there had been an active interchange of views 
between the European Cabinets, and the situation had 
been to a considerable extent modified. Metternich 
still took up an irreconcilable attitude; Prussia only 
agreed to co-operate in case of a complete unanimity 
of the Powers; but France, where the Catholic zeal 
of Charles X. inclined him to emulate St. Louis in for- 
warding a crusade against the infidel, had agreed to 
support the protocol.^ 

In the spring of 1827 further conferences took 

place in London, in which Austria consented to take 

part. But when Metternich found that he could not 

1 Baron de Damas to Lord Granville. Prokesch, Appen- 
dix, vii. 27. 



THE TREATY OP LONDON 249 

influence the decision of the other Powers, he with- 
drew his representative in wrath. On April 4, 1827, 
tlie British and Russian ambassadors handed to the 
Grand Yizier the joint protocol of the Powers. 

The Yizier, in the name of the Sultan, angrily re- 
fused to admit the right of foreign governments to 
interfere between the Sultan and his subjects, and, in 
view of the Treaty of Akkerman, complained bitterly 
of this new move on the part of Russia. The protocol 
having been thus refused, it became necessary to pro- 
ceed a step further; and, on the initiative of France, 
the Protocol of St. Petersburg was, on the 6th of July, 
converted into tlie Treaty of London, by which the 
contracting parties bound themselves to secure the 
autonomy of Greece, under the suzerainty of the Sul- 
tan, but without breaking off friendly relations with 
the Porte. ^ For this purpose the fleets of the three 
allied Powers were, under Admirals Codrington, de 
Rigny, and von Heyden, to establish a blockade of the 
Morea against all Turkish and Egyptian ships, and thus 
to compel Ibrahim to return to Egypt. The intention 
of using force was disclaimed, but, as without this the 
attainment of the object of the blockade seemed 
doubtful, a wide discretion was left to the admirals. 

The ambassadors of the three Powers were still 
1 For the text, of. Holland, p. 7. 



250 THE WAE OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

in Constantinople, and on the 16th of August they 
presented to the Porte a final note, calling on the Otto- 
man Government to arrange an armistice with the 
Greeks, and threatening, in case of refusal, to take 
any measures necessary to enforce it/ The Porte 
hesitated for a moment in face of the determined atti- 
tude of the Powers, and Metternich used the moment's 
delay for a last desperate diplomatic move. The death 
of Canning, too, which took place on the 8th of Au- 
gust, promised to modify the policy of England, and 
gave him some hope of still being able to reconstruct 
the shattered edifice of his diplomacy. He proposed 
to the Porte that Turkey should solicit the good offices 
of Austria for a settlement of her differences with the 
other Powers.^ The Ottoman Government, glad of 
any chance of retiring with dignity from a dangerous 
attitude, or of any pretext for delay, hesitated for a 
while, and finally, on the 20th of October, accepted 
the Austrian proposal. But it was too late. At mid- 
day on this same 20th of October, Admiral Codring- 
ton had sailed his fieet into the bay of JSTavarino, and 
before nightfall the proud armada of the Mussulmans, 
which was to have crushed out the last spark of Hel- 
lenic liberty, was drifting a mere tangled mass of 
broken wreckage on the face of the waters. 

1 Prokesch, Appendix, viii. 29. 2 /&. viii. 32. 



CHAPTER XV 

111 success of the Greeks at sea — Junction of the Egyptian 
and Turkish fleets at Navarino — Abortive expedition of 
Cochrane to Alexandria — Increase of piracy — Victory of 
Cochrane off Cape Papas — Intervention of the allied Ad- 
mirals — Armistice accepted by the Greeks and rejected 
by the Turks — Codrington at Navarino — Convention 
with Ibrahim — Renewed activity of the Greeks — Captain 
Hastings in the Gulf of Corinth — Destruction of a Turk- 
ish flotilla at Salona — Ibrahim sails from Navarino — Ac- 
tion of Codrington — The allied fleets enter the Bay of 
Navarino — The battle of Navarino 

At sea the events of the year 1827 had hitherto been 
as indecisive as on land. Lord Cochrane had done 
nothing to retrieve the disastrous impression produced 
by the fiasco before Athens. He was unable to prevent 
a Turkish fleet of twenty-eight sail joining, on the 14th 
of May, the Egyptian fleet in the harbour of j^avarino. 
A vigorous naval demonstration off Patras, in connec- 
tion with the movements of Kolokotrones, would prob- 
ably now have been his best policy. He preferred, 
however, to play a more venturesome game, and to 

251 



252 THE WAE OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

sail on an enterprise which could only have been justi- 
fied by brilliant success. At the beginning of June he 
put to sea with a squadron of twenty-two war vessels 
and six fire-ships, without letting it be known what was 
his destination. 'Not till he had passed the island of 
Crete did he inform his captains that it was his inten- 
tion to sail for Alexandria and attempt to destroy the 
fleet which Mehemet Ali was now fitting out in order 
to enable Ibraham to crush the last remnants of the 
Greek sea-power. On the 17th of June Cochrane ap- 
peared off Alexandria. The Egyptians were utterly 
taken by surprise, and the guard-ship at the mouth of 
the port was destroyed before it could make its escape. 
Had the Greeks at once sailed boldly into the har- 
bour, it is possible that they might have succeeded 
in destroying the Egyptian fleet, which was but half 
equipped and quite unprepared for an engagement. 
Failure, however, would have meant utter destruc- 
tion; and Cochrane did not venture to risk his ships 
through the narrow entrance to the port. He con- 
tented himself with hovering about outside; while 
Mehemet in person, furious at the insult to his capital, 
pressed on the armament of his ships, and, as soon as 
they were ready, stood out to sea to punish the pre- 
sumption of the Greeks. These, however, did not 
care to risk an engagement with Mehemet's superior 



INTERVENTION OF THE ADMIRALS 253 

force, and made all sail for Greece, pursued for some 
distance by the Egyptians. This second fiasco de- 
stroyed what survived of Cochrane's prestige. The 
Greeks, weary of their continued ill-success at sea, took 
once more, with increased zest, to piracy pure and sim- 
ple. It was reckoned that, at this time, more than a 
quarter of the population were engaged, in one way or 
another, in this lucrative pursuit. ^ Piracy,' said the 
^ Spectateur d' Orient,' ^ is the only complete and sys- 
tematised organisation which the Revolution of '21 
has as yet produced.' 

At last, however, on the 1st of August, Cochrane 
did succeed in winning a victory at sea. Off Cape 
Papas he fell in Avith an Egyptian corvette and 
schooner, which he captured after a sharp engagement, 
and towed in triumph into the harbour of Nauplia. 
The eff'ect of this success, the last achieved by the 
Greeks before the intervention of the Powers in the 
war, was heightened by the news which immediately 
followed. 

On the 11th of August the terms of the Treaty of 
London w^ere communicated to the French and Eng- 
lish admirals at Smyrna. Admirals Codrington and 
de Rigny were now empowered to interpose in the 
war, and part the combatants, ^ if possible, with trum- 
pets; if necessary, with cannon.' The island of Melos 



254 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

was fixed upon as the place of rendezvous for the al- 
lied fleets; and meanwhile Codrington sailed to ]^au- 
plia to inform the Greek Government of the decision 
of the Powers. The news was received by the Greeks 
with the wildest demonstrations of delight; and there 
was no need to use any threat of force to induce them 
to agree to the armistice. In the present crisis of its 
fortunes the Hellenic Government was only too glad 
to accept the intervention of the Powers, and, on the 
advice of the British admiral, once more transferred 
its seat to the island of /Egina, in order to escape from 
the terrorism of the factions, and to have a free hand 
in dealing with the foreign representatives. 

Meanwhile the armistice, accepted by the Greeks, 
had been rejected by the Turks with scorn. The 
Porte, indeed, refused to believe that the Powers were 
in earnest, or that, in the last resort, they would appeal 
to force. At Constantinople a solemn farce was en- 
acted to proclaim to all the world at once the deter- 
mination and the clemency of the Sultan. The Greek 
Patriarch was compelled formally to implore the Im- 
perial forgiveness for such of the revolted provinces 
as had already submitted, and the prayer was ostenta- 
tiously granted. At the same time, a powerful arma- 
ment was fitted out to proceed to the reduction of the 
islands of Hydra and Spezzia. Mehemet Ali, too, had 



CODRINGTON AND IBRAHIM 255 

now completed his great armada of ninety-two ships, 
fifty-one of them vessels of war; and, on the 7th of 
September, this sailed into the harbour of ISTavarino, 
raising the number of the Turko-Egyptian fleet in the 
bay to a hundred and twenty-six sail. 

Five days later Admiral Codrington, who had 
been unable to intercept the Egyptian fleet, arrived 
off Xavarino. He at once informed the Turkish ad- 
miral of the terms of the Treaty of London, and told 
him that any attempt on the part of the Turko-Egyp- 
tian fleet to leave the bay would be undertaken at its 
peril. Ibrahim, informed by the Capitan Bey of Ad- 
miral Codrington's ultimatum, took time to think; 
and, pending the arrival of the French admiral, no 
further action was taken. On the 22nd of September, 
Admiral de Kigny arrived, and on the 25th a confer- 
ence was arranged with the Egyptian commander-in- 
chief. The instructions of the admirals were precise ; 
and Ibrahim, on his side, professed himself unable to 
decide anything until he had received instructions 
from Constantinople. It was calculated that it would 
take twenty-five days for these to arrive, and during 
this period Ibrahim agreed to keep his fleet in the har- 
bour of jSTavarino, and to undertake no operations 
against Hydra or Spezzia. Small squadrons were, how- 
ever, to be allowed to leave the bay in order to commu- 



256 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

nicate with Siida and Patras. The admirals now be- 
lieved that Ibrahim would yield, and that a demon- 
stration in force would be sufficient to induce the 
Egyptian fleet to withdraw to Alexandria, without the 
need of having recourse to more violent measures. A 
couple of guard-ships were left to watch the entrance 
to the bay, and the allied fleet withdrew, de Rigny 
sailing to Elaphonesos, and Codrington, after dispatch- 
ing a few of his ships to Malta, going northward to 
watch the proceedings of Cochrane, who was now cruis- 
ing off the coast of Epirus. 

The situation was now in the highest degree pecul- 
iar and strained. The Greeks, having accepted the 
armistice which the Ottomans had refused, now had 
the allies on their side ; and, while Ibrahim's fleet was 
detained in forced inactivity in the harbour of Xa- 
varino, they were straining every nerve to make the 
best of the favourable conditions which the Sultan's 
obstinacy had created for them. The Turks com- 
plained bitterly that, while the armistice was enforced 
upon them, the Greeks were allowed a perfectly free 
hand, and that the allies, while affecting impartiality, 
were, in fact, actively engaged on the side of Greece. 
This, indeed, to all intents and purposes, was actually 
the case. Yet, Greece having willingly accepted the 
armistice, it would have been absurd to have insisted 



EENEWED ACTIVITY OF THE GREEKS 257 

on her remaining passive, while the Ottomans contin- 
ued the war. As long, therefore, as the Turks main- 
tained their present attitude, the Greeks could reap, 
unhindered, the full benefit of the coercive measures 
of the Powers, which were necessarily directed against 
that side only which had proved refractory. 

Under these circumstances the war was carried 
on by the Greeks with renewed activity. An expe- 
dition under Colonel Fabvier was sent to the long- 
suffering island of Chios. Kriezotis and Karatasos 
were commissioned to stir up a rebellion in Thessaly 
and Macedonia. Crete was blockaded; and 2,000 
Greek troops were landed at Grabusa to attempt once 
more to fan into a llame the slumbering embers of re- 
volt. In Western Hellas several chiefs of Armatoli 
were again in arms ; and an expedition was sent, under 
Church and Cochrane, to make an effort to reduce Mis- 
solonghi, and obtain a foothold in Albania. 

The enterprises of Kriezotis and of Fabvier ended 
in quarrels and failure, the renewed rising of the 
Cretans only in some months of useless bloodshed. 
The expedition of Church and Cochrane, on the other 
hand, was of more importance, not only in its direct 
achievements, but because it led immediately to the 
active intervention of the allied fleet. 

The plan was for Church to advance, with a small 



258 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

army of 1,400 men, from the Isthmus of Corinth along 
the coast of the Gulf. Cochrane, meanwhile, with a 
squadron of twenty-three ships, was to sail round the 
Peloponnese, and, forming a junction with Church, 
to carry him over to Western Hellas. On the 10th of 
September Cochrane anchored before Missolonghi. 
Codrington, however, who, as stated above, had sailed 
up from ]^avarino to watch his movements, forbade 
him to disembark in Albania; and the original plan of 
campaign had therefore to be abandoned. Cochrane 
had to content himself with bombarding the fort of 
Yasilidi, without, however, producing any impression. 
He then returned to Syra in the Cyclades, leaving Cap- 
tain Hastings, with a small squadron, to join Church 
in the Gulf of Corinth. 

Besides his own vessel, the steamship Karteria, 
Hastings had under his command the SoteVy com- 
manded by Captain Thomas, a couple of schooners and 
two gimboats. On the 23rd of September the Soter, 
accompanied by the schooners and gunboats, ran the 
gauntlet of the forts of Rhium, through the ^ little 
Dardanelles,' under a hot fire. Hastings followed 
soon after in the Karteria, without suffering any 
damage, and proceeded to reconnoitre the hostile fleet, 
which was lying at anchor under the guns of several 
shore batteries at Salona. He found it to consist of 



ACTION OFF SALONA 259 

eleven ships, five of them large, and including a 
schooner of sixteen and a brig of fourteen guns. On 
the 30th of September he sailed to attack the Turkish 
fleet with the Karteria, the Sot €7% and a couple of gun- 
boats. The Ottomans made no effort to avoid the en- 
gagements; indeed, their main anxiety was lest the 
Greek squadron should discover the immense disparity 
of their forces in time to escape what they supposed 
would be their total destruction. Hastings anchored 
the Karteria about five hundred yards from the shore, 
under a furious fire from the Turkish ships and bat- 
teries; while the rest of his little flotilla remained 
about two hundred yards further out. He proceeded 
with the greatest coolness and deliberation. Some 
rounds of cold shot were first fired from the small can- 
non, in order to discover the exact range. This having 
been done, Hastings loaded the long guns and carron- 
ades with bombs and red-hot balls, and poured in a 
murderous fire on the Turks. The effect was instan- 
taneous. A shot entered the magazine of the Turkish 
commodore, and blew him into the air; a brig was 
sunk, one schooner burnt, and another driven ashore; 
and within half an hour the Ottoman fleet was com- 
pletely destroyed. The gunboats now ran in shore and 
silenced the Turkish batteries; and an attempt was 
made to haul off the stranded schooner. This, how- 



260 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

ever, liad to be abandoned, as tbe woods near the sbore 
were occupied by Albanian sbarp-sliooters, wlio pre- 
vented any one from approaching the vessel. It was 
thereupon bombarded from a distance; and the work 
of destruction was complete. 

This victory gave the Greeks once more the com- 
mand of the Gulf of Corinth, and opened up their 
communications between the Morea and the mainland. 
Its importance, however, lay not so much in its imme- 
diate military as in its ultimate political effects; for 
it was the news of the career of Captain Hastings in 
the Gulf of Corinth, and of the destruction of the Ot- 
toman squadron at Salona, which brought to a head 
the quarrel between Ibrahim and the admirals, and so 
led directly to the catastrophe of I^avarino. 

In view of the destructive activity of the Greeks, 
Ibrahim held himself to be no longer bound by the 
verbal agreement entered into on the 25th of Sep- 
tember; and he determined to send a strong squadron 
to the Gulf to avenge the defeat at Salona, and put a 
stop to the proceedings of Hastings. On the 1st of 
October the frigate Dartmouth^ which had been left 
to watch the Turkish fleet in N'avarino, signalled the 
departure of a Mussulman squadron; and from the 
heights of Zante thirty Turkish warships were pres- 
ently seen sailing, with a fair wind, in a north-westerly 



i 



IBRAHIM SAILS FROM NAVARINO 261 

direction. This was the first division of the Egyptian 
fleet, under Mustapha Bey, bound for Patras. In spite 
of a high sea that was running, Codrington at once put 
out from Zante in pursuit, and on the following day 
placed himself between the Turks and the Gulf of 
Patras. He now sent word to the Ottoman Admiral 
that he would fire on the first vessel trying to pass, and 
forced him to turn back, the British fleet accompany- 
ing him as far as the southern point of the island of 
Zante. On the evening of the 3rd the second division 
of the Ottoman fleet, consisting of three frigates, four 
corvettes, and seven brigs, was signalled. On board 
one of the frigates Ibrahim himself was present; the 
other two were commanded by Tahir Pasha and Mo- 
hurrem Bey. After exchanging signals with Musta- 
pha, this division also prepared to return to ^avarino. 
Meanwhile, however, a stiff south-westerly wind had 
arisen against which it was impossible to beat up; and 
on the morning of the 4th three frigates and a number 
of smaller ships were still ofl' Cape Papas, and endeav- 
ouring to make for Patras. Codrington now once 
more, in the teeth of the gale, w^ent in pursuit. On 
the evening of the same day he overhauled the Turks, 
and, accusing Ibrahim of a gross breach of his word, 
threatened force if they did not at once return. Tahir 
replied that the truce had applied only to Hydra, and 



262 THE WAK OF GKEEK INDEPENDENCE 

not to Patras; and Codrington now proceeded to fire 
on the foremost Ottoman sliips, wliicli had not hoisted 
their colours, and drove them back. In the night the 
gale increased to a hurricane, and both fleets were scat- 
tered. " Ibrahim, however, made no further attempt 
to reach Patras, and returned to I^avarino. 

On his arrival he found the expected instructions 
from the Porte awaiting him. These, so far from 
counselling him to yield to the demands of the ad- 
mirals, ordered him to redouble his exertions for the 
reduction of the Morea, and promised him the speedy 
support of Kiutayeh. ISTothing could have better 
pleased the Egyptian commander-in-chief in his pres- 
ent temper; and, without delaying a day, he proceed- 
ed to wreak the consuming wrath, which he was 
powerless to exercise on the hated admirals, on the al- 
ready thrice devastated country. The British officers 
watched from their ships the columns of flame and 
smoke which were the signal to the Powers of the Ot- 
toman defiance. 

As such, indeed, it was understood by Admiral 
Codrington. On the 13th, the Eussian admiral, 
Count Heyden, and the Prench admiral, de Pigny, 
arrived off IN'avarino; and the allied fleet was now 
complete. The British squadron numbered eleven, 
including three line-of-battle ships and four frigates, 



ULTIMATUM OF THE ADMIRALS 263 

tlie Frencli seven, with three line-of-battle ships and 
two frigates, the Kussian eight, of which four were 
line-of-battle ships, and two frigates. The total num- 
ber of guns amounted to one thousand two hundred 
and seventy. 

A council of war was at once held, and it was 
decided to send an ultimatum to the Egyptian com- 
mander-in-chief. To continue a pacific blockade of 
tlie coast seemed, under the circumstances, useless; 
and even this it would soon be impossible to main- 
tain, with the approach of winter, on a coast exposed 
to the fury of every storm that blew. The admirals 
had been allowed a wide margin for the use of their 
own discretion, and luckily Codrington, the senior in 
command, was not one to shrink from responsibility. 

The ultimatum now presented to Ibrahim de- 
manded fresh securities, the return home of the Turk- 
ish and Egyptian fleets, the prompt cessation of hostil- 
ities in the interior, and the evacuation of the Morea. 
The only reply received by the admirals was through 
Ibrahim's dragoman, who said that his master was 
away in the interior, and that it was impossible to con- 
vey any message to him. This sounded unsatisfactory 
enough; and on the 18th another council of war was 
held, in order to arrive at a final decision. 

It was now determined, as the blockade from with- 



264 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

out had failed, that the allied fleet should make a fur- 
ther demonstration by sailing into the harbour, and it 
was hoped that this, combined with renewed represen- 
tations to the Ottoman commander, might persuade 
the Turks that it was to their own interest to yield. 
But in spite of the pacific tone of the decision, Cod- 
rington was under no delusion as to the result of this 
move. He had already, on the 17th, had the harbour 
reconnoitred; and he now made every disposition for 
the eventuality of a fight, assigning to each ship its 
place in the line of battle, and concluding his general 
orders with the famous words of Lord ITelson that * no 
captain can do wrong who lays his ship alongside that 
of an enemy.' 

The harbour of ^avarino is formed by a large bay, 
three miles in length by about two in breadth. It is 
protected to the west by the celebrated island of 
Sphakteria, and only open to the sea at its south-west- 
ern end, where it is entered by a channel some three 
quarters of a mile in width. The northern end of 
Sphakteria is separated from the mainland only by 
a narrow and shallow channel. 

The Turkish fleet was anchored in the line of the 
bay, facing the entrance, forming rather more than a 
half circle, and having its extremities protected by 
the fortress of ^avarino on the one side and the bat- 



THE ALLIED FLEET ENTERS THE BAY 265 

teries of Sphakteria on tlie other. The ships, eighty- 
two in number, were arranged in a triple line, in such 
a way that the gaps in the front row were filled by 
those in the rear; and, on each flank of the foremost 
line, which consisted of twenty-two of the largest ves- 
sels, were posted three fire-ships. Though greatly su- 
perior both in number of ships and guns to the allied 
squadrons, the Ottoman fleet was inferior in the size 
of its vessels, there being only three line-of -battle ships 
as compared with the ten of the allies. 

At about half -past one o'clock on the afternoon of 
the 20th, Admiral Codrington's flag-ship sailed into 
the harbour, followed by the whole of the allied fleet. 
As the entrance was too narrow to allow of any other 
formation than line ahead in passing in, the batteries 
commanding the mouth of the bay might, at the outset, 
have done great execution on the allied ships as they 
sailed past. ^N'ot a gun was fired, however, and it al- 
most seemed as though the affair might, after all, have 
a peaceful termination. Without a sign of resistance 
being offered, the French and British ships took up 
the positions assigned to them, dropping their an- 
chors and turning their broadsides to the enemy; and 
even the Russian fleet, though delayed an hour by a 
sudden dropping of the breeze, had plenty of time to 
take its place in the line. 



266 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

The DartmoiitJi was now ordered by the British 
admiral to request the removal of a fire-ship, which 
was stationed to windward of the English flag-ship; 
and on the Turks refusing to alter its position, a boat 
was sent to cut its cables, and tow it aside. The at- 
tempt to do this was resisted by the Ottomans with vol- 
leys of musketry, and a French and an English 
ship answered with their guns. Admiral Codrington 
now sent a boat to carry a remonstrance to the Turkish 
admiral; but the boat was fired on, and the 
bullet struck the flag-ship. The battle now became 
general. 

From the point of view of naval science the fight 
at l^avarino has little importance, for cooped up within 
the limits of a narrow bay, there was no room for the 
display of tactics or seamanship. It was a mere ques- 
tion of ^ hard pounding; ' and sound discipline and 
good practice at the guns were the factors which deter- 
mined the victory. It was not long doubtful on which 
side this lay. For two hours the cannonade continued, 
while, from the amphitheatre of hills around, twenty 
thousand of Ibrahim's troops watched the struggle. 
At the end of this time the flag-ship of the Capitan 
Bey and that of Mohurrem, which had been engaged 
by the Asia, cut their cables and drifted to leeward. 
Others of the Turks now began to follow suit, or fired 



BATTLE OF NAVARINO 267 

and abandoned their ships; and by the evening the 
Turkish fleet was completely destroyed/ 

The allies remained in the bay all night, experienc- 
ing considerable difficulty in saving their own ships 
from the burning wrecks which were drifting amongst 
them in every direction. In the morning it was found 
that, of all the Ottoman fleet, only twenty-nine vessels 
were still afloat. The whole bay was littered with a 
blackened and blood-stained tangle of broken wreck- 
age, and with the mutilated remains of the poor 
wretches who had perished in the explosions of the 
Turkish ships; while the sea for some distance round 
was red with human gore. The loss of the allies had 
been comparatively slight, not more than five hundred 
and forty being killed or wounded ; but of the Mussul- 
mans no less than six thousand had perished. 

1 M. B. i. 487. Codrington's despatch is g-iven in full in 
Prokesch, Appendix, viii. 36. 



CHAPTEE XYI 

The consequences of the battle of Navarino — The allied 
fleets retire to refit — Ibrahim remains firm — Effect of 
the battle on the Powers — Kussia proposes a joint ul- 
timatum to the Porte — Weak and vacillating- policy of 
England — Lord Dudley's note to the Porte — Policy of 
Welling-ton — Effect of the battle at Constantinople — 
The Porte demands compensation — Withdrawal of the 
ambassadors — The Sultan proclaims a Holy War — 
Treaty of Akkermann declared void — Kussia declares 
war, and occupies the Principalities. 

The battle of E'avarino was important rather for its 
diplomatic than for its immediate military effects. 
Ibrahim, who had arrived in time to witness the de- 
struction of the last of his fleet, is reported merely to 
have laughed grimly at the sight; and he exhibited, 
after as before the catastrophe, the same unshaken 
resolution. The allied admirals, immediately after 
the fight, renewed their demand that the Egyptians 
should evacuate the Morea, and threatened serious 
consequences in case of refusal. In spite, however, 

of the object lesson of the smoking wreck of his fleet 

268 



ATTITUDE OF IBRAHIM 269 

scattered in the bay beneath his eyes, Ibrahim replied 
by stating his intention of remaining, until such time 
as he should be ordered to leave by his master the 
Sultan. The admirals were in no condition to enforce 
their fresh ultimatum. The ships of the allied fleet 
had suffered much in the battle, and it was necessary 
for them to refit ; and for this purpose the British and 
llussian squadrons now sailed to Malta, the French 
to Toulon. 

For Ibrahim, indeed, the destruction of his fleet 
had for the moment brought a sensible relief. It is 
true that his elaborate plans for the reduction of the 
Greek islands had been shattered; but, on the other 
hand, he was now freed from the_intolerable presence 
of the admirals ; a great deal of diplomatic fog which 
had hitherto obscured his path had been cleared away; 
and he was able to do his duty to the Ottoman cause 
without being hampered by considerations of interna- 
tional policy. He accordingly set to work without de- 
lay to make arrangements for passing the winter in the 
Morea. With care, he could hope to make his avail- 
able stores hold out till the next harvest, even should 
it be impossible to receive supplies from abroad. Of 
the surviving Turkish ships he made use to embark the 
sick, the wounded, and useless mouths generally, for 
Alexandria, and at the same time to forward several 



270 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

tliousands of Greek captives for the supply of the 
slave markets of Egypt/ 

AVhile the Egyptian leader was thus preparing, 
under adverse circumstances, to maintain his position 
in the Peloponnese, the news of JSTavarino had pro- 
duced the most opposite effects upon the Cabinets and 
peoples of Europe. Metternich, giving voice to the 
opinions of the court of Vienna, denounced the action 
of the allied admirals as an unparalleled outrage, the 
destruction of the Ottoman fleet as an act of piracy 
and murder. In England the account of Admiral 
Codrington's action was received with very mixed 
feelings. To the weak Cabinet of Lord Goderich, 
which in a half-hearted manner had continued the 
policy of Canning, it was wholly unwelcome. They 
had babbled of peace, of friendly intervention, and 
pacific demonstrations; and now the prophecies of 
Metternich had come true, and they found themselves 
plunged, by the ^ indiscretion ' of the British admiral, 
and contrary to their desires or convictions, into war 
— and war, moreover, with the Power which it had 
hitherto been the policy of England to support, as the 
great barrier against the aggressive and ambitious 

1 The fact that the British admiral did nothing- to pre- 
vent this was made, later on, the pretext for depriving 
him of his command. 



RECEPTIOIi OF THE NEWS IN PARIS 271 

schemes of Russia. By the Tories, and the Tory 
press, the action of the allied admirals was denounced 
in no measured terms. The Times and the Morning 
Post ^ referred to it as an outrage on a friendly Power, 
as worse than a crime, as a blunder, which had made 
the English fleet the instrument for the aggrandise- 
ment of Eussia. It was argued at large whether Cod- 
rington should be rewarded, or tried by court martial; 
and though he did ultimately receive his G.C.B., the 
arguments by which his claims were supported 
sounded rather like a defence than a panegyric. 

Meanwhile the news had been received in France 
with open, and in Eussia wdth ill-concealed, delight. 
In France, indeed, the Government of Charles X. had 
stood greatly in need of a little military glory to fur- 
bish up its tarnished reputation. Where it had been 
thought necessary to teach in the schools that ISTapo- 
leon Bonaparte was a royalist general, who had gained 
victories for the monarchy during the temporary ab- 
sence of the king from France, a real military success, 
won under the auspices of the Bourbon dynasty, could 
not but be welcome; and while the vanity of the 
French was flattered by the revived dream of military 
glory, Eussia found it hard to disguise her satisfaction 
at a ' regrettable event ' which had destroyed at a 

1 Prokesch, ii. 275 &c., gives several articles in full. 



272 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

blow the entire sea-power of a nation with which she 
was then preparing, on her own account, to go to 
war. 

Kussia, indeed, proposed to the allied Powers that 
the work of Navarino should be completed by pre- 
senting to the Porte a joint ultimatum embodying the 
terms of the Treaty of London/ The English Cabi- 
net, however, seemed utterly incapable of taking any 
vigorous action. There can be no doubt that its true 
policy would have been to have accepted the victory 
of ^Navarino as a fait accompli, and pushed it to its 
logical conclusion. Had the combined fleets, after de- 
stroying the Ottoman navy, forced the Dardanelles, 
and dictated terms in common to the Sultan under 
the walls of Constantinople, not only would two 
years of bloodshed have been avoided, but England 
would have been spared the blow to her prestige in 
the East which was dealt by the separate action of 
Russia. 

In spite of the bloody barrier of ^N'avarino, how- 
ever, the British Government still affected to believe in 
the possibility of maintaining amicable relations with 
the Porte. "VYhile France was willing enough to sup- 
port Russia, Lord Dudley, on behalf of England, re- 
plied to the Russian note, that the Treaty of London 
1 t)espatch of Count Nesselrode. Prokesch, Appendix, ix. 1. 



ATTITUDE OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT 273 

was peaceful in its intentions, and that only peaceful 
means should be used to enforce it/ In the King's 
speech, in 1828, the action of the admirals was referred 
to as ' an untoward event,' which, however, it was 
Jioped would not disturb the harmony of the relations 
between His Majesty's Government and that of the 
Sultan; ^ and to the Porte itself representations were 
made justifying Admiral Codrington's action on the 
ground that the Turks had themselves been the 
aggressors. When the Ottoman Government very 
naturally inquired by what right the allied fleet had 
entered the harbour of ]^avarino, at all, the reply was 
' by the right which every fleet has to enter a friendly 
port in time of peace ! ' 

The British ministers were in fact bound hand and 
foot to a policy which they hated. Even while Goderich 
was still at the head of affairs. Lord Dudley had con- 
fessed to the Austrian minister that he considered the 
Treaty of London an iniquity, but an iniquity in which 
it was unfortunately, for the present, necessary to per- 
severe; ^ and when, in January 1828, the Duke of 
Wellington succeeded Goderich at the head of the 
Government, the policy of Canning was committed 
to the hands of a statesman who had hated him as a 

1 Note of Lord Dudley. Prokesch, Appendix, ix. 3. 
2 Hansard, xviii. 3. 3 Mendelssohn, i. 491. 

18 



274 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

revolutionist, and who was heart and soul devoted to 
the methods of Metternich. 

Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising 
that the policy of the English Government, after 
Xavarino, Avas to the last degTee vacillating and 
weak. They had neither the courage to throw over 
the Treaty of London, nor the will to make it effec- 
tive in the only way possible. In the words of Baron 
von Prokesch-Osten, they sought to undo the ' evil ' 
to which they had been appointed the unwilling heirs, 
* not by soaring above the treaty, but by lagging as 
far as possible behind it.^ That Greece was not ruined 
by their timid and unsympathetic policy was due to 
the uncompromising attitude of the Porte, which gave 
Russia the pretext which she desired for interfering 
single-handed in the affairs of the East. 

The news of the battle of ^N'avarino reached 
the ambassadors of the Powers at Constantinople, 
through a private channel, before it was known to the 
Porte. They immediately went to the Grand Yizier, 
and put to him as an abstract question, what the atti- 
tude of the Ottoman Government would be in the 
event of the allied fleets using force against the navy 
of Ibrahim. The Yizier replied, diplomatically, that 
it was impossible to name an unborn child of w^hich 
the sex was unknown. Yf hen, however, the Porte had 



EFFECT AT CONSTANTINOPLE 275 

received official news of the destruction of its fleet, 
lie told them that he could only describe it as a revolt- 
ing outrage, for which redress would be demanded/ 
The Ottoman Government thereupon lodged with the 
ambassadors a claim for compensation, and a demand 
for an apology. Both were refused, even by the Brit* 
ish Government, on the ground that, however deplor- 
able the affair may have been, the Turks had been the 
actual aggressors. Some further futile pourparlers 
followed; but, in the end, the breach with the Porte 
was complete ; and the ambassadors of the allied Pow- 
ers were withdrawn from Constantinople.^ At the 
same time all British, French, and Kussian subjects 
were ordered to leave the Ottoman dominions; and 
twelve thousand Catholic Armenians were banished 
to Angora. The sole offence of these unfortunate 
people was that they owed obedience to the Pope, that 
' swine ' who pretended to be the vicegerent on earth 
of the prophet Jesus, and might, therefore, be reason- 
ably suspected of being devoted to the interests of the 
* Franks.' When the Yizier was remonstrated with 
for tearing these unfortunates in mid-winter from 
their homes and occupations, he merely replied, with 
a sardonic smile, ^ After all. Angora is not Siberia ! ' ^ 
In the breast of Sultan Mahmoud himself the news 
1 Mendelssohn, i. 495. 2 Prokesch, ii. 199. s ibid. ii. 202. 



276 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

of tlie destruction of his fleet had stirred up a devour- 
ing wrath, which was only with difficulty restrained 
during the first negotiations with the Powers. As 
soon as the ambassadors had retired, and the necessity 
for an affected moderation of tone was past, it burst 
forth with unrestrained violence. On the 20th of De- 
cember a solemn Uatti-sheriff was issued, calling on 
the Moslemin to rise for the defence of Islam, which 
the Christian Powers had united to destroy. The 
cruelty as well as the perfidy of the European Govern- 
ments was enlarged upon, who, with hypocritical pro- 
fessions of friendship on their lips, had done to death, 
in time of peace, six thousand of the true believers. 
Russia especially was singled out for denunciation; 
and the Treaty of Akkermann, which had recently 
been concluded with her, was declared null and void. 
Finally, it was announced that, in the defence of the 
faith, the followers of the prophet reckoned nothing 
of the odds that might be arrayed against them, feel- 
ing secure in the righteousness of their cause and in 
the protection of the Almighty.^ 

Nothing could have been more welcome to Russia 

than this outburst; for the formal abrogation of the 

Treaty of Akkermann by the Porte gave her the 

pretext which she desired for going to war with 

1 Prokesch, Appendix, viii. 44. 



RUSSIA DECLARES WAR ON TURKEY 277 

Turkey on her own account. The working out of the 
Treaty of London ^ by peaceful means ' she was quite 
willing to leave to the other members of the Triple 
Alliance. The ruin of the Ottoman sea-power at 
Navarino had given her the undisputed mastery of 
the Black Sea; the dying flame of the Greek revolt 
could be fed into new life by Kussian subsidies, and 
form a diversion in the south; while Kussia, unham- 
pered by allies, established herself in the Balkan penin- 
sula. In the Mediterranean, where military operations 
would have been costly and difficult, Russia readily 
consented to be bound by the terms of the Treaty of 
London. In return, France willingly, and England 
not without considerable misgiving, were prepared to 
let her have a free hand elsew^here. The reply then 
of Russia to the Hatti-sJieriff, was the declaration of 
her intention to occupy the Danubian principalities. 
Metternich's nightmare had come true, and the end 
of all the sentimental interference in the affairs of 
Greece was to be the aggrandisement of Russia in the 
east of Europe. 

The Austrian statesman, indeed, still made des- 
perate efforts to avert the catastrophe. He enlarged 
to the Porte, through his representative at Con- 
stantinople, on the suicidal folly of its attitude, and 
besought it to modify its tone. The Grand Vizier 



278 THE WAR OF GEEEK INDEPENDENCE 

replied, moodily, that it seemed tliat Austria too would 
soon be numbered among tlie enemies of Islam; but 
the importunity of Metternich so far prevailed, that 
the Ottoman Government was induced to explain 
away the Hatti-sheriff, and even to consent to open 
negotiations on the basis of the Treaty of London. 
But it was too late. Eussia had no desire to come to 
terms; and on the 6th of May her army crossed the 
Pruth. 

For Greece, then, the direct result of the Battle 
of jSTavarino was that, after years of waiting and 
struggle, the great Orthodox power, from which in the 
early days of the revolution so much had been ex- 
pected, had at last come to her rescue, none the less 
effectually that her motives were entirely selfish. Af- 
ter years of heroic effort, the Hellenes had begun to 
despair of success. Everywhere, in the islands, on the 
continent, and in the Morea, the Turks had once more 
gained the upper hand; the means for further resist- 
ance were exhausted; the heroes of the first hopeful 
years were dead ; the reckless enthusiasm of the people 
crushed out under the accumulated weight of their 
misfortunes. Indeed, the very people whom it was 
desired to free seemed no longer to exist. Of the once 
thriving population nothing was visible to the passing 
traveller, but here and there, some hollow-eyed shad- 



EFFECT ON THE PROSPECTS OF THE GREEKS 279 

ows, wandering miserably among the ruins of burnt 
villages or tlie blackened stumps of the devastated 
orchards. J^ow, however, a new ray of hope shone 
through the lowering clouds of the national misfort- 
unes. "With the Powers of Europe arrayed on her 
side against the Porte, with Eussia actively fighting 
her battles, there seemed no cause for despair; and 
Greece could look forward once more with confidence 
into the future. And to whom was it due that she had 
been saved from the fate which seemed to her children 
more dreadful than death? Lord Salisbury in a recent 
speech declared that the very existence of Greece as a 
nation was due to the Concert of the Powers. Yet 
nothing can be more certain than that, if the question 
had been left to the Cabinets of Europe alone, Greece 
would never have been freed. Metternich was the 
typical statesman of the period, the ideal of all the 
chanceries of Europe; and to Metternich the diplo- 
matic proprieties were of infinitely more importance 
tlian any national aspirations whatever; and no claims 
of abstract justice could be allowed for a moment to 
interfere with the rules of haute politique.^ It was, 
as a matter of fact, to the peoples of Europe, and not 

1 ^Metternich's jnclgrnent as to the result of interfering" 
on behalf of the Greeks proved true enoug-h. His capital 
error, politically speaking-, lay in his underrating" sentiment 
and public opinion as factors to be considered. 



280 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

to their governments, that Greece owed her liberty. 
The battle of Navarino was the master stroke that cut 
the Gordian knot of her troubles; yet not one of the 
allied monarchs, not even I^icholas, would have vent- 
ured to give his admiral the order to fight. ' It was 
the public opinion of Europe which forced the unwill- 
ing courts into a peaceful intervention, and then swept 
away the admirals into their deed of blood at IN^ava- 
rino. Philhellenism had shown that it w^as no mere 
dream of pious enthusiasts, but a power; and while, 
astonished and thunderstruck, the Cabinets kept si- 
lence, the peoples rejoiced, and a deep sigh of satis- 
faction rose from all Christendom.' ^ 

1 Mendelssohn Bartholdy, i. 488, 



CHAPTER XYII 

The arrival of Capodistrias in Greece — Enthusiastic recep- 
tion by the Greeks — Misery of the country — Condition 
of the Government — Principles of Capodistrias — He aims 
at establishing- a bureaucracy on the Russian model- 
Military reforms — Piracy in the ^gean — The Powers in- 
tervene — Destruction of Grabusa by the Anglo-French 
fleet — Pirates destroyed by Miaoulis at Skopelos and 
Skiathos — Attempts of Capodistrias to improve the fi- 
nances — His nepotism 

In the midst of the excitement and enthusiasm aroused 
by the news of the battle of Navarino, Count John 
Capodistrias arrived in Greece. He had indeed been 
in no hurry to take up the thorny and thankless task 
which had been assigned to him when, on April 11, 
1827, the assembly of Troezene had elected him presi- 
dent of Hellas. As early as July the ex-minister of 
liussia, in an interview with the Czar Mcholas at 
Zarscoeselo, had asked and received permission from 
his master to undertake the trust which the Greeks 

had offered him. The pension which the Czar pro- 

381 



282 THE WAR OF GREEK IT^DEPENDENCE 

posed to bestow upon him lie refused; but he listened 
with all the greater attention to the instructions which 
the Autocrat of the Eussias gave him for the guidance 
of his futiu'e conduct. If he had the imperial blessing 
on his enterprise, it was that he was regarded by the 
Czar, with justice, as Russian in his sympathies, and, 
above all, as one whose character and training would 
be the best guarantee against ^ revolutionary ' ten- 
dencies. 

The next few months he had spent partly in 
Switzerland, where for some time he had made his 
home, partly in visiting the various European courts 
with a view to interesting them in the affairs of Greece, 
and, if possible, persuading them to supply the neces- 
sary sinews of war. He had met with but little sym- 
pathy and less material support; and when the tid- 
ings of J^avarino led him to expect important develop- 
ments in the East, he determined at last to start for his 
new sphere of labour. The British Government placed 
the frigate Warspite at his disposal to convey him to 
Greece, and a French and a Eussian frigate were 
added by way of honourable escort. On the 19th of 
January, then, after being driven by stress of weather 
for two or three days into the harbour of iN'auplia, 
he arrived at ^gina, where the Hellenic Government 
now had its seat. As he landed, the three frigates 



ARRIVAL OF CAPODISTRIAS 283 

fired a salute, and hoisted the Greek ensign at their 
tops, this being the first recognition by any of the 
Powers of the Greek flag. 

The arrival of the President was welcomed with 
the wildest demonstrations of joy by the people. The 
great reputation of Capodistrias, and, above all, the 
fact that he represented not only the national will of 
the Greeks, but the guaranteed support of Europe, 
made him appear as the long-expected Messiah of the 
Hellenic people. The ill will which the long delay of 
his coming had bred was forgotten in the joy of his 
actual arrival; and to the Greeks it seemed as though 
a new era had dawned with the moment he set foot on 
shore. 

His first impression of the country he had come 
to govern was not indeed such as to inspire him with 
any great measure of hope or confidence. The short 
detention in ^auplia had itself been a revelation of 
inconceivable chaos and misery. Ibrahim's cavalry 
still scoured the country up to the very gates; and 
inside the walls the wretched town was given up to 
plague, famine, and a ceaseless war of factions. The 
chiefs Grivas and Photomaras again held their strong- 
holds of Palamidi and Itsch-kale; and a fresh bom- 
bardment was imminent. The arrival of the new 
President indeed, backed as he was by the support of 



284 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

the great Powers, served for the tirae to put an end 
to the civil strife; and, at his command, the rival 
cliieftains willingly surrendered their fortresses, sub- 
mitted to be reconciled, and placed their forces at 
his disposal. Arrived at ^gina, however, he re- 
ceived from the ministers a report of the condition of 
the Government and of the country which might 
well have made him repent the task he had under- 
taken. 

In the Morea and in continental Greece the misery 
of the population and the devastations of the soldiery 
had made all organised government impossible; and 
in the islands anarchy reigned supreme. While the 
Government was compelled to wander from Poros to 
!N"auplia, and from ^auplia to ^gina, to escape from 
the violence of the warring factions, every private in- 
dividual who could gather round him a band of hired 
ruilians was at liberty to play the tyrant in his own 
district. There was neither cultivation, nor commerce, 
nor industry remaining. The peasants no longer 
sowed, for the harvest would be reaped by the lawless 
soldiery; merchants would not venture to sea, for 
robbery and death awaited them there; and workmen 
would no longer labour, because they could not count 
on being paid. The Government itself was a govern- 
ment in little more than name, and could scarce com- 



CONDITION OF GREECE 285 

mand obedience even in ^gina itself. The treasury 
was empty, and the Minister of finance could show 
only a budget of debts. The sole sources of revenue 
remaining were the tithes of certain of the islands, the 
customs, and the prizes brought in by the more than 
doubtful activity of the Greek privateers. As for the 
military strength of the Government, some 1,500 
men under G. Diovuniotes, and 2,500 under General 
Church were all that could be reckoned on. The 
castles and strong places were still in the hands of 
robber chieftains. The fleet, consisting for the most 
part of private vessels, was being used by the islanders 
mainly for their own ends, principally in piracy; 
and the squadron under the command of Admiral 
Cochrane was alone at the disposal of the Gov- 
ernment. Finally, for the administration of justice 
there existed, in all Greece, only two courts — the 
prize court in .^gina, and the commercial court in 
Syra. 

To deal with this lamentable state of affairs Capo- 
distrias had only his great reputation, his experience, 
and about 300,000 fr. in money subscribed by Euro- 
pean Philhellenes for the ransom of captives. He had, 
indeed, the prestige of legitimacy, and of the support 
of the Powers, which secured him at the outset uni- 
versal recognition, and made even the most turbulent 



286 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

spirits bow to his autliority. But for tlie creation of 
a really strong Government tlie essential materials 
were lacking. In the attempt to evolve order out of 
the chaos, he had, as he bitterly complained in later 
days to Lord Palmerston,^ to use the very instruments 
which had produced the confusion. In the absence 
of any one whom he could trust, he was thrown back 
upon himself; and the outward circumstances of his 
position seemed to exaggerate and to justify the arbi- 
trary policy to which, by nature and training, he was 
already inclined. An enlightened dictatorship was 
probably what would have been, at this time, the best 
form of government for Greece; but to have exer- 
cised it successfully would have required a rare com- 
bination of broad-mindedness and strength; and Ca- 
podistrias, though on the whole a man of high prin- 
ciples, was narrow in his sympathies, and the strength 
of character which he undoubtedly possessed bordered 
upon obstinacy. His experience of affairs, although 
great, had been very one-sided; and he had no imag- 
inative sympathy to enable him to see beyond his own 
somewhat narrow circle of ideas. He was in fact 
a typical bureaucrat, and one, moreover, who had 
been trained in the corrupt school of Russian state- 
craft. 

1 Cf. Prokesch-Osten, ii, 445. 



GOVERNMENT OF CAPODISTRIAS 287 

By such a man, with such antecedents, the 
problem of restoring the chaos of Greek affairs to 
order would be approached only in one way. He 
found a government, in theory democratic, liberal, 
and ^ revolutionary,' in practice, impotent to create 
or to maintain a semblance of order. E'ot unnatu- 
rally he came to the conclusion that the practice was 
the result of the theory, and that the first thing to be 
done was to supersede the system which had been 
productive of nothing but anarchy and distress by 
one vvdiich should prove more effective in restoring 
order and prosperity. He set to work then without 
delay to substitute for constitutional government a 
bureaucratic regime based on the Russian model, 
with himself as its sole central and motive power. 
His method of effecting the revolution was marked 
by characteristic disingenuousness. By a threat of 
immediate retirement in case of refusal, he first of 
all forced the Senate to abrogate the Constitution of 
Troezene. In a proclamation which he issued on the 
1st of February, he then pretended that this had been 
done because the constitution had not given him suffi- 
cient powers to guarantee the independence of Greece ; 
and he promised to summon a new ISTational Conven- 
tion for April, undertaking, meanwhile, to base his 
government on the principles of the three constitu- 



288 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

tious of Astros, Epidaurus, and Troezene. This last, 
however, was a mere blind to cover his intention of 
concentrating the whole functions of government in 
his own hands. In place of the Senate he created a 
council of twentj-seven members, called the Pan- 
hellenium, nominated by himself, ostensibly to 
advise him in his public policy, really only to 
register his decrees. Besides this he established 
a General Secretarial Bureau, a sort of Privy 
Council, still more dependent upon himself, and 
which gradually absorbed all the business of the Pan- 
hellenium. 

The crisis of the national affairs, and the prestige 
of foreign support, enabled Capodistrias to carry 
through his coup d'etat without meeting with any 
serious opposition. A few voices here and there 
were raised in protest, but they were not heard in the 
outburst of joy and enthusiasm which greeted the 
President from all sides; and the more important of 
the old leaders, who might at the outset have proved 
troublesome, he had included in the Government. 
Konduriottes, Zaimis, and Petrobey Mavromichales 
were made presidents of the three committees of 
the Panhellenium. Mavrocordatos the President at- 
tached to himself as financial adviser, with no particu- 
lar office ; and the powerful influence of Kolokotrones 



ESTABLISHMENT OF A CENTRAL BUREAUCRACY 289 

was secured by appointing him commander of the 
forces in the Morea. 

Under such auspices it is possible that a wise and 
far-sighted statesman might have succeeded in carry- 
ing through his schemes of reform, and in founding 
a strong personal government based on the good-will 
and the gratitude of the people. But Capodistrias was 
neither wise nor far-seeing. He was a man of a cut- 
and-dried system, which he was determined to impose, 
at all hazards, upon the country he governed; and so, 
as his difficulties increased, and as the opposition, 
which had at first not ventured to make itself heard, 
gathered in force and bitterness, his government, from 
being merely irritating and oppressive, gradually de- 
veloped into a tyranny. Before long, and step by step, 
the whole machinery of Russian autocracy had been 
established on the free soil of Greece: an absolutely 
centralised government based on an elaborate system 
of espionage and of secret police, and supported by 
arbitrary imprisonment, censorship of the press, in- 
timidation of local authorities, and all the other 
weapons of iiTesponsible rule. Even the imme- 
morial communal liberties, which the Ottomans 
had suffered to survive, were now destroyed by the 
jealous distrust of the ex-Minister of Russia; and, in 

all Hellas, there was soon no power left to oppose, 
19 



290 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

by constitutional means, the arbitrary will of tbe 
President. 

The difficulties that faced him at the outset of his 
career might indeed easily have made a statesman of 
a more democratic temper intolerant of an opposition 
which may have appeared merely selfish and factions. 
Apart from the task of restoring some semblance of 
prosperity to the country, devastated by the war, there 
were a hundred questions, financial, military, and 
diplomatic, awaiting settlement. The war, too, though 
slumbering from the sheer exhaustion of the combat- 
ants, was by no means at an end. Ibrahim was still 
firmly established in the south of the Morea, with an 
army of 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. In Feb- 
ruary he proved that he still had power to strike, by 
marching northwards on one of his great harrying 
expeditions, in the course of which he fell upon Tripo- 
litza with fire and sword, razed it to the ground, blow- 
ing up the more solid buildings with gunpowder, and 
sowed the ruins with salt. He was only prevented 
from treating ]^auplia in the same way by symptoms 
of mutiny among his troops. In vain Capodistrias, 
by direct negotiation and through the intervention of 
the admirals, endeavoured to persuade him to evacu- 
ate the country. ^ If I go,' he said grimly, ' it will 
be by way of the Isthmus, and my course shall be like 



ATTEMPTS AT MILITARY REFORM 291 

that of the simoon, which overthrows cities, buries the 
inhabitants in the ruins, and dries up the trees to the 
roots! ' 

Had he carried out this threat, the armies of 
Greece would have been in no condition to resist. 
It became a matter of urgent necessity to restore 
them to some degree of military efficiency; and the 
time was not unpropitious for such an undertaking. 
The wild soldiery were tamed by hunger, and hast- 
ened to obey, when the President ordered them to 
assemble under the command of the newly-appointed 
Commander-in-Chief, Prince Demetrius Hypsilanti, 
at Damala. Controlling as he did the only available 
food supplies, it would not have been difficult for the 
President to have compelled the Armatoli to submit 
to some sort of European discipline. He was, how- 
ever, quite unversed in military science himself, and 
the only man who could have carried out the reform 
successfully, the French Colonel Fabvier, he had re- 
cently, in the true spirit of autocratic jealousy, forced 
out of the Greek service. He contented himself then 
with dividing the army into unwieldy bodies of a thou- 
sand men, called chiliarchies, each under a colonel. 
Drill and discipline were allowed to take care of 
themselves. 

At sea the condition of the Hellenic forces cried 



292 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

even more loudly for reform than on land. Soon 
after the arrival of the President, Hydra had sent a 
deputation with offers of assistance, but coupled with 
a demand for redress of grievances, and compensa- 
tion for losses sustained in the national cause. To 
their haughty advances Capodistrias replied by a snub. 
Out of an empty treasury no compensation could be 
paid, even if it were due; as for their condescending 
offers, he had no need of them; they must obey his 
orders, or he would take care that they were not in- 
cluded in the terms of the treaty establishing Greek 
independence.^ This episode was the first of a series 
wdiich threw the islands ultimately into armed oppo- 
sition to the President. 

For the present the great question at sea was that 
of the suppression of piracy. For some time the 
Powers had winked at its continuance, because it 
gave them from time to time a ready pretext for in- 
terfering in the affairs of the Archipelago. But now 
the evil exceeded all bounds. I^ot only did vessels, 
which were virtually pirates, sail under letters of 
marque from the Greek Government, but regular cor- 
sair strongholds had been established on many islands 
of the ^gean; and now on Grabusa, off the coast of 
Crete, a flourishing town had sprung up which was 
1 Mendelssohn, ii. p. 43. 



SUPPRESSION OF PIRACY 293 

solely supported by this nefarious traffic. This ex- 
hausted the patience of the Powers, and in No- 
vember 1827 the admirals received orders to clear the 
seas. 

In January 1828, accordingly, Commodore Sir 
Thomas Staines appeared oif Grabusa with a com- 
bined xVnglo-French squadron, captured a dozen pirate 
ships, and destroyed the town. The inhabitants fled 
to Crete, and joined the insurgents under the Philhel- 
lenes Hahn and Urquhart. At the same time, Capo- 
distrias dispatched the Greek fleet on a similar errand 
elsewhere. Whatever the sins of the Government ves- 
sels themselves might be, there could be no question 
of the duty of suppressing pirates who dared to operate 
without lawful authority; and at Skopelos Admiral 
Miaoulis destroyed forty-one, and at Skiathos thirty- 
eight, pirate ships. After completing this work, he 
was sent to help Sachtouris blockade Ibrahim in ISTav- 
arino, and try to cut off the supplies which, from time 
to time, he had received from Crete and from the Io- 
nian Islands, 

At every turn the President was hampered in his 
operations by lack of funds. He attempted, with but 
poor success, to establish at ^gina a national bank, 
to which, as he let it be plainly known, he expected 
the wealthier of the Greek leaders to contribute. In 



294 THE WAR OP GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

spite, however, of all the pressure he brought to bear, 
and of considerable deposits made by those inde- 
fatigable Philhellenes, King Ludwig of Bavaria and 
the banker Eynardt of Geneva, the project lan- 
guished, in the absence of either credit or adequate 
securities. The old Turkish system of farming the 
taxes, so fruitful of misery and corruption, had not 
been abolished; and, as they now fetched an in- 
creased price, a certain sum was made by putting these 
up once more to auction. It was decreed, moreover, 
that the taxes, which had hitherto been collected in 
kind, were in future to be paid in money: a regula- 
tion which resulted in giving over the peasantry into 
the hands of the usurers. The President addressed 
pitiful appeals for advances to the Cabinets of Europe, 
but for the present with very moderate success; and 
not till after the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war 
did he receive subsidies on a large enough scale to 
relieve his embarrassments. 

In his dislike and distrust of the men with whom 
he had to work, Capodistrias allowed himself to be 
misled into what was possibly the most fatal of all his 
many blunders. He thrust his own brothers into of- 
fices of great importance, for which they were wholly 
unfit, and surrounded himself more and more with 
compatriots of his own, members of the same semi- 



NEPOTISM OF CAPODISTRIAS 295 

Venetian Corfiot aristocracy to which he himself be- 
longed, who had taken no share in the war of Libera- 
tion, and were out of sympathy with the democratic 
ideas of the Greek people. His brother Viaro, a law- 
yer by profession, who had no quality either of brain or 
heart to recommend him, he made administrator of the 
Sporades, where his arrogance, folly, and absolute con- 
tempt for law or justice, made the wretched islanders 
long for the Turkish cadis back again. Yet this man, 
of whose tyrannous dealings with the islands Capodis- 
trias had been well acquainted, was, when shortly after 
his arrival Lord Cochrane resigned his command, ap- 
pointed High Admiral. In the same way, his younger 
brother Agostino, mthout possessing one single quali- 
fication for the office, except perhaps an imposing 
presence, was appointed over the heads of Hypsilanti 
and Sir Richard Church to the supreme command of 
the army. 

Such flagrant instances of nepotism could hardly 
fail to offend and alienate a people as "jealous and am- 
bitious as the Greeks; and if, for the time being, the 
position of Capodistrias was unshaken, it was that his 
presence among them was regarded as a pledge of the 
goodwill of Russia and of the Triple Alliance, from 
which alone they could now hope to obtain that for 
which they had fought and suffered. Should anything 



296 THE WAR OF GPwEEK INDEPENDENCE 

at any time occur to shake their faith in the good in- 
tentions of the Powers, their disappointment would 
assuredly vent itself against the man who had done so 
much to make his government odious and oppressive. 



CHAPTER XYIII 

The effects of the Russian Campaign on the Concert — Unex- 
pected vitality of Turkey — The French commissioned 
by the Concert to drive Ibrahim from the Morea — Cod- 
rington at Alexandria — He arranges with Mehemet Ali 
for the evacuation of the Morea — Landing of the French 
at Modon — Ibrahim evacuates the Peloponnese — The 
French occupy the fortresses — Protocol of November 16 
— Withdrawal of the French army — Capodistrias presses 
the war — Renewed insurrection in Crete — Greek naval 
operations — Hypsilanti advances into Attica — Opera- 
tions in West Hellas 

' The Triple Alliance/ said Metternieli, ^ consists of 
one Power at war, which at the same time poses as 
mediator; of another Power which operates in a spirit 
of friendly hostility ; and, finally, of a Power friendly 
to the Porte, which is at the same time the ally of its 
declared enemy and the accomplice of its friendly foe ! 
Europe has never experienced such an imbroglio ! ' ^ 

The Russian declaration of war had indeed pro- 
duced a strange diplomatic tangle, which it seemed, 
at first sight, almost hopeless to attempt to unravel. 

1 Mendelssohn, ii. 94. 
297 



298 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

The Triple Alliance appeared to be once more on the 
point of breaking np. The British Cabinet saw with 
horror and alarm the threatened destruction of the 
Ottoman power in Europe, the maintenance of which 
was one of the main articles of its political creed; 
yet it was bound, by treaty obligations, by public 
opinion, and, above all, by the ^ untoward ' fact of 
Navarino, to aid and abet in the fatal work. Welling- 
ton indeed declared roundly that, come what might, 
he would suffer no Russian aggrandisement. For the 
present, however, all that could be done was to at- 
tempt to counterbalance the expected victories of the 
Czar's forces by judicious tactics within the field of 
operation of the Alliance. 

For the present, indeed, the alarm of England at 
the action of Russia was without grounds. As has 
often since been the case, the ^ Sick Man,' who, ac- 
cording to wise diplomatic doctors, was at the point 
of dissolution, showed at the approach of danger a 
most unexpectedly vigorous vitality. Instead of the 
easy and triumphant march to Constantinople, which 
the Russians had looked forward to when they crossed 
the Pruth, it cost them two hardly-contested cam- 
paigns before they could bring the Ottomans to terms. 

This, however, was as yet ' on the knees, and be- 
tween the hands of the gods,' and, for the present, the 



INTERVENTION OF THE FRENCH 299 

other two Powers of the Alliance feared to be out- 
shone by the prestige of Eussia in the East. It was 
proposed in the Conference, which was still sitting in 
London, to intervene actively to secure the evacuation 
of the Morea by the Egyptian forces. England, in- 
deed, at first refused to do anything that might still 
further embarrass the Porte; but the Prince de Polig- 
nac pointed out, in a diplomatic aside, that the inter- 
vention was regarded at Paris ' as a means for getting 
a free hand as regards Kussia.' The Russian represent- 
ative for his part had no objection to a course which 
would create a further diversion in Russia's favour; 
and so finally it was decided, on the 19th of July, that 
France should occupy the Morea, and compel the with- 
drawal of Ibrahim.^ England, out of friendly con- 
sideration for her old ally the Sultan, refused to share 
in the enterprise, and stipulated that, as soon as her 
work was done, France should withdraw her troops. 
The Government of Charles X. eagerly accepted the 
task, only too glad of an opportunity for covering the 
ever-widening cracks in its foundations with fresh 
wreaths of military glory. 

Meanwhile, however, circumstances, and the irre- 
pressible activity of Codrington, once more interfered 
with the designs of the^Conference. Capodistrias was 

1 Protocol of July 19. Prokesch, Appendix, ix. 21. 



800 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

now doubly anxious to rid the Morea of the presence 
of Ibrahim. The Russian invasion had withdrawn the 
mass of the Turkish troops from continental Greece; 
and it would have been easy to reconquer all that 
had been won from the Greeks by Reshid; but as 
long as Ibrahim remained in the south it was impossi- 
ble for the Hellenic forces to leave the Morea. Under 
these circumstances the President once more earnestly 
pressed the admirals to compel the withdrawal of the 
Egyptian army; and in July a conference was held by 
them at Zante, at which it was decided ' to facilitate 
the sailing of a fleet of transports from Alexandria, to 
carry away Ibrahim's forces. If, however, the hopes 
of Egyptian transports should prove deceptive, every- 
thing possible would have been done.' 

Admiral Codrington, without authority from 
above, and without consulting any one, determined 
that the hopes should not prove deceptive. He sailed 
to Alexandria, and, on the 9th of August, arranged a 
treaty with Mehemet Ali, providing for an exchange 
of prisoners, and for the immediate evacuation of the 
Morea. The strong and frank personality of the Brit- 
ish admiral is said to have exercised a great influence 
over the mind of the Viceroy; but the determining 
factor in the negotiations was of course the impending 
Erench expedition, which both were aware of, but 



GENERAL MAISON IN THE MOREA 301 

neither mentioned! ^ It was the last interference on 
behalf of Greece of the clear-sighted and courageous 
admiral; and it came none too soon; for, on his return 
to ISTavarino, he found Sir Pulteney Malcolm, who 
had been sent out to supersede him.^ 

In their eagerness for glory, the French had 
pushed on their preparations with unexpected haste; 
and on the 30th of August, before the transports which 
were to convey Ibrahim to Alexandria had arrived, 
General Maison landed with 14,000 men at Petalidi in 
the Gulf of Coron. To their infinite disgust, however, 
they found that the object of their expedition had 
already been achieved. The Egyptian army showed 
not the slightest disposition to dispute their landing. 
On the contrary, Ibrahim called upon the French com- 
mander, and inspected the troops, which, instead of the 
expected glory, had to be content with some neatly- 
turned compliments on their smartness and military 
appearance. 

On the 16th of September the transports arrived, 

1 Mendelssohn, ii. 97. 

2 The conduct of Admiral Codring-ton during- his com- 
mand had been violently criticized, and his independence 
had more than once forced the hand of the Government. 
In the present instance, however. Lord Aberdeen paid in 
the House of Lords a high tribute to the skill with which 
the negotiations at Alexandria had been conducted, Cf. 
Hansard, xxiv. 991. 



302 THE WAB OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

and the Egyptian army began to embark. On the 3rd 
of October Ibrabim himself left with the last of his 
troops. It had been stipulated that no prisoners were 
to be removed against their will, and French soldiers 
were drawn np on the qnay to see that this provision 
was observed. Of the six hundred captives, however, 
only eleven elected to remain in their devastated coun- 
try. For the rest the flesh-pots of Egypt seemed to 
hold out greater attractions; and in the end the scan- 
dal of such a desertion was avoided by their all being 
compelled to remain. 

The ill-will of the French at being deprived of their 
laurels found vent in a breach of the convention which 
Codrington had arranged with Mehemet Ali, and 
which the French affected not to recognise. By the 
terms of the treaty for the evacuation of the country, 
Ibrahim was to be allowed to leave garrisons in such 
fortresses as had been in the occupation of the Sultan's 
forces at the time of his landing; and, in accordance 
with this provision, garrisons had been left in the 
castles of Coron, Modon, and i^avarino, and in the 
fort of Ehium. These the French summoned to sur- 
render. The Turks refused, but, in the case of the 
first-named fortresses, suffered the besiegers to plant 
their ladders against the walls, and storm the defences 
without opposition. Only the fort of Rhium resisted, 



THE TURKS EVACUATE THE MOREA 303 

but, after a short bombardment, this also capitulated 
at discretion; and this, for the present, completed the 
warlike operations of the French in Greece. During 
the remainder of the occupation the troops were em- 
ployed in the arts of peace: in making roads, tilling 
the devastated fields, clearing out the accumulated 
filth in the towns, and generally setting a good ex- 
ample, which it would have been well for the Greeks 
to have followed. 

The French occupation was unpopular in Greece, 
and Capodistrias himself had not desired it; but, now 
that it was a fait accompli, he thought it might be put 
to still further uses. The withdrawal of Ibrahim had 
left him free to put an end to the practical armistice 
which had now for months obtained in East and West 
Hellas; and he now suggested that General Maison 
should march across the Isthmus, and drive the Otto- 
mans into Macedonia. However much he may have 
desired to do so, the French General, in face of his 
instructions, dared not accept; though probably, had 
he done so, the Government at Paris would have gladly 
justified his action. Any hesitation he may have had 
was set aside by another protocol of the Conference of 
London, that of the 16th of ISTovember, which declared 
the Morea, with the neighbouring islands and the 
Cyclades, under the protection of Europe, thereby 



304 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

tacitly excluding continental Greece from all share in 
the benefits won by the war/ The French now with- 
drew from Greece, leaving only a couple of battalions 
in the fortresses of Coron and ]^avarino to act as a 
guarantee of order. 

The publication of the protocol of the 16th of 
!N'ovember roused a storm of indignation throughout 
Greece. Capodistrias himself shared the popular feel- 
ing. The inclusion of continental Greece in the new 
State was vital to its very existence as a free country; 
and the President determined to press the war, in spite 
of Conference and protocols. ^ I agree with you,' he 
wrote to General Haydeck, ' that if we had some well- 
served field pieces and a few squadrons of cavalry 
we could win our frontier in spite of the London 
protocol.' ^ 

In prosecuting the war with vigour Capodistrias 
had a double object to serve. He desired to secure 
for Greece her natural boundary, and he wished also 
to effect a diversion in favour of Russia, which was 
now being hard pressed in the Balkan campaign. 

If the inclusion of Athens and Thebes in the Hel- 
lenic State was an article of faith, that of the island of 
Crete could hardly be regarded as more than a pious 

1 For text see Prokesch, Appendix, ix. 45. 

2 Mendelssohn, ii. 109. 



RENEWED RISING IN CRETE 305 

aspiration. Yet, in the interests of Russia rather than 
those of Greece, Capodistrias had not hesitated to fan 
once more into a flame the ever smouldering embers 
of Cretan rebellion. Soon after the Russian declara- 
tion of war, he had sent the Philhellene Baron Reineck 
to replace the Cretan leader, Hadji-Michali, who had 
been killed at Francocastelli, and had entrusted him 
with a message characteristically diplomatic. Greece 
dare not, he said, call on the men of Sphakia to rise; 
but, if they did so of their own accord, a Greek com- 
missary would be there to counsel and lead them. 
Much less would have sufficed to rouse the inflamma- 
ble islanders. The insurrection, once begun, swept 
with irresistible force over the island. At ITerokuro 
the Ottomans were defeated ; the district of Apocorona 
was in the hands of the rebels; and the Turks were 
driven back upon Suda. Massacres of Greeks in the 
power of the Ottomans followed every Greek victory, 
the work of mutual slaughter proceeding uninter- 
rupted until, in October, Admiral Malcolm, Codring- 
ton's successor, appeared off the island, and proposed 
an armistice in the name of the Powers. Mustapha, 
the Turkish commander, at first refused, but ulti- 
mately was persuaded to accept the armistice ; but in 
spite of this the plundering and murder went on on one 

side and the other, for some time longer. 
20 



306 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

The naval operations of the Greeks during the 
year 1828 were also, in the pursuit of the same policy 
as that which had stirred up the useless rising in Crete, 
directed primarily in the interests of Eussia, and only 
indirectly in those of Greece. Eussia, in declaring war 
on Turkey, had, as has already been mentioned, sought 
to reassure her allies by guaranteeing the neutrality of 
the Mediterranean; but, as her difficulties in the Bal- 
kan peninsula increased, she sought by one means or 
another to modify this arrangement, as far as such 
modification suited her own interests/ Count Hey den 
received orders to blockade the Dardanelles; and he 
even went so far as to capture two or three Egyptian 
vessels, on the plea that they were conveying muni- 
tions of war to Bulgaria.^ Owing, however, to the 
strenuous objections of the allied Powers, the block- 
ade was subsequently modified, and the captured ships 
were released. Under these circumstances Capodis- 
trias did what he could to come to the assistance of 
Eussia. He ordered Admiral Sachtouris, who was 
blockading Volo, to raise the blockade and sail to the 
Hellespont, on the pretext that this measure was neces- 
sary to secure the arrival of the necessary food sup- 
plies. At the same time he issued letters of marque 
to a number of privateers, who promptly revived that 
1 Prokesch, Appendix, ix. 33. 2 /ft. x. 5. 



HYPSILANTI IN ATTICA 307 

piratical activity which at the beginning of the 
year Capodistrias had himself aided in suppressing. 
Among others, eight Austrian vessels were brought in 
and condemned by the prize court at iEgina ; but, on 
the vigorous intervention of the Austrian Captain 
Dandolo, the booty had to be disgorged. 

On land meanwhile operations had, during the 
summer, been at a standstill. As long as Ibrahim 
remained in the Morea, any action beyond the Isthmus 
was impossible ; and Hypsilanti had remained in camp 
at Megara. He was, however, only waiting till the 
withdrawal of the Egyptian troops became a certainty; 
and in October accordingly, when the new^s of Ibra- 
him^s embarkation reached him, he broke up his camp 
and advanced into Attica. The country had been de- 
nuded of troops by the Russian war, and the advance 
of the Greeks was rapid and victorious. Attica was 
immediately overrun ; and, after two successes gained 
at Stevenikos and Martini, Boeotia with its capital 
Levadia, and Salona fell into their hands. The pos- 
session of East Hellas seemed now assured to the 
Greeks, and the season being far advanced, Hypsilanti 
concentrated his forces round Thebes. 

In Western Hellas also military operations had, 
for the greater part of the year, been practically at 
a standstill. Shortly after the battle of ;N"avarino, 



308 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Captain Hastings had transported a small body of 
troops, under General Church, to Dragomesti on the 
coast of Acarnania; and subsequently another force 
crossed the Gulf of Corinth and occupied the site of a 
Greek fort on the mainland, opposite the island of 
Trisognia. But the troops were utterly demoralised; 
the peasants were in general hostile to them; and 
nothing was done. Captain Hastings had, on De- 
cember 29, 1827, bombarded and captured the fort 
of Yasiladi ; but, not long afterwards, he had retired 
in dudgeon from active operations, owing to the fact, 
which Church was powerless to prevent, that the 
Greek chiefs were carrying on a brisk trade with the 
Turks at Patras in the rations supplied to them by 
the Philhellenes ! After the arrival of Capodistrias, 
he had indeed again allowed himself to be persuaded 
to resume operations; but an attack which, on the 25th 
of May, he made on Anatoliko was repulsed; and he 
himself, to the great sorrow of the Greeks, whom he 
had served with such unselfish courage and devotion, 
was mortally wounded. 

A month later, on the 27fch of June, Capodistrias 
himself arrived off the coast of Acarnania on board 
the Warsjute, and proceeded to visit the camp of Sir 
Richard Church. He found the troops in an even 
worse condition than those he had reviewed not long 



OPERATIONS IN WEST HELLAS 309 

before at Troezene, and lie was not careful to disguise 
his opinion. When Church proposed to introduce the 
officers of his force, the President refused. ^ I know 
these gentlemen/ he said. ^ You have fought the 
Turks for nine years, you say ! You have stolen sheep 
and goats ! That is all you have done ! ' ^ Yet one at 
least of these officers, the Frenchman Manche, had 
taken part in the heroic defence of Missolonghi. 
Capodistrias was indeed distinguished for the posses- 
sion of a biting tongue, which he kept but imperfectly 
under control; and it made him many enemies. 

Church, however, was glad enough of the incentive 
given by the President's visit to exchange the weari- 
some inactivity of the last months for active opera- 
tions. In September the Greeks advanced to the Gulf 
of Arta, and occupied Loutraki. An attempt of the 
Corsican adventurer Pasano, who had been appointed 
by Capodistrias to succeed Captain Hastings, to force 
an entrance to the Gulf of Arta failed ; but the Greek 
officers, who believed this failure to have been due to 
the admiral's cowardice, subsequently made another 
attempt, without waiting for orders, and passed gal- 
lantly under the batteries of Prevesa. This secured 
to the Greeks the command of the Gulf of Arta. 
Pasano was now recalled, and the courageous and capa- 

1 Mendelssohn, ii. 85. 



310 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

ble Hydriot admiral, Kriezes, appointed to succeed 
him. On tlie 29 th of December the town of Yonitza 
fell into the hands of the Greeks; but the almost de- 
fenceless Venetian castle did not surrender till March 
17, 1829. 



CHAPTER XIX 

Joint report of the ambassadors at Poros — The Protocol of 
March 22 — Indig-nation of the Greeks — Capodistrias pro- 
testa against the Protocol — He refuses to cease hostili- 
ties — Arbitrary rule of the President — Financial support 
of Europe — A National Assembly summoned — Measures 
taken by Capodistrias to secure satisfactory elections — 
Congress opened at Arg-os — Proceedings of the Congress 
— Beginnings of organised opposition 

"While the Conference of tlie Powers was consulting 
in London, a commission, consisting of the three am- 
bassadors who had retired from Constantinople, had 
been sitting at Poros for the purpose of collecting evi- 
dence and reporting. They had applied to Count Capo- 
distrias for statistics of the condition of Greece, and 
he had furnished them, as far as the confused and dis- 
organised state of the country would allow. At the 
same time he had insisted on the Greek views with 
regard to the boundary question, and had suggested 
Prince Leopold of Coburg, afterwards first King of 
the Belgians, as a candidate for the sovereignty of 

Hellas. In December 1828 the commissioners re- 

311 



312 THE WAE OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

ported, and their memorandum, known as the Proto- 
col of Poros, formed the basis of a protocol signed, on 
behalf of all the Powers, at London on March 22, 
1829, the provisions of which did not differ very 
greatly from the measures which were adopted when 
Greece was ultimately established as an independent 
kingdom. The frontier of the new Hellenic State was 
to be drawn from the Gulf of Yolo to the Gulf of Arta, 
and among the islands it was to include Euboea and the 
Cyclades. An annual tribute of about £30,000 was 
to be paid to the Porte. The Turks who had owned 
land in Greece were to be allowed to sell their prop- 
erty, or to be otherwise compensated. The Hellenic 
State was to enjoy perfect autonomy under the su- 
zerainty of the Sultan, and was to be governed by 
an hereditary prince selected by the Porte and the 
Powers.^ 

This plan, which fixed a boundary so much morel 
liberal than had been foreshadowed by the protocol] 
of the 16th of November, might have been carrie( 
into execution at once, had all the contracting Powers] 
been really in earnest. It embodied the views of Sir 
Stratford Canning, whose intimate acquaintance with] 
the conditions of the problem seemed to guarantee itg 
success; and it was warmly supported by France. Bui 

1 Prokesch, Appendix, x. 2. 



THE PROTOCOL OF MARCH 22 313 

Russia had no desire to see tlie Greek question settled 
before she herself was in a position to wring terms 
out of the Sultan, and would have preferred to post- 
pone the whole matter until she could make peace. 
The diplomatic pedantry, or the short-sighted policy, 
of Lord Aberdeen, played into the hands of the 
Russians. He consented, indeed, in order to keep on 
good terms with France, to sign the protocol; but he 
insisted at the same time on a diplomatic procedure 
which ended by postponing the whole question, until 
the result of her second campaign made Russia the 
sole judge. * While Capodistrias was intriguing, 
while Sultan Mahmoud w^as fuming with rage, and 
while the population of Greece was perishing from 
misery, the English Foreign Secretary insisted on 
reserving to each of the Allied Courts the right of 
weighing separately the objections which the indig- 
nant Sultan might make to the proposed arrange- 
ments/ ^ Under these circumstances the judgment 
passed by Metternich on the work of the Allies was 
neither unjust nor untrue. He saw that the protocol 
was less concerned with the welfare of the Greeks than 
with the desire to arrange a modus vivendi for the 
Concert. ^ The Triple Alliance,' he said, ' can live on 
the protocol for ^ year; but the Alliance itself is 

1 Finlay, ii. 222. 



314 THE WAE OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

impotent for good. It is only a combination of wiles 
against wiles.' ^ 

In Greece itself tlie publication of the protocol 
was received with an outburst of indignation not 
inferior to that which had greeted the protocol of the 
16th of jSTovember. To the Greeks it seemed that, all 
through the long and tortuous processes of the diplo- 
matic negotiations, which had now reached another 
stage, they themselves had been regarded merely as 
pawns in the game of statecraft, to be moved hither 
and thither as the players pleased, and without regard 
to their own desires or aspirations. After all that 
they had done and endured, they were to be cheated 
of the freedom for which alone they had fought and 
suffered ! For what was this ' autonomy ' worth that 
year by year had to acknowledge a degrading depend- 
ence; which merely substituted for the blood tax 
which the ray ah had paid to the Ottoman, a lump sum 
paid yearly for the right of the nation to exist? The 
Hydriots and Spezziots had been ' autonomous ' be- 
fore the war. Had they fought and bled for eight 
years merely to be ^autonomous' at the end? The 
wild hillsmen of the Maina declared loudly that they 
would only pay tribute, as from time immemorial they 
had paid it, at the point of their swords. What, too, 
1 Mendelssohn, ii. 124. 



INDIGNATION OF THE GREEKS 315 

of the islands which had suffered so much in the cause 
of liberty, and were now to be left to languish under 
the yoke of the Turk? What of Samos, of Crete, 
above all, of Chios? Was this rent and mutilated 
fragment, arbitrarily cut off from the Hellenic body 
by the cynical selfishness of Europe, all that was to 
be left of the great Panhellenic ideal which had been 
so enthusiastically proclaimed by the Constitution of 
Troezene ? 

Upon Capodistrias, too, as in a sense the repre- 
sentative of the Powers, fell some reflection of this 
hostile criticism. He had indeed himself, though he 
had at the outset refused to subscribe to the wide 
claims of the Constitution of Troezene, consented to 
receive the protocol only under protest. He had, he 
said, under the terms of the Constitution, no right to 
accept it on his own authority. Pending the meeting 
of the I^ational Assembly, however, he would consent 
to do so. His experience of diplomacy and of the 
nature of protocols had probably taught him that, 
with the Eusso-Turkish war still undecided, the 
protocol was worth little more than the paper on which 
it was written, and that its acceptance at the present 
moment, with the reservation of the ultimate right 
of the Assembly to decide, would in no wise compro- 
mise the eventual settlement of the question. 



316 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Capodistrias had, indeed, no intention of submit- 
ting to the terms of the protocol. On the question 
of the Ottoman suzerainty he was prepared to keep 
an open mind; but he resented the article which de- 
prived the Greeks of the right to elect their own 
prince. In spite of the suggestion he had thrown out 
to the commission at Poros, that the crown should be 
offered to Prince Leopold of Coburg, he had never 
surrendered the hope that he himself might ultimately 
be the ruler selected; and this was the end to which 
all his efforts were directed, and to which the re-estab- 
lishment of order and prosperity in Greece were means. 
It seemed to him intolerable that, after he had borne 
all the burden and heat of the day, and had turned the 
ungoverned wilderness which he had found into a 
strong and well-ordered state, at the eleventh hour 
another should step in and enjoy all the fruits of his 
toil. His prospects of being selected by the Powers 
were remote. If the choice were left to the Greek 
nation itself, his popularity among the mass of the 
people and the measures he had taken to assure his 
influence would probably be sufficient to secure his 
appointment. 

On the 18th of May the British Resident requested 
the President, as the Ottoman Government had agreed 
to an armistice, to cease hostilities on his part, and to 



CAPODISTRIAS REJECTS THE PROTOCOL 317 

withdraw within the limits assigned by the protocol 
of the 16th of November. Capodistrias refused, on 
the plea that this had never been officially notified to 
him; and, at the same time, he formally protested 
against that article of the protocol of the 22nd of 
March, which deprived the Greeks of all voice in 
the selection of their sovereign. To the representa- 
tive of Prince Leopold, who had been sent to make 
inquiries, he stated emphatically that the candidature 
of no prince would be acceptable to the Greek people 
under the terms of the protocol of the 22nd of March, 
which excluded the islands of Samos and Crete from 
the Hellenic State. He added furthermore that the 
acceptance of the Orthodox religion would be regarded 
as an absolutely essential condition of the acceptance 
of any ruler by the Greeks. This was the first of a long 
series of difficulties and objections raised by Capodis- 
trias, by which he at length persuaded Prince Leopold 
to resign his candidature. 

Capodistrias was now at the height of his power. 
He had succeeded, by one means or another, in bring- 
ing the whole administrative machinery of Greece into 
immediate dependence on his own will; and, under 
the shadowy forms of a constitutional republic, he was 
in fact an absolute monarch. His popularity among 
the mass of the people was as yet unimpaired; and 



318 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

thoTigli there was great discontent among certain sec- 
tions of the political classes, any signs of this consti- 
tutional opposition were ruthlessly suppressed. Even 
the most private criticisms passed on the President 
were treated as treason against the State; and private 
letters were opened and examined by order of the 
Government, their contents being used as evidence of 
disaffection against the existing order/ 

While, by such tyrannical means as these, Capo- 
distrias had been able to establish an undisputed au- 
thority in all the affairs of Greece, he had succeeded 
also in maintaining his reputation throughout Europe 
unimpaired. He had throughout been careful to give 
the impression that his arbitrary measures were but 
temporary expedients, unhappily necessitated by the 
disturbed state of Greece, and that, as soon as the 
Government had been placed on a firm foundation, 
and some degree of order and prosperity restored to 
the country, the liberties secured by the Constitution, 
and Avhich he had sworn to respect, would be once 
more conceded. With this explanation the Liberals 
of Europe were fain to be satisfied; and the sup- 

1 A priest named Pharmakidi was imprisoned for no 
other offence than having-, in a confidential letter to a 
friend, dared to comment adversely on some measures of 
the President. 



EUROPEAN SUBSIDIES 319 

port of the Philhellenes was still ungrudgingly be- 
stowed. The European Governments, too, were now 
no longer backward in their support; and the Presi- 
dent was relieved from the financial embarrassments 
which had hampered his operations on his first arrival. 
The subsidies from Russia alone amounted, by the be- 
ginning of the year 1831, to over 3,000,000 francs, 
besides large consignments of munitions of war. 
Charles X. subscribed 250,000 francs a month for 
the ^ Vendee du Christianisme.' England, after a 
great many refusals, at last also sent a contribution 
of 500,000 francs. Finally, the Genevese banker 
Eynardt forwarded 700,000 francs as the beginning 
of a new loan. AVith these resources, for the expendi- 
ture of which he was responsible to no one, with his 
personal popularity, and his unshaken hold on the 
organisation of the Government, the position of the 
President seemed unassailable. ' Greece,' said Metter- 
nich, ^ is Capodistrias.' 

When, on his arrival, Capodistrias had caused the 
suspension of the Constitution of Troezene, he had 
promised to summon a meeting of the J^ational 
Assembly without undue delay. April had been the 
date originally fixed; but the President had, on one 
pretext and another, managed to postpone the Con- 
gress for more than a year. ISTow, however, the 



320 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

presentation of tlie protocols, and the international 
relations of Greece, made it necessary for him at last 
to carry out his promise, and summon a meeting of 
the representatives of the nation. He had indeed 
no fear as to the result. The old communal liberties 
had been destroyed; the votes of the electors, for 
all purposes, were directed by the prefects appointed 
by the central Government; and, to make assurance 
doubly sure, he now caused the Panhellenium to pass 
a law placing the electoral colleges absolutely under 
the heel of the administration. Not content with this, 
he undertook, in the month of March, an extended tour 
through the country, to influence the electors by his 
personal presence. The peasantry were just beginning 
to feel the return of prosperity after the exhaustion 
of the war, and * Pappa Johannes ' was greeted every- 
where with the greatest enthusiasm. The result was 
the return of an assembly blindly devoted to his in- 
terests. 

On the 23rd of July, Capodistrias, in a Russian 
uniform and his breast covered with orders, opened the 
new Congress, which met in the ruins of the ancient 
theatre of Argos. 

Signs of opposition were, indeed, not wanting; but 
in the Congress itself no criticism of the President's 
policy could make itself heard. Kolokotrones, ever a 



PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONGRESS 821 

notable supporter of Capodistrias, had ridden down 
from the mountains at the head of an armed band; 
and Niketas, the ^ Turk-eater/ was present with a force 
nominally deputed to protect the Congress, really to 
overawe it in the interests of the President. 

An address of confidence in the President was 
moved. Grivas and one or tw^o other critical spirits 
desired to raise objections; but they could not succeed 
in making themselves heard. Kolokotrones leaped up, 
as soon as the tendency of their remarks became ap- 
parent. ^ We want no European tomfoolery here ! ' 
he cried ; ^ N^o babble ! Let those who are in favour of 
the address stand up ! ' As he enforced his arguments 
by drawing his yataghan, and his followers were the 
more numerous, there was nothing to urge in reply, 
and the address of confidence in the President was 
passed without a dissentient voice! A Government 
which could command so effective a closure had little 
to fear from factious opposition. There were violent 
scenes more than once. At one time Kolokotrones and 
Grivas were with difficulty kept from crossing swords. 
But, in the end, the resolutions passed by the assembly 
were entirely in accord with the policy of the Govern- 
ment; which was the less surprising since, as a matter 
of fact, they had all been drawn up by Capodistrias 
himself. He had not indeed obtained his nomination 
21 



822 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

to tlie Presidency for life, as that would have been of 
little value without the previous consent of the Pow- 
ers, but he had obtained an Act of the Assembly de- 
claring that the decisions of the Conference of Lon- 
don should not be held to be binding on Greece, 
without the ratification of the Greek legislature, 
lie was, moreover, in negotiating the settlement 
of the Greek question with the Powers, given a 
free hand in the matter of the suzerainty and the 
tribute. 

On the 19th of August the Congress was dissolved; 
and the position of Capodistrias seemed more firmly 
assured than ever. But the constitutional opposition 
which had been so long suppressed was beginning to 
make headway. The decisions of an assembly so 
notoriously packed could carry no moral weight; it 
was known that it had merely registered the decrees 
of the President; and the discontented spirits ex- 
pressed their sense of the situation by saying sarcasti- 
cally ^ John poured out: John drank! ' 

A new senate had been created by the Assembly, 
of which the constitution overthrew all the democratic 
principles enunciated by former congresses. Sixty 
names were presented to the President, and out of 
these he selected twenty-one, adding six more on his 
own nomination. It v/as in connection with this that 



^ 



BEGINNINGS OF OPPOSITION 323 

he experienced the first signs of the coming storm. 
Miaoulis, Kondnriottes, and Mavrocordatos, to whom 
he offered places, refused, and formed the nucleus of 
an influential opposition. 



CHAPTEK XX 

Operations in East and West Hellas— Last engagement of 
the War— End of the Eusso-Turkish War — The Peace of 
Adrianople — Reception of the news in Greece — Its effect 
on the Powers — Anglo-Austrian entente — Protocol of 
February 3, 1830 — Leopold of Coburg accepts the crown 
— Capodistrias rejects the Protocol — Agitation in Greece 
— Leopold resigns — Concession by the Porte of reforms 
in Crete — They are rejected by the Cretans — Boundaries 
of Greece fixed by Protocol of July 1 — Evacuation of Hel- 
las by the Turks. 

The weary struggle was now dragging to its termina- 
tion. Both sides had long been exhausted; the fiery 
enthusiasm of the revolt was quenched, and the stub- 
born opposition of the oppressors broken. For the 
Greeks there remained but the task of clearing conti- 
nental Hellas of the last remnants of the Ottoman oc- 
cupation. 

Capodistrias, who had expressed himself dissatis- 
fied with both Hypsilanti and General Church, at this 
juncture ^ astonished the world by making his brother 
Agostino a general,' ^ and sending him, though he was 

1 Finlay, ii. 207. Mendelssohn, li. 86. 
324 



LAST INCIDENTS OF THE WAR 325 

little better than a fool, to take over the supreme di- 
rection of all civil and military matters in Western 
Hellas. In the absence of any qualifications for this 
position, fortune came to his assistance. 

A wily Greek named Paparrigopulos, who had 
studied a rude diplomacy in the school of Ali Pasha, 
had for some time been at work undermining the 
morale of the Turkish garrisons of Lepanto, Mis- 
solonghi, and Anatoliko; and, when Count Agostino 
appeared off these cities, he easily succeeded in per- 
suading them to surrender. The garrison of Lepanto 
capitulated on the 30th of April; and Missolonghi 
and Anatoliko were evacuated on the 14th of May. 
Agostino, who conducted the operations of the land 
forces from the secure vantage ground of the quarter- 
deck of the Hellas, gained all the credit of these suc- 
cesses, which were really due to the insidious propa- 
ganda of Paparrigopulos.^ A last expiring effort was 
made by the Turks in Eastern Hellas before hostili- 
ties ceased. A body of Albanians under Asian Bey 
marched from Zeituni by way of Thermopylae, Leva- 
dia, and Thebes. Hypsilanti's troops were seized with 
a sudden panic, and scattered to all the four winds. 
Asian advanced without opposition to Athens, left a 
select garrison in the Acropolis, and, collecting such 
1 Mendelssohn, ii. 86. 



326 THE WAE OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Turks as were still scattered over tlie country, began 
his return marcli. Meanwliile, however, Hypsilanti's 
troops had assembled again as quickly as they had dis- 
persed, and when Asian reached the Pass of Petra, he 
found his retreat cut off by a superior Greek force. 
Unable to fight his way through, he was compelled, on 
September 25, 1829, to conclude a capitulation, by 
which the Turks engaged to evacuate all Eastern Hel- 
las, except the Acropolis and the fort of Karababa on 
the Euripus. This was the last engagement of the War 
of Liberation. It fell, therefore, to Prince Demetrius 
Hypsilanti to conclude the war, which his brother 
had begun, eight years before, on the banks of the 
Pruth. 

It was, however, by the victory of a mightier com- 
batant that the fate of Greece had, meanwhile, been 
decided. The war, which for two summers had been 
waged between the Russians and Turks in the Balkan 
peninsula, had come to a sudden and dramatic end. 
It had from the first been a war of surprises, the Otto- 
mans revealing imsuspected strength, and the Russians 
unsuspected weakness. And now by sheer force of as- 
surance, the weaker forced the stronger to submit! 
General Diebitsch stood with about 13,000 men at 
Adrianople, in the heart of an enemy's country, threat- 
ened in the rear by the unconquered armies of the 



THE PEACE OF ADRIANOPLE 327 

Grand Yizier and tlie Pasha of Skutari, and, in front, 
faced bj the mighty city of Constantinople, which con- 
tained at least a hundred thousand men capable of 
bearing arms. Yet he conquered, where he ought to 
have capitulated. Though his scanty troops were dec- 
imated by disease, and he had no hope of reinforce- 
ments, he succeeded, by the boldness of his move- 
ments, in exaggerating the idea of his strength, and, 
finally, terrified the Ottoman Government into sub- 
mission.^ 

On the 14th of September the Peace of Adrianople 
was signed. Its terms largely increased the influence 
of Russia in the East, and especially in the Danubian 
principalities, which were rendered by its provisions 
practically independent of the Ottoman Government, 
and therefore all the more open to Eussian interfer- 
ence. Besides certain provisions dealing with Russian 
trade rights and the free navigation of the Bosphorus, 
the treaty also included the acceptance by the Porte of 
the principles of the London Protocol of the 22nd of 
March, dealing with the affairs of Greece.^ Thus, ow- 
ing to the procrastinating policy of the other mem- 
bers of the Alliance, Russia was able to pose before 
the world as the sole guarantor of the independence 

1 Fyffe. Modern Europe, i. 342. Mendelssohn, ii. 164. 

2 Prokesch, Appendix, x. 30. 



328 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

of Greece, and take to lierself all the credit whicli slie 
would otherwise have had to share with her allies. 

The news of the conclusion of the Peace of 
Adrianople was received in Greece with the liveliest 
demonstrations of joy. Capodistrias, who believed 
that now he would reap the reward of his obedience 
to the mandate which the Czar had given to him at 
the meeting at Czarscoeselo, publicly announced the 
peace, and ordered Te Deums to be sung in the 
churches. When, however, the terms of the treaty 
became known, the delight of the Greeks was turned 
into disgust, and Capodistrias felt that he had been 
betrayed by the Power which he had served so faith- 
fully. Russia, from which they had expected so much, 
had after all only obtained for them the terms of the 
protocol of the 22nd of March, which they had already 
rejected with indignation and scorn. Capodistrias also 
experienced a bitter disillusion. His own claims had 
been forgotten. Of the presidency for life, which was 
the least reward he might have expected for his faith- 
ful service to the cause of Russia, there was no men- 
tion ; he was, after all, to be ousted in favour of some 
German princeling. The treaty, moreover, gave a seri- 
ous blow to his popularity in Greece. He had all along 
been regarded as the representative of Russia, the guar- 
antee and surety of the Czar's goodwill; and this had 



EFFECT ON THE RELATIONS OF THE POWERS 329 

not a little contributed to strengtlien his position. The 
disappointment and dismay of the Greeks now inevi- 
tably turned against him, as in some measure respon- 
sible for the dashing of their hopes; and from this 
period the opposition to his government, hitherto timid 
and depressed, gained in intensity and boldness. 

If the Peace of Adrianople had made a bad im- 
pression on the Greeks, the news of it fell into the 
midst of the conference of the Powers with the dis- 
turbing force of a bomb. Serious as the effects of the 
Russian success undoubtedly were, they were exag- 
gerated out of all proportion by the alarms of the 
statesmen of the Alliance. 'Not only had Russia out- 
witted and overreached her allies by settling the Greek 
question without their co-operation, but the whole 
edifice of the Ottoman Power, which it had been the 
policy especially of England to prop up, as a barrier 
against Russian ambition, was in danger of collapsing 
— nay, had collapsed. The Duke of Wellington de- 
clared that Turkey was not dying, but dead.^ He de- 
plored that the conference had ever departed from the 
protocol of the 16th of November, and inquired what 
new independent Power could be created to replace 
the Ottoman Empire as a barrier against Muscovite 
aggression. Lord Aberdeen suggested raising the 
1 Report of Prince Esterhazy. Prokesch, Appendix, x. 44. 



330 THE WAB OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Porte up again, and propping it in place by means of 
a European guarantee ; and it was even seriously pro- 
posed to establish a Greek empire, with Constantinople 
as its capital/ 

Metternich watched with cynical satisfaction the 
development of the storm within the councils of the 
Alliance. He regarded the present crisis as the direct 
result of the weak and hesitating policy which England 
in particular had throughout pursued; and he now 
asked the British Cabinet sarcastically whether in 
future ' Great Britain intended to follow an English 
or a Liberal policy.' ^ Eor his own part he did not 
believe in the collapse of Turkey, w^hich had only been 
beaten because it believed itself to be so. IlTeither did 
he think that Russia had, for the present, any desire 
to destroy the Ottoman Power; and he was certain 
that she would never wish to see it replaced by a 
free and powerful Hellas. He now proposed to 
reopen negotiations on the basis of the maintenance 
of Turkey, and the creation of an independent Greek 
State. 

The whole question was once more plunged back 

into the diplomatic kettle. Within the Conference 

itself, which continued its sittings in London, there 

was a complete rearrangement of interests and parties. 

1 Mendelssohn, ii. 168. 2 lUd. ii. 167. 



ANGLO -AUSTRIAN ENTENTE 331 

On the 11th and 12th of October a cordial entente 
between the English and Austrian Cabinets had been 
arrived at; and the policy of the majority of the 
Powers was henceforward directed to counteracting 
the preponderance obtained by Russia. 

Wellington now recognised, what Metternich had 
insisted on so long, that Greece must be erected into 
an independent State; for, the Porte being caught 
inextricably in the toils of Russia, to create a vassal 
principality in the Levant would only be to open the 
way for the extension of Russian influence in the Med- 
iterranean. On the other hand, as long as there re- 
mained any hope of maintaining the Ottoman Empire, 
the Tory statesman would do nothing to raise up a 
Power which might conceivably become a new source 
of danger to its existence. If, therefore, Greece was 
to be independent, its limits must be so curtailed that 
it could under no circumstances prove a menace to 
Turkey.^ He did not see that a strong Hellas would 
have been the surest of all barriers against the advance 
of Russia, and the settlement, therefore, which of all 
others Russia would most have dreaded. 

The views of the English Cabinet were embodied 
in a new protocol, which was signed at London, on 
behalf of the Powers, on February 3, 1830. By the 
1 Mendelssohn, ii, 174. 



332 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

terms of this protocol Greece was to be erected into 
an independent State, and its frontiers were fixed to 
run from the mouth of the river Aspropotamos to 
Mount Artolina, and thence, over the comb of the 
range of Oxia and Oeta, to the mouth of the Sper- 
cheios. Euboea and the neighbouring islands were to 
be Greek, as also Skyros and the Cjclades. Prince 
Leopold of Coburg was proposed as the ruler of the 
newly-constituted State, but with the title, not of king, 
but of ^ sovereign prince.' ^ 

Except the guarantee of complete independence, 
so grudgingly conceded, this settlement had nothing 
to recommend it to the acceptance of the Hellenes. 
Apart from the confinement of the new State within 
limits which would have made effective government 
impossible, and w^hich rendered the gift of indepen- 
dence a hollow mockery, the lines of the frontier had 
been so drawn as to appear almost purposely offensive 
to Greek national feeling. Attica and Boeotia, where 
the population was mainly Albanian, were to be in- 
cluded in the new State, while xYcarnania and ^tolia, 
which were inhabited by a Greek-speaking race, were 
to remain Turkish! Strategically, too, the proposed 
frontier was impossible ; for it left in the hands of the 
Turks ^ the barrier which nature pointed out ' : that 
1 Holland, p. 11. 



PROTOCOL OF FEBRUARY 3 333 

rugged mountain range which, from the Gulf of 
Arta to that of Volo, runs ^ like a backbone behind 
Greece/ ^ 

On the 8th of April the protocol of the 3rd of 
February was officially notified to Count Capodistrias. 
At the same time he was directed by the Powers to 
proclaim an armistice, and to order the withdrawal of 
the Greek troops within the borders assigned by the 
protocol. Capodistrias veiled his own refusal by tak- 
ing refuge behind the forms of the Constitution, and 
answered that, though he would accept the protocol, 
he had, in fact, no right to do so imtil it had been laid 
before the National Assembly.^ The Senate, in the 
hands of which the Powers of the Assembly were 
vested, when it was itself not sitting, but which really 
represented only the views of the President, there- 
upon presented a memorandum refusing to accept the 
protocol. In face of the indignant opposition of the 
Greek nation (for in this matter Capodistrias un- 
doubtedly had the people on his side) it would have 
been a work of great difficulty to have enforced this 
latest settlement of the Hellenic question. As it was, 
it remained a dead letter, not only owing to the refusal 
of the Greeks to accept it, but because the serious oc- 
currences in other parts of Europe during the year dis- 
1 Palmerston. Hansard, xxii. 562. 2 Mendelssohn, ii. 179. 



334 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

tracted the attention of the Powers, for the time, from 
the affairs of Greece. 

Unpopular as the protocol of the 3rd of February- 
was, it contained, however, one provision which was 
highly acceptable to the Greeks, that, namely, which 
designated their future ruler. In the matter of th.e 
appointment of a prince, Capodistrias had been play- 
ing a dark and diplomatic game. There seems little 
doubt that he was himself ambitious of becoming the 
ruler of Hellas; and the ambition would have been 
perfectly justified. He seemed, however, quite in- 
capable of using open and straightforward means for 
the attainment of an object, when underhand and 
crooked methods could be employed. He had publicly 
proclaimed his anxiety for the speedy appointment of 
a king; in his private memoranda to the Powers and to 
the ambassadors he had frequently expressed the same 
opinion; and he had himself proposed the name of 
Prince Leopold to the conference of ambassadors at 
Poros. Yet now that the appointment seemed about 
to be realised, he did everything, short of open protest 
and resistance, to make it impossible. 

The Opposition had long been casting about for 
some effective means of embarrassing the Govern- 
ment; and the popular enthusiasm aroused by the 
nomination of their new prince appeared to them to 



ATTITUDE OF THE OPPOSITION 335 

offer an opportunity wliicli was not to be neglected. 
The President and the Senate had, it was true, re- 
jected the protocol, but the President and Senate in 
no way represented the public opinion of Greece. 
The limitation of the frontiers was doubtless lament- 
able; yet their arrangement could not be regarded 
as final, and the question would not be compromised 
by accepting those benefits which the protocol un- 
doubtedly did confer. The presence of the new ruler 
was ardently longed for by the country, groaning 
under the despotic sway of Capodistrias. In short, 
it was decided by the members of the disaffected Op- 
position to counteract the action of the President and 
Senate by working up a popular demonstration of wel- 
come to Prince Leopold; and to this end addresses 
were circulated for signature in all parts of the coun- 
try, bidding welcome to the Prince, and asking him not 
to delay in coming to a nation which was eagerly ex- 
pecting him. The addresses were extensively signed; 
for Capodistrias's public utterances on the subject had 
led the people to believe that he himself was anxious 
for the arrival of the Prince. But Capodistrias was 
angered by what he regarded as a scarcely veiled at- 
tack upon himself, and alarmed at the number and 
importance of the signatories; for these included not 
only Mavrocordatos, Zaimis, Miaoulis, Petrobey, and 



836 tup: war of greek independence 

numberless primates of the Morea and Hydra, but even 
Sissinis, tlie President, and several members of the 
Senate, who thus stultified their own previous action. 
He did not, indeed, dare to forbid the forwarding of 
addresses to the candidate approved by the Powers; 
but he issued orders that these were not to be sent di- 
rect, but to be submitted first to the inspection of the 
Government. Moreover, he let it be plainly known 
that those who signed would only do so at the risk of 
incurring his displeasure; and if they chanced to be 
Government ofiicials they were dismissed, on the plea 
that, in signing, they had been guilty of an act of in- 
subordination.^ 

While, by these means, Capodistrias tried to stem 
the tide of enthusiasm for Prince Leopold in Greece, 
he was also occupied in attemptinsj to shake the 
Prince's own resolution to accept the crown. To 
Baron Stockmar, Leopold's representative, who had 
come to Greece to make inquiries, he had already 
given a vivid picture of the magnitude of the task 
the Prince proposed to undertake. In the communica- 
tions he now had with Leopold himself, he cunningly 
combined earnest entreaties for his speedy arrival, 
Avith alarming accounts of the difficulties he would 
experience when he did arrive: of the utter exhaus- 

1 Mendelssohn, ii. 212. 



RESIGNATION OF PRINCE LEOPOLD 337 

tion of tKe country, the general corruption and in- 
subordination, and, above all, the absolute lack of 
money. He impressed upon him the advisability, nay, 
the necessity, for joining the Orthodox Church; 
he asked whether he would be prepared to unite with 
the people in arranging a Constitution, in accordance 
with the decrees of the Congress of Argos, and whether 
he would consent to be bound by the decisions of that 
Assembly. 

There has been some controversy as to what ulti- 
mately induced Leopold to resign the trust which had 
been solemnly conferred upon him, at his own solicita- 
tion, by the Powers of Europe. The death of George 
lY., and the shadowy prospect of a possible regency 
in England during the minority of Queen Victoria, 
can hardly be judged a sufficient motive, though they 
were considered so by many at the time.^ It is more 
probable that the intrigues and innuendoes of Capo- 
distrias were successful, and that Leopold was dis- 
gusted by the prospect which his acceptance of the 
Greek crown had opened before him. The policy of 
the President in suppressing the addresses of welcome 
had also borne fruit, and the Prince was more than 
doubtful as to the nature of the reception that awaited 
him on the part of -the Greek nation. On the 21st of 

1 So Prokesch-Osten, ii. 417. 
23 



838 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

May, accordingly, he formally handed in his resigna- 
tion to the representatives of the Powers, stating as 
his reason the extreme unwillingness of the Greeks to 
accept the protocol of the 3rd of February. 

By the Hellenes the news of his resignation was 
received with a grief that was akin to despair; ^ 
in the diplomatic world it excited a ferment of anger 
and disgust, which found loud expression. Lord 
Aberdeen, in the House of Lords, made a statement 
which was construed into an attack on the Prince, and 
an arraignment of his motives in resigning the crown.^ 
Earl Grey, and other friends of Prince Leopold, took 
up the cudgels on his behalf; and, on the part of the 
Whigs, the affair was made the occasion for an elabo- 
rate attack on the whole Tory policy with regard to 
Greece. A letter was read from General Church con- 
demning utterly the frontier fixed by the protocol; 
and Lord Palmerston said that he could see no reason 
why Crete and the islands should not have been in- 
cluded, so as to make Greece a really powerful State. ^ 

The resignation of Prince Leopold, and the crisis 
which almost immediately followed in the affairs of 
Europe, put a stop to any strenuous endeavour to give 

1 MeFidelssohn, ii. 211. 2 Hansard, xxiv. 990. 

3 Prokesch, ii. 420. Cf. Hansard, xxii. 558. For the whole 
question of Leopold's resignation, see also Mendelssohn, IL 
183-211. 



THE PORTE GRANTS REFORMS TO CRETE 339 

effect to the protocol of the 3rd of February. It was 
at best but a weak attempt at compromise, and as such 
could never have satisfied anyone, or been more than 
a temporary settlement of the questions it affected to 
solve. The conception of an independent Greece, 
strong enough to form the nucleus of a State which 
should embrace all the Hellenes, and form an effective 
barrier against the aggressions of the Slav races in the 
East, would have been worthy of a strong cabinet. 
It was an act of political folly, born of vacillat- 
ing and divided counsels, to endeavour to create an 
independent Greece too weak to maintain its inde- 
pendence, and foredoomed to fall under whatever 
influences should chance to be paramount in the 
East. 

While the ultimate fate of the new State was thus 
still left undecided, the Porte had been quietly pro- 
ceeding with the settlements necessitated by the new 
conditions of its existence. The first of these dealt 
Avith the future of Crete. On June 6, 1830, a firman 
was issued granting several new rights to the Cretan 
rayahs/ In future the annual poll-tax was to be col- 
lected by their own bishops and captains, who were 
themselves to be exempt from it, as also were all mer- 
chants trading in their own ships. Free navigation of 
1 Prokesch-Osten, ii. 423. 



340 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

the Black Sea and of the ^gean was conceded, as well 
as the right of the Cretans to sail under their own flag. 
There were to be in future no extraordinary burdens 
levied, and the inhabitants were to elect their own local 
officials. These, and certain minor reforms, seemed 
to assure the Cretans a fair measure of liberty. To 
Samos also was conceded the right of dealing direct 
with the Porte through its own elected representa- 
tives, instead of, as heretofore, through the Capitan 
Pasha. 

The prospect of these islands becoming contented 
under the Ottoman rule did not suit the purposes of 
the Greeks ; and emissaries were accordingly sent who 
succeeded in persuading the Cretans and Samians to 
refuse all concessions. Soon afterwards, the Ottoman 
Government, weary of the turbulent island, sold Crete 
to Mehemet Ali for 25,000,000 piastres. Upon this, 
Grabusa, which, since the destruction of the pirate 
stronghold, had been held by the allied fleets, was 
handed over to the Egyptians. Large numbers of 
fugitives were brought by the war-ships of the allies, 
and by Kanaris, to Greece, where they formed an ad- 
ditional drain on the slender resources of the Gov- 
ernment. Such, for the time being, was the fate of 
Crete. 

On the mainland everything remained as yet un- 



EVACUATION OF HELLAS BY THE TUKKS 341 

decided. The revolution of July, with all the vast and 
pregnant issues which it raised, distracted the atten- 
tion of the European Cabinets from the affairs of 
Greece. The London Conference, indeed, still con- 
tinued to devote an occasional thought to the question, 
and on the 1st of July a protocol was issued confirm- 
ing that of the 3rd of February, and appointing com- 
missioners for the delimitation of the boundary. Very 
little, however, was done. The Turks demanded 300,- 
000 Spanish dollars as compensation, before they 
would evacuate Attica and Boeotia; and the Greek 
Government had no money with which to meet the 
demand. Failing the payment of this sum, the Otto- 
mans, in the summer of 1830, systematically devas- 
tated the country, and it was reckoned that half the 
olive trees in Attica were destroyed. At last the 22nd 
of January was fixed on as the term for the evacua- 
tion to be carried out; but this proceeded, even then, 
very slowly. There were a thousand questions of com- 
pensation, and the like, to be settled; and the unhappy 
Mussulmans were naturally reluctant to leave their 
homes and their beloved country. A touching inci- 
dent is told, which may serve to illustrate this aspect 
of the war and its results. A Turk, who was starting 
on his sad journey, turned once more to gaze for the 
last time on the Piraeus. Overcome with emotion, he 



342 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPET^^DENCE 

prostrated himself, and kissed the ground from which 
he and his fathers had drawn their life. ^ Sweetest 
fatherland ! ' he cried, ^ I am leaving you, and shall 
never see you again ! ' ^ 

^ rXvKVTarr] fxov naTpls, <r€ x<^^<i^ X^P*-^ irXeov va ce IbSa (Men- 
delssohn, ii 221). 



CHAPTEK XXI 

Effect on the Greek question of the July Revolution — Grow- 
ing- opposition to the arbitrary rule of Capodistrias — 
Activity of the press — The ' Apollo * suppressed at Nau- 
plia — It is transferred to Hydra — Hydra becomes the 
centre of the Opposition — Divisions in the Concert of 
the Powers — Hydra declares ag-ainst the President — 
Miaoulis seizes the Greek fleet at Poros — Intervention of 
the Russian Admiral — Miaoulis blows up the Hellas — 
Sack of Poros — Rival assembles summoned at Argos and 
Hj^dra 

The revolution of July, wliicli hurled Charles X. from 
the throne of France, and established the popular 
monarchy of Louis Philippe, reacted in more ways 
than one upon the fortunes of Greece. Xot only did 
it produce a rearrangement of the relations of the 
Powers, the liberal Government of France drawing 
away from Russia and attaching itself more closely to 
the policy of England, but this first victory of the 
revolution stirred into activity all those forces of dis- 
content which the policy of Metternich and the Holy 
Alliance had, for fifteen years, succeeded in repress- 



344 THE WAR OP GEEEK INDEPENDET^CE 

ing. Beside the vast and dangerous issues raised by 
these movements, the affairs of Greece sank into com- 
parative insignificance. During the autumn of 1830, 
England and France were fully occupied with the 
revolution in Belgium; and, towards the end of the 
year, the insurrection of the Poles claimed the whole 
attention of Eussia. In the absorption of these 
more pressing interests Greece was, for the time 
being, forgotten; and Capodistrias was left to pursue 
his policy, unhampered by the interference of the 
Powers. 

The revolution had, however, another effect upon 
the affairs of the Hellenes. The old republican cry 
of ^Liberty! Equality! Fraternity!' raised once 
more, amid the rattle of musketry, from the barri- 
cades of Paris, had penetrated to Greece, and awak- 
ened echoes among its islands and mountains. The 
opposition to Capodistrias, the ' Eussian pro-consul,' 
as he had begun to be termed, gained fresh vigour, 
and was inspired by a new enthusiasm. To the mass 
of the peasantry indeed, at any rate in the Morea, 
where the word Suntagma (Constitution) was rapidly 
becoming synonymous with rapine and bloodshed, the 
personal rule of Capodistrias was not unwelcome. 
But to that large class of Greeks who had imbibed 
some degree of European culture, and still more to 



EFFECT OF THE JULY REVOLUTION 345 

tliose independent island communities which had en- 
joyed, under the Ottoman rule, far more liberty than 
they were allowed by the prefects of the President of 
free Greece, the repressive and irresponsible govern- 
ment of Capodistrias became day by day more odious. 
Under the influence of the French uprising a burst of 
' republican babble ' ^ broke forth among the more 
ardent spirits of the Opposition, and a hundred wild 
schemes were mooted. It was even proposed to invite 
the veteran Lafayette, ^ the conqueror of two worlds ' 
as he had once loved to be called, ^ the fool of men and 
circumstances ' as Napoleon had named him, to assume 
the presidency of Greece. In Paris the venerable 
Korais, to whom Hellas owed so much,^ supported this 
idea, which, however, of course, evaporated in talk. 
More powerful and more permanent were the results 
of the literary efforts which now began to be made by 
the Opposition, in order to influence public opinion 
against the existing regime in Greece. 

By the terms of the Greek Constitution the com- 
plete liberty of the press had been secured. Taking 
advantage of this, a young Greek named Polyzoides, 
who had lately returned from Paris, imbued with the 
spirit of the revolution, started a newspaper, the 
* Apollo,' which was to represent the views of the 
1 Prokesch-Osten. 2 See p. 16. 



346 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Opposition, and set up his office and press, in tlie first 
instance, in ISTauplia, under the very eyes of the Gov- 
ernment. This was too much for the official mind of 
the Capodistrian administration. Constitution or no 
constitution, this impious criticism of the Government 
must be stopped. The issue of the very first number 
was followed by a police raid on the premises of the 
paper; the whole edition was confiscated, and the 
machinery and plant taken possession of by the Gov- 
ernment. Polyzoides urged in vain that in Greece, 
by the terms of the Constitution, the press was free. 
The Government replied that, though the Constitu- 
tion did not forbid attacks on officials, neither did it 
authorise them. Driven from !N^auplia, Polyzoides 
removed the headquarters of his paper to Hydra, 
where it flourished under the protection of the Hydriot 
communal government, which refused all the Presi- 
dent's demands for its suppression. 

Capodistrias, true to the traditions of his Eussian 
schooling, was not taught wisdom by this failure, and 
continued his efforts to curb the journalistic opposi- 
tion. He protested, indeed, that he had no intention 
of interfering with the liberty of the press; but lib- 
erty was not licence, and he reserved to the Govern- 
ment the right of deciding when the bounds between 
the two had been overstepped! The popular poet, 



HYDRA HEADS THE OPPOSITION 347 

Alexander Soutsos, in one of his satires, gave voice 
to the public feeling aroused by this policy: — 

My friend, the press is free — for him who spares the crowd 
Of government officials and their friends, 
Nor criticises ministerial means and ends. 
The press is free, my friend, — but writing's not allowed.i 

This shortsighted action of the President produced 
the usual results. The violence and the circulation of 
the Opposition newspapers grew with the efforts of the 
authorities to suppress them; and a journal which, 
left alone, might have perished for lack of readers, 
expanded into an influence and a power. 

The gathering forces of opposition and discontent 
found a centre and rallying place in the island of 
Hydra. From the very outset the haughty rejection 
of the advances of the Hydriots by Capodistrias, which 
has already been mentioned, had prejudiced the proud 
islanders against his government; and nothing that 
he had done since had tended to reconcile them to it. 
Accustomed to complete autonomy under the mild 
suzerainty of the sultans, they had seen their liberties 
curtailed by the action of Capodistrias, and their free 
communal constitution turned into a mere machine for 
registering the decrees of the Government prefects. 
In common with JEgina, Spezzia, and Poros, they had 
1 Mendelssohn, ii. 224. 



348 THE WAR OF GREEK IKDEPENDENCE 

writhed under the capricious and irresponsible tyranny 
of Yiaro Capodistrias. If this was Liberty, they might 
well begrudge the cost at which it had been purchased. 
Their once flourishing island was on the verge of ruin; 
their wharves deserted, their vessels rotting in the port. 
The self-chosen fate which bound them to a govern- 
ment whose chief was trying to stave off national bank- 
ruptcy by a ruinous fiscal policy threatened to destroy 
the last remnants of their prosperity. Already many 
of their merchants had transferred their business to 
islands which still enjoyed the blessings of Turkish 
rule; and the rest threatened to follow. These were 
the results of the immense sacrifices which the Hydri- 
ots had made for the cause of Greece, and for which, so 
far from receiving any compensation, they had re- 
ceived not even recognition. The Government was in 
their debt for losses and damage they had sustained in 
the national service, and they presented a claim for 
fifteen million francs. Capodistrias, after some pre- 
varication, finally offered six millions in full satisfac- 
tion of the demand. The Tlydriots refused in wrath, 
and their breach with the Government was final.^ 

Hydra now became the focus of a huge conspiracy, 
which soon extended all over the archipelago, and 
which had for its end the establishment of a constitu- 
1 Mendelssohn, ii. 224. 



INCREASING AGITATION 349 

tional government.^ The important island of Syr a, 
which was, at this period, the main source of the na- 
tional revenues, early gave in its adherence to the 
movement, and it was followed by most of the other 
island communities. The ^ Apollo,^ under the vigor- 
ous editorship of Polyzoides, became the mouthpiece 
of the agitation; and its columns were filled with ad- 
dresses, from all parts of the archipelago, clamour- 
ing for a free constitution. The mainland and the 
Morea as yet held aloof, and even sent the President 
petitions in an opposite sense. It seemed as though 
Hellas were about to be rent into two halves, with the 
waters of the iEgean, on which her liberties had been 
cradled, flowing as a barrier between them. 

Within the councils of the Triple Alliance also a 
cleavage now became apparent; and, while Capodis- 
trias could always reckon upon the support of Russia, 
the liberal Western Powers showed a scarcely veiled 
sympathy for the Opposition. The Hydriots had de- 
manded the right to elect a new Demogerontia, or com- 
munal council ; and Capodistrias had replied that they 
might elect whom they pleased, but that he would rec- 
ognise only those who obeyed his government. Their 
growing hostility he proposed to meet with coercive 
measures; and he proceeded to sound the representa- 
1 Prokesch, ii. 439. 



350 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

tives of the Powers, with a view to discovering how 
far he could reckon upon their support. To his ques- 
tions the French minister replied by suggesting insidi- 
ously the occupation of ITauplia by French troops. 
Mr. Dawkins, the English Eesident, answered that he 
failed to see that the demand of the Opposition for the 
assembling of the Congress was ill-timed, or that the 
Congress in itself would be harmful in the present 
state of the country. The Kussian representative on 
the other hand told the President that he should 
^ stamp on the head of the viper of revolution ' at once, 
and promised him the active sympathy of Russia if he 
should take this course.^ Capodistrias followed the 
advice which appealed most to his own prejudices and 
convictions. He took up the only weapon which lay 
immediately to hand; he refused to issue to the Hydri- 
ots their ships' papers, without which they were liable 
to be treated as pirates; and, at the same time, he ap- 
plied to the admirals of the three Powers to support 
him, by preventing the Hydriot ships from keeping 
the sea without their legal warranty. Admiral Ricord, 
who commanded the Russian squadron, at once ac- 
ceded to this request. The French and English ad- 
mirals on the other hand said that they had no author- 
ity to prevent the Hydriot vessels from sailing, 
1 Mendelssolm, ii. 232. 



MIAOULIS SEIZES THE GREEK FLEET 351 

Hydra now took up an attitude of open hostility 
to the Government, and the whole party of Opposition 
concentrated itself on the island. The Council of 
Demogeronts, or communal elders, which had been en- 
tirely in the interests of Capodistrias, was dissolved, 
and the Government commissary fled. Mavrocordatos 
had already arrived in the island to give the support 
of his presence to the movement; and now active 
preparations were pushed forward for summoning a 
!N'ational Convention to Hydra, where, in the mean- 
time, a ^ Constitutional Committee ' was established, 
consisting of seven members, and including such well- 
known names as Konduriottes and Miaoulis. 

Matters were now rapidly reaching a crisis. The 
defection of Syra especially had been a severe blow 
to Capodistrias; and he recognised the necessity for 
taking vigorous measures to restore this and the other 
islands to their allegiance. The national fleet of 
Greece, including the fine frigate Hellas^ and the 
steamer Kartcria, lay in the harbour of Poros, where 
also the arsenal was established, and Capodistrias now 
sent orders for this to be made ready for sea, with a 
view to coercing the refractory islands. But the Hy- 
driots had realised this danger, and determined to an- 
ticipate it. 

On the 26th of July, by order of the Hydriot 



352 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

government, Admiral Miaoulis sailed, with only some 
fifty men, to Poros, and, with the help of the inhabi- 
tants, seized the arsenal and the fleet. Kanaris, the 
hero of Chios, was on board the corvette Spezzia, and 
Miaoulis tried to win him over to the constitutional 
cause. But the sturdy old seaman, who believed heart 
and soul in the divine mission of Eussia, true to his 
sense of duty, refused the hand that was held out to 
him, and was placed for a short time under arrest. 

When the news of the exploit of Miaoulis reached 
Capodistrias, he was furious. Three days before, 
yielding to the representations of the English and 
French Kesidents, he had promised to summon the 
IsTational Assembly in October, or earlier if possible. 
This coup d^ctat of the Hydriots was all that he had 
got by his weakness. In his dealings with these rebels 
at any rate there should be no consideration shown, 
and the insult to the majesty of government should 
be wiped out in blood. On the Greeks, however, he 
could no longer reckon; and he turned for assistance 
to the representatives of the Powers. By an unfortu- 
nate mischance, the English frigate, commanded by 
Captain Lyons, had sailed for the Gulf of Athens that 
very morning; and the French Resident, M. de 
Rouen, was also absent. This gave Capodistrias an 
opening of which he was not slow to avail himself. 



ACTION OF THE RUSSIAN ADMIRAL 353 

The crisis called for immediate action; and he ap- 
pealed to the Russian admiral to compel the Hydriots 
to evacuate Poros, and surrender the fleet. Admiral 
Eicord, a bluif seaman, ready to do anything that 
seemed to serve the interests of his master the Czar, 
was easily persuaded by the ex-minister of Russia. 
Without waiting for his colleagues, he sailed for 
Poros, and summoned Miaoulis to surrender the fleet, 
and return to Hydra. The intrepid Hydriot replied 
that he owed obedience only to the government of Hy- 
dra, that he would yield, if at all, only to the united 
commands of the three Powers, and that, if the Rus- 
sian admiral attacked him, he would oppose force to 
force. In any case, however, sooner than let the na- 
tional fleet fall again into the hands of the Govern- 
ment, he would himself destroy it. For the present 
the Russian did not venture to proceed to extremes; 
and contented himself with watching the outlets of the 
harbour, so as to prevent Miaoulis carrying off the 
fleet. A considerable force had also meanwhile been 
sent, under x^iketas, to attack the island from the land 
side, where it was only separated from the Pelopon- 
nese by a narrow channel. 

At the end of the month the English frigate, with 
Captain Lyons on board, returned; and with the 

French frigate, under Captain Lalande, proceeded to 
23 



354 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

join the Russian admiral before Poros. It was impos- 
sible for them, under the circumstances, to dissociate 
themselves entirely from the action of their colleague; 
and thej now combined with him to demand the with- 
drawal of Miaoulis. They had, however, no author- 
ity to use force; and, when the Hydriot admiral re- 
fused to obey, they returned to iSTauplia to ask for in- 
structions, having first obtained a promise from both 
Miaoulis and Admiral Ricord that neither of them 
would take action during their absence. 

To the Residents of the Western Powers it seemed 
that, however technically wrong the action of Miaoulis 
may have been, morally he was in the right; they 
were jealous, moreover, of the attitude of Russia in 
the matter; and they refused to have anything to do 
with measures of coercion. Ultimately a compromise 
was agreed upon. The Hydriot admiral was to be 
summoned, in the name of the Triple Alliance, to sur- 
render the property of the State; but Capodistrias, on 
his side, was to announce a general amnesty, and to 
promise once more to convene the ^N'ational Assembly. 
With these instructions. Captains Lalande and Lyons 
sailed on the 12 th of August for Poros. 

Meanwhile, however, Capodistrias had sent a letter 
overland by a swift messenger, explaining the state of 
affairs to the Russian admiral, and bidding him strike 



MIAOULIS DESTROYS THE HELLAS 355 

while there was yet time/ The Russian was nothing 
loth to obey. The inhabitants of Poros, intimidated 
by the hostile attitude of the Russians, had 'already con- 
cluded a convention with him, by which they agreed to 
surrender the town and the arsenal. But, before this 
happened, it had come to a fight between him and the 
Hydriot admiral. The Russians, while nominally in- 
active, had blockaded both ends of the narrow strait 
which divides Poros from the mainland, and in which 
the Greek fleet lay. A Hydriot brig, which was bring- 
ing provisions for the admiral, was fired upon by the 
Russians, who were thereupon themselves attacked by 
the Greek ships, and by the small fort which com- 
manded the narrow entrance to the channel. In the 
course of this battle the Spezzia was dismasted, and, 
with a Hydriot brig, ultimately fell into the hands of 
the Russians. 

Miaoulis now threatened, if the Admiral Ricord 
did not cease hostilities, to carry out his purpose of 
destroying the Greek vessels that still remained in his 
hands ; and the Russian, who knew the Hydriot^s res- 
olute character, upon this thought it best to refrain 
from further hostilities. The letter of the President, 
however, now seemed to him an authorisation to pro- 
ceed 5 and, on the 13th, he began moving his ships in, 
1 Mendelssohn, ii. 244. 



356 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

with a view to taking up a position for battle. The sharp 
eye of Miaonlis, accustomed, from the experience of 
years of naval warfare, to note the slightest signs of an 
enemy's intentions, immediately discovered the object 
of this manoeuvre. As the Kussian ships sailed toward 
their new quarters, two explosions were heard, and 
over the brow of the island great columns of smoke as- 
cended. Admiral Miaoulis had carried out his threat, 
and rather than suffer them to be used to coerce the 
freedom of the islands, had blown up with his own 
hands the magnificent frigate Hellas and the corvette 
Hydra. He himself escaped with his men, in the 
ships' boats, to Poros, and thence to Hydra. 

On the same day the troops of Mketas and Kal- 
lergis entered the town of Poros, and, though this had 
capitulated freely, it was treated as a hostile city taken 
by storm. For hours the unhappy town was given 
over to the cruelty and lust of the brutal mercenaries, 
who, when they at last desisted from outrage and rob- 
bery, returned to ISTauplia laden with booty. Though 
they had not struck a blow in honest fighting, their 
zeal was rewarded by a public proclamation, in which 
Capodistrias hailed them as the saviours of their 
country. 

The affair of Poros was decisive as to the relations 
of the representatives of the Powers among themselves 



CAPODISTEIAS BELIES ON RUSSIA 357 

and towards the President. The action of the Russian 
admiral was naturally resented by the other members 
of the Triple Alliance ; and even the Russian Resident 
had, for form's sake, to reprimand the admiral for ex- 
ceeding his instructions. But the antagonistic interests 
of the three ^ allies ' were now clearly defined ; and 
while the Opposition felt that they could reckon upon 
the support of France and England, Capodistrias 
threw off all disguise, and openly avowed his depend- 
ence upon the goodwill and the assistance of Russia. 
The French officers of the Greek regular troops, who 
had expressed their disgust at the devastation of Poros, 
were dismissed, and their places filled by Russians. 
The Greek fleet, too, being now destroyed, Capodis- 
trias did not hesitate to appeal for aid to the Russian 
admiral, and even proposed that Russian officers 
should be placed on board such Hellenic ships as still 
remained. At the request of the President, Admiral 
Ricord now sailed to blockade Hydra and Syra; and 
the French and English frigates followed to prevent 
hostilities. For their part, the Greek islanders, who 
ever since the treaty of Kainardji in 1774 had been 
accustomed to sail under the Russian flag, now tore 
this do\\Ti, and hoisted the revolutionary tricolour. 

Capodistrias now announced his intention of sum- 
moning, pour dcs liaisons majeures^ the E'ational As- 



358 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

semblv for the 13th of September, and at once began 
to move heaven and earth to secure a pliant majority. 
The Congress of Argos had, as a matter of fact, been 
merely prorogued ; but the President feared a possible 
change in the opinions of the representatives who had 
before been so amenable to his will; and to guard 
against this, he now announced that the electoral col- 
leges might either choose the same deputies as before, 
or proceed to the election of new ones. At the same 
time he took care that all the machinery of corruption 
and intimidation was in good working order; while, 
with the idea of stirring up public feeling against 
the Opposition, he flooded the country with pamphlets 
denouncing the action of the Hydriots in destroying 
the national fleet. The representatives of Hydra, and 
of those districts which acknowledged the Constitu- 
tional Commission, were to be excluded from the new 
Congress. The Commission replied by summoning on 
their own account a l^ational Assembly to meet at 
Hydra; and the Hydriot vessels sailed from island to 
island, and along the coast, to invite representatives 
to attend. To this activity the Russian admiral, at the 
request of Capodistrias, endeavoured to put a stop. 
Three Hydriot brigs which, in the course of canvass- 
ing for the assembly, had entered the Gulf of Coron, 
were attacked by the Russians; and their crews, see- 



DISMISSAL OF VIARO CAPODISTRIAS 359 

ing no chance of escape, ran them ashore and set fire 
to them, while thej themselves took refuge with the 
French garrison in Kalamata. 

Capodistrias now tried to recover some of his 
vanishing popularity by dismissing some of the most 
hated instruments of his oppressive rule; and his 
brother Yiaro, and the astute chief of police, Gennatas, 
were deprived of their ofHces. But this came too late 
to influence public opinion favourably, and merely 
cost the President, at a critical time, the services of 
two devoted and trustworthy servants. Whatever 
good effect it might have produced was swept away in 
the storm of ill-will which broke forth when he once 
more announced the postponement of the Congress. 
To those who had hoped against hope that the Presi- 
dent would exchange his personal for a constitutional 
regime, this seemed the final confession that he was 
afraid to meet the representatives of the nation, and 
that he had set his face permanently against the estab- 
lishment of liberty in Greece. The wilder spirits 
began now to look back into the classic ages for a paral- 
lel, and to talk of the virtue of tyrannicide. 



CHAPTEE XXII 

The approach of the crisis — Position of Petrobey — His dis- 
content with the Government — Character of the Main- 
otes — Attempts of Capodistrias to reduce them to order 
— Imprisonment of the Mavromichales — Kising" in the 
Maina — Escape of Petrobey — He is recaptured and tried 
— Admiral Ricord intercedes — Humiliation of Petrobey 
— Murder of Capodistrias by George and Constantino 
Mavromichales — Character of Capodistrias 

Though all things seemed to point to tlie approacHng 
collapse of the rule of Capodistrias, the catastrophe 
was hastened not so much by his contempt for consti- 
tutional liberty, as by his endeavour to crnsh out the 
savage instincts inherited by a tribe of wild hillsmen 
from centuries of barbarism. 

Petrobey Mavromichales, popularly known as the 
King of the Maina, had been one of the first chiefs to 
raise the standard of revolt in the Morea/ A man of 
dignified and venerable presence, the father of nine 
stalwart sons, and the absolute ruler of a brave and 
warlike tribe, the position of Petrobey seemed to raise 

1 See p. 50. 
360 



PETROBEY MAVROMICITALES 361 

him high above the brig-and chiefs by whom he was 
for the most part surrounded, and to point him out as 
the natural leader of the Greek revolt. But his mild 
and genial character, and his lack of political intuition, 
had early pushed him into the background, and com- 
pelled him to give place to men who, like Kolokotrones, 
were of a fiercer and more masterful disposition. For 
the rest, his objects in rising against the Turks were 
probably no more disinterested than theirs. But few 
of the Greek leaders ever rose to the idea of a patriot- 
ism to which all personal interests were subordinate; 
and, for the most part, they desired to end the domin- 
ion of the Ottoman pashas only that they themselves 
might reign as pashas in their stead. To this rule Pe- 
trobey was no exception. When, therefore, it began 
to appear that the sole outcome of all the ten years' 
struggle was to be a highly centralised despotism 
w^orked in the interests of Russia, the old chief was 
naturally but ill-content. At first, indeed, Capodis- 
trias had been at pains to conciliate him. He was made 
a member of the Senate, and his demands for money 
were from time to time listened to. But Petrobey's 
ideas of feudal magnificence and patriarchal generos- 
ity made him a lavish spender; and Capodistrias at 
length wearied of the ' eternal petitioner,' as he called 
him. The insubordination and restlessness of the 



362 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Mainotes moreover offended tlie President's sense of 
administrative order, and for these he held the old 
chief largely responsible. He began, therefore, to 
treat Petrobey with increasing coldness, and to oust 
him more and more from the counsels of the Gov- 
ernment. 

The character of the Mainotes was scarcely such 
as to appeal to a believer in a cut-and-dried system of 
government; and perhaps, in the eyes of any modern 
ruler, despotic or democratic, their picturesqueness 
would not compensate for their obvious deficiencies as 
citizens of a civilised State. They had, indeed, their 
own code of morality, which they enforced with ruth- 
less severity; ^ but it was hardly such as could have 
been included in the statute book of Hellas. They 
were taught to reverence women and old men, to obey 
their chief, to honour their parents, to keep their word, 
to show courage in battle, to rob without being 
found out, and, above all, never to forget an injury. 
Blood feuds were handed down from generation to 
generation; they were transmitted by will, by adop- 
tion, by marriage even, the man who married a woman 

1 Death was the penalty for seduction; but, under cer- 
tain circumstances, the seducer might be allowed to leave 
the country, in order to make money sufficient to enable 
him to marry the g-irl. If he failed to return at the time 
appointed, the girl was put to death. 



THE MAINOTES 363 

' having blood ' undertaking tlie duty of revenge. 
Murder was even employed as a legal instrument ; and 
Capodistrias was shown a bill, signed by persons still 
living, in which the debtor, in case of non-payment, 
gave the creditor the right to assassinate him or two of 
his relations. 

To the mind of the President, trained in the rigid 
discipline of the Russian administrative system, the 
existence of this turbulent State within the State 
seemed at once a scandal and a menace; and he de- 
termined to take measures for its reform. The readi- 
est road to this seemed to be to overthrow the para- 
mount influence of the family of the Mavromichales ; 
and to this end Capodistrias proceeded to encourage 
those local chieftains who had from of old been their 
bitter rivals. At the same time he instructed his pre- 
fect Genovallis to do all in his power to curb their un- 
ruliness. The immediate result of this policy was that, 
at Eastertide in the year 1830, Djami Mavromichales, 
the brother of Petrobey, headed a rising of the Maina 
against the prefect. Capodistrias thereupon had re- 
course to the arts of Machiavellian diplomacy. He 
summoned Petrobey 's son George to an interview, and 
treated the young man with such distinction and kind- 
ness that he persuaded him to proceed to the Maina, 
and to induce his uncle Djami to come to E'auplia, for 



364 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

the purpose of discussing his grievances with the Presi- 
dent. Once within the walls of ITauplia, however, 
Djami was arrested, tried on an old charge of murder, 
and imprisoned in the fortress of Itsh-kale, where he 
remained for eighteen months. The rest of the mem- 
bers of his family were, at the same time, placed under 
police supervision, and forbidden to leave the town. 
In January 1831, however, ^ Katzakos ' Mavromi- 
chales, Dj ami's son, succeeded in making his escape, 
fled to the Maina, and there spread the news that the 
President was compassing the ruin of the Mavromi- 
chales. He was soon joined by his uncle Constantine, 
and between them they succeeded in arousing the fury 
of their wild clansmen. The Mainotes flew to arms, 
and threatened, if the Government refused to liberate 
their chiefs, that 5,000 ^ Spartans ' would march upon 
!N'auplia. 

When the news of the rising in the Maina reached 
his ears, Petrobey asked Capodistrias to allow him to 
go and make an attempt to stay the excitement. The 
President refused; and thereupon Petrobey also fled, 
sailed in an English vessel to Zante, and proceeded to 
cross thence to the Maina. The weather, however, was 
stormy; and the old chief was driven by a contrary 
wind into Katakolo on the coast of Elis, where he was 
arrested by Kanaris, who had been sent in pursuit, and 



PETROBEY IMPRISONED 365 

carried back to Nauplia. He was now tried for 
treason, by a special commission (as being a senator 
and peer of Greece), was found guilty, and imprisoned 
in his turn in the fortress of Itsh-kale. 

The news of the chief+ain's arrest was sent to the 
Maina ; and his brother Constantino was persuaded, by 
the promise of his personal freedom being respected, 
to proceed to ISTauplia for the purpose of opening nego- 
tiations. N'o sooner, however, did he reach the capital 
than he and his nephew George were likewise placed 
under police supervision, and forbidden to leave the 
town. 

After some lapse of time, the venerable mother of 
Petrobey, an old lady eighty-six years of age, appealed 
to the Russian admiral to intercede with the President 
for the release of her son; and Admiral Ricord was 
moved to undertake the charge, nothing doubting that 
his personal influence with Capodistrias would enable 
him to bring about a settlement. The President, in 
fact, so far yielded as to promise to release Petrobey, 
on condition of his acknowledging his errors ; and 
with this decision the Russian admiral proceeded to 
interview the old chieftain. At first the proud old 
man refused to consider the question of an apology; 
but, at last, worn out with eight months' imprisonment, 
and longing for a breath of the free air of the moun- 



366 THE WAR OF GEEEK INDEPENDENCE 

tains, he reluctantly allowed himself to be per- 
suaded. 

His submission was to take place at an interview 
with Capodistrias, which was fixed for five o'clock on 
the afternoon of October 8, 1831. Unfortunately, the 
President had that very morning received a copy of 
the London ^ Courier,' containing a violent tirade 
against his person and a scathing criticism of his policy. 
Weary and overwrought with the labours and anxi- 
eties of his ofiice, his mind seemed, at this last insult, to 
lose its balance; and, jaded and angry, when Petrobey 
arrived under guard at the time appointed, he refused 
to see him. 

When this message was delivered to him, the old 
chieftain was petrified with rage and mortification. 
Was it for this that he, the Bey of the Maina, had 
consented to demean himself by asking pardon of a 
Corfiot upstart? Was he, a Mavromichales, forty-nine 
of whose kinsmen had fallen in warfare with the Turk, 
to plead in vain for pardon in the ante-chamber of a 
man who had never struck a blow for Greece ? Speech- 
less with anger, the proud old man was led back 
through the streets to his prison. On the way he 
passed in front of the house occupied by his son George 
and his brother Constantine. Here a sudden thought 
struck him. He paused, and called out, ^Tih cra<; 



ASSASSINATION OF CAPODISTRIAS 367 

iraiBial^ (^ Ho there, children!') At the sound of 
his voice the two hurried to the window, and, lean- 
ing out, asked him how he fared. The old man only 
pointed to his guards, said, in a voice choked with pas- 
sion, ' You see how I fare ! ' and passed on. But the 
Mavromichales had understood. The code of the 
Maina allowed them, under the circumstances, only 
one course of action. Their chief, and the head of 
their family, had received a wrong, and this must be 
wiped out in blood. 

The resolution to assassinate the President was, 
indeed, not a new one. The Mavromichales had al- 
ready received wrongs enough at his hands to abun- 
dantly justify this act in their eyes; and they had long 
since, by the connivance of their guards, provided 
themselves with weapons for the purpose. They now 
determined no longer to delay their action. 

On Sunday morning, the 9th of October, Capodis- 
trias rose, as usual, at five o'clock, and, after devoting 
an hour to work, proceeded, accompanied by his one- 
armed servant, Kokonis, and a soldier named Leondas, 
to the Church of St. Spiridion to hear mass. On the 
way he was passed by Constantine and George Mavro- 
michales, who saluted him hurriedly, and hastened on 
to the church. This was already full of worshippers, 
and the two Mainotes took up a position, one on each 



368 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

side of the door through which the President would 
have to pass. Capodistrias had been warned from 
several quarters that his life was in danger, but he had 
refused to take any precautions. ' Providence/ he 
said, ' watches over the President of Greece. They 
will reverence my white hairs ! ' When, however, he 
saw the two Mavromichales, he hesitated for an in- 
stant, for he knew the customs of the Maina. The 
hesitation was but momentary, and the next minute he 
had passed up the steps of the church. The Mavromi- 
chales waited till he had passed them; then Constan- 
tine fired a pistol, loaded with a double charge, at his 
head; and, as he staggered and fell, George plunged 
a dagger into his heart. The two murderers then 
turned and fled. Capodistrias fell without a cry and 
without a groan; his servant, Kokonis, caught him with 
the stump of his arm, and laid him gently on the 
ground; then, leaving the body of his master, rushed 
after the assassins. A shot which he fired at Constan- 
tine took effect; but, after a stumble, he managed to 
continue his flight, though with difficulty. Mean- 
while the sound of the scuffle and the pistol shots had 
disturbed the worshippers in the church, who now 
poured out, and, with an excited crowd that had col- 
lected, joined in the pursuit. Constantine, who had 
been wounded in the leg, was speedily overtaken, 



FATE OF THE ASSASSINS 369 

dragged to the ground with curses and imprecations, 
and torn and mauled by the infuriated mob. Yet his 
wild courage did not desert him. ^ Don't dishonour 
me, boys! ' he cried; ^ better light a candle at the 
church door! ^ Ho! Is there no palikari here will 
end me with a pistol-ball? ' He had not to wait long.^ 

Meanwhile George had taken refuge in the French 
consulate, which was speedily surrounded by a howl- 
ing mob clamouring for his blood. On learning what 
had happened, the French Resident could not refuse 
to deliver him up to the proper authorities, especially 
in view of the threatening attitude of the crowd ; and 
he was presently marched off to Itsh-kale,^ under the 
guard of a strong body of soldiers. He was tried by 
court-martial, and condemned to be shot. 

George Mavromichales, handsome, brave, winning, 
and of an open and generous disposition, had been a 
general favourite ; and when he was led out to execu- 
tion, the crowd of spectators were strangely divided 
between sympathy for himself and hatred of his crime. 
He showed no trace of fear, and faced his death with 
a serene courage worthy of a nobler cause. He ex- 
pressed and felt no regret for a deed which was fully 
justified by the code of conduct under which he had 

1 The candle is lighted at the church door when anj'one 
dies. 2 Mendelssohn, ii. 272, &c. 

24 



370 THE WAE OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

been reared. Turning to the crowd, just before tbe 
fatal volley was fired, he cried out, ^ Freedom ! Unity ! 
Love! ' a strange political testament for one who died 
to expiate a crime, inspired by the wild law of retalia- 
tion which he had inherited from an age of tyranny 
and barbarism. 

The light in which the deed was regarded by the 
mass of the common people was sufiiciently shown by 
the rage of the populace at the time, and which cer- 
tainly was not due to any artificial stimulation. Among 
the liberal Opposition, however, always somewhat too 
ready to justify ill-doing by an appeal to classical prec- 
edents, the two Mavromichales were hailed as martyrs 
in the cause of freedom. Journalists wrote and poets 
sang of the modern Harmodios and Aristogeiton, who 
had rid the world of a new Pisistratus; and the stu- 
dents of ^gina, in imitation of the Athenians of old, 
went about singing the ancient ode : — 

In myrtle spray I'll wreathe my blade, 
Like those two friends in freedom's cause. 

Who low in blood the tyrant laid, 
And gave to Athens equal laws. 

But was Capodistrias a tyrant ? His motives and 
his policy have been variously judged, according as 
the standpoint of his critics has varied; but by the 



CHARACTER OF CAPODISTRIAS 371 

mass of opinion his Government has been condemned. 
It was condemned indeed by its failure, for it could 
have been justified only by success. If his iron-bound 
system of bureaucracy could have secured order for a 
time to the distracted country, this might have been 
cheaply bought at the cost of a temporary sacrifice of 
liberty. As it was, liberty was sacrificed, without 
order being secured ; and, this being so, the unconsti- 
tutional dealings of Capodistrias may be stigmatised, 
in the language of Talleyrand, as worse than a crime 
— as a mistake; for where methods confessedly dis- 
honest, but defended on the ground of expediency, 
fail, it may be permitted to assert that honesty would 
have been the best policy. Baron von Prokesch-Osten 
indeed, writing from the point of view of the entourage 
of Prince Metternich, considers the policy of the Presi- 
dent the only one possible under the then existing con- 
ditions, and ascribes its failure to the factious opposi- 
tion of greedy adventurers, unprincipled agitators, 
radical windbags, et hoc genus omne, aided and abet- 
ted by the unscrupulous machinations of the English 
and French Residents. 

But this is only to say that Capodistrias failed, 
as Metternich failed, because he had not sufficient sym- 
pathetic imagination to grasp all the conditions of the 
problem he was called upon to solve, and persisted in 



372 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

leaving out of his political calculations that important, 
and fatal, factor of ^ sentiment.' 

Yet, though the methods of Capodistrias were tyr- 
annous, this is not to say that he was a ^ tyrant ; ' for the 
true tyrant is as selfish in his ends as he is unscrupu- 
lous in his means. Capodistrias doubtless had ambi- 
tions, and legitimate ambitions; he aspired to rule his 
country; and he laboured to this end. But, for all 
that, it was for Greece that he toiled as much as for 
himself, or more ; and if he desired to rule his country, 
it was for her good. To his love for Greece he had 
sacrificed, long since, his splendid position in the coun- 
cils of Russia ; to this, when he was called to the presi- 
dency, he surrendered his time, his health, his pleas- 
ures, and all that he possessed. On his arrival, the 
Assembly had proposed to vote him an income out of 
the national funds ; but this Capodistrias had refused ; 
and, so far from receiving a penny from the revenues 
of Greece, he devoted the whole of his slender fortune 
to the attempt to eke out the poverty of the national 
treasury. His personal habits were worthy of the elder 
Cato. He rose early, and worked the whole day in his 
bureau, the sole furniture of which was a square sofa 
and a plain writing-table. For the pleasures and 
amusements which ^ tyrants ' usually allow themselves, 
he cared nothing; and he used to remark that his ex- 



CHARACTER OF CAPODISTRIAS 373 

treme temperance in youth liad left him an old age 
^ like winter, cold but healthy.' The simplicity of his 
dress was, indeed, a rock of offence to the Greeks, who 
love gorgeous attire; and only during his progresses 
through the country did he ultimately always wear a 
uniform; because he had been told that, on the first 
occasion of his ^asiting the rural districts, the peasants 
had prostrated themselves before the out-rider, under 
the impression that that splendid person must be the 
President. Count John Capodistrias, in short, was a 
man whose talent for government, though great, fell 
very short of genius, as his moral character, though 
high, yet did not attain to the highest virtue; and 
Fate, or, as he would have preferred to say. Provi- 
dence, had placed him in a position where a greater 
and a nobler man might well have failed. 



CHAPTER XXIII 

Provisional Government — Agostino Capodistrias — Congress 
of Argos — Agostino elected President — Feud between 
Moreots and Rumeliots — Fighting in Argos — Eumeliots 
v^^ithdraw^ — Kolettes follows — Opposition Government es- 
tablished at Megara — Civil War — Kolettes invades the 
Morea — Impotence of the Government — Intervention of 
the Powers — Resignation of Agostino — Kolettes su- 
preme — Continued anarchy — The French occupy Nauplia 
— Insurrection of Kolokotrones — Treaty of May 7 — Otho 
of Bavaria declared King of Greece — Close of the Con- 
ference at London 

MuEDEE cannot under any circumstances be consid- 
ered an effective method of democratic reform, be- 
cause the heated political atmosphere which it en- 
genders is not favourable to the growth of free insti- 
tutions. The appetite for slaughter, moreover, grows 
with indulgence; and, as likely as not, the party, or 
the man, that appeals to the sword will in the end per- 
ish by the sword. To this rule the assassination of 
Count Capodistrias was no exception. To the hun- 
dred causes of faction and bitterness which already 

374 



AGOSTINO CAPODISTRIAS 375 

distracted the unhappy country was now added this 
blood-feud between the parties ; all hope of an orderly 
and constitutional rule was for the time at an end; 
and, in place of the liberty they had expected, the 
Liberals saw Hellas given over to all the miseries of 
an unbridled anarchy. 

As soon as the assassination of the President be- 
came known, the Senate had assembled, and had ap- 
pointed a provisional committee of three members to 
carry on the Government. The three selected were 
Count Agostino Capodistrias, Kolokotrones, and Ko- 
lettes. Though the Senate had no constitutional right 
to take this step, the Residents of the Powers had 
thought it best, in the absence of any other authority, 
to support their action, and to recognise the provisional 
Government thus established, until the National As- 
sembly could be called together and a legal administra- 
tion appointed. 

Agostino Capodistrias had already, during his 
brother's lifetime, posed as his heir and successor; and 
now that he was really thrust into the place of the 
murdered President, he attempted to ape his policy. 
He possessed, however, not a tithe of the ability w^hicli 
had not saved his brother from ruin; and arbitrary, 
ignorant, vain, and incompetent, he could not hope to 
succeed, where a stronger and a better man had failed. 



376 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Kolettes, already meditating a stroke for the supreme 
power, now threw himself into opposition, and made 
Agostino's pro-Ilussian policy especially the object of 
his attacks. 

The National Assembly was summoned to meet at 
Argos on the 19th of December. The national crisis 
arising from the death of Capodistrias might have been 
used to make, at any rate, some attempt to heal the 
divisions in the State. Kolettes, supported by the Eng- 
lish and French Eesidents, urged that the representa- 
tives who had been summoned to the Congress at Hy- 
dra should be invited to attend at Argos; but to this 
both Agostino and Kolokotrones strenuously objected, 
and the opportunity for heahng the breach was lost. 
When the Assembly ultimately met at Argos, it was 
discovered that the majority of the deputies were de- 
voted to the Capodistrian party; and in the division on 
the future constitution of the Government, a hundred 
and forty-six of these voted for the exclusion of Kolo- 
kotrones and Kolettes from the provisional committee, 
and the appointment of Agostino Capodistrias as sole 
President. 

The growing jealousy of the Moreots for the Ru- 
meliots now broke out into open feud. Many of the 
chieftains had descended to the Assembly, as usual, 
surrounded by crowds of followers; and Argos was 



BATTLE BETWEEN THE FACTIONS 377 

full of armed men. Already, on the afternoon of the 
21st, there had been a skirmish in the streets, between 
Grivas and the Suliot Djavellas; and the greater num- 
ber of the Capodistrian majority in the Congress had 
fled in alarm to E'auplia. On the 23rd there was a 
regular battle between about twelve hundred Kume- 
liots and the troops of the Government, in which the 
former, who had insufficient ammunition and no ar- 
tillery, were beaten, and compelled to withdraw from 
the town. Kolettes, ousted from the Government, 
now determined to throw in his lot with the Rumeli- 
ots; and, followed by about sixty of the deputies and 
several of the more important leaders, he proceeded to 
the Isthmus. At Megara the Kumeliots had gathered 
their strength, and here it was determined to set up a 
provisional government in opposition to that at ]^au- 
plia ; while at the same time negotiations were opened 
with the Hydriots. Kolettes himself, Zaimis, and 
Konduriottes, were elected to form the governing 
committee; and Mavrocordatos, who had come over 
from Hydra, was made State secretary. Greece was 
once more rent in twain, and threatened anew with the 
horrors of civil war. 

The Powers had now begun, after a long interval, 
to concern themselves again with the affairs of Greece. 
On the 26th of September the Conference had met 



378 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

once more in London, and liad issued a protocol, the 
Wliigs being now in power, conceding the frontier 
from Arta to Yolo; and, at the same time, ordering the 
Residents to support the Government, and aid it in 
repressing the imrnliness of the Hydriots. This pro- 
tocol, arriving after the death of the President, most of 
whose demands it conceded, well illustrates the cum- 
brousness of the attempt to regulate the affairs of 
Greece from a committee-room in London. Events 
were moving fast in Hellas, and by the time a second 
protocol had been sent to correct the first, it, too, was 
out of date. 

There were now two Governments face to face, and 
the problem was too complicated to allow of its being 
solved by recognising one and regarding the other as 
simply revolutionary and unauthorised. Sir Stratford 
Canning, who had arrived at Kauplia, on his way to 
Constantinople, in the midst of the crisis, tried to over- 
come the difficulty by arranging a reconciliation. 
Supported by the Russian and French Residents, he 
handed a memorandum to Count Agostino suggesting 
the proclamation of an amnesty, and the summoning 
of a new Assembly, to which the representatives both 
at Hydra and Megara should be admitted. But 
Agostino was infatuated, and would yield nothing. 
He believed that, with the aid of Kolokotrones, K- 



THE POWERS SUPPORT AGOSTINO 379 

ketas, and the other Moreot chieftains of his party, 
he could hold his own against Kolettes and his Kume- 
liots, and he wonld be content with nothing short of 
their absolute submission. Canning and the Eesidents 
now began to suspect that the justice of the case lay on 
the side of the Opposition rather than on that of the 
Government, and they sent despatches to London in 
this sense/ Meanwhile, however, on the 24th of Feb- 
ruary, there arrived another protocol of the London 
Conference, dated January the 7th, which confirmed 
the orders contained in the first, and ordered the repre- 
sentatives of the Powers to recognise the Government 
established by the Congress of Argos.. This the Eesi- 
dents, in spite of their better judgment, were now com- 
pelled to do; and Capodistrias, fortified by their sup- 
port, issued a proclamation promising an amnesty to 
all those who should submit.^ The Hydriots, who, in 
common with the Assembly at Megara, had taken up 
an attitude of uncompromising hostility to the Govern- 
ment of Agostino, were thereupon threatened by the 
admirals with severe consequences if they refused to 
accept the amnesty. But threats and promises were 
alike unavailing. Even the news, which reached E"au- 
plia on the 11th of March, of the election of the young 
Prince Otho, second son of King Ludwig of Bavaria, 

1 Prokesch, ii. 475, &c. 2 /&. Appendix, xii. 13 and 19. 



380 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

as King of Greece, wliicli it was hoped would put a 
stop to the civil strife, had but little effect. "What 
effect it did have was rather contrary to that which 
had been expected; for each party was anxious to 
be in possession on the new King's arrival, so as to 
have the greater claim on any favours he might have 
to bestow, and they redoubled their efforts to oust 
their rivals. To the notification of the election of the 
King, the Assembly at Megara replied that, king or no 
king, they would not lay down their arms until Count 
Agostino Capodistrias had quitted the country; and, 
to give force to their representations, they proceeded 
to acts of open hostility. After occupying Lepanto, 
they laid siege to the castle of Salona, which was held 
for the Capodistrians by Mamouris, attacked Metaxas 
in Delphi, and plundered Arachova. Once more the 
dogs of war were unleashed, to raven and slay over the 
devoted country. The miserable peasants, who had 
just begun to recover somewhat from their ten years' 
agony, cursed the name of Liberty, which had meant 
for them nothing but wrong and suffering, and the 
cry of ' Constitution,' which they had learned to asso- 
ciate only with robbery and violence ; and they prayed 
for the speedy arrival of the foreign King, with his 
alien troops, to save them from the misrule of their 
own self -constituted leaders. 



OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR 381 

The forces of the contending parties were un- 
equally matched; and, since it was to come to a trial 
of strength, it became apparent that Kolettes was likely 
to get the upper hand. Against the five thousand men 
Avhom he could bring into the field, Agostino could 
rely upon no more than some two thousand. In view 
of the emptiness of the treasury, it was impossible for 
him to rely on the venal loyalty of such chiefs as the 
Suliot Djavellas. Zaimis had not yet declared him- 
self; and on his decision depended the allegiance of 
Achaia and Arcadia. The forces of the Government 
were, moreover, distracted by the necessity for dealing 
with troubles in the south of the Morea; for the Main- 
otes had attacked and taken Monemvasia, and the Mes- 
senians had called in the French to their aid against 
the exactions of Kolokotrones. Distrusted and dis- 
trustful, the Government seemed incapable, in this 
crisis of their affairs, of giving either help or advice. 
As though to proclaim their impotence to all the 
world, they could think of no better plan for reducing 
the Mainotes to obedience than releasing the Mavromi- 
chales, upon their promising, for the tenth time, to call 
their turbulent tribesmen to order. The Assembly at 
!Nauplia, occupied, amid wars and rumours of wars, 
in debating the future constitution, fell into absolute 
contempt. 



382 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Meanwhile the time was approaching for the ar- 
rival of the new King; and as yet, among all this tur- 
moil of conflicting factions, there was no one to repre- 
sent his authority. As he was under age, the question 
of the regency was a serious and pressing one, demand- 
ing immediate settlement. Under the present circum- 
stances of the country the best and safest plan would 
undoubtedly have been to have appointed a committee 
of regency, fairly representative of all parties; but 
the hostile factions each aimed at undivided power, 
and preferred plunging the country into war to sur- 
rendering one shred of the spoils of office. The depu- 
ties at ITauplia gave the signal for the definite out- 
break of hostilities by electing Agostino Capodistrias 
Regent (fcvfiepvrjT'^^;) of the realm. 

By the Rumeliot party this was taken to mean 
that, even after the arrival of Otho, Agostino would, 
as Regent, still hold the reins of power; and Kolettes, 
determined to prevent this at all hazards, decided at 
once to invade the Morea, and to compel Capodistrias 
to resign. On the 6th of April he crossed the Isthmus, 
at the head of a force which the Government troops 
were powerless to resist. On the next day he entered 
Argos, where he issued a proclamation, in which he 
said that his only object was to escort back those depu- 
ties who, in December, had been intimidated into flight 



KOLETTES ADVANCES TO KAUPLIA 383 

by the Capodistrians. On the 8th he advanced in 
triumph to ISTauplia. Here, however, he met with a 
check ; for the representatives of the Powers had landed 
troops, and occupied the gates of the town; and 
they now met Kolettes with a demand for an armistice 
of a few hours, in order that the position might be dis- 
cussed. Kolettes thereupon took up his quarters in the 
suburb of Pronia. 

By a fortunate chance a protocol of the London 
Conference, dated the 7th of March, and embodying 
the recommendations of Canning's memorandum of 
the 28th of December, had arrived the day before, in 
the very nick of time. The forces of the Alliance were 
now ordered to intervene to keep the peace, and nego- 
tiations were to be opened on the basis of the recom- 
mendations made by Canning in his memorandum, 
the resulting Government to be supported by force of 
arms. 

The Residents now declared for a mixed Govern- 
ment, which should be fairly representative of all 
parties, and proceeded to lay this decision before 
Count Agostino Capodistrias, w^ho, seeing that, under 
these circumstances, he could neither resist the will 
of the Powers nor obtain any real share in a Govern- 
ment of which Kolettes would be the moving power, 
resigned, and the next day left the country, carrying 
with him the body of his brother. 



384 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

The Senate now once more stepped into the breach, 
and, after negotiating with the Eesidents, appointed a 
governing Committee. In this, Kolettes was included; 
but, as the remaining four members were either openly 
or secretly hostile to him, he insisted on the impossi- 
bility of carrying on the Government under these cir- 
cumstances, and enforced his views by the very practi- 
cal argument of summoning the remainder of his 
troops to join him at Pronia. The Eesidents, recognis- 
ing the soundness of his objections, and anxious to 
avoid the battle which now seemed imminent between 
the hostile factions, prevailed on the Senate to recon- 
stitute the Committee, which was ultimately com- 
posed of seven members, of whom four were partisans 
of Kolettes. 

Kolettes had now attained the object for which he 
had plotted and schemed so long, and was, in the eyes 
of all, the virtual ruler of Hellas. Originally physi- 
sian to Ali Pasha, he had learned in the corrupt court 
of Janina all the meaner arts of political activity. He 
was cunning and plausible, and a solemn and reticent 
demeanour had given him, among the volatile Greeks, 
a reputation for wisdom which was not altogether 
founded on fact. At the outset of his career at the 
helm of state, he was confronted with difficulties which 
would have made a wiser man despair. He soon dis- 



GOVERNMENT OF KOLETTES 385 

covered that the Senate, the majority of which were 
Capodistrians, though they had conceded his demands 
as to the personnel of the Committee, had so ordered 
it that it was, for his purposes, practically powerless. 
Decrees had to be signed by all the members; they 
were invalid if any three protested against them; and 
no business could be transacted unless five members 
were present. As three of its members were known 
to be hostile to him, it is obvious that this arrangement 
left him absolutely powerless, and in fact rendered the 
Committee itself a farce. 

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that 
the new Government was scarcely more effective than 
the old. It had in opposition to it all the supporters of 
the fallen party, a majority of the Senate, many of 
the most powerful of theMoreot chiefs, in eluding Kolo- 
kotrones, Niketas, and Rhangos, and a large number of 
the wealthy primates, who feared for their property, 
menaced now by the wild bands of mercenaries who 
had raised Kolettes to power. Besides all these, the 
squadrons under Kanaris and Andruzzos were hostile ; 
and, last but not least, the English and Russian Resi- 
dents, jealous of the influence acquired over Kolettes 
by the French, began to favour the opposite party. 

The very instruments of his power were now turn- 
ing to Kolettes' destruction. The most immediately 
25 



386 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

pressing question was how to rid himself of the soldiers 
whom he had brought into the Morea, and who, to the 
number of seven or eight thousand, were living at free 
quarters upon the unhappy population. Every day 
that they remained increased the bitterness of the hos- 
tility of the Moreots to his rule; and yet, in the ab- 
sence of any money to discharge the arrears of their 
pay, it was impossible to induce them to recross the 
Isthmus. In Patras, and in l^auplia itself, there were 
signs of open insurrection ; and, in his extremity, Ko- 
lettes had been compelled to call in the French to his 
aid. On the 20th of May, twelve hundred men, under 
General Corbet, marched into ISTauplia, and occupied 
the castles of Itsh-Kale and Palamidi. At Patras, how- 
ever, they had been anticipated. The Suliot Djavellas 
entered the town before the French detachment could 
reach it, roused the inhabitants by telling them that 
the Government had sold them to the foreigners, 
and prepared to hold the place against all comers. 
The French, finding that their occupation v/ould 
be opposed, did not attempt to take the town; and 
a force which Kolettes subsequently sent against it fra- 
ternised with the troops of Djavellas, who remained 
in possession of Patras till the arrival of King 
Otho. 

A new ^National Assembly was now summoned for 



REVOLT OF KOLOKOTRONES 387 

the 30tli of April, in spite of tlie opposition of the 
Powers, who thought that it would have been better to 
have postponed its meeting, in view of the approaching 
arrival of the King. Deputies, elected or self -chosen, 
streamed from all sides to the appointed place. It was 
like the heaping together of highly inflammable mate- 
rials for a conflagration. The suppressed anger of the 
fallen party was fed by an increasing suspicion of the 
encroachments of the French, which the Government 
seemed to favour; and the growing hatred of the Pe- 
loponnesians for the Kumeliots would alone have been 
sufiicient to feed the flames of civil war. This was 
not long delayed. 

Kolokotrones, refusing to have anything to do with 
the Congress, held himself, like a modern Achilles, 
moodily aloof in the stronghold of Karytsena. Kolettes, 
mistrusting his attitude, sent Grivas, with his Rume- 
liot bands, from Argos into the districts of Leondari 
and Phanari in the interior of the Morea. Koloko- 
trones w^ell understood that this move was directed 
against himself. The bands of Grivas, largely com- 
posed of Mussulman Albanians, were the most ruth- 
less and bloodthirsty of all the hordes of mercenaries 
by which the country was overrun; and, when they 
occupied Tripolitza, from all Arcadia rose up a wail of 
terror and despair. Kolokotrones, with characteristic 



388 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

promptness, now issued a proclamation to tlie Hel- 
lenes, declaring the Government to be the enemies of 
the country, the Assembly unconstitutional, and war 
against them both just and necessary. At the same 
time he summoned the Peloponnesians to arms, to aid 
him in expelling the hordes of Grivas. His appeal met 
with a ready and immediate response ; and the Moreot 
captains crowded to his banner, to help in the expul- 
sion of the hated Kumeliots. Gennaios Kolokotrones 
marched on Tripolitza, while Mketas raised the Mes- 
senians, and did battle with the hillsmen of the Maina. 
Kolettes endeavoured to take measures to suppress the 
revolt; but, at this crisis, Zaimis and the other Capo- 
distrian members of the Committee of Government 
withdrew, and the executive was thereby deprived of 
all constitutional powers. All was now complete an- 
archy. The Assembly at Argos began the work of 
verifying its powers, while the Senate denounced it 
as illegal and unconstitutional. The executive, par- 
alysed and impotent, depended entirely on the precari- 
ous support of the mercenary bands, who upheld it 
only as an excuse for plundering the Morea. The 
Government, as a last expiring act of protest, issued a 
ban against Kolokotrones, signed by four only of its 
members. The answer was a raid of Kallergis, with 
his horsemen, into the plain of Argos; and the As- 



OTHO OF BAVARIA ACCEPTS THE CROWN 389 

sembly, in alarm for its safety, once more fled, and 
took refuge within the walls of l^auplia. 

At this juncture arrived the news of a weighty de- 
cision of the Conference in London, which promised 
to be a final settlement of the Greek question. The 
crown had, as already mentioned, been offered to 
Prince Otho, the second son of King Ludwig of Ba- 
varia, whose youth (he was scarcely seventeen) was 
considered an advantage, as it would enable him to 
adapt himself more readily to the conditions of the 
country he was called upon to govern. In accepting 
for his son, the King of Bavaria had insisted on certain 
important modifications of the former protocols, and 
most of his demands had been conceded. The exten- 
sion of the frontier beyond the line of Arta — Yolo, 
fixed by the protocol of the 26th of September was, 
indeed, refused, as was also the suggestion to include 
the island of Crete in the new kingdom. But Otho 
was to be King, not ' Sovereign Prince ' of Greece; 
and an adequate loan was guaranteed, to enable the 
new Government to start unhampered by want of 
funds. The united squadrons of the Powers, and the 
French troops, were also placed at the disposal of the 
Kegency, for the maintenance of order.^ 

This treaty was signed on the 7th of May, and the 
1 Prokesch, Appendix, xii. 30. 



390 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

news of it reached Greece just as the Assembly was 
escaping from Argos to I^anplia. The representatives 
of the Powers besought the Government to dissolve 
the Congress, which, under present circumstances, 
could do nothing but harm. But the Government was 
neither willing nor able to comply, and the Assembly, 
asserting that its session was necessary in order to con- 
firm the election of the new King, refused to dissolve. 
Denied admittance to I^auplia by the French troops, 
it occupied a house in the suburb of Pronia, where it 
carried on a precarious existence, discussing the Con- 
stitution and preparing an address to King Otho. 
Here, on the 22nd of August, Grisiotis, with his mer- 
cenaries, fell upon it, clamouring for arrears of pay; 
and, when it became clear that they had no money 
with which to meet his demands, he scattered the depu- 
ties to all the four wmds, carrying off IN'otaras, the 
President, and several of the wealthier members, to 
his camp at Argos, whence they were only released on 
paying a ransom of 110,000 piastres. 

On the 18th of August Demetrius Hypsilanti, who 
had been a member of the governing Committee, died; 
and as this still further weakened the position of the 
administration, Mavrocordatos, Tricoupis, and one or 
two others, attempted to effect a reconciliation of par- 
ties, but without success. The civil war continued 



COMPLETE ANARCHY 391 

with daily increasing fury; and day by day the power 
of Kolokotrones grew. All the Morea was on his 
side; and Grivas was hard pressed in Tripolitza. In 
the south, the Mainotes had gone on a plundering ex- 
pedition on their own account, and Mketas was endeav- 
ouring to reduce them to order. In the north, Kaller- 
gis was fighting the Rumeliots. In Corinth Karatassos 
had established himself; and Djavellas still held 
Patras and the surrounding country. The flames of 
v/ar had crossed the Gulf of Corinth, and the Armatoli 
of Gardikiotis Grivas had attacked and captured Mis- 
solonghi; while, in East Hellas, both parties had 
united, and were marching on the Isthmus for an inva- 
sion of the Peloponnese. !N'auplia, alone in all Greece, 
was in the enjoyment of the blessings of peace, imder 
the protection of the Trench garrison. 

In the midst of all this tumult, on the 15th of 
August, Sir Stratford Canning arrived from Constan- 
tinople, bringing the confirmation by the Porte of the 
treaty agreed upon by the Powers in I^ondon. The 
Ottoman Government had accepted the extension of 
the frontier, and had agreed to evacuate the ceded 
districts before the end of December, on condition of 
the compensation due being paid before that time. 
Certain minor questions raised by the evacuation, and 
dealing with the future relations of the two nations, 



392 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

were at the same time arranged; and the representa- 
tives of the Powers now declared the object of the 
Treaty of London attained, and the Greek question set- 
tled for ever/ 

1 Prokesch, ii. 506. 



CHAPTEE XXIV 

Continued civil strife — Success of Kolokotrones — Impotence 
of the Government — Misery of the country — Fight be- 
tween Armatoli and the French at Argos — Arrival of 
King Otho — Conclusion 

The arrival of tlie new King might now be daily ex- 
pected. Some final details liad been arranged by the 
London Conference; and, at the end of August, King 
Ludwig had replied to the addresses of loyalty and wel- 
come sent by the Committee of Eegency and the Sen- 
ate. An embassy, consisting of Admiral Miaoulis, 
Constantine Botzares, and Dimitrios Paploutas, was 
now despatched to Munich, to do homage to the new 
ruler, on behalf of the Hellenic nation. 

The prospect of the speedy arrival of the King, 
however, did nothing to put a stop to the civil con- 
test; on the contrary, the parties fought with all the 
greater violence in their effort to oust each other 
while there was yet time. Kolokotrones was every- 
where victorious. He had driven Grivas and his 

Rumeliots out of Tripolitza ; and these now cut their 

39:i 



394 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

way back over the Isthmus, and finally joined Gardi- 
kiotis Grivas in Missolonghi. Kallergis had again ad- 
vanced on the capital; and Kolokotrones now had an 
interview with Admirals Ricord and Hotham in Xau- 
plia, in which he demanded the reconstruction of the 
Government. Conferences and intrigues followed, in 
which Kolettes was supported by the French, while 
the party of Kolokotrones had the sympathy of the 
Russians and English. In the end, Kolettes was left 
nominally in possession, sharing the government with 
two colleagues. But his rule was in fact confined to 
the town of E'auplia. Outside the walls Kolokotrones 
governed the whole of Greece ; and the Morea at least 
was regularly apportioned among his captains. As 
though to put the finishing touch to the spectacle of 
utter impotence presented by the nominal Govern- 
ment in E'auplia, the Committee of Regency quar- 
relled with the Senate, and the latter fled to Astros. 

The year 1832 had been the most miserable of all 
the war; the Greeks had suflered more from the 
cruelty and rapine of their own countrymen than in 
all the Ottoman invasions, more even than they had 
endured at the hands of the armies of Ibrahim; and 
now, at the end of the year, the country was utterly 
exhausted, and both parties were wearied out with the 
suicidal strife. The high-sounding principles pro- 



MISERY OF THE COUNTRY 395 

claimed in the constitutions of Troezene, Astros, and 
Epidaurus had been forgotten, drowned in the din of 
war and lost amid the clamour of party cries. Of 
the elaborate administrative edifice erected by Capo- 
distrias, but broken wrecks and fragments remained. 
The courts of law were closed, the Senate scattered. In 
I^auplia, the Secretaries of State carried on the shadow 
of a Government, in order to make it possible to speak 
of Greece ; for of a united Hellas there was otherwise 
no sign. North of the Isthmus the country was com- 
paratively free from local tyrants; and the communes 
governed themselves, in the absence of any superior 
authority, with good success. South of the Isthmus, 
Kolokotrones gradually freed the Morea from every 
oppression but his own, and governed, after a patri- 
archal fashion, with the aid of his captains, and of such 
of the Capodistrian officials as were left. Only in the 
extreme south, the Mainotes, true to their character to 
the last, w^ere still in arms, and carrying on war against 
Kolokotrones on the one side, and the admirals of the 
allied fleets on the other. 

Active preparations were now being made in 'Nslu- 
plia for the reception of the new Ejng. He was to be 
accompanied by some Bavarian troops, to guard his 
person, and form the nucleus of a disciplined army. 
To make room for these in the capital, three companies 



396 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

of French troops were transferred to Argos, wliicli was 
at that time in the hands of the forces of Kolokotrones 
and Grisiotis. The appearance of the French was the 
signal for suspicious murmurs on the part of the wild 
Armatoli; and from words it soon came to deeds. 
The French were attacked in the streets of the town, 
and a regular battle ensued, in which the Greeks lost 
many killed and wounded; and several executions fol- 
lowed. This was the last blood shed in the "War of 
Liberation. 

On the 28th of January, the watchmen on the hills 
about E'avarino reported that a large squadron of men- 
of-war, of which the leading ship flew the ensign of 
Hellas, was passing along the coast; and the news at 
once spread like wild-fire that the King was coming at 
last. The next day, amid the thunder of artillery and 
the joyful shouts of the people, the fleet entered the 
harbour of E'auplia, and the first King of the Hellenes 
disembarked upon the shores of Greece. 

The landing of the Bavarian King forms a con- 
venient epoch for bringing the narrative of the Greek 
"War of Independence to a close. ^N'ot that King Otho 
proved an effective deus ex machina, to unravel the 
tangled plot of the Hellenic drama; nor that by his 
arrival the Greek question had, as the diplomatists of 



CONCLUDING REMARKS 397 

the Conference had fondly imagined, been settled for 
ever; but it was the formal end of the struggle against 
the Turkish domination; and it opened a new phase in 
the history not only of Greece but of Europe, in the 
commonwealth of which a new Christian kingdom was 
now included. How pregnant this last fact was v/ith 
dangerous issues for the future, the history of the last 
sixty years, and especially the events of the present 
time, have proved. It may be doubted, indeed, 
whether the peril would have been so great to Euro- 
pean peace, had the Powers been less timid in their 
handling of the question of Hellenic independence. It 
is, however, the essential weakness of every Concert 
that, even when its mutual jealousies allow it to 
achieve anything at all, it can never effect more than 
a compromise, ^ow, in politics, compromise is the 
seed of all evils. A one-sided settlement, even when 
unjust, will in the end be better for the world; for, 
though one party to the arrangement may be dissatis- 
fied, the other will be content; whereas, in case of a 
compromise, both sides will be discontented, and the 
chances are that the question at issue, instead of being 
settled, will only be postponed. In the case of the re- 
volt of the Greeks against the Ottoman Empire, the 
truth of this is especially obvious, and has been proved 
only too clearly by the subsequent development of the 



398 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

Levantine question. Yet Metternich alone, of all the 
statesmen of the Concert, realised it clearly at the time, 
and was, from the very outset, opposed to any form of 
compromise. As long as he had any hope of carrying 
the Cabinets of Europe with him, he insisted on the 
absolute right of the Ottoman Government to crush a 
rebellion of its own subjects; yet in the end, though 
he could not be suspected of possessing a shred of Phil- 
hellenic sentiment, it was he who first proposed the 
establishment of a strong and independent Hellenic 
State. In this change of attitude there was no incon- 
sistency. It was merely the objection of a keen and 
far-seeing statesman to those half measures which are 
the expedients of weakness and timidity. The peace 
of Europe he saw could be best maintained by adopt- 
ing one of two alternatives: by crushing or by concili- 
ating Hellenic sentiment. He believed that the policy 
of crushing was safer than that of conciliation; but as 
soon as he saw that the conditions of the problem ren- 
dered the former impossible, he recognised the latter 
as the only alternative. Just, however, as the speed of 
a fleet is that of its slowest vessel, so the policy of a 
Concert is that of its most short-sighted member; and, 
in the settlement of the Greek question, it was Eng- 
land that acted as a drag upon the counsels of Europe. 
Had Canning lived, it is possible that, utterly antagon- 



CONCLUDING REMARKS 399 

istic as the views and aims of the two statesmen really 
were, he might ultimately have united with Metter- 
nich in creating a powerful Greece. With Turkey tied 
hand and foot in the power of Russia, this would in- 
deed have seemed the obvious policy for England, as 
for Austria, to pursue. But the tradition of friendship 
for the Ottoman Empire was too strong for the Tory 
statesmen into whose hands the fate of Hellas had been 
in the first instance committed. They had inherited 
from Canning a policy which they loathed; and 
pledged as they were to bestow some measure of lib- 
erty upon Greece, they doled this out with a niggard 
hand. They seemed to hope that, if they reduced the 
concessions to Greece to the lowest possible point, 
Turkey might, after all, consent to overlook this un- 
friendly action on the part of a friendly Power. But 
' no man loves one the better for giving him the bas- 
tinado, though with never so little a cudgel,' ^ and pos- 
sibly even hates one the worse, if the beating be ac- 
companied by expressions of affection and esteem. To 
the Ottoman Government the attitude of Great Brit- 
ain, even before the battle of l^avarino, was frankly 
incomprehensible. While Lord Strangford, at Con- 
stantinople, was protesting the goodwill of England 

1 Burleigh's Advice to Queen Elizabeth, &c. Fourth collec- 
tion of Somers' Tracts, 1. 101. 



400 THE WAR OF GEEEK INDEPENDENCE 

towards the Porte, Englisli volunteers and English 
gold were being poured into Greece, to aid the rebel- 
lious ray ahs ; and that the British Government had no 
power to prevent this, the Turks refused to believe. 
!Nravarino, of course, confirmed the Porte in its rooted 
distrust of English professions. The open hostility of 
Eussia it could appreciate; but the hypocrisy of a 
Power which illustrated its friendship by slaughtering, 
in time of peace, six thousand of the true believers, 
passed all understanding. 

England, in fact, through her anxiety to maintain 
Turkey as a barrier against Muscovite aggression, 
played straight into the hands of Eussia ; and it should 
have been clear that if such a barrier was to be erected, 
it was certainly not to be found in a Power which 
viewed Great Britain with well-grounded distrust, and 
had, since the Peace of Adrianople, surrendered itself 
to Eussian influence. What Eussia dreaded, and re- 
sisted with all her power, was not the preservation of an 
empire which was bound, sooner or later, to break up, 
but the erection on its ruins of independent Christian 
States strong enough to resist her own advance, and 
especially the creation of a Hellas sufiiciently powerful 
to stem the rising tide of Slavonic influence. If, then, 
it was essential for England to resist the establishment 
of Eussia as a Power in the Mediterranean, this could 



CONCLUDING REMARKS 401 

best have been effected by doing what Russia most 
dreaded, and founding a Greek State on a basis so 
strong that there would have been no danger of its be- 
coming a mere appanage of more powerful neighbours. 
Broadly speaking, this was the only possible policy 
worthy of the name ; for it was the only policy which 
the English people would, in the long run, tolerate. 
But the conditions under which English statesmen 
work make a really strong and consistent foreign pol- 
icy almost impossible. Wellington had been ham- 
pered by the Philhellenic legacies of Canning; Palm- 
erston was hampered by the Turcophile tradition of 
the Tories. In opposition, he had advocated the inclu- 
sion of Crete in the Hellenic kingdom, a course which 
would have obviated many future troubles; in office, 
he could effect no more than the extension of the 
frontier to the line of Arta-Yolo. The Greece thus 
created was strong, but not strong enough to make her 
contented; and ^ what the mixture of strength and 
discontent engenders needs no syllogism to prove.' ^ 
Whilst the Philhellenic policy of the British 
Government had thus succeeded only in achieving 
either too much or too little, the pro-Turkish policy 
into which it speedily relapsed could never be rendered 

1 Lord Burleigh's Advice to Queen Elizabeth, &c. Fourth 
collection of Somers' Tracts, i. 101. 



403 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

really effective^ because it was in constant danger of 
being hampered by the outspokenness of English pub- 
lic opinion, which is not in sympathy with Turkish 
methods of government. The net result, then, of sixty 
years of British diplomacy in the near East is that, at 
the present moment, every vestige of influence which 
England ever possessed at Constantinople has van- 
ished ; and Greece, which might have been a bulwark 
of British power in the Mediterranean, lies crushed 
and bleeding beneath the heel of the Turk. How far 
this latter fact is due to the action of English states- 
men, and how far to the vanity and impatience of the 
Greeks themselves, may be left for the future to de- 
cide. To the author it seems probable that the cau- 
tious diplomacy of Lord Salisbury was directed to the 
creation of that greater Greece which the precipitate 
action of the Greeks themselves, and in no slight de- 
gree also the ill-judged agitation of Philhellenes in 
England and elsewhere, has rendered impossible for 
at least a generation to come.^ 

To the constitution of a nation, however, more is 

1 1 do not think this opinion inconsistent with a sincere 
sympathy with the orig-inal struggle of the Greeks for free- 
dom, or even with their desire for further expansion. But, 
from the point of view of European sentiment, there is all 
the difference in the world between the love of liberty and 
the desire of territorial aggrandisement. A war under- 



CONCLUDINa REMARKS 403 

needed than an extension of territory and the guaran- 
tee of the Powers ; and it has been questioned whether 
the character of the Greeks is such as to warrant their 
being entrusted with any extended dominion. It is 
pointed out that, as a nation, they are bankrupt, and, 
as a people, though possessing many attractive quali- 
ties, factious, unstable, and dishonest. Yet, though 
all this may be said of them, and, indeed, appears only 
too clearly in the history of the "War of Independence, 
that war, and the one which has just been concluded, 
prove that the Greeks are capable of making great sac- 
rifices for the sake of a national ideal; and it is pos- 
sible that, with a wider field on which to work, their 
conceptions of duty and patriotism would likewise ex- 
pand. To maintain that the Greeks are, as a race, in- 
capable of establishing and maintaining a powerful 
State, is to ignore the teaching of a long, if compara- 
tively neglected, period of history. The Byzantine 
Empire was a Greek State; and, hopelessly corrupt as 
it doubtless too often proved itself at the centre, it 
nevertheless preserved civilisation and the remains of 
ancient culture for a thousand years against the flood 

taken merely to substitute 'union' for 'autonomy' in 
Crete could have been justified only by success. As it was, 
the action of the Greeks seems to have been worse than a 
crime — a folly. 



404 THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 

of barbarism whicli, from the north and east, threat- 
ened to overwhelm them. 

We are what suns and winds and waters make us; 

and the Greeks of to-day are very much what their 
fathers were before them. There never was an age 
when Greece was peopled by a race of heroes and phil- 
osophers, or when her counsels were governed solely 
by the purest patriotism. The Athenian crowd which 
listened to the masterpieces of ^schylus or Sophocles 
was as fickle, as superstitious, and as cruel as the Athe- 
nian crowd of to-day. The sun of the ancient culture 
of Hellas is set, and we see but the after-glow which 
lights up the highest and purest peaks; while over all 
that w^as low, and sordid, and commonplace, the night 
of oblivion has fallen. It is not for us, then, to judge 
the modern Greek as unworthy of our sympathy, be- 
cause he seems cast in a less heroic mould than those 
from whom he boasts his descent. Our attitude may 
well be that of Lord Byron, of whom Colonel l^Tapier 
said: ^ All [the Philhellenes] came, expecting to find 
the Peloponnesus filled with Plutarch's men, and all 
returned, thinking the inhabitants of IsTewgate more 
moral. Lord Byron judged them fairly; he knew that 
half-civilised men are full of vices, and that great al- 
lowance must be made for emancipated slaves. He, 



CONCLUSION 405 

therefore, proceeded, bridle in hand, not thinking them 
good, but hoping to make them better.' The condi- 
tions have changed, for Hellas, since then, has en- 
joyed half a century of freedom; yet we should do 
well to regard its people with a like charitable judg- 
ment, and a like hope. For assuredly the future of the 
East lies not with the Turks, who, in spite of their high 
qualities and personal worth, are fettered by a system 
which seems incapable of reform, but with those de- 
spised and often degraded Christian peoples, who yet 
possess, in their religion, if not in their race, the poten- 
tiality of progTess and improvement. 




_ MAP 

to illUB 

THE GREEK WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 

Scale atJagdah HileH 



FrarOieT' of 1881 

ProrvUer of 1832 

TVanii-ep fuceA hyJivitocolofPtli.a 1830.. 



Str^i/bpdJs G*agTaphi£oX J 



INDEX 



Aberdeen, Lord, and Admiral 
Codrington, 301 note; his 
policy with regfard to the 
protocol of March 22, 1829, 
313; suggests a European 
guarantee of the integrity 
of Turkey, 330; on the res- 
ignation of Prince Leo- 
pold, 338 

Acarnania excluded from the 
new State by the protocol 
of February 3, 331 

Acrocorinthos, the, besieged 
by the insurgents, 52; capt- 
ured by Dramali, 102; re- 
taken by the Greeks, 130, 
and note 

Acropolis, see Athens 

Adrianople, Peace of, 327-329 

^gina, island of, made centre 
of Government, 225, 282, 
284; national bank estab- 
lished at, 293, 294; 347 

Afentulis heads rebellion in 
Crete, 153 

Akkerman, Treaty of, 248, 276 



Albania, power of Ali Pasha 
in, 27 

Albanians, 3, 27, 48; revolt of, 
in Northern Greece, 52; 
Mussulman chiefs join the 
Turks, 64, 111, 127, at Kasos, 
156, at Psara, 160; their 
costume assumed by the 
Greeks, 171; before Misso- 
longhi, 183, 193, 196, 201; 
massacre of, at Munychia, 
217; under Asian Bey capit- 
ulate to Hypsilanti, 326; 
under Grivas devastate the 
Morea, 388 

Alexander I., his attitude to- 
wards the Greek revolt, 22, 
78; takes Capodistrias into 
his service, 23; denounces 
the revolt under Hypsilanti, 
37; withdraws his ambassa- 
dor from Constantinople, 
78; dismisses Capodistrias, 
114; reopens relations with 
the Porte, 115; meets the 
Austrian Emperor at Czer- 



407 



408 



INDEX 



nowitz, 116; decides on in- 
dependent action on the 
Greek question, 240; his 
death, 240 

Alexandria, military prepara- 
tions at, 156; attempt of 
Cochrane on, 252; Codring- 
ton at, 300 

Ali, Kara, at Chios, 93; his 
flagship burnt by Kanaris, 
95 

Ali Pasha of Janina, 11; his 
character and career, 25 et 
seq.; his relation to the 
Greek revolt, 29, 96; Greek 
leaders trained at his court, 
91, 133, 203, 325 

Ali Pasha, Governor of Nau- 
plia, 107 

Anagnostaras, 50, 175 

Anatoliko, siege of, 128; feud 
with Missolonghi, 144; its 
capitulation, 192; attacked 
by Hastings, 308; evacuated 
by the Turks, 325 

Andruzzos, 385 

* Apollo,' the, newspaper, sup- 
pressed by Capodistrias, 346 ; 
organ of the Opposition at 
Hydra, 349 

Arachova, destruction of 
Turkish force at, 212; 
plundered by partisans of 
Kolettes, 381 

Areopagus, the, established 
at Salona, 84, 88; quarrels 



with Odysseus, 98; dissolved 
by him, 119 

Argos, first Congress of, 85; 
panic at, on approach of 
Dramali, 103; resistance of 
the townsmen to the Greek 
mercenaries, 229; scene of 
the first Congress of Capo- 
distrias, 320, and of the 
meeting of the National As- 
sembly under Agostino,376; 
occupied by French troops, 
396; fight between French 
and Armatoli at, 396 

Armatoli, origin of, 9; their 
relation to the Klephts, 10 

Armenians, Catholic, ban- 
ished to Angora, 275 

Arsenal at Tophana, destruc- 
tion of, 124 

Arta, attacked by Suliots and 
Mussulman Albanians, 64; 
Greeks capture the Gulf of, 
309; frontier drawn from, 
312, 378, 389, 401 

Asian Bey, invades Attica, 
325; surrenders to Hypsi- 
lanti, 326 

Astros, National Assembly at, 
121; Constitution of, 122, 
288, 395 

Athens, outbreak of the re- 
volt at, 52; Omer Vrioni re- 
lieves the Acropolis of, 62; 
fall of the Acropolis of, 99; 
massacre of the Turks at, 



INDEX 



409 



101; taken by Dramali, 102; 
Odysseus Governor of, 119; 
Gouras commands in the 
Acropolis, 150; stormed by 
the Turks, 206; Reshid be- 
sieges the Acropolis of, 207- 
209; plans of Karaiskakis 
for its relief, 209; arrival of 
Cochrane and Church be- 
fore, 214; operations round, 
215; rout of the Greeks at, 
219; surrender of the 
Acropolis of, 221; retained 
by the Turks, 326 

Attica, revolt in, 52; tyranny 
of Gouras in, 205; Reshid 
Pasha welcomed by the 
peasants of, 206; Karaiska- 
kis commands in, 208; op- 
erations in, 208-222; its 
population Albanian, 332; 
devastation of, by the 
Turks, 341; evacuation of, 
341, 342 

Austria, and Prince Alexan- 
der Hypsilanti, 41; Austrian 
vessels captured by Greek 
privateers, 307; Anglo-Aus- 
trian entente, 331. (For the 
attitude of Austria on the 
Greek question, see Metter- 
nich.) 

Bairam, the Feast of, Ibra- 
him in the Bay of Makry 
celebrates, 158 



Bceotia, rising in, 52; its pop- 
ulation Albanian, 332 

Bosphorus, Russian privileges 
in the navigation of the, IS, 
327 

Botzares, Constantine, 172, 
393 

Botzares, Marko, leads the 
Suliots against Arta, 64; his 
exploit at Karpenisi, 127; 
Byron offers to assist him, 
140; his follovs^ers taken 
over by Byron, 143 

Botzares, Notaris, leads the 
defence of Missolonghi,184; 
plans the final sortie, 195, 
197, 200 

Brigands, see Klephts 

Bucharest, Alexander Hypsi- 
lanti at, 35, 36 

Budrun, naval engagements 
off, 163-166 

Bulgarian mercenaries em- 
ployed by the Greeks, 133 

Burbaki, Colonel, French of- 
ficer, death of, 214 

Byron, Lord, arrives in Greece, 
135; helps to raise the first 
Greek loans, 135, 136; his 
impressions of Greece and 
of the Greeks, 136, 138, 139; 
his efforts to reconcile the 
factions, 140, 141; goes to 
Missolonghi, 141; his illness 
and death, 144; effect of his 
death on Europe, 144 



4i0 



INDEX 



Canning, his attitude toward 
the Greek question, 116 and 
note, 237; withdraws from 
the St. Petersburg Confer- 
ence, 238; opens negotia- 
tions with the Czar, 245, 
246; his death, 250 

Canning, Sir Stratford, see 
Redcliffe, Lord Stratford de 

Capitulations, violation of, 
by the Greeks, 55, 58, 59, 100 

Capodistrias, Count Agostino, 
295, 324; his character, 375; 
elected President, 376; op- 
position to, 377; refuses the 
compromise suggested by 
the Powers, 378; supported 
by the Powers, 379; elected 
Regent, 382; refuses the 
mixed Government pro- 
posed by the Powers, 383; 
resigns, 383 

Capodistrias, Count John, For- 
eign Minister of Russia, 23; 
refuses the leadership of 
the Hetairia, 24; dismissed 
by Alexander I., 114; elect- 
ed President of Greece, 225 ; 
his arrival in Greece, 281- 
283; refuses a Russian pen- 
sion, 282; his arbitrary prin- 
ciples, 286; his unconstitu- 
tional rule, 287-290; difficul- 
ties of his position, 290; at- 
tempts at military reform, 
291; suppresses piracy, 292, 



293; establishes a national 
bank, 293; appeals to the 
Powers for funds, 294; his 
nepotism, 294, 295; tries to 
procure the withdrawal of 
Ibrahim, 300; asks the 
French to aid against the 
Turks in North Hellas, 303; 
his attitude towards the 
protocol of November 16, 
304; aims at aiding Russia, 
304, 306; stirs up rebellion 
in Crete, 305; visits West 
Hellas, 308; suggests Prince 
Leopold as candidate for 
the crown, 311; his views on 
the protocol of March 22, 
315, 316, 317; his tyranny, 
318; summons a Congress 
at Argos, 320; his policy en- 
dorsed by the Congress, 321, 
322; beginnings of opposi- 
tion to, 323; his disappoint- 
ment at the terms of the 
Peace of Adrianople, 328; 
his attitude towards the 
protocol of February 3, 333; 
opposition to, 335, 336; his 
attitude towards the candi- 
dature of Prince Leopold, 
317, 336, 337; effect of the 
July revolution on the posi- 
tion of, 344; attempts to 
curtail the liberty of the 
press, 345-347; his quarrel 
with Hydra, 347-359; avows 



INDEX 



411 



his dependence on Russia, 
357; attempts to recover his 
popularity, 359; his attempt 
to crush the Mainotes, 360- 
366; his treatment of Pe- 
trobey, 366; his assassina- 
tion, 368; his character, 
370, 371 

Capodistrias, Viaro, 295, 348, 
359 

Castlereag-h, Lord, 78, 115 

Catherine II., encourages the 
hopes of the Greeks, 20; 
sends a fleet to stir up re- 
bellion in the Morea, 20 

Charles X., 299, 319, 343 

Chios, Lykourgos lands in, 
92; Kara Ali lands in, 93; 
flight of Lykourgos, 93; 
massacre of Christian in- 
habitants, 93; Colonel Fab- 
vier's expedition to, 257 

Christians, position of, in the 
Ottoman Empire, 8 et seq.; 
Ali Pasha and, 28 note 

Church, Sir Richard, ap- 
pointed Commander - in - 
Chief, 214; before Athens, 
215; his neglect during the 
massacre of St. Spiridion, 
216, 217; his abortive at- 
tack on Athens, 219; orders 
the surrender of the Acrop- 
olis, 221; expedition to Mis- 
solonghi, 257; operations 
in West Hellas, 308; his 



opinion of the frontier fixed 
by the London protocol, 338 

Civil War, First, 131; Second, 
' War of the Primates,' 147; 
of Hydra against Capodis- 
trias, 351; against Agostino 
Capodistrias, 381 

Cochrane, Lord, his services 
engaged by the Greeks, 137; 
appointed High Admiral, 
214; before Athens, 216; 
abortive expedition to Alex-- 
andria, 252 ; victory off Cape 
Papas, 253; expedition to 
Missolonghi, 257; resigns 
his command, 295 

Codrington, Admiral Sir Ed- 
ward, intervenes in the fac- 
tion war at Nauplia, 231; 
ordered to blockade the 
Morea, 249 ; convention with 
Ibrahim at Navarino, 255; 
forbids Cochrane to land in 
Albania, 258; attacks the 
Ottoman squadron, 262; 
sends ultimatum to Ibra- 
him, 263; decides to enter 
the harbour, 264; battle of 
Navarino, 265; criticism of 
his action in London, 271; 
his convention with Me- 
hemet Ali, 300; Lord Aber- 
deen's reference to him, 301 
note 

Commerce, growth of Greek, 
after Kainardji, and its ef- 



412 



INDEX 



feet on the Greek naval 
power, 13, 14 

Communal system, preserved 
by the Turks, 14; its im- 
portance during" the periods 
of anarchy, 15, 79, 80, 395; 
abolished by Capodistrias, 
289 

Constantinople, outburst of 
fanaticism at, after the 
Greek massacres, 75; execu- 
tion of the Greek Drago- 
man and the Patriarch, 76, 
77; destruction of the ar- 
senal of Tophana, 124; mas- 
sacre of the Janissaries, 247; 
banishment of the Catholic 
Armenians, 275, 276 

Constitution, of Epidaurus, 
85; of Astros, 121; of Troe- 
zene, 226 

Corinth, 106, 233, 391 

Coron, held by the Turks, 52, 
64, 79, 98, 126; occupied by 
the French, 302, 304 

Crete, represented in the Na- 
tional Assembly, 121; in- 
surrection in, 153; reduced 
by Hussein Bey, 154, 155; 
atrocities by the Egyptians, 
154, 155 note; Cretan ref- 
ugees as pirates, 228; at- 
tempt of the Greeks to re- 
vive the rebellion, 257; 
renewed revolt, 305; Turk- 
ish reform rejected at the 



instigation of the Greeks, 
340; Palmerston and, 401 
Cyclades, pirate strongholds 
established in the, 228; un- 
der the protection of the 
Powers, 303; 312, 332 

Damala, National Assembly 
at, 225, 291 

Dania, Colonel, commands 
the corps of Philhellenes, 
108 

Danubian Principalities, in- 
surrection in, 30; and Rus- 
sia, 277, 327 

Dardanelles, the, Russian 
rights in, 13, 114, 115, 248 

Dervenaki, Pass of, destruc- 
tion of Dramali's army in 
the, 105 

Diakos, Athanasios, takes Le- 
vadia, 52; defeated and exe- 
cuted, 62 

Diebitsch, General, Russian 
Commander-in-Chief, con- 
cludes the Peace of Adrian- 
ople, 326, 327 

Dikaios, see Phlesas, Pappa 

Djavellas, his defence of Klis- 
sova, 193, 199; levies black- 
mail on the peasants, 228; 
his feud with Grivas, 377; 
381, 386, 391 

Dragashan, battle of, 39 

Dramali (Mahmoud Ali, Pasha 
of Drama), prepares to in- 



INDEX 



413 



vade Greece, 98, 100; takes 
Athens and the Acropolis, 
102; advances into Argolis, 
103; Mehmet fails to bring 
him supplies, 104; his re- 
treat, and defeat in the Pass 
of Dervenaki, 105; again 
defeated in the Pass of 
Agionori, 106; his escape to 
Corinth, and death, 106 
Dudley, Lord, on the Treaty 
of London, 272, 273 

East Hellas, see Hellas 

Egypt, see Mehemet Ali 

England, new attitude on the 
Eastern question, 116 and 
note; Philhellenic enthusi- 
asm in, 136; reception of 
the news of the battle of 
Navarino in, 270; vacillat- 
ing policy after Navarino, 
274; Anglo-Austrian entente, 
331 (see also London) 

Epidaurus, Constitution of, 
85 

Eresos, first use of fire-ships 
in the Bay of, 71 

Eubcea, 64, 89, 312, 332 

Eynardt, Swiss banker and 
Philhellene, 294, 319 

Fabvier, Colonel (ex-officer 
of Napoleon), defeated at 
Chaidari, 209; helps to de- 
fend the Acropolis, 211; re- 



organises the Greek troops, 
213; expedition to Chios, 
257; leaves the Greek ser- 
vice, 291 

Fire-ships, first use of, 71; de- 
struction of Ottoman line- 
of-battle ships by, 72; qual- 
ities necessary for their 
effective use, 74; exploits of 
Kanaris with, 94, 95, 107, 
162, 163; their ineffective- 
ness against a well-trained 
enemy, 165 

Fleet, Greek, commercial 
origin of the, 13; first ex- 
ploits of, 68; insubordina- 
tion in, 66, 70, 167, 168, 191; 
destruction of that of Gal- 
axidi, 73; purchase of the 
Hellas, 137; first employ- 
ment of steamers, 137, 215; 
seized by Miaoulis at Poros, 
355 

Fleet, Ottoman, manned by 
Greek seamen, 13; effect of 
the revolt of the Greek isl- 
ands on, 67, 68; its condi- 
tion at the outset of the 
war, 68; first actions with 
the Greeks, 70; Greek and 
Turkish vessels compared, 
70, 73; its inaction under 
Mehmet Pasha, 104, 107; 
under Khosrew Pasha, 125 
(see Khosrew) ; compared 
with that of Mehemet Ali, 



4M 



INDEX 



165; destroyed at Navarino, 
266 

France, supports the policy 
of Metternicli, 240; sup- 
ports the protocol of St. 
Petersburg, 248; joins Eng- 
land and Eussia in the 
Treaty of London for se- 
curing the autonomy of 
Greece, 249; reception of 
the news of the battle 
of Navarino in, 271; the 
French occupation of the 
Morea, 299, 301, 304; the 
Kevolution of 1830, 341, 343; 
the French at Nauplia, 386 

Francis I., Emperor of Aus- 
tria, and the execution of 
the Patriarch, 77; meets the 
Czar at Czernowitz, 116 

Galatz, massacre of Mussul- 
mans at, 32 
Galaxidi, destruction of, 73 
Georgaki of Olympus, General 
under Prince Alexander 
Hypsilanti, 35, 38-42 
Germanos, Archbishop of Pat- 
ras, Hetairist leader, 46; 
proclaims the revolt at 
Kalavryta, 48; his unsuc- 
cessful attack on Patras, 
49; his character, 81, 82 
Goderich, Lord, 270, 273 
Gogos, his treachery at the 
battle of Peta, 109 



Gordon, General, on the Greek 
Government, 136; in Greece, 
213, 214, 215 

Gouras, lieutenant of Odys- 
seus, 126; invades the 
Morea during the second 
civil war, 148; defeats and 
murders Odysseus, 149, 150; 
commands in the Acropolis, 
150, 205; his tyranny, 205, 
206; his death, 210; heroism 
of his wife, 210 (cf. 126) 

Grabusa, island of, 257; be- 
comes a pirate stronghold, 
292; destroyed by the allied 
fleet, 293; sold to Egypt, 
340 

Gravia, actions at the khan 
of, 62, 90, 119 

Greece: interest of Europe in 
Greece, 1, 2, 402 and note; 
the barbarian invasions and 
the continuity of the Greek 
race, 3; causes of the revo- 
lution, 7; under the Otto- 
man rule, 8 et seq.; growth 
of brigandage, 10; com- 
munal liberties, 14; out- 
break of the revolt, 48; 
spread of the insurrection 
to continental Greece, 52, 
and to the islands, 65; dif- 
ficulty of forming a central 
Government, 79; the Senate 
of the Peloponnese formed, 
81; first meeting of the 



INDEX 



415 



National Convention, 84 ; 
Mavrocordatos elected Pres- 
ident, 85; plan of Mahmoud 
II. for the reconquest of 
Greece, 97; failure of Dra- 
mali's invasion, 102-106; 
Greek claims recognised by- 
England, 116; Kussia pro- 
poses the division of Greece 
into separate principalities, 
117; power of the military 
chiefs, 118, 119, 120; Nation- 
al Assembly at Astros, 121; 
a new Government organ- 
ised, 122; anarchy, 124, 125; 
invasion of Yussuf and 
Mustai Pashas, 124-129; re- 
newed anarchy, 129, 130; 
first civil war, 131; Govern- 
ment of Konduriottes, 132; 
Lord Byron in Greece, 135- 
145; the second civil war, 
148, 149; strong position of 
the Government at the be- 
ginning of 1825, 150; inter- 
vention of Mehemet Ali, 
153-181; desperate condition 
of Greece at the end of 1825, 
180, 181; effect in Europe of 
the defence of Missolonghi, 
203; reconquest of East 
Hellas by Keshid Pasha, 
205-222; renewed war of 
parties, 224 ; Capodistrias 
elected President, 225; Con- 
stitution of Troezene pub- 



lished, 226; renewed an- 
archy, 227; Greece and the 
Powers, 237; proposal to 
place Greece under British 
protection, 245 ; interven- 
tion of the three allied 
Powers, 249, 250; events 
leading up to the battle of 
Navarino, 253-267; effect in 
Greece of the battle of 
Navarino and of the Rus- 
sian declaration of war, 
278; the presidency of 
Capodistrias, 281-296; Ibra- 
him evacuates the Morea, 
302; French occupation of 
the Morea, 302-304; Hypsi- 
lanti regains East Hellas, 
307; the protocol of March 
22, 1829, 312-317; unconsti- 
tutional rule of Capodis- 
trias, 317-323; last incidents 
of the war, 325, 326; the 
London protocol of Febru- 
ary 3, 1830, and its effect on 
Greek opinion, 331-334; the 
Hydriot rebellion, 351-359; 
the attempt to subdue the 
Mainotes, 363, 364; assas- 
sination of Capodistrias, 
368; Provisional Govern- 
ment appointed, 375; presi- 
dency of Agostino Capo- 
distrias, 376-384; anarchy 
and civil war, 377-385; Gov- 
ernment of Kolettes, 385; 



416 



INDEX 



renewed anarchy, 387-396; 
Otho of Bavaria accepts the 
crown, 389; his arrival in 
Greece, 396 

Greek Church, 4-7 

Greek language, 16-18 

Greeks, question as to the 
origin of the modern, 2 et 
seq.; their clergy, 5, 6; their 
status in Turkey, 8 et seq.; 
effect on their position of 
the Treaty of Kainardji, 13; 
of the islands, 13; their po- 
litical and social organisa- 
tion, 13, 14; the Primates, 
14; the Phanariot, 15; their 
violation of capitulations, 
55, 58, 59, 100; their tenden- 
cy to local divisions, 79, 85, 
147, 224, 229 

Gregorios, Patriarch of Con- 
stantinople, execution of, 
77 

Grisiotis, 126, 390, 396 

Grivas, Eumeliot chief, holds 
the castle of Palamidi, 229, 
230, 232; submits to Capo- 
distrias, 283, 284; in opposi- 
tion to Capodistrias, 321, 
377; harries the Morea, 387, 
391, 393 

Grivas, Gardikiotis, 391, 394 

Hastings, Captain, Philhel- 
lene, advises the purchase 
of the Karteria, 165; at 



Munychia, 215; action in 
the bay of Salona, 258-260; 
his death, 308 

Hellas, East, rising in, 52; as 
a separate administrative 
centre, 84; under the rule 
of Odysseus, 119; under 
Gouras, 150; invaded by 
Kiutayeh, 205 ; devastated 
by the Turks, 341 ; civil war 
in (1832), 380 

Hellas, West, rising in, 52 ; its 
government organised by 
Mavrocordatos, 84; invaded 
by Omer Vrioni, 111; invad- 
ed by Mustai Pasha, 124, 
127, 128; Agostino Capodis- 
trias appointed Adminis- 
trator, 324; final surrender 
of places held by the Turks, 
325 

Hellas, the frigate, purchase 
of, 137; destruction of, 356 

Hellenes, name of, revived by 
modern Greeks, 18 

Hetairia Philike, the, origin 
and objects of, 20, 21; its 
leadership refused by Capo- 
distrias, 23, 24; Prince Alex- 
ander Hypsilanti accepts 
the leadership, 24; its rela- 
tions with Ali Pasha, 28 and 
note; share of its members 
in the massacre at Galatz, 
33; anathematised by the 
Patriarch, 37 ; its emissaries 



INDEX 



417 



in the Morea, 45; Sultan 
Mahmoud executes many 
members by way of repri- 
sals, 76 

Heyden, Admiral von, 249, 
262, 306 

Holy Alliance, the, Alexander 
I. and, 22, 78; its threatened 
disruption, 115; its dissolu- 
tion, 238, 239 

Hussein Bey Djeritli, reduces 
Crete, 154; destroys Kasos, 
157; storms Sphakteria, 173, 
174; his death, 194 

Hydra, declares for the Greek 
cause, 65; its claims reject- 
ed by Capodistrias, 292; 
centre of opposition to the 
government, 346-349, 351; 
an opposition Assembly 
summoned here, 358 

Hydriots, the, their character, 
66, 147, 167, 171, 191 et pas- 
sim 

Hypsilanti, Prince Alexander, 
accepts the leadership of 
the Greeks, 24; begins the 
revolt in theDanubian prin- 
cipalities, 30; connives at 
the massacre of Mussul- 
mans, 34; affects royal airs, 
34; his forces, 35; occupies 
Bucharest, 36; excommuni- 
cated by the Patriarch, and 
denounced by the Czar, 37; 
his defeat, and flight, 40; 



imprisoned in Austria, and 
dies, 41 

Hypsilanti, Prince Demetrius, 
15; at Monemvasia, 53; at 
Tripolitza, 60; his charac- 
ter, 54, 83; his pretensions, 
82; his government, 83-85; 
authorises the attempt on 
Chios, 92; attacks Nauplia, 
97; at Argos, 103; holds 
Larissa against Dramali, 
104, 119, 153; helps to de- 
fend the mills of Lerna 
against Ibrahim, 179, 231, 
232; appointed Commander- 
in-Chief by Capodistrias, 
291; final victories in East 
Hellas, 307, 326; his death, 
390 

Hypsilanti, Prince Nicholas, 
39, 40 

Ibrahim, Egyptian Command- 
er-in-Chief, son of jNIehemet 
Ali, 153; sails from Alex- 
andria, 157; at Budrun, 163- 
166; reaches Crete, 167; 
lands at Modon, 168; his 
victories in the Morea, 173, 
174-176, 178-181; at Misso- 
longhi, 189-196; returns to 
the Morea, 204, 224; cam- 
paign in Elis, 232, 233; in 
:Messenia, 234, 235, 236; his 
Convention with the allied 
admirals, 255; breaks the 



418 



I^STDEX 



Convention, 260, 262; after 
the battle of Navarino, 268- 
270; devastates the Morea 
and destroys Tripolitza,290, 
293; evacuates the Morea, 
301, 302 

Ionian Islands, 110, 138, 146, 
161 

Ismail Djebel Akhdar, de- 
stroys Galaxidi, 72, 73; com- 
mands the Egyptian ships 
sent against Kasos, 156 

Ismail Pacho Bey, 28, 47 

Janina, Court of Ali Pasha 
at, 27; siege of, 29, 47, 64 

Janissaries, destruction of 
the, 247 

Kainakdji, Treaty of, 13, 20 
Kalamata, first victory of in- 
surgents at, 51 
Kalavryta, Germanos raises 
the standard of the Cross 
at, 48 
Kallergis, 356, 388, 391, 394 
Ivanaris, Constantine, his ex- 
ploit off Chios, 94, 95; fur- 
ther successes with fire- 
ships, 107, 162, 163; sup- 
ports Capodistrias, 352, 364, 
385 
Karaiskakis, raid on Misso- 
longhi, 144; invades the 
Morea during the second 
civil war, 148; at the battle 



of Krommydi, 172, 173; at 
the siege of Missolonghi, 
187, 195, 196, 201; character 
and antecedents, 207, 208; 
made Commander-in-Chief, 
208, 209; his victories, 212, 
213; during the operations 
before Athens, 214-217; his 
death, 218 
Karalampos, 123, 131 
Karatasos, 257, 391 
Karavia instigates massacre 

at Galatz, 33, 34; 40 
Karteria, steamer commanded 
by Captain Hastings, 137, 
165, 215, 258-260, 351 
Karystos, 89, 90, 91, 126 
Karytasna, siege of, 51, 387 
Kasos, destruction of, 157 
Khosrew Pasha, Turkish ad- 
miral, his ineffective cruise 
in aid of the expedition of 
Mustai Pasha, 125, 126; de- 
stroys Psara, 159-168; at- 
tacks Samos, 162, 163; rela- 
tions with Ibrahim, 163, 
166; at Missolonghi, 185, 
186 
Khurshid Pasha, besieges Ali 
Pasha in Janina, 29, 47, 
60; prepares to reconquer 
Greece, 97, 98; failure of his 
plan, 106-108; his death, 112 
Kiutayeh, see Eeshid Pasha 
Klephts, the, 10-13, 27 et pas- 
sim 



INDEX 



419 



Klissova, repulse of Arab and 
Ottoman troops from, 193 

Ivolettes, Minister of War, 91, 
99; in the Government of 
Ivonduriottes, 131-133, 148; 
a member of the Provision- 
al Committee after the 
death of Capodistrias, 375; 
joins the disaffected Eu- 
meliots, 377, 381; marches 
on Nauplia, 383; at the head 
of the Government, 384-386; 
impotence of his Govern- 
ment, 394 

Kolokotrones, Gennaios, 229, 
230, 234, 235, 388 

Kolokotrones, Panos, death 
of, 148 

Kolokotrones, Theodore, his 
character, 50 and note; leads 
the revolt in the Morea, 50; 
defeated before Karytsena, 
51, 52; his victory at Val- 
tetsi, 60; takes Tripolitza, 
61; during" the campaign of 
Dramali, 103, 105, 106; takes 
Nauplia, 107; his power in 
the Morea, 119, 120; his 
quarrel with Mavrocordatos 
and the Assembly, 123, 124, 
126; during the first civil 
war, 129-134; and Byron, 
138; begins the second civil 
war, 147; imprisoned in 
Hydra, 149; commands 
against Ibrahim, 179, 180; 



excluded from the Govern- 
ment of Zaimis, 224; his 
successes against Ibrahim, 
233-235; supports Capodis- 
trias, 288, 320, 321; after the 
death of Capodistrias, 375; 
revolts against the Govern- 
ment of Kolettes, 387-389, 
393-395 

Ivonduriottes, his Presidency, 
131, 132, 133, 147-149; his 
incapacity, 132, 177; his 
' campaign ' against Ibra- 
him, 171; his attitude to- 
wards Capodistrias, 288, 323, 
351; a member of the op- 
position Government at Me- 
gara, 377 

Korais, Adamantios, and the 
Greek language, 16-18; sug- 
gests Lafayette as Presi- 
dent, 345 

Kriezotes, 211, 257 

Krommydi, battle of, 173 

Laibach, Congress of, 22 
Larissa, defence of the castle 

of, 104 
Leopold of Coburg, Prince, 

311, 316, 317, 332, 334-339 
Lepanto, 64, 144, 325, 380 
Lerna, defeat of Ibrahim at, 

179 
Levadia, 52, 62, 126, 307 
Loans, Greek, raised in Lon- 
don, 135, 136; their destina- 



420 



INDEX 



tion, 137; detained by the 
Ionian Government, 146 ; 
Greek parties and the, 146- 
148, 161, 170, 171; Turkey 
and the, 203, 400; advanced 
by European Governments, 
319 
London, Treaty of (July 6, 
1827), 249, 253, 272, 273, 274; 
Treaty of (May 7, 1832), 
389, 392; Conference of, 299, 
304, 329-331, 341, 377, 379, 
383, 389; end of the Confer- 
ence of, 391, 392; protocols 
of the Conference of (March 
22, 1829), 312, (February 3, 

1830) 331, (September 26, 

1831) 378, (January 7, 1832) 
379, (March 7, 1832) 383 

Londos, 48, 121, 132, 134, 147, 

148 
Ludwig" of Bavaria, King, 203, 

294, 389, 393 

Macedonia, revolt suppressed 
in, 97; attempt to revive it, 
257 

Mahmoud, Sultan, orders re- 
prisals for the Greek atroc- 
ities, 75-77; and the revolt 
in Chios, 92; his plan for 
the suppression of the 
Greek insurrection, 97; ap- 
peals to Mehemet Ali, 152, 
153; reforms the army, 247; 
destroys the Janissaries, 



247; his indignation w^ith 
Eussia and the Protocol of 
St. Petersburg, 247, 248; ef- 
fect of the battle of Nava- 
rino on, 276 

Mainotes, the, 50-53, 130, 132, 
235, 314, 360-370, 381, 395 

Maison, General, commands 
the French expedition, 301, 
302 

Makriyanni, 179, 210 

I\Iakry, Ibrahim in the Bay 
of, 158 

Makrynoros, Pass of, 110, 112, 
183 

Maniaki, battle of, 178 

Mavrocordatos, Alexander, 15, 
83; elected President, 85; 
his character, 86; campaign 
in West Hellas, 108; at Mis- 
solonghi. 111; his quarrel 
w^ith Kolokotrones, 123, 129; 
corresponds with Byron, 
138, 141; at Sphakteria, 175; 
favours the ' English' party, 
224; financial adviser to 
Capodistrias, 288; his op- 
position to Capodistrias, 
323, 351, 377 

Mavromichales, Constantine, 
179, 364, 365; assassinates 
Capodistrias, 368 

Mavromichales, Djami, 363 

Mavromichales, Elias, death 
of, 89 

Mavromichales, George, 175, 



INDEX 



421 



227; assassinates Capodis- 
trias, 368-370 

Mavromichales, Petros, Bey 
of the Maina, see Petrobey 

Megara, Opposition Govern- 
ment at, 377 

ISIegaspilaion, repulse of Ib- 
rahim by the monks of, 234 

Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Egypt, 
his Convention w^ith the 
Sultan, 152; his navy, 158, 
252, 254, 255; arranges a 
treaty with Codrington, 
300; buys Crete, 340 

Mehmet Pasha, Turkish ad- 
miral, neglects to support 
Dramali's invasion, 104; his 
cowardice in not relieving 
Nauplia, 107 

Messenia, the rising in, 50, 
234, 381 

Metaxas, 123, 131, 138 

Metternich, Prince,' 22; and 
Alexander L, 78, 113, 237; 
his object to prevent a Rus- 
so-Turkish war, 114; moots 
the idea of Greek indepen- 
dence, 239; his opinion of the 
Protocol of St. Petersburg, 
247, 248; proposes Austrian 
mediation, 250; his opinion 
of Navarino, 270; his at- 
tempts to avert the Russo- 
Turkish war, 277, 278; on 
the Triple Alliance, 297, 
313, 314, 319; his attitude 



toward the Greek question, 
398 

Miaoulis, Andreas, Greek ad- 
miral, his character, 68, 69; 
attacks the Turkish fleet 
off Chios, 94, 133, 162; vic- 
tories off Budrun and Crete, 
164-166, 167; destroys the 
Egyptian squadron in the 
harbour of Modon, 176; re- 
lieves Missolonghi, 187, 191; 
fails to relieve Missolonghi, 
194; consents to serve un- 
der Cochrane, 214; relieves 
Samos, 223; destroys pirate 
ships, 293; his opposition to 
Capodistrias, 323, 351; seizes 
the arsenal and fleet at 
Poros, 352; blows up the 
Hellas, 356, 393 

Missolonghi, revolt of, 52; 
Mavrocordatos at, 83, 84; 
first siege of. 111; Byron at, 
142-144; the second siege of, 
182-203; later history of, 
257, 258, 325, 391 

Modon, siege of, 52, 64, 79, 98, 
126, 168, 302 

Moldavia, Greek rising in, 30- 
42 

Monemvasia, siege of, 52-56, 
381 

Morea, the, local self-govern- 
ment in, 14; preparations 
for the revolt in, 44 et seq.; 
effect of the earthquake of 



422 



Il^DEX 



1820 in, 45; outbreak of the 
insurrection in, 48; exter- 
mination of the Mussulman 
inhabitants of, 48 et seq.; 
pestilence following the fall 
of Tripolitza, 75; landing of 
Ibrahim in, 168; devasta- 
tion of, 180, 235, 236, 262, 
284; French occupation of, 
299, 301; under the protec- 
tion of Europe, 303 
Munychia, 214, 215, 216, 220 
Mussulmans, their exclusive- 
ness favours the preserva- 
tion of the characteristics 
of the conquered Christian 
races, 5; their relation to 
the Eayahs, 9; in theMorea, 
14, 44; Ali Pasha's merce- 
naries refuse to massacre, 
27; massacred by the Greeks, 
37, 33, 48, 51, 52, 56, 57, 59, 
61, 65, 66, 93, 100, 101, 217; 
of Monemvasia, their char- 
acter described by Admiral 
Haglan, 56; allied with the 
Suliots against Arta, 64; re- 
prisals by, at Constanti- 
nople, 75; massacre the 
population of Chios, 93; 
their atrocities in Crete, 
154; appeal of Ibrahim to 
the religious fanaticism of, 
158; of Asia Minor, their 
hatred of the Psariots, 159; 
their observance of capitu- 



lations, 192 note; Sultan 
Mahmoud proclaims a Holy 
War, 276; evacuation of 
Greece by the, 341; under 
Grivas ravage the Morea, 
388 

Mustai Pasha invades West 
Hellas, 124, 127-129 

Mustapha Bey, defeated at 
Arachova, 211, 212; Otto- 
man commander at Nava- 
rino, 261; Turkish com- 
mander in Crete, 305 

Musuri, Dragoman to the 
Porte, executed, 76 

National Assembly, (1821) 
publishes the Constitution 
of Epidaurus, 85; (1822) 
Constitution of Astros, 121; 
(1827) Constitution of Troe- 
zene, elects Capodistrias, 
225; summoned to Argos by 
Capodistrias (1829), 320-323; 
elects Agostino Capodis- 
trias (1831), 375; summoned 
by Kolettes (1832), 386, 387; 
finally dispersed by Grisi- 
otis, 390 

Nauplia, siege of, 61, 79, 97; 
surrender of, 107; Koloko- 
trones in, 130; during the 
civil wars, 133, 134, 147; 
held by the bands of Photo- 
maras and Grivas, 228-232; 
Capodistrias at, 284; the 



INDEX 



423 



Mavromichales imprisoned 
at, 364, 3G5, 366; occupied 
by Kolettes, 383; garrisoned 
by the French, 391; recep- 
tion of King- Otho at, 396 

Navarino, siege of, 52; mas- 
sacre at, 58; besieged by 
Ibrahim, 172-176; Codring- 
ton at, 255, 256; battle of^ 
265-267; effects of the bat- 
tle of, 268-280, 400; occupied 
by the French, 302, 304 

Nenekos, defection of, 233-235 

Nicholas I., Czar, 41; his ac- 
cession, 241; attitude to- 
wards the Greeks, 244; and 
Turkey, 246, 276, 277; and 
Capodistrias, 281 

Niketas, 50, 126, 130 note, 146, 
233, 235, 321, 356, 385, 391 

Notaras, 132, 214, 233, 390 

Odysseus of Ithaka, Captain 
of Armatoli, defeated at 
the khan of Gravia and at 
Scripu, 62, 63, 120; his 
equivocal conduct before 
Karystos, 90; his character 
and designs, 90, 91; attacks 
Zeituni, 98; attempt of the 
Government to remove him 
from the command of East 
Hellas, 98; Pelaskas and 
Noutzas sent to supersede 
him, and are murdered by 
him, 99; helps Kolokotrones 



against Dramali, 106; his 
inactivity during the in- 
vasion of Yussuf Pasha, 
126, 127; his supremacy in 
East Hellas, 132; attempts 
to get Byron into his hands, 
145; his relations w^ith Col- 
onel Stanhope, 145 and note; 
his disgust at not receiving 
a share of the loan, 146, 147; 
his treason, 149; defeated 
by Gouras, 149; imprisoned 
and murdered, 150 

Omer Vrioni, defeats Diakos, 
62; retreats from Attica, 63; 
his invasion of West Hellas, 
97, 98; besieges Missolon- 
ghi, 110-112; joins Mustai in 
the siege of Anatoliko, 128; 
defeated by Karaiskakis, 
212, 213 

Otho, Prince, of Bavaria, 
elected King of Greece, 379, 
380, 389, 393; his arrival, 
396 

Palmerston, Lord, 338, 401 
Panhellenium, the, 288 
Panourias, a Klepht, heads 

the rising at Salona, 52 
Papadiamantox^ulos, 48, 184, 

199 
Paparigopulos, Iletairist, sent 
by Ali Pasha to Russia, 28 
note; corrupts Ottoman gar- 
risons, 325 



424 



INDEX 



Papas, action off Cape, 253 

Paploutas, 234, 235 

Patras, rising- at, 49, 52, 61, 64, 
79, 86, 98, 234, 235, 308, 386 

Patriarch of Constantinople, 
official head of the Greek 
world, 5; execution of the, 
77 

Peta, battle of, 109 

Petrobey, Mavromichales, Bey 
of the Maina, joins the in- 
surgents, 50; before Kala- 
mata, 51; at Missolonghi, 
111; President of the Ex- 
ecutive, 122; supports Ko- 
lokotrones, 130, 132; his ap- 
peal for funds to Byron, 
138; his relations with 
Capodistrias, 288, 360-362; 
imprisoned, 365, 366, 367 

Phanariots, the, 15, 16, 118 

Philhellenes, the Corps of, 
108, 109; in Europe, 145, 202, 
203, 280, 400 

Phlesas, Pappa (Dikaios), 
Hetairist agitator, 45, 46; at 
the battle of Maniaka, 177- 
179 

Photomaras, made Governor 
of Nauplia, 134, 229; feud 
with Grivas, 230, 232, 283, 
284 

Piada, National Assembly at, 
85, 225 

Pirates, Greek merchantmen 
armed against, 14; Greek 



warships act like, 66; from 
Algiers in the Ottoman 
ships, 68; of Kasos, 156; of 
Psara, 162; connived at by 
the provisional Government, 
227, 228; immense increase 
of, 253; Capodistrias and the 
suppression of the, 292; of 
Grabusa destroyed by Sir 
Thomas Staines, 293; at 
Skopelos, at Skiathos sup- 
pressed by Miaoulis, 293; 
Greek privateers act as, 306, 
307 

Polyzoides, editor of the 
' Apollo,' 345, 346, 349 

Poros, Commission of, 311; 
Protocol of, 312, 347; action 
of Miaoulis at, 351, 352, 355, 
356, 357 

Press, liberty of the, pro- 
claimed by the Constitution 
of Troezene, 226; attacked 
by Capodistrias, 345-347 

Primates of the Morea, 14, 15; 
summoned by the Turkish 
kaimakam to Tripolitza, 47; 
join the revolt, 48; their 
selfish aims, 80; their op- 
position to Demetrius Hyp- 
silanti and the Phanariots, 
82, 83; they oppose the 
National Assembly, 84; re- 
vive the Peloponnesian Sen- 
ate, 85; their opposition to 
the military chiefs, 122 ct 



INDEX 



425 



seq., 130 ct seq.; their rupt- 
ure with the islanders, 134; 
they revolt against the Gov- 
ernment of Konduriottes, 
147; they are defeated and 
their houses burnt, 148; 
heroism of, at Missolonghi, 
199; their opposition to the 
Government of Kol^tes, 
385 

Protocols, (of St. Petersburg-) 
24G, 247, 248; (of Poros) 312. 
(For those of the Confer- 
ence of London, see Lon- 
don.) 

Prussia, attitude on the Greek 
question, 248 

Psara, revolt of, 65 ; feud with 
Samos, 125; destruction of, 
146, 159-161; piracy of, 228 

Pylos, siege of, 172, 173; sur- 
render of, 175 

Eedcliffe, Lord Stratford de, 
appointed Ambassador to 
the Porte, 245, 312; and 
Agostino Capodistrias, 378, 
379; 383, 391 

lieshid Pasha (Kiutayeh), 
wins the battle of Peta, 108, 
109 and note; invades West 
Hellas, 177; besieges Mis- 
solonghi, 183-202, 205; in 
East Hellas, 205; besieges 
the Acropolis, 206, 209-213, 
216-221; his honourable con- 



duct, 221 note; retires to 
Janina, 222 

Ricord, Admiral, 350, 353, 355, 
356, 365 

Rigny, Admiral de, 249, 253, 
255 

Eimnik, Alexander Hypsilan- 
ti at, 39, 40 

Eoraaioi exchanged by the 
Greeks for the name of Hel- 
lenes, 18 

Kumeliots, invade the Morea 
at the invitation of Kon- 
duriottes, 133, 148; their 
feud with the Suliots in 
Nauplia, 228-232; their feud 
with the Moreots, 376; sup- 
port the opposition to Agos- 
tino Capodistrias, 377; in- 
vade the Morea under Ko- 
lettes, 382; they devastate 
the Morea, 386; Koloko- 
tronec raises the Pelopon- 
nese against them, 388-391; 
driven out of the Morea, 393 

Russia: obtains by the Treaty 
of Kainardji certain rights 
over the Christian subjects 
of the Porte, 13, 20; Greeks 
trade under the Russian 
flag, 13; belief of the Greeks 
in Russian support, 13, 19, 
20, 21, 30; disclaims sym- 
pathy with the revolt in the 
Principalities, 37; public 
feeling on the execution of 



426 



INDEX 



the Greek Patriarch, 77, 78; 
obtains certain rights in 
the navigation of the Dar- 
danelles, 115; Conference of 
the Powers at St. Peters- 
burg, 238, 239; death of 
Alexander I., 240; accession 
of Nicholas I., 241; military- 
revolt, 242, 243; agrees to 
the Treaty of London of 
July 6, 1827, 249; reception 
of the news of Navarino, 
271, 272; proposes further 
joint action against Tur- 
key, 272, 273; declares war 
against Turkey, 277; cam- 
paign in Turkey, 298 ; block- 
ades the Dardanelles, 306; 
subsidies to Greece, 319; 
concludes the Peace of Adri- 
anople, 326-329; supports 
the despotic policy of Capo- 
distrias, 350, 353, 355, 356, 
357. (See also Alexander I. 
and Nicholas I.) 



Sachtouris, 66, 162, 175, 293, 
306 

St. Spiridion, massacre of the 
Albanian garrison of the 
monastery of, 216 

Salona, the revolt at, 52; exe- 
cution of the Bishop of, 62; 
the * Areopagus ' at, 84, 307, 
380 



Salona, the Bay of. Captain 
Hastings's victory in, 259, 
260 

Samos, revolt of, 68; attacked 
by the Psariots, 125; at- 
tacked by Khosrew Pasha, 
162, 163; relieved by Miaou- 
lis, 223, 226; excluded from 
the new State, 315; Turkish 
reforms in, 340 

Savas, commander under Al- 
exander Hypsilanti, 35; his 
treason and death, 38 

Sheik-ul-islam, murder of the, 
66, 67 

Sissinis of Gastuni, 147, 225, 
232, 336 

Skourti, Hydriot captain, 
made Commander-in-Chief, 
and defeated at Krommydi, 
172 

Skuleni, battle of, 43 

Soutzos, Michael, Hospodar 
of Wallachia, 33, 34, 42 

Spezzia, island of, declares for 
the Hellenic cause, 65, 125, 
255, 347 

Sphakteria, 172; stormed by 
Hussein Bey, 174, 175, 265 

Stanhope, Colonel (Earl of 
Harrington), 145 and note, 
146 

Strangford, Lord, British Am- 
bassador to the Porte, 78, 
114, 142 note, 245 

Suda, Hussein lands at, 154; 



INDEX 



427 



Ibrahim in the Bay of, 154, 
166; 305 

Suliots, the, under Botzares 
attack Arta, 64; Mavrocor- 
datos marches to the relief 
of, 108, 109; throw in their 
lot with the Greeks, 110, 
127, 128; and Byron, 143, 
144; their feud with llume- 
liots in Nauplia, 228 

Syra, 258, 349, 357 

Tarella, Colonel, commands 
the regiment of Greek regu- 
lars at Beta, 108, 109 

Taxation, evils of the Turkish 
system of, 8, 9; not re- 
formed after the revolt, 80, 
294 

Tergovisht, skirmish at, 39 

Thebes, 62, 126, 205, 307 

Thermopylae, Greek defeat at, 
62; 100 

Thessaly, 63, 226, 257 

Tombazes, Jakonaki, Hydriot 
admiral, 65, 68, 71, 72, 153, 
155 

Tophana, destruction of the 
Ottoman magazines at, 124 

Triple Alliance, the, 248, 249; 
Metternich on, 297, 313, 314, 
330; effect on it of the Rus- 
sian declaration of war, 298, 
299; effect on it of the Eus- 
sian proclivities of Capodis- 
trias, 349; and the action of 



Miaoulis at Poros, 354; and 
Agostino Capodistrias, 378, 
379 
Tripolitza, 14, 47, 52; siege 
and capture of, 59-61, 75, 
132; taken by Ibrahim, 179, 
290; 388 
Troezene, Constitution of, 226 
Turkej^ condition of the 
Greeks in, 8-16; concedes 
the demands of Russia with 
regard to the Dardanelles, 
115; obtains the help of 
Mehemet Ali, 152 et seq.; re- 
fuses the mediation of the 
Powers, 239; accepts the 
Russian ultimatum, 246; re- 
sents the Protocol of St. 
Petersburg, 247; and the 
Treaty of London, 250; re- 
jects the proposed armis- 
tice, 254; demands compen- 
sation after Navarino, 265- 
267; the Sultan announces 
a Holy War, 276; Russia de- 
clares war against, 277; un- 
expected vitality of, 298; 
various opinions as to the 
effect of the Treaty of Ad- 
rianople upon, 329, 330; ef- 
fect of recent events on 
English influence in, 399, 
400, 401 

Urquhart, Major, Philhel- 
lene, 215, 293 



428 



INDEX 



Valtetsi, Turkish defeat at, 

60 
Vasiladi, island of, 190, 191, 

192, 258, 308 
Vasilika, Turkish defeat at, 

63 
Vassos, Montenegrin captain, 

89, 214 
Vladimiresco, Theodore, Wal- 

lachian officer under Hypsi- 

lanti, 35, 36, 38 
Vrachori, massacre of Mus- 
sulmans at, 57, 58; 128 

Wallachia, 31-43. (See also 
Danubian Principalities.) 

Welling'ton, Duke of, his mis- 
sion to the Czar, 246; and 
the policy of Canning-, 273, 
274; and Eussian desig-ns 
on Turkey, 298; declares 
Turkey dead, 329; favours 
the creation of an inde- 
pendent Greece, 331; 401 

West Hellas, see Hellas 

Xanthos, E., 21, 23 

Yassy, massacre of Mussul- 
mans at, 33, 34; Hypsilanti 



holds court at, 34; occupied 
by the Turks, 42 
Yussuf Pasha, relieves the 
citadel of Patras, 49; 111; 
his campaign in East Hel- 
las, 125-127; restores By- 
ron's vessels and stores, 142 
and note; at the siege of 
Missolonghi, 185, 189 

Zaimis, takes part in the at- 
tack on Patras, 48; at the 
Assembly of Astros, 121; 
member of the Executive 
Council, 123; during the 
first civil war, 130, 132, 134; 
takes part in the second 
civil war, against the Gov- 
ernment of Konduriottes, 
147; and Karaiskakis, 208; 
elected President, 224; re- 
signs, 225; in the Govern- 
ment of Capodistrias, 288; 
a member of the opposition 
Government at Megara,377; 
withdraws from the Gov- 
ernment of Kolettes, 388 

Zante, 136, 146, 261; Confer- 
ence at, 300 

Zeituni, attack of Odysseus 
on, 98; 120, 325 



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